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TuREE ancient biographies} of Thucydides have 
come down to us, but they are of little value. They 
are derived from ancient commentaries, and the bio- 
graphical details which they contain, wherever they 
do not rest upon inference from the text of the 
history itself, are often confused and contradictory. 
These are supplemented by scattered statements of 
several ancient writers—Dionysius of Halicarnassus, 
who wrote two treatises on Thucydides (De Thucy- 
didis historia tudictum and the Second Letter to Am- 
maeus)y-Plutarch (Cimon iv), and Pausanias (1, xxxii.). 

The-only authentic facts about the life of Thucy- 
dides are gathered from casual mention in the History. 
He was the son of Olorus (iv. civ. 4); commenced 
the compilation of materials for writing the History 
at the outset of the Peloponnesian War (1. i. 1); 
and lived through the whole war, ripe in years and 

1 One of these, compiled in three distinct portions ‘‘ from 
the commentaries,” passed under the name of Marcellinus, 
who is probably to be identified with the author of Scholia 
on Hermogenes 7rep) oracewr, who seems to have lived in the 
fifth century A.D.; another was by an anonymous gram- 

marian ; and the third is a short notice in Suidas, s.v. 

A2 vii 


judgment, following it with close attention, that he 
might acquire accurate information (v. xxvi. 5). He 
suffered from the plague of 429 B.c. (1. xlviii. 3), of 
which he wrote his famous account (1. xlvii-—liv). 
Elected one of the ten generals in 424 B.c., he was 
sent to the coast of Thrace (where he enjoyed the 
right of working certain gold mines) to operate 
against Brasidas. Failing to relieve Amphipolis, he 
was exiled in 424 B.c., and remained in banishment 
for twenty years, and thus was able to become ac- 
quainted with affairs on both sides (v. xxvi. 5). 

For other facts we are dependent largely upon 
inference ; some are reasonably certain, others less 
so. The name of his father was identical with that 
of the Thracian prince Olorus, whose daughter He- 
gesipyle was married to Miltiades, and his tomb, 
having the inscription ®ovxvdiSys ‘OAdpov “AAmovcros, 
was in the suburb of Athens known as KoiAn Medc- 
rides, adjoining those of Cimon and Miltiades (Plut. 
Cim. iv). We may therefore assume that Olorus, 
the father of Thucydides, was a near kinsman of the 
Thracian prince Olorus. If, as Marcellinus says (§ 2), 
Thucydides’ mother was named Hegesipyle, like 
Cimon’s mother, that would be confirmation of the 
relationship ; but Plutarch makes no mention of this. 
It seems likely, then, that Thucydides was of near 
kin to Cimon, younger perhaps by one generation. 
His father Olorus was probably a full citizen of 
Athens, as is indicated by the fact that, mentioning 



himself as orparyyds (iv. civ. 4), he writes @ov«vdisnv 
rov "Odcpov; for only as an Athenian citizen could 
his father be mentioned in this official style. 

As to the date of Thucydides’ birth, the only 
ancient statement that seems worthy of credence 
was made by Pamphila, a woman writer who in the 
time of Nero made a great compilation of the results 
of learning. Aulus Gellius (N.A. xv. 23) quotes 
from Pamphila that, at_the beginning of the Pelo- \ 
ponnesian War, Hellanicus was sixty- -five years of | 
age, Herodotus fifty-three, Thucydides forty. Pam- / 
phila’s dates were probably taken from the chrono- 
logical handbook of Apollodorus (second century B.c.), 
which was generally accepted among the Greeks and 
Romans. The term forty years used by Pamphila 
doubtless meant the dxuy or prime of Thucydides, 
and may have been fixed on the basis of his own 
assertion that he began to collect material at the 
opening of the war (1. i. 1) and was then in full 
maturity of mind (v. xxvi. 5). At any rate his own 
statement, taken with Pamphila’s date, has led to 
the general assumption that the historian was born 


somewhere about 472 B.c. — 

It is indicated by Marcellinus (§ 46), and is prob- 
able in itself, that the decree for Thucydides’ ban- 
ishment was adopted on the motion of Cleon, ‘who 
was then at the heigl ight of his power; and it is 
probable that the charge brought against him was 
treachery (zpodocia), as stated by Marcellinus (§ 55) 



and the anonymous biographer (§ 2), and apparentiy 
implied by Aristophanes (Vesp. 288). His own words, 
EvveBn por detyew, admit of this interpretation; and 
the~statement of Pausanias (1. xxiii. 9) that he was 
later recalled from exile on the motion of Oenobius! 
is best understood on this basis. If he had been 
banished by a simple decree of the people, the 
general amnesty that followed the capture of Athens 
by Lysander would have been sufficient for him as 
for other exiles; if the sentence was more severe, 
a special decree would be necessary. But it is 
possible, of course, that the motion of Oenobius 
antedated the amnesty of Lysander’s peace by a 
few months, 

As to Thucydides’ death, jthere was a persistent 
tradition that_he was assassinated and the fact that 
the History breaks off suddenly in the midst of ex 
citing events of the Decelean War seems to suppor 
the tradition.) Plutarch (Cim. iv. 3) says that it was 
eommonly- reported that he died_a violent death at 
Scapte Hyle;) Pausanias (1. xxiii. 9), that he was 
murdered on his journey home from exile; Marcel- 
linus (§ 10), that after his return from exile he died 
and was buried in Athens. But whether he died in 

1 The name, which is a rare one in the fifth century, is 
found as that of a general commanding in the neighbourhood 
of Thasos in 410-9 z.c. and we hear somewhat later of one 
Eucles, son of Oenobius; hence it has been conjectured that 
the father of Oenobius was Eucles, who was Thucydides’ 
colleague in Thrace in 424 B.o. (Lv. civ). 


Thrace or in Athens, it seems clear from his own 
words that_he outlived the term of his banishment 
(v. xxvi. 5, EovéBy por pevyew tiv euavtod ery etkoor) 
and that he returned to Athens, since his description 
of the wall of Themistocles, whose remains “ may 
still be seen at the Peiraeus”’ (1. xciii. 5), shows that 

he was there after the destruction of the walls -2 

Lysander. If he had lived tos see ce the re: restoration of > 

med it. mafia is another reason, 
too, for supposing that he did not live to this year: 
in m1. cxvi. 2 he says that the eruption of Aetna, 
which occurred in the spring of 425 B.c., was the 
third on record ; hence the one mentioned by Dio- 
dorus (xiv. lix. 3) for 396 B.c. could not have been 
known to him. It seems reasonable, then, to assume 

There is a pretty and oft-repeated story! that 

Thucydides, as a boy, heard Herodotus recite a 
portion of his History at Olympia and was moved 
thereby to tears, whereupon Herodotus said, “ Olo- 
rus, your son’s spirit is aflame with a passion for 
learning.” But Lucian, when telling of the powerful 
effect of Herodotus’ recitation at Olympia,? would 
surely have mentioned this circumstance had he 
known of it; besides, chronology is in the way, it 

1 Suidas s.v. dpyav and @ovxvdisns; Photius, Bibl. 60; 
Marcellinus, § 54. 
2 Herod. i. 




we hold to Pamphila’s testimony. But if he did 
not as a boy hear Herodotus recite at Olympia, he 
must have known him later as a man at Athens. 
The period of his youth and early manhood fell in 
the time when Athens was most prolific in great 
men. It is clear that he had heard and admired Pe- 
ricles, and he must have seen Aeschylus and known 
Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, Anaxagoras, So- 
crates, Gorgias, Antiphon, Pheidias, Polygnotus, 
Mnesicles, Ictinus, Callicrates, and Hippocrates. 
Association with such men and the atmosphere of 
Athens at such a time best explain the development 
of his genius; but the limits of his subject, as he 
conceived it, precluded any mention of any of these 
except Pericles, so that for any personal influence of 
theirs upon him we are left to inference. The first 
seven years of the war, before his banishment, were 
doubtless spent in large part at Athens, where he 
must have heard the speeches of Pericles, the dis- 
cussions about Mytilene and about Pylos, as well as 
about other matters of which we have accounts in 
this History. But the twenty years of his exile he 
probably passed largely on his properties in Thrace,} 
engaged in the task of compiling materials for his 
work about the war, as indeed we are told that he 

1 It was his family connection with Thrace which led to 
his acquiring the right of working gold mines in that region 
(rv. ev. 1), which is all that he himself says, though his 

biographers state that he was the owner of gold mines at 
Scapte Hyle. 



did by Plutarch (De Ezil. xiv.) and Marcellinus (§§ 25 
and 47). 

From Thucydides’ opening statement, that he 
began the composition of his History at the out- 
break of the war, expecting it to be a great one 
and more noteworthy than any that had gone before, 
we should naturally infer that he continued the 
compilation and composition throughout the war, 
and in fact—as it is clearly unfinished—until his 
death. Again, as it was never completed, so it was 
never completely revised, and it is natural that one 
can find traces of the different dates at which the 
several portions were composed. Evidence of this 
kind has been brought forward in support of differ- 
ent hypotheses as to the composition of the work. 
The most famous of these was that put forth by 
F. W. Ullrich in his Beitrage sur Erklérung des Thu- 
kydides,.Hamburg, 1845, in which it is maintained 
_that. Books I-V. xxvi, which contain the history ot \> 
the Archidamian War (432-421 B.c.), formed a sepa- _ 

. rate treatise composed between the Peace of Nicias , 
‘and the Sicilian Expedition, | “and that the phrase 
“this war” in the earlier books refers to the Ten 
Years’ War only. 

In v. xxvi Thucydides does make a fresh start with 
the words, “The same Thucydides recorded the 
events in order, reckoning by summers and winters,} 

1 His division of the year corresponds to the actual con- 
ditions of the carrying on of war in ancient times: summer 



until the fall of Athens.” But he adds, “The 
war lasted for twenty-seven years, and anyone 
who declines to count the interval of truce as war 
is mistaken;’’ which sounds very much like the 
opening of a second volume of a work that falls 
into natural divisions. It is quite likely, as Ullrich 
maintains, that the account of the Archidamian War 
(I.-v. xxvi.) was composed mainly in the interval 
between 421 and 416 B.c.; but that it received im- 
portant additions after the fall of Athens seems 
certain, e.g. 1. lxv. on the career of Pericles. So 
much may well be admitted for Ullrich’s hypothesis, 
but it is not necessary to admit more. Even the 
story of the Sicilian expedition, the finest part of 
the whole work, need not be considered to have 
been originally a separate treatise, but only to have 
received especial care. As for the rest, a paragraph 
from Classen’s introduction to Book V outlines a 
probable order for the growth of the history which 
seems reasonable : “Though I am convinced that 
the whole work was written in the shape in which 
we have it after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian 
War, and that Thucydides was called away from life 
when engaged in the last revision and combination 
of the portions which he had noted down and 
sketched in outline from the beginning of the war, 

—the larger half, including both spring and autumn—cover- 
ing the time approximately from March to October, winter 
from November to February, 



yet I do not believe that all parts of the work re- 
ceived an equally thorough review. I think that the 
masterly introduction, which makes our First Book, 
was completed with the full knowledge of the disas- 
trous result of the twenty-seven years’ war; that 
then the history of the ten years’ war and the Si- 
cilian Expedition, for which it is likely that the 
results of laborious inquiry were already at hand 
more or less perfectly worked out, received their 
final touches; and that after this, before the thread 
of the narrative was taken up again with the Ionic- 
Decelean War, the intervening period of the cipjvy 
UrovAos was described.” 

The most interesting testimony as to the recog- 
nition of the power of Thucydides in ancient times 
is Lucian’s statement (adv. Indoct. 102) that Demo- 
sthenes copied out the history eight times. Dio 
Cassius constantly imitated and borrowed from him, 
and among others of the later historians who emu- 
lated him were Philistus, Arrian, and Procopius. 
There is internal evidence that Tacitus was influ- 
enced by him, and Sallust often imitated him. Quin- 
tilian’s oft-quoted characterization, Densus et brevis et 
semper instans stbt Thucydides, shows his appreciation. 
In modern times his greatest panegyrist is Macaulay: 
“There is no prose composition, not even the De 
Corona, which | place so high as the Seventh Book 
of Thucydides. It is the ne plus ultra of human 
art”; again, “The retreat from Syracuse—Is it or 



is it not the finest thing you ever read in your life?” ; 
and still again, “He is the greatest historian that 
ever lived.” John Stuart Mill said, “The most 
powerful and affecting piece of narrative perhaps 
in all literature is the account of the Sicilian cata- 
strophe in his Seventh Book.” The Earl of Chatham, 
on sending his son William Pitt to Cambridge, “left 
to professional teachers the legitimate routine in the 
classic authors, but made it his particular desire that 
Thucydides, the eternal manual of statesmen, should 
be the first Greek which his son read after coming 
to college.” And the Earl of Chatham's estimate is 
well supported by Sir G. Cornwall Lewis: “ For 
close, cogent, and appropriate reasoning on political 
questions, the speeches of Thucydides have never 
been surpassed ; and indeed they may be considered 
as having reached the highest excellence of which 
the human mind is capable in that department.” 

In the ordinary narration of events the style of 
Thucydides is clear, direct, graphic. In strong con- 
trast with this generally simple and lucid form of 
statement is his style in describing battles and other 
critical events, in generalizations, and especially in 
the speeches; here the statement is often so concise 
and condensed as to become very difficult. Thucy- 
dides was not the first to use speeches as a means 
of vivid presentation of important crises and the 
actors in them; for that he had the precedent of 
Homer and the Attic drama, But he used this 



means with such impressive effect and success as to 
induce frequent imitation in later historical writing 
in ancient times. He does not pretend to give the 
exact words of the speakers, but says frankly in the 
Introduction (1. xxii. 1): “ As to the speeches that 
were made by different men, either when they were 
about to begin the war or when they were already 
engaged therein, it has been difficult to recall with 
strict accuracy the words actually spoken, both for 
me as regards that which I myself heard, and for 
those who from various other sources have brought 
me reports. Therefore the speeches are given in the 
language in which, as it seemed to me, the several 
speakers would express, on the subjects under con- 
sideration, the sentiments most befitting the occasion, 
though at the same time | have adhered as closely as 
possible to the general sense of what was actually 
said.” As a natural result the language of the 
speeches has a uniform character, both in the struc- 
ture of the sentences and in particular expressions— 
in other words it is that of Thucydides himself; but 
at the same time the character and mode of thought 
of the assumed speaker are clearly manifest in each 
speech. In the hands of Thucydides such a means 
of presenting to us a critical situation is extraordin- 
arily effective; here, as in his most striking narra- 
tions, his readers become spectators, as Plutarch 
expressed it. Oras Classen said, “ Without our own 
choice we find ourselves involved in the conflict of 



interests, and are put in the position to form judg- 
ment for ourselves from the situation and the feeling 
of parties. Very seldom does the historian himself 
add a word of comment.” 

We are accustomed to admire among Thucydides’ 
great qualities as historian, his impartiality, his 
trustworthiness, vivid description, sense of contrast, 
conciseness, epigrammatic sententiousness, reserve, 
pathos. We come to approve heartily his way of 
leaving facts clearly stated and skilfully grouped to 
carry their own judgments. He is never a partisan, 
and the unsophisticated reader might at times wonder 
what his nationality was did he not frequently sub- 
scribe himself ‘Thucydides the Athenian.’’ Histo- 
rians sometimes criticise his attitude, but they all 
accept his statements of fact. His descriptions of 
battles read as if he himself had been present. He 
dramatises history by placing events in such juxta- 
position that a world of moral is conveyed without 
a word of comment; for example, when the funeral 
oration with its splendid eulogy of Athens is followed 
by the description of the plague, the disgraceful 
Melian episode is succeeded by the Sicilian disaster, 
the holiday-like departure from Athens is set over 
against the distressful flight from Syracuse. He 
packs his language so full of meaning that at times 
a sentence does duty for a paragraph, a word for a 
sentence. ‘Of all manifestations of power, restraint 
impresses men most,’ and however much we regret 



his reserve, since for much that he might have told 
us we have no other witnesses, we come more and 
more to regard this as great art. As for pathos, no 
historian ever excelled such passages as those where 
the utter defeat of a hitherto invincible navy is por- 
trayed (vu. lxxi), or the misery and dejection of the 
departing Athenian host is described (vu. ]xxv), or 
where the final catastrophe in the river Assinarus 
seems to occur before our eyes, preparing us for the 
final sentence: “Fleet and army perished from the 
face of the earth, nothing was saved, and of the 
many who went forth few returned home.” 


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eprint ienygael ee aes 


Of Thucydidean manuscripts the following are, according 
to Hude, the most important :— 

Monacensis, Library at Munich (228), paper, 13th century. 
Britannicus, British Museum (11727), parchment, 11th 

A Cisalpinus sive Italus, now in Paris (suppl. Gr. 255), 
parchment, 11th or 12th century. 

B Vaticanus, Vatican Library at Rome (126), parchment, 
llth century. 

C Laurentianus, Laurentian Library at Florence (69, 2), 
parchment, 11th century. 

EK Palatinus, Library at Heidelberg (252), parchment, 11th 

F Augustanus, Library at Munich (430), parchment, 11th 



No one of these manuscripts is of such age or excellence as 
to deserve preference before all others; but of the two 
families which may be distinguished, Laurentianus leads the 
one, namely, C and G, Vaticanus the other, namely, ABEF. 
Britannicus holds a sort of middle ground between the two. 
Hude’s preference is for Laurentianus ; Classen’s, following 
Bekker, for Vaticanus. From vi. xciv on Vaticanus has a 
special value as coming perhaps from a different copy. 


Aldus: Editio Princeps, Venice, 1502, folio; scholia 1503. 

Stephanus: Paris, 1564, folio; with scholia and Valla’s Latin 
version made in 1452. The second edition (1588) is the 
source of the Vulgate. 

I. Bekker: Oxford, 1821, 4 vols., with scholia and Duker’s 
Latin version. Also Ed. ster. altera, Berlin, 1832 
(746, ’68). 



Poppo: Leipzig, 1821-40, 11 vols. (prolegomena, commen- 
tary, etc.). 

Poppo: Minor edition, Leipzig, 1843-51, 4 vols.; revised 
1875-85 by Stahl. 

Goeller: Leipzig, 1826 and 1836, 2 vols., annotated. 

Arnold: London and Oxford, 1830-39, 3 vols., annotated. 

Didot : Paris, 1840, text with Latin version by Haase. 

Bloomfield : London, 1842-43, 2 vols., annotated. 

Kriiger: Berlin, 1846-7 and 1858-61, 2 vols., annotated. 

Boehme: Leipzig, 1856 and 1871-75, annotated ; new edition 
revised by Widmann. 

Classen: Berlin, 1862-76 and 1875-85, 8 vols., annotated ; 
revised by Steup. 

Stahl: Editio ster. Leipzig, 1873-74, 2 vols., introduction, 
text and adnotatio critica. . 

Van Herwerden: Utrecht, 1877-82, 5 vols., text with critical 

Jones: Oxford, 1898, 2 vols., text. 

Hude: Leipzig, 1898-1901, text with critical notes. 

EpITIons oF SINGLE Books 

Shilleto: Books I and II, London, 1872-3, with critical 
and explanatory notes. 

Schoene: Books I and II, Berlin, 1874, text and critical 

Croiset : Books I and II, Paris, 1886, annotated. 

Rutherford : Book IV, London, 1889. 

American ‘‘ College Series,” Boston, based on Classen-Steup : 
Morris, Book I, 1887; Fowler, V, 1888; Smith, III, 
1894; VI, 1913; VII, 1886. 

Lamberton: Books VI and VII, New York, 1886; II and 
III, 1905. 

Holden: Book VII, Cambridge, 1891. 

Goodhart : Book VIII, London, 1893. 

Marchant: Book II, London, 1893; VI, 1905; VII, 1910. 

Spratt: Book III, Cambridge, 1896; IV, 1912; VI, 1905. 

Fox: Book III, Oxford, 1901. 

Tucker: Book VIII, London, 1908. 

Mills: Book II, Oxford, 1913. e 






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1 The Greek text used for this translation of Thucydides 

is that of Hude. Variations from his text are indicated in 




I, Tuucypipes, an Athenian, wrote the history 
of the war waged by the Peloponnesians and the 
Athenians against one another. He began the task 
at the very outset of the war, in the belief that 
it would be great and noteworthy above all the 
wars that had gone before, inferring this from the 
fact that both powers were then at their best in 
preparedness for war in every way, and seeing the 
rest of the Hellenic race taking sides with one state 
or the other, some at once, others planning to do so. 
For this was the greatest movement that had ever 
stirred the Hellenes, extending also to some of the 
Barbarians, one might say even to a very large part 
of mankind. Indeed, as to the events of the period 
just preceding this, and those of a still earlier date, 
it was impossible to get clear information on account 
of lapse of time ; but from evidence which, on pushing 
my inquiries to the furthest point, I find that I can 
trust, I think that they were not really great either as 
regards the wars then waged or in other particulars. 

II. For it is plain that what is now called Hellas 
was not of old settled with fixed habitations, but 
that migrations were frequent in former times, each 
tribe readily leaving its own land whenever they were 




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yewv aotaciactov ovcav avOpwiro. wKovy oi 
> \ Bris \ / ’ a , > 
aUTOL Alel. Kal Tapddevywa TOdE TOU Adyou OvK 
2 Y / b ni \ / \ »” \ 
EXaYXlaTov €oTe Ova TAS peTOLKHoELg1 Ta AAXa pI) 
opoiws avénOjnvary éx yap Tis 4AXns ‘EAAdSos of 
ToNéu“w 7 oTacer éextrimtovtes trap >AOnvatous 
€ / id / A > , \ 
ol duvatwrato. ws BéRatov dv aveywpouy, Kal 

r f > \ > \ lal / By 
ToNtiTaL yuyvomevot evOUS ato TaXaLod pelw ET/ 

1 So Ullrich: peroixias és Mn. 

BOOK I. um. 1-6 

forced to do so by any people that was more numer- 
ous. For there was no mercantile traffic and the 
people did not mingle with one another without fear, 
either on land or by sea, and they each tilled their 
own land only enough to obtain a livelihood from it, 
having no surplus of wealth and not planting orchards, 
since it was uncertain, especially as they were yet 
without walls, when some invader might come and 
despoil them. And so, thinking that they could ob- 
tain anywhere the sustenance required for their daily 
needs, they found it easy to change their abodes, and 
for this reason were not strong as regards either the 
size of their cities or their resources in general. And 
it was always the best of the land that was most 
subject to these changes of inhabitants—the districts 
now called Thessaly and Boeotia, most of the Pelo- 
ponnesus except Arcadia, and the most fertile regions 
in the rest of Hellas. For the greater power that 
accrued to some communities on account of the 
fertility of their land occasioned internal quarrels 
whereby they were ruined, and at the same time 
these were more exposed to plots from outside tribes. 
Attica, at any rate, was free from internal quarrels 
from the earliest times by reason of the thinness of 
its soil, and therefore was inhabited by the same 
people always. And here is an excellent illustration 
of the truth of my statement that it was owing to 
these migrations that the other parts of Hellas did 
not increase in the same way as Attica; for the most 
influential men of the other parts of Hellas, when 
they were driven out of their own countries by war 
or sedition, resorted to Athens as being a firmly 
settled community, and, becoming citizens, from the 
very earliest times made the city still greater in the 



> , / > / \ / cA 
éroincav wAnbe avOpwTav THVY TOALY, WOTE 
kal és “lwviav totepov ws ovX iKaVis OVENS THS 
> a > ‘ ge/ 

Attikns atrotkias e€eTreunrpav. 

III. Androl &€ pos Kai Tdde TOY Tada@v acGE- 
veav ovx HKloTa* mpo yap TaV TpwiKay ovdéev 
/ , A > / oie , 
daiverar mpotepov Kown épyacapyevn n EAdas* 
Soxet 8€ pot, ovdé Todvopa TodTo Evymaca Te 
elyev, GAXA TA ev TPO” EAAnVOS Tod Aeveadio- 
vos Kal mdvu ovdée Elva Hh érikANoLs avTN, KaTAa 
GOvn S¢ ddXa@ TE Kal TO HeAacyiKov ert wreia Tov 

J je A \ bd] , / a 
88 kal Tav Taidwv avtod év TH POi@tids iayu- 
/ \ DJ , > \ b] > 2] / > 
cdvTwv, Kal émayopuévwv avtovs ée7 whedia es 
\ v / ’ ec / \ ” a 
Tas GNAas Tones, Kal’ Exadotovs pev dn TH 
éutdia padrov KareicGar “EXXqvas, ov pevtor 
ToAXOD Ye Xpovou edvvaTO Kal GTacWW exVLKHCAL. 
a \ / ad a \ 
Texpnptot o€ padioTa Ounpos. TorAAo yap 
Botepov ere Kal Tov TpwrKady yevopevos ovdapod 
ef 1 \ / Inf 1S ” 7 
ottw! tovs Evpravtas wvopacey ovd addouUS 
i rods peta “Ayirréas ex THs POcw@tL60s, oltep 
\ n i ae! \ \ > a 
Kat mpa@to.” EdAnves Hoav, Aavaovs 6€ &v Tots 
v ». Cy J / Vi \ > A > 
reat Kal Apyelous cat “Ayatovs avaxanel. ov 
unv ovdé BapBdpovs ecipnxe Sia TO pnde “EX- 
Anvds Tw, os éuol Soxei, avtimadov és év dvopa 
; , e > = € Y 7 
dtoxexpic0at., of & ovv ws Exactor “ EdAXAnves 
KaTa TONELS TE OoOL GAAHAwY EvViecay Kal Evp- 
mavtes batepov KrAnOévtes ovdev mpo TaV Tpat- 
nav d¢ acbéveray Kal aperkiav GdAdAnA@Y aOpoot 

1 Added by Reiske. 

BOOK I. n. 6-1. 4 

number of its inhabitants; so that Attica proved too 
small to hold them, and therefore the Athenians 
eventually sent out colonies even to Ionia. 

III. The weakness of the olden times is further 
proved to me chiefly by this circumstance, that before 
the Trojan war, Hellas, as it appears, engaged in no 
enterprise in common. Indeed, it seems to me that 
as a whole it did not yet have this name, either, but 
that before the time of Hellen, son of Deucalion, 
this title did not even exist, and that the several 
tribes, the Pelasgian most extensively, gave their 
own names to the several districts ; but when Hellen 
and his sons became strong in Phthiotis and were 
called in to the aid of the other cities, the clans 
thenceforth came more and more, by reason of this 
intercourse, to be called Hellenes, though it was a 
long time before the name could prevail among them 
all. The best evidence of this is given by Homer; 
for, though his time was much later even than the 
Trojan war, he nowhere uses this name of all, or 
indeed of any of them except the followers of 
Achilles of Phthiotis, who were in fact the first 
Hellenes, but designates them in his poems as 
Danaans and Argives and Achaeans. And he has 
not used the term Barbarians, either, for the reason, 
as it seems to me, that the Hellenes on their part 
had not yet been separated off so as to acquire one 
common name by way of contrast. However this 
may be, those who then received the name of 
Hellenes, whether severally and in succession, city 
by city, according as they understood one another’s 
speech, or in a body at a later time, engaged 
together in no enterprise before the Trojan war, 
on account of weakness and lack of intercourse 



érpafav. adda Kal TavTny THY oTpaTelav Oa- 
Aadoon On TAELW Ypw@pevor Evv7TrOov. 

IV. Mivws yap wadaitatos @yv axon topev 
% 5) / x nr a € nf 
/ > \ “ b / \ A“ / 
Adoons etl TrelaoTOv éexpatynce Kai THV KuKXa- 
/ \ \ A n 
dav vnowv hpEe Te Kal olKLoTNS TP@TOS TOV 
/ > / na > / \ \ 
mretoTov éyéveto, Kapas éfeXadcas Kai Tovs 
~ r , / 
éauTov Taidas Hye“ovas éyKaTacTHaas* TO TE 
z ! e Seles l 2 A / 24? 
AnoTLKdY, ws elKos, KAOnpEL Ex THS Oaddoons ép 
ef 29 7 a \ a 7 
dcov édvvaTo, TOD Tas Tpocddous paAXov Lévat 
7 \ A 
V. Of yap “EAXAnves TO dAa Kai TaV Bap- 
Bdapwv of te év TH HITrelpw Tapaladdcoton Kal 
4 / > > \ A a 
Scot vicous elyov, érerdn npEavTo wadXov Tre- 
cal \ 3 b] 3 4 > ‘h \ 
patovaGar vavolv é7 adXAnXOUS, ETPATTOVTO TpOsS 
/ a cal 
AnoTEelayv, NyouMev@v avdpav ov TaV advvaTaTa- 
n / nm lal 
TwY Képdous TOD apETEepov avTa@V veka Kal Tots 
/ a \ / 
acbevéot tTpobis, Kal Wpoomimtovtes ToXETLY 
\ > 4 
Kal Tov weloTov Tov Blov évTevGev étroLovYTO, 
> / / fal 
ovK €xovTOs Tw alayUYnY To’TOU Tov Epyou, 
/ \ / a A a 
hépovtos O€é Te Kal ddEns warrov: Snrovor 5é TOV 
TovTo Opav, Kal of madatol TOY ToLnTa@V Tas 
fal / fal 
a / e = 
épwTavtes el ANTTAL EloLV, WS OUTE MY TuVOavoV- 
/ \ > D4 U 
tat atakiovvTwy To Epyov, ols TE EmLpEdes En 


BOOK I. 11. 4-v. 2 

with one another. And they united even for this 
expedition only when they were now making con- 
siderable use of the sea. 

IV. Minos is the earliest of all those known to us 
by tradition who acquired a navy. He made himself 
master of a very great part of what is now called 
the Hellenic Sea, and became lord of the Cyclades 
islands and first colonizer of most of them, driving 
out the Carians and establishing his own sons in 
them as governors. Piracy, too, he naturally tried 
to clear from the sea, as far as he could, desiring 
that his revenues should come to him more readily. 

V. It should be explained that in early times both 
the Hellenes and the Barbarians who dwell on the 
mainland near the sea,! as well as those on the islands, 
when once they began more frequently to cross over 
in ships to one another, turned to piracy, under the 
lead of their most powerful men, whose motive was 
their own private gain and the support of their 
weaker followers, and falling upon cities that were 
unprovided with walls and consisted of groups of 
villages, they pillaged them and got most of their 
living from that source. For this occupation did not 
as yet involve disgrace, but rather conferred some- 
thing even of glory. This is shown by the practice, 
even at the present day, of some of the peoples on 
the mainland, who still hold it an honour to be suc- 
cessful in this business, as well as by the words of 
the early poets, who invariably ask the question of 
all who put in to shore, whether they are pirates,? 
the inference being that neither those whom they 
ask ever disavow that occupation, nor those ever 

1 e.g. Phoenicians, Carians, and probably Epirots. 
2 cf. Homer, y 73; « 252, 

VOL. 1. cde 


3 eldévar ovK overdifovtwv. édAnfovto S€ Kal Kat 
/ / la nr 
e777 / A A / / “4 
EddAddos TO Tadkalw TpoTwM VvéweTaAL TeEpi Te 
>’ U 
Aoxpovs tovs ‘Oforas wal AitwXdods cal ’Axap- 

al / a 
vavas Kal THY TAUTN NTrELpoV' TO TE TLONpOpopel- 
aQat TovTOLs TOis NTELPWTaLs aTrO THS Tadalas 

, b] / 
a \ \ , 

VI. aca yap 7 ‘“Enndas éordnpodope Sa Tas 
> / 3 / \ > b] A > 
apapKTous TE OlKNTELS KAaL OVK achadrels Trap 

adAnrous éepddous, Kal EvvyOn thy diartav pel 
cd > / iA e / rn 
2 OTAwY éroincavTo WoTrep of BapBapot. onpetov 
na a er € — sme 
8 éott\rabra ‘ris “EXdddos ets ob Two vepoueva 
a Fi 
3 (T@V ToTeE Kal)és TaYTAas Opoiwy SiatTNnUaT@V. év 
Qn cal N rn / / 
tois mpatot O€ "AOnvaio: Tov te aldnpov KaTé- 
/ A / \ 
Gevto Kal avetpévn TH Siaitn és TO TpUpEepw@Tepov 
peTéoTynoav. Kal ot tpeacBuTEpot avTois TaV Ev- 
4 \ \ e / > \ , 
Sarmovev 1a TO aBpodiattov ov ToOAVS YpoVOS 
érrelon XIT@VAS TE ALVODS éeTTavaaVTO dopodvuTES 
Kal ypvo@v teTTiyov évépoer KpwRUov avadov- 
lal ’ lal n an > , Ka \ 
pevot TOV Ev TH Kehadryn TpLXa@V' ad ov Kal 
"lever tov o BuTépou a To Evyyeves em 
vy TOUS Tpe pous Kata To Evyyeves €tr 
4 TON avTn 1 oKEUV? KaTécXeEV etpia & av 
nH y xev. per pla 
n \ r U lal 
écOAntt Kal és Tov viv TpoTovy mpato. Aaxkedat- 

, b] / » Naw 2 Ye oF \ \ 


\ , 
Aovs of Ta pellw KEeKTHMEVOL icodialTOL wadLOTA 
5 KatéaTynoav. éyupveOnoay TE TPMTOL Kai es TO 


BOOK I. v. 2-v1. 5 

censure it who are concerned to have the informa- 
tion. On the mainland also men plundered one 
another ; and even to-day in many parts of Hellas 
life goes on under the old conditions, as in the region 
of the Ozolian Locrians, Aetolians, Acarnanians, and 
the mainland thereabout. And these mainlanders’ 
habit of carrying arms is a survival of their old 
freebooting life. 

VI. Indeed, all the Hellenes used to carry arms 
because the places where they dwelt were unpro- 
tected, and intercourse with each other was unsafe ; 
and in their everyday life they regularly went armed 
just as the Barbarians did. And the fact that these 
districts of Hellas still retain this custom is an evi- 
dence that at one time similar modes of life pre- 
vailed everywhere. But the Athenians were among 
the very first to lay aside their arms and, adopting an 
easier mode of life, to change to more luxurious 
ways. And indeed, owing to this fastidiousness, it 
was only recently that their older men of the wealthier 
class gave up wearing tunics of linen and fastening 
up their hair in a knot held by a golden grasshopper 
as a brooch;! and this same dress obtained for a 
long time among the elderly men of the Ionians 
also, owing to their kinship with the Athenians. 
An unpretentious costume after the present fashion 
was first adopted by the Lacedaemonians, and in 
general their wealthier men took up a style of living 
that brought them as far as possible into equality 
with the masses. And they were the first to bare 
their bodies and, after stripping openly, to anoint 

1 The mode of wearing the hair in a knot on the top of 
the head with the insertion of a pin in the form of a cicada 

seems to have persisted long at Athens, a mark of antiquated 
manners as characteristic as the queue or pig-tail with us. 



\ > , / \ A / 
davepov aroduvtes Nima peta tod yuyvalecBat 
nrelavtTo. TO dé wadat Kai ev TO ‘OdvpTLK@ 
5] a , ” \ \ > a G49 
ayave Sial@pata éyovtes TeEpt TA aldota ot aOdn- 

{> 2 / \ > bE A bp] \ / 
Tal nywvilovto, Kal ov TONG ETN ETrELOH TETTAUD- 
by4 \ \ > nn / »” ? aA 
Tat éte 6€ Kal év tots BapBapois eotww ols vo, 
Kal padusta Tois "Aclavois, TuypHs Kal wads 
GOXa tiPerat, cat SveSwpévor TodTO Sp@awv. ToAXa 
/ \ 
8S dv cal adda Tis atrodeiEeve TO Tadatov “EX- 

\ € / a a lal / 
AnVLKOY OmoLOTpoTTAa T@ vdv BapRapix@ srartw- 
MeVOD. | 

a / 
VII. Tay S€ roXewv doar péev vewtata oKicOn- 
/ ’ / aA 
> al al lal 
Rov éxovcat ypnudtov, éw avTols Tots aiyrarots 
> / \ / \ > \ > / 
éxtiCovto Kal Teiyeos TOUS LaP uous ateddpBavov 

, a \ 
éurropias Te Evexa Kal THS Tpos TOUS TpoTotKoUS 
4 > 4 € \ \ \ \ / 
éxactot iayvos: ai 6€ tadaal dua THY AnoTELaY 
s \ \ > / > \ / lal 
éml woAv avTicxyovoay amo Oaracons waddov 

7 a lal 
wxiaOnacav, at Te €v Tais vycos Kal év Tais 
/ 54 \ > rn 
nretpors (Epepov yap AAXAjAOUS TE KaL TOV AXrOV 
Scot bytes ov Oadacolot KATW @KOUY), Kal MEX PL 
al / 
\ aA 
VIIL. Kal ody jocov AnoTai Hoav oi vnotwTat, 
ra , 2 
Kapés te dvtes cal Poivixes. obTot yap bn Tas 
TrEloTAS TOV viTwY @KnTaVY. papTUpLov Oé 
/ \ / ¢ va? / > a 
Anrov yap Kabapouévns vo “AOnvaiwr év TOS5¢€ 
a / \ al “ > n 4 
T@ ToAcu@ Kal TaV Onka@v avatpeOeca@y, daar 
Roav tav teOvewtwyv €v TH ViTw, UTEP Husov 


BOOK I. vi. 5—vitt. 1 

themselves with oil when they engaged in athletic 
exercise; for in early times, even in the Olympic 
games, the athletes wore girdles about their loins in 
the contests, and it is not many years since the 
practice has ceased. Indeed, even now among some 
of the Barbarians, especially those of Asia, where 
prizes for wrestling and boxing are offered, the con- 
testants wear loin-cloths. And one could show that 
the early Hellenes had many other customs similar 
to those of the Barbarians of the present day. 

VII. However, the cities which were founded in 
more recent times, when navigation had at length 
become safer, and were consequently beginning to 
have surplus resources, were built right on the sea- 
shore, and the isthmuses! were occupied and walled 
off with a view to commerce and to the protection of 
the several peoples against their neighbours. But 
the older cities, both on the islands and on the main- 
land, were built more at a distance from the sea on 
account of the piracy that long prevailed—for the 
pirates were wont to plunder not only one another, 
but also any others who dwelt on the coast but were 
not sea-faring folk—and even to the present day 
they lie inland. 

VIII. Still more addicted to piracy were the 
islanders. These included Carians as well as Phoe- 
nicians, for Carians inhabited most of the islands, as 
may be inferred from the fact that, when Delos was 
purified by the Athenians in this war” and the graves 
of all who had ever died on the island were re- 
moved, over half were discovered to be Carians, 

1 7.e. fortified cities were established on peninsulas, con- 
nected with the mainland by an isthmus, which was then 

walled off as Epidamnus (ch. xxvi. 5) and Potidaea (Iv. exx. 3), 
2 In the sixth year of the war, 426 B.c. cf. III. civ. 



Kapes éfavycar, roo Oevres TH TE of agi TOD 
Orrov EvyvteOaupévn Kal TH TpoT@ G viv Ett 

Kataortaytos be tou Mivw vavtixov Teoipe- 
TEPAa eryeveTo map: adda rous (0 yap €x TOV DIT OY 
KaKkoupyol avéoTnoay UT avrov, Ore Ep Kal Tas 
TOANAS AUTOV Kar@eice), Kal ol Tapa Oddaccav 
dvOpoT ot paAAov On Tv KTHOW TOV Xpnparav 
mepteBadrovTo 1 @s TOV LMTEPOL EauT@V cpeyve- 
pevot’ ep lépevo yap T@VY KEepo@v ot TE HaaoUS 
Umrépevov TOV Kpelac ovey dovAelav, of te Suva- 
TOTEPOL ‘mrepiovatas EXOVTES mpoo-eT oLovvTo vmn- 
KoouS TaS €AdaooUS TONES. Kal EV TOVT® TO 
TpOT@ paddov dn Ovtes UoTepov Ypovw emt 
wien eoTpaTevoay. 

. Aya pepvov Té you SoKEl TOV TOTE Suvapel 
Slt Kal ov TOTOUTOY TOS Tuvddpew bpxous 
KaTehnppevous tous Enevns punoThypas dy@v TOV 
otoXov ayerpalt. éyovar Sé Kal of Ta Gadeatata 
TleAorrovynciov pin mapa TOV TpoTepov de- 
Serypevor) Tlédomd TE ™ parov mwAnOEL XPnHaTOV, & 
ArOev ex THS Acias éxov és dvOpwrrous am Opous, 
Ovvapl TepuToung apLevov Thy erovupiay THS xo 
pas émnduv dvta buws axel, Kal toTepov Tols 

1 Aude reads zepieSddovro with C,. 

EID ee) SS SSS ee 

1 According to the post-Homeric legend, all who paid 
their court to Helen engaged to defend the man of her 


BOOK I. vu. 1-1x. 2 

being recognized by the fashion of the armour found 
buried with them, and by the mode of burial, which 
is that still in use among them. | 

But when the navy of Minos had been established, 
navigation between various peoples became safer— 
for the evil-doers on the islands were expelled by him, 
and then he proceeded to colonize most of them 
—and the dwellers on the sea-coast now began to 
acquire property more than before and to become 
more settled in their homes, and some, seeing that 
they were growing richer than before, began also 
to put walls around their cities. Their more settled 
life was due to their desire for gain; actuated by 
this, the weaker citizens were willing to submit to 
dependence on the stronger, and the more powerful 
men, with their enlarged resources, were able to 
make the lesser cities their subjects. And later on, 
when they had at length more completely reached 
this condition of affairs, they made the expedition 
against Troy. 

IX. And it was, as I think, because Agamemnon 
surpassed in power the princes of his time that he 
was able to assemble his fleet, and not so much 
because Helen’s suitors, whom he led, were bound 
by oath to Tyndareus.! It is said, furthermore, by 
those of the Peloponnesians who have received the 
clearest traditional accounts from men of former 
times, that it was by means of the great wealth 
which he brought with him from Asia into the midst 
of a poor people that Pelops first acquired power, 
and, consequently, stranger though he was, gave his 
name to the country, and that yet greater things 

choice against all wrong. ef. Isoc. x.40; Paus. 11. xx. 9; 
Apollod. m1. x. 9. 



, , 4 a 
exyovors ete peifw EvveveyOjvat, Evpvabéws peév 
’ A b lal € \ ¢ fal ’ , 
év tH ’Attixn v7o0 “Hpaxredav azrofavortos, 
"Atpéws O€ pntpos adeXdhod dvtos av’T@ Kal ért- 
pews O€ NTPOS S$ QUT® Kal é7t 
/ > / 23 > / / 
tpéyravtos Evpuvadéws, or’ eotpateve, Muxnvas 
\ > a ’ al 
Te Kal THY apXnV KaTa TO oiKelov 'ATpet (TUYXa- 
vew 5€ avTov devyovta Tov matépa Sia Tov 
Xpucinmov Oavatov), Kal ws OvKETL avexwpnoeV 
Evpuadevs, Bovropévor cat Tav Muxnvaiorv PoBo 
“ ¢ lal \ ee \ lal > 
tov ‘Hpaxrerdav cal dua duvatov doxovvta eivat 
\ fal , ral , 
Kal TO TAHGos TeEPepaTrevxoTta TaV Muxnvatov Te 
\ x . 
Kat dcwv Evpuabevs jpye tHv Bacireiav “Atpéa 
maparafPely kal tov Ilepoedav tovs Hedomidas 
na wee 
peifous KatactThvar. & pot Soxet “Ayapéuvwv 
\ \ aA \ iA 3 \ / lal 
TapadaBov Kal vavTiK@ € Gua emt TrEOY TOV 
” > “2 \ / > / \ / 
a / \ / , \ 
i bobo Evvayayov tromoacGa. gaivetar yap 
\ 4 > 
vavol Te TAElaTaLs AUTOS AdiKopevos Kai ApKact 
, / lal 
mpootapacyav, ws “Opunpos TovTo ded7jwxer, et 
la ’ n z 
Tw ikavos TeKuNpla@oat. Kal €v TOD GKNTTPOV 
¢ a f ” IEtN “ce 3 a / 
dua TH Tapadoce elpnxey avtov “ ToAAHaL v7)- 
cowor Kal “Apyei wavtl avacce’ ovK« ay ov 
/ y” rn / 2 \ > A 
vicwv é&~ TeV Teplotkidwy (avTat bé€ ovK ap 
\ 3 > / x > / > / \ 
x / a 
vauTixoy elyev. elxdtew S€ ypn Kal TavTn TH 
\ \ a 
gTpaTela ola Hv Ta TPO AUTH. 

1 Chrysippus, his half-brother, son of Pelops and Axioche, 
was killed by Atreus and Thyestes at the instance of their 
mother Hippodameia. 


BOOK I, ix. 2-5 

fell to the lot of his descendants. For when Eu- 
rystheus set out on the expedition that resulted in 
his death in Attica at the hands of the Heracleidae, 
Atreus, his mother’s brother, who chanced to have 
been banished by his father for the death of Chry- 
sippus,' was intrusted by Eurystheus with Mycenae 
and the sovereignty because he was a kinsman; and 
when Eurystheus did not return, Atreus, in accord- 
ance with the wish of the Mycenaeans, who feared 
the Heracleidae, and because he seemed to be a 
man of power and had won the favour of the mul- 
titude, received the sovereignty over the Mycenaeans 
and all who were under the sway of Eurystheus. And 
so the house of Pelops became greater than the house 
of Perseus. And it was, I think, because Agamemnon 
had inherited all this, and at the same time had be- 
come strong in naval power beyond the rest, that he 
was able to collect his armament, not so much by 
favour as by fear, and so to make the expedition. 
For it is clear that he himself brought the greatest 
number of ships, and that he had others with which 
to supply the Arcadians,? as Homer testifies, if he is 
sufficient witness for anyone. And he says, in the 
account of the delivery of the sceptre,? that Aga- 
memnon “ruled over many islands and all Argos.” 
Now, if he had not had something of a fleet, he 
could not, as he lived on the mainland, have been 
lord of any islands except those on the coast, and 
these would not be “many.” And it is from this 
expedition that we must judge by conjecture what 
the situation was before that time. 

2 cf. Homer, B 576 and 612, 
3 cf. Homer, B 101-109. 



Le \ = VAe Al a 
X. Kat éte pev Muxivar pixpov nv, 7) et TeToV 
: a \ > f a s 
rote TOALo La vov pH aioypewr SoKEl Eivat, ovK 
tal , 4 3 / ‘ 
axpiBel av TLS TNMEL@ KpwpEVvOS aTLaTOLN BN 
rn e - 
yevérOat Tov aTdNOV TOGODTOY GaoV ol TE TOLNTAl 
¢ , / 
cipykact Kal 6 Aoyos KaTéxet. Aaxedatpoviwy 
A / / 
pevt yap ei 4 rods epnuwbetn, AerpOein dé Ta 
e \ \ rn ips \ b / \ x 
Te (epa Kal THs KaTacKEUNS Ta Ebaby, TOAAHY av 
s > / fol / / al 
rat , fal 
ypovov Tois érerta Tpos TO KAEOS aUTOY elval 
a / \ 
(kaitot TleXorovvijcov tov mévte Tas dvo potpas 
fol / la) la 
vépovras THS Te EvpTrdans tyyobvTar Kal ToV Ew 
/ A a Pi BA / 
Evpuayov Todkdwy: o“ws dé, ovTe Evvoltxiaberons 
n e ad \ rn 
/ \ nr lal 
Tedéor Yonoaperys, KATA Kopas € TH Tara@ 
rt ¢€ / , ’ 

Tihs ‘EdAdbos tpoTe@ oixicBeions, haivorT av vTro- 
, > / \ \ > \ lal , 
Scectépa), AOnvaiwy dé 76 ato TovTO TadovTwy 

, x \ , Wee Mae A 
Surraciav av thy Svvamy eixalecPar ato THs 
lat > a / / 
pavepas drvews Tis TOAEws 7) EoTLY. oOvKOUY aT L- 
lal Dy "% »9\ \ ” a / al 
oTely elkos ovde Tas ders THY TONEWY paXXOV 
a / 
oxotrel %) Tas Suvapuers, vopitew bé Thy oTpatelav 
/ / a fol 
éxeivny peyioTny pev yevécOar THY TPO avTijs, 
/ 5 4 we , 
Revrropévny Sé TaV viv, TH “Opnpov ad Trouncer et 
lal \ al 
Te xpy KavTadOa moTeveEL, HY elKos éml TO metfov 
\ n <4 \ 
pev ToLnTHY OvTa KOTMHTAL, OMwS dé dhaivetat 
/ \ , 
Kal otTws évdeecTépa. TeToinke yap XLALwV Kai 
a \ a 
Staxociwy veav tas pev Borwtav elxoot Kal 
e \ > 8 a \ be Mir / / 
éxatov avdpav, tas b€ DidoxtyTov TevTnKovTa, 
1 Added by Hude. 2 Added by Stephanus. 

BOOK I. x. 1-4 

X. And because Mycenae was only a small place, 
or if any particular town of that time seems now to 
be insignificant, it would not be right for me to treat 
this as an exact piece of evidence and refuse to 
believe that the expedition against Troy was as great 
as the poets have asserted and as tradition still main- 
tains. For if the city of the Lacedaemonians should 
be deserted, and nothing should be left of it but its 
temples and the foundations of its other buildings, 
posterity would, I think, after a long lapse of time, 
be very loath to believe that their power was as great 
as their renown. (And yet they occupy two-fifths 
of the Peloponnesus and have the hegemony of the 
whole, as well as of their many allies outside ; but 
still, as Sparta is not compactly built as a city and 
has not provided itself with costly temples and other 
edifices, but is inhabited village-fashion in the old 
Hellenic style, its power would appear less than it 
is.) Whereas, if Athens should suffer the same fate, 
its power would, I think, from what appeared of the 
city’s ruins, be conjectured double what it is. The 
reasonable course, therefore, is not to be incredulous 
or to regard the appearance of cities rather than 
their power, but to believe that expedition to have 
been greater than any that preceded it, though 
falling below those of the present time, if here 
again one may put any trust in the poetry of Homer; 
for though it is natural to suppose that he as a poet 
adorned and magnified the expedition, still even on 
his showing it was evidently comparatively small. 
For in the fleet of twelve hundred vessels he has 
represented the ships of the Boeotians as having 
one hundred and twenty men each, and those of 



a e > \ n \ / \ / 
dnA@v, ws euoi Soxel, Tas peyiotas Kat édayxi- 
» nr / lal 
otas' G\Xwy yor peyéOous mépt ev veay KaTa- 
Noyo ovK euvycOyn. avtepérar b€ OTL Hoav Kal 
/ / > A ® / \ / 
paxlpor Tavtes, ev Tats DiroxTHTov vavat Se67- 
/ \ 

, / \ > : \ cal 

lal f, lal 
é€w Tav Baciiéwy Kal TOY pwddLOTAa év TédEL, 
, / , 
rn lal \ al 
yy > \ a a , 
hapKTa eYovTas, AAA TM TAaNAL@ TpoTw@ ANHOTL- 
, / \ \ Ps > 
KWTEpOV Taped Kevacpéva. Tpos Tas peyioTas 6 
/ nr \ nr 
ovv Kal éhaxiatas vats TO fécov oKOTOUYTL Ov 
, / \ lol 
moAXoL haivovtar éovtes, WS ATO TaaHS THS 
¢ Los 
> ? eS lal 
XI. Aitiov & Hv ovy 7 OrAvyavO pwria ToToUTOV 
/ a \ a > / ’ 
dcov nH axXpnuatia. THS yap Tpopys amopta Tov 
Te oTpaTov éAdoow iyayov Kal doov ATLfOY 
avtobev TodenodvTa Biotevoey, érrerdn 5€ adu- 
, al / \ \ 
KOMEVOL ayn expaTynaay (Ojrov Sێ- TO yap Epupa 
rn / , 
ovd évtatv0a Tacn TH Suvdper ypnodpuevol, adda 
an Ty / 
mpos yewpylav Ths Nepoovncov tpaTopevor Kat 
AnoTElay THS Tpodpiys amopia. Kal padXov ot 
not is tpopis amopig. 3 Kal padrov oi 
rn lal / \ / ” r 
Tpaes av’tav dueovrappévon ta déxa ETN avTEtyov 
rn e , 
Bia, tois aiet vToXeTTOpmevols avTiTaXoL GVTEs. 
‘ / \ > Ss fed »” lal \ Vv 
meprovalay dé e 7Gov ExovTEs Tpopijs Kal dvTES 


BOOK Vitex, 4421, 2 

Philoctetes as having fifty,! indicating, it seems to 
me, the largest and the smallest ships ; at any rate, 
no mention as to the size of any others is made in 
the Catalogue of Ships. But that all on board were 
at once rowers and fighting men he has shown in 
the case of the ships of Philoctetes; for he repre- 
sents all the oarsmen as archers. And it is not likely 
that many supernumeraries sailed with the expedi- 
tion, apart from the kings and those highest in office, 
especially as they were to cross the open sea with all 
the equipment of war, and, furthermore, had boats 
which were not provided with decks, but were built 
after the early style, more like pirate-boats. In any 
event, if one takes the mean between the largest 
ships and the smallest, it is clear that not a large 
number of men went on the expedition, considering 
that they were sent out from all Hellas in common.2 
XI. The cause was not so much lack of men as 
lack of money. For it was a want of supplies that 
caused them to take out a comparatively small 
force, only so large as could be expected to live on 
the country while at war. And when they arrived 
and had prevailed in battle—as evidently they did, 
for otherwise they could not have built the defence 
around their camp—even then they seem not to 
have used their whole force, but to have resorted to 
farming in the Chersonese and to pillaging, through 
lack of supplies. Wherefore, since they were scat- 
tered, the Trojans found it easier to hold the field 
against them during those ten years, being a match 
for those who from time to time were left in camp. 
But if they had taken with them an abundant 
1 Hom. B 510, 719. 
2 The number would be 102,000, #.e. 1,200 ships at 85 men 


€ ¥ / \ / lal \ 
aOpoo. avev AnoTElas Kal yewpylas Evveyas Top 
ar Py / 4 bi xa / an 
Torenov Siépepov, padiws av mayn KpatodvTes 
” \ > c , ; \ , A >A 
elhov, of ye Kal ovy aOpoo, adda péper TO aiel 
, > A / ’ x / 
TapovTt avtetyov, Todtopxia 8 av mpooKabefo- 
pevolt €v éXdooovi TE XPOVw Kal aTrOVwTEpOY THY 
/ > \ ? , / 
Tpotav eldov. adda bt aypnuatiav(td Te po 
4 > nan > \ > / \ la) b] 
ToUTwY) acbevh Hv Kai avTa ye 52) TadTa, dvoma- 
U lal Vs A a 
oTOTATa TaY Tply yevoueva, dnrODTAL Tois Epryots 
UTodeéaoTEpa OvTAa THS Pyuns Kal Tov viv Trepl 
lal \ Ae 
\ \ 3 
XII. ’Evei cal peta ta Tpwixa 4 “EXXas Ett 
, / 
> a“ oe \ / an € 
caca avénOnvar. Te yap uvaywpnots Tov “EX- 
/ / 

Ajnveav €& “I\tov ypovia yevouévn Tordra évedy- 
woe, Kal oTaces ev Tais TOdEoW ws ert TO 
\ ey 4 > > > 3 / Fy / 
Toru EeylyvoVvTO, ap wy ExTLTTOVTES TAS TrOAELS 

” / \ e a e : a 

extiCov. Bowwrtot te yap o. viv éEnkooT@ éTet 

peta “IXiov Gdwow é€& “Apyns avactdytes vd 

Occcarav thy viv pév Bowtiav, mpotepov bé 

/ a / v \ > al 
Kadpunida,yiv carovpévnv wxnoay (Rv S€ avtav 
Kal atrobac mos ev TH YR TavTyn TpoTEpov, ag’ wv 

en > / a ? a 

kat €s "INov €otpatevoav), Awpins Te oydonkosT@ 

érer Evv ‘Hpaxretidars IleXorrovvncov Exyov. uo- 

b] a / id a e € \ 

Ais TE Ev TOAAD® yYpovw novyacaca n EdXXas 

, \ > , ’ / > / > / 

BeBaiws Kal (ovxéTe aviatamevn) amroixias é€e- 


BOOK I. x1. 2-xu. 4 

supply of food, and, in a body, without resorting to 
foraging and agriculture, had carried on the war 
continuously, they would easily have prevailed in 
battle and taken the city, since even with their 
forces not united, but with only such part as was 
from time to time on the spot, they yet held out; 
whereas, if they could have sat down and laid siege 
to Troy, they would have taken _ it in less time and 
with less trouble. But becausé_of lack of money not 
only were the undertakings before the Trojan war 
insignificant, but even this expedition itself, though 
far more noteworthy than-any~befores-is.shown by 
the facts to have been inferior to its fame and to the 
tradition about it that now, through the influence 
of the poets, obtains. 

XII. Indeed, even.-after vere war Hellas 

was still subject to migrations and in process of 
settlement, and hence “HE-HSE pet rest and wax 
stronger. For not only did the return of the Hel- 
lenes from Ilium, occurring as it did after a long 
time, cause many changes; but factions also began 
to spring up very generally in the cities, and, in con- 
sequence of these, men were driven into exile and 
founded new cities. The present Boeotians, for 
example, were driven from Arne by the Thessalians 
in the sixtieth year after the capture of Ilium and 
settled in the district now called Boeotia, but formerly 
Cadmeis; only a portion of these had been in that 
land before, and it was some of these who took part in 
the expedition against Ilium. The Dorians, too, in the 
eightieth year after the war, together with the Hera- 
cleidae occupied the Peloponnesus. And so when 
painfully and after a long course of time Hellas 
became permanently tranquil and its population was 
no longer subject to expulsion from their homes, it 



A 8 \ ’ r \ nw 
meute, Kat “lwvas pev “A@nvaios kat vnotwTov 
Tovs Toddovs wxicay, “Itadias 8€ Kal LiKedias 

‘ ol ¢ 
To mAéov IleXotrovynaton tTHS TE GAANS “EXAdOos 
éoTw & xYwpia. mavta b€ TavTa voTEepovy TaY 
Tpawixav éxticOn. 
= € 
XIII. Avvatwrtépas 5é yiryvomévns tis “EAXddos 
nr fol al a 
Kal TOV YpnuaTov THY KTHOW ETL wadAov 7 Tpo- 
f al 
TEpov Tolovpevyns Ta TOAAA TuUpavvides ev Tals 
A / 5 
Todeot KabioTaVTO, TOV TpoTodwY perlovwv yi- 
yvouevwv (mpotepov d€ Hoav émlt pyntols yépact 
matpikal Bactdetat), vauvTikd te é&nptveTo 7 
€ n la 
EAXAds xal THs Oaddoons paddXov avTetyovTo. 
mp@tor dé KopivOsor Aéyovtar éyyvtata Tov viv 
\ cal 
TpoTov petayelploa Ta Tepl Tas vavs Kal TpLN- 
lal , an ¢ 
pets mpa@tov év KopivOe tis “EXXdbos éevvauTn- 
ynOjvar. daivetar 6€ Kal Laptows ’Apewoxrdijs 
KopivO.0s vaurnyos vats Toujcas Téeooapas: ETH 
8 éotl uddtota TplaKkoota és THY TeNEUTHY TODSE 
lo > a / 
ToD modéuov, dte “ApervoxAfs Laptous HrOev. 
vavpaxia Te TadaTtaTn wv topev yiryvetat Ko- 
/ N / 4 \ / \ 
pwOiwy mpos Kepxupaious: étn 6€ wadtota Kai 
tavtn é€nxovta Kal Siakdotd éote péexXpL TOV 
fal la) \ / 
avtov ypovov. oixovvTes yap THY TOW Oi Ko- 
pivOcor émt tod icOuod aiei 8) rote éurropiov 
= fal ¢ / \ / \ a \ / 
etyov, TOY EXAnvwy TO Taal KaTAa yn Ta ThELw 
a \ / fal b Nw / 
}, kata Odraccav, TOV Te EvTos IleXoT7rovYHaoV 
\ n ” \ Alyse  —? 3) ¥5 , 
kal tov é&w, d1a THs exelvywy Tap addANoOUS 
ETLLLTYOVTMV, XpHnwacl TE OvvATOL Hoav, ws Kal 


BOOK I. xu. 4-xm1. 5 

began to send out colonies. The Athenians colonized 
Ionia and most of-the7islands ; the Peloponnesians, 
the greater part of Italy and Sicily and some portions 
of the rest of Hellas. And all these colonies were 
planted after the Trojan war. 

XIII. As Hellas grew more powerful and con- 
tinued to acquire still more wealth than_ before, 
along with the increase of their revenue tyrannies ) 
began to be established in most of the cititewherexs~ 
before that there had been hereditary kingships 
based on fixed prerogatives. The Hellenes began to 
fit out navies, too, and to apply themselves more to 
the sea. And the Corinthians are said to have been 
the first of all to adopt what was very nearly the 
modern plan as regards ships and shipping,! and 
Corinth was the first place in all Hellas, we are told, 
where triremes were built. And it appears that 
Ameinocles, a Corinthian shipwright, built four ships 
for the Samians, also ; and it was about three hundred 
years before the end of the Peloponnesian war that 
Ameinocles came to the Samians.? The earliest sea- 
fight, too, of which we know, was fought by the 
Corinthians against the Corcyraeans ;? and this was 
two hundred and sixty years before the same date. 
For as the Corinthians had their city on the Isthmus, 
from the very earliest times they maintained there 
a market for the exchange of goods, because the 
Hellenes within and without the Peloponnesus, in 
olden times communicating with one another more by 
land than by sea, had to pass through their terri- 
tory; and so they were powerful and rich, as has 

1 The reference seems to be to the construction of har- 
pours and docks as well as to the structure of the ships, 

e.g. providing them with decks (ch. x. 4). 
8 704 B.O. > 664 B.C. 



Tols maXaLots Tointais dednrAwTaL’ adveoy yap 
? , \ / > / & fh, 

eTwvopacav TO ywplov. émrevdyn Te ot “EAANVES 
cal ” \ a / \ 

\ / Ui 

Kov KaOnpovr, Kal éwTOpLoy TAapEeKXoVTES aupoTEepa 

»” / 
Suvatiy éoyov Xpnuatov tmpocod@ THY Tod. 
¢ \ , 

6 Kat "Iwow Uotepovy TorV yiyveTat vavTLKoY él 
Kupou Iepcav tpetov Bacidevovtos kai Kap- 
Bvcov tov viéos avtov, Tis Te Kal’ éauTovs 
Garacons Kip morepmotvtes expatnoay twa 
ypovov. Kal Ilodvepatyns, Ldpouv tupavyay ért 
* a / v lal , 
KapBvcovu, vavtiK@ toyvav adrXas TE TOV VHNTwY 
e / 3 / We / id \ > / 
UmnKoous éToijncato Kal Prverav éehwv aveOnxe 

re wed a / a 
T@ Amod\XAove TO Anrio. Bawxats te Maccanriav 
, geld lal 
oixifovtes Kapyndovious évixwy vavyayoortes. 
4 % cal an cal 
XIV. Avvatetata yap tTavTa TeV vavTiKaoY 
2 / \ % la) a a 
hv. gaivetar 6€ Kal Tavta, moddais yeveais 
/ lal lal 
votepa yevoueva TOV TpwlLKav, TpLnpEect pev OXé- 
/ >] \ 
2 waxpols éEnptupéva HoTeEp Exeiva. OALYOV TE TPO 
eC r \ lad / / A \ 
tav Mnédixev cat tod Aapetov Pavatou, ds peta 
/ nr / 
KapBvonv Iepoav éBacirevce, tpinpers epi TE 
Yixedlayv toils Tupavvots és TAGs éyévovto Kal 
n \ al \ r — 
Kepxupaios tadta yap Tedevtaia mpo THs Eép- 
, / A 
Eou otpatelas vauTiKa a&iodoya év TH “ENXaOu 
, a \ \ ’ rn 
3 xatéoTn. Aiyiwwhtar yap Kat “A@nvaiot, Kal 

1 cf. Hom. B 570; Pind. Ol. xiii. 4. 
2 559-529 B.c. 8 532-522 B.c. Cf. Tit. Civ. 
5 Marseilles, founded 600 B.c. 


BOOK I, xu. 5—x1v. 3 

been shown even by the early poets, who called the 
place “ Wealthy Corinth.”! And when navigation 
grew more prevalent among the Hellenes, the 
Corinthians acquired ships and swept the sea of 
piracy, and offering a market by sea as well as by 
land, raised their city to great power by means of 
their revenues. The I[onians, too, acquired a power- 
ful navy later, in the time of Cyrus,” the first king of 
the Persians, and of Cambyses his son; and waging 
war with Cyrus they maintained control of the sea 
about their own coasts for some time. Polycrates, 
also, who was tyrant of Samos in the time of Cam- 
byses,? was strong in sea-power and subdued a num- 
ber of the islands, Rhenea among them, which he 
captured and consecrated to the Delian Apollo.‘ 
Finally the Phocaeans, when they were colonizing 
Massalia,® conquered the Carthaginians in a sea-fight. 

XIV. These were the most powerful of the fleets ; 
and even these, we learn, though they were formed 
many generations later than the Trojan war, were 
provided with only a few triremes, but were still 
fitted out with fifty-oared galleys and the ordinary 
long boats,® like the navies of that earlier time. In- 
deed, it was only a little before the Persian war and 
the death of Darius,’ who became king of the Per- 
sians after Cambyses, that triremes were acquired in 
large numbers, namely by the tyrants in various parts 
of Sicily and by the Corcyraeans ; and these were the 
last navies worthy of note that were established in 
Hellas before the expedition of Xerxes. As for the 
Athenians and Aeginetans and any other maritime 

§ wAoia, usually contrasted with war-ships (tp:qpes), but 
here marked as ships of war by the epithet uaxpa, though 

probably differing little except in size from trading- vessels. 
7 485 B.C, 



/ v / a \ 4 \ 
oitives addot, Bpayéa €KEKTHVYTO Kal TOUTWY TA 
> ’ A 
ToAAa TeVvTNKOVTEpoUS’ Oe TE a ov 'AOnvaious 
ol 7 > / r 
OcuictoKANs enercev Aiywntats modenovvtas, 
rn / % \ 
kal dua tov BapBapov mpocboximov dvtos, Tas 
vavs Toincaclal, alomep Kal evavpaynoay: Kal 
3 \ , 
avTat ovTw elyov dia Tdons KaTATTpwLaTa. 
\ = 
XV. Ta peév ody vavtixa Tov ‘EXXANvev Tot- 
a \ o 
avta Hv, Ta Te TadXala Kai Ta VaTEpoy yevopeva. 
ioyuv O€ TEpleTTOLnTAaVTO Guws OVK ELayioTHY Oi 
, > a , , \ 
v > ia) > / LY \ / 
/ \ ee a 
otTpépovto, Kal pddiota door un SiapKh elxor 
/ \ cal \ / i<4 x / 
ywopav. Kata ynv de TOAEMOS, OOev Tis KaV OUVA- 
\ / 
pls TrepleyéveTo, ovdsis Evvéctn: wavtes b€ Hoar, 
\ / \ e / \ 
dgoL Kal eYEVOYTO, TPOS OMopovs TOvS aoeETépousS 
ExadoTols, Kal exdnuous oTpatelas TOAV ATO THIS 
€ lal > , ” lel > 3 lal e 
éauT@v ém addwv Katactpodn ove é&joay oi 
a > \ / \ \ , 
EdAnves. ov yap EvverotnKecav pos Tas peyi- 
, . , 23 > > <3 \ “a. 
oTas ToAELS UTIKOOL, OVD av avTOL aTO THs lons 
\ , > a ae , \ 
cal id 4 4 ’ / 3 / 
/ + FS \ ( / \ ‘ / 
pdriota O€ és TOV TdNaL TOTE YEvopEvov) TOAELOV 
, a 
Xarkidéwy cai ’Epetpidv cat To aXXo “EAXANviKOv 
és Evppaytiav éxatépwv SueoTn. 

1 Referring to Xerxes’ invasion. This Aeginetan war ig 
referred to in ch. xli. 2, 


BOOK I. xiv. 3-xv. 3 

powers, the fleets they had acquired were incon- 
siderable, consisting mostly of fifty-oared galleys ; 
and it was only quite recently that the Athenians, 
when they were at war with the Aeginetans and 
were also expecting the Barbarians,! built their fleet, 
at the instance of Themistocles—the very ships 
with which they fought at Salamis. And these 
vessels were still without decks throughout their 

XV. Such were the navies of the Hellenes, both 
those of early and those of later times; nevertheless 
those who gave attention to such matters acquired 
not a little strength by reason both of revenue of 
money and of sway over others. For they—and 
especially the peoples whose own territory was insuffi- 
cient—made expeditions against the islands and sub- 
jugated them. But by land no wars arose from which 
any considerable accession of power resulted; on the 
contrary, all that did occur were border wars with 
their several neighbours, and foreign expeditions far 
from their own country for the subjugation of others 
were not undertaken by the Hellenes. For they 
had not yet been brought into union as subjects of 
the most powerful states, nor, on the other hand, 
did they of their own accord make expeditions in 
common as equal allies; it was rather against one 
another that the neighbouring peoples severally 
made war. But it was chiefly in the war that arose 
a long time ago between the Chalcidians and the 
Eretrians,? that all the rest of Hellas took sides in 
alliance with the one side or the other. 

2 The war for the Lelantine Plain (cf Hdt. v. xcix.; Strabo, 
x. i. 11); usually placed in the seventh century, but by 
Curtius in the eighth (see Hermes, x. pp. 220 ff.). 



XVI. ’Emeyéveto 5€ addols TE AXOOL KwAU- 
pata py avénOhva, cal “loot mpoxwpnoavtoy 
éml péya Tov Tpaypatwov Kodpos cai n Lepoixn 
é£ovoia Kpoicov cabedodca Kal boa évtos” AXvos 
Tmotauov pos Oddaccay, émETTPATEVGE Kal TAS 
év TH Hreipw ToAELs ebovAwoe, Aapetos Te VaTEpov 
T@ Dowixv vavTiK@ KpaTav Kal Tas vycous. 

XVII. Tépavvol te 6001 Hoav év tTais “EXAnu- 
Kais ToOAEct, (TO ef EavT@Y LOVvOV) TpoopwpeEVoL ES 
Te (TO c@pua),Kal és TO Tov idiov oiKov afew be 
dodarelas Ocov édvvavtTo pddtoTa Tas TOXELS 
@Kouv, empaxOn Te ovdev an’ adtav Epyov ak.o- 
Royov, ef a El TL TPOS TEpLolKOUS TOUS aUTaY 
éxdotots.: ovtw tavtaxobev 7 EndXas eri trodvv 
Ypovoy KaTELYETO NTE KOLWH Pavepov pNnoev KaT- 
epyalecOal, Kata TOdELS TE ATOAMOTEpA ElvaL. 

XVIII. ’Ezrecd2) S€ of te “AOnvaiwy tupavvot 
Kal of €x THs addAns “EAXdbos ert TOAD Kai Tplv 
TupavvevOeians of TAEloTOL Kal TeAEUTALOL TAY 
Tav év Suedia vd Aaxedaipovioy KatedvOnoav:} 
» yap Aaxedaipov pera Tv KTiow \TaV voP 
évorxovvtov ait Aawpiav) él mreiatov av 
icwev Xpovov oTacidcaca Guws ex TAaXaLTAaTOV 
Kal nuvouynOn Kal alel atupdvvevtos Hv: ETN Yap 

1 After éxaorois the MSS. have of yap év SixeAia em) wrelorov 
éxépnoay Suvduews, for those in Sicily advanced to a very 
great degree of power, which Wex deletes, followed by most 
editors. 2 Hude omits with E. 


BOOK I. xvi.-xvin. 1 

XVI. But different Hellenic peoples in different 
localities met with obstacles to their continuous 
growth; for example, after the Ionians had attained 
great prosperity, Cyrus and the Persian empire, after 
subduing Croesus! and all the territory between the 
river Halys and the sea, made war against them and 
enslaved the cities on the mainland, and later on 
Darius, strong in the possession of the Phoenician 
fleet, enslaved the islands also.? 

XVII. The tyrants, moreover—whenever there 
were tyrants in the Hellenic cities—since they had 
regard for their own interests only, both as to the safety 
of their own persons and as to the aggrandizement 
of their own families, in the administration of their 
cities made security, so far as they possibly could, 
their chief aim, and so no achievement worthy of 
mention was accomplished by them, except per- 
chance by individuals in conflict with their own 
neighbours. So on all sides Hellas was for a long 
time kept from carrying out in common any notable 
undertaking, and also its several states from being 
more enterprising. 

XVIII. But finally the tyrants, not only of Athens 
but also of the rest of Hellas (which, for a long time 
before Athens, had been dominated by tyrants)—at 
least most of them and the last that ever ruled, 
if we except those in Sicily—were put down by the 
Lacedaemonians. For although Lacedaemon, after 
the settlement there of the Dorians who now inhabit 
it, was, for the longest period of all the places of 
which we know, in a state of sedition, still it obtained 
good laws at an earlier time than any other land, 
and has always been free from tyrants; for the 

1 546 B.O. 2 493 B.c, 


b / U Pre / / > \ 
\ ral lal / ? > z 
TedeuTIY TODSE TOU TroAéuov, ad ov Aaxedar- 
A a / aA 
pOvloL TH AUTH ToALTELa Yp@vTaL’ Kai dv aUTO 
, \ yi a vy U , 
duvapevot Kal Ta €v Tals adXaLs TOAEGL KaOLaTA- 
\ A 
gay. peta O€ THY TOV TUPavYwWY KaTaddVoOW EK 
Ths “EXXdSdos ov ToAXOls ETeow Botepov Kai % ev 
an \ ? , 
Mapadau payn Mydwv rpos APnvatous éyéverto. 
5 u be ” , SE LA Wal e Ba B a 
ext O€ eres peT avTny addis 0 BapBapos TO 
/ > \ / 
peyaro otorw ert THY “EdXddda SovAwoopeEVos 
x \ / / > f 
nrOev. Kal peyaddrouv Kivdvvou émixpewacbevTos 
/ / A , ¢ 
of te Aaxedatpovioe Tov EvpToNeunoavTwy ‘EX- 
/ ’ 
Anvov nyncavtTo Suvapet TpovyorvTes, Kal ot AOn- 
vaio. érriovt@y TaV Mndwyv dvavonOévtes éxdi7rEiv 
TY TOL Kal avacKevacdpevor és Tas vais 
éoBavtes vauTiKol éyévovTo. KOWn TE aTTwod- 
\ / ef % A , 
pevot TOV BapBapov vVaTepoyv ov TOAX@ rex plOn- 
/ / \ 
cav mpos Te “AOnvatous cai Aaxedaipovious\oi Te 
amooravtes7Bacthens “EAAnves kal ot Evptrone- 
paoavTes) Suvdper yap TavTa meyiora Seepavy’ 
3 (ayvor yap ol ev KaTa yhv, of 6é vavaiv. Kal 
Odiyov pwév Ypovov Evvépervev 1) Oparypia, eTvTELTAa 
dueveyOévtes of Aaxedatpoviot Kai of ‘AOnvaior 
b / \ a / \ ? , 
eTONEuNnoay peta TOV EvpLLaywY POs aAAnXoOUS, 
\ na v ¢ / ” é al 
Kal Tov ad\A@v EXAnvwv ef Twes Tov dtactatep, 
, ev lal 
Tpos TOUTOUS On EXYWpoUY. WaTe-.aTo TaV Mnéu- 

1 The legislation of Lycurgus, thus placed by Thucydides 
at four hundred years or more before 404 B.c., would be about 
804 B.c. (Eratosthenes gives 884). 


BOOK I. xvin. 1-3 

period during which the Lacedaemonians have been 
enjoying the same constitution! covers about four 
hundred years or a little more down to the end of 
the Peloponnesian war. And it is for this reason 
that they became powerful and regulated the affairs 
of other states as well. Not many years after the 
overthrow of the tyrants in Hellas by the Lace- 
daemonians the battle of Marathon? was fought 
between the Athenians and the Persians; and ten 
years after that the Barbarian came again with his 
great host against Hellas to enslave it. In the face 
of the great danger that threatened, the Lacedae- 
monians, because they were the most powerful, 
assumed the leadership of the Hellenes that joined 
in the war; and the Athenians, when the Persians 
came on, resolved to abandon their city, and pack- 
ing up their goods embarked on their ships, and 
so became sailors. By a common effort the Bar- 
barian was repelled; but not long afterwards the 
other Hellenes, both those who had revolted from 
the King and those who had joined the first con- 
federacy against him, parted company and aligned 
themselves with either the Athenians or the Lace- 
daemonians; for these states had shown themselves 
the most powerful, the one strong by land and the 
other on the sea. The defensive alliance lasted only 
a little while; then the Lacedaemonians and the 
Athenians quarrelled and, with their respective 
allies, made war upon one another, and any of the rest 
of the Hellenes, if they chanced to be at variance, 
from now on resorted to one or the other. So that 
from the Persian invasion continually, to this present 
war, making peace at one time, at another time 

2 490 B.O. 



rf a ~ an 



Evupaxyows adpictapévols ev TapecKkevdoavto Ta 


ToNéula Kal éutrerpoTepoe eyévovTo meTa KLVOUV@D 

, a 

XIX. Kal of wév Aaxedatpovior ody vrotenets 
éyovtes popou Tovs Evpudxous yyobvto, Kat OXL- 

al / / 
yapxiav 5€ dict avtols povoy éemiTndelws OTrws 
“ee a la) 
TodiTevoovat OepatrevovTes,, AP@nvatos dé vavs TE 
lal / A , Ud \ / 
TOV TOMMY TO YPOvO Taparafovtes, TANV Xiwv 
/ \ / lal al 
cal AecBiwv, Kal ypipata Tols Tact TakarTes 
dhépev. Kai éyéveto autos és Tovde Tov TONEMOD 
‘ \ 
% idia TapacKeun pelfwv 7) WS TA KpaTLOTA TOTE 
rat a / ” 
peta axpaipvods THs Evppayias HvOnoav. 

XX. Ta pév ody Tadata ToradTa nipov, yadeTra 
wv \ Con / na rd \ 
édvTa tavtl é&fs Texunplo TioTedoal. ol yap 

\ > \ al / 
id , / 
eTrex wpla chicw 7%, ouoilws aBacavictws Tap 
’ a fol 
adAnrov Séyovtat. “AOnvaiwy yovv To TAHOVos 
ed ” ei? & 7. | , 
Immapyxov olovtat vp’ “Appodiov kal “Apiotoyet- 
Tovos TUpavvoy 6vTa aToUavely Kal ovK icacL 
ef ¢€ / \ 4 x > ge) 
éte Immias pev mpecButatos wy npyxe Tav Ierou- 
/ cs / \ \ \ > 
otpatou viéwy,” Immapyos 5€ Kai Oeccanros aber- 
a / a 
hol joav avtov, Urototyicavtes O€ TL exelyn TH 
a € / ,’ 
nuepa Kal tapaxphua “Apuddtos cal “Apiotoyet- 
> a / / ¢ / 7 
twv ex Tov Evvedotay apiow Imria pweunviocba, 

1 of. Vis ixxxy.(2,5 Vo. lyvii.4, 
2 Lost its independence after the revolt of 427 B.c. 
cf. 111. L 3 i.e. as if they took place in some distant land. 


BOOK I. xvur. 3-xx. 2 

fighting with each other or with their own revolted 
allies, these two states prepared themselves well in 
matters of war, and became more experienced, 
taking their training amid actual dangers. 

XIX. Thé Lacedaemonians maintained their hege- 
mony without kééping-theirallies tributary to them, 
but took care that these should have an oligarchical 
form of government conformably to the sole interest 
of Sparta; the Athenians, on the other hand, main- 
tained theirs by taking over in course of time the 
ships of the allied cities, with the exception of 
Chios 1 and Lesbos,” and by imposing on them all a 
tax of money. And so the individual resources of 
the Athenians pvailable for this war became greater 
than thosé of themselves and their allies when that 
alliance was still unimpaired and strongest. 

XX. Now the state of affairs in early times I 
have found to have been such as I have described, 
although it is difficult in such matters to credit 
any and every piece of testimony. For men accept 
from one another hearsay reports of former events, 
neglecting to test them just the same,? even though 
these events belong to the history of their own 
country. Take the Athenians, for example ; most of 
them think that Hipparchus was tyrant when he 
was slain by Harmodius and Aristogeiton.4 They 
do not know that it was Hippias, as the eldest of 
the sons of Peisistratus, who was ruler, and that 
Hipparchus and Thessalus were merely his brothers ; 
further, that Harmodius and Aristogeiton, suspect- 
ing, on that very day and at the very moment of 
executing their plan, that information had been con- 
veyed to Hippias by one of their fellow-conspirators, 

*514.B.c. On this digression, cf. Hdt. v. lv.; vi. exxiii.; 
Arist. ’A@. Tod. 17 f. 35 


ra A ’ / e / , \ 
Tov pev aTéayYovTo ws mpoeLdoTos, BovrAopuevor bé 
a \ i 
mow EvrrAnPOjvat Spacavrés Te Kal Kwdvvedoa, 
fal \ 
tT ‘Immapy@ TepituxXovTes Tapa TO AewxKopeov 
kadrovpevoy thv Iavabnvaixny toumnv é1ako- 
3 opoovte améxteway. Trodda &€ Kal ddXa Ett Kal 
fal / 
viv ovTa Kal ov ypovm apvnoTovpeva Kal ob 
adrot“EAAnvEes ovK OpPas olovTal, W®aTEP TOUS 
Ld / \ al , 
te Maxedaipoviwv Bacihéas un mid Whd@ tpoc- 
tiOec Bat Exatepov, adra Svoiv, Kal Tov Letavatny 
/ > val = a 3533 / , icf 
Oyo avtois eivat, Os OVS eyéveTo TWTOTE. OUTWS 
atanraitwpos tois todXots 7 EntTnats THS adn- 
Geias cal érl Ta éToiwa madXov TpéTTOVTAL. 
XXI. Ex b€ Tov eipnuévayv Texunpiwv Guws 
an ” / / a iol > 
TolavTa av Tis voulfwv padiota & dindOov ody 
apyaptavot, Kal ovTE @S ToLNnTAal UuvyKact Tept 
” e /, / b] \ \ 
ovTE ws Aoyoypada EvvéGecayv éml TO Tpocaya- 
, Cal > / x > / v > , 
yoTEpov TH akpodcet 7) adnOéaTEpor, dvTa ave&é- 
AeyxTA Kal TA TOAAG UTO Yporov aUT@Y aTiaTwsS 
Sack \ \ a > / e a Ar oe / 
éml TO uwvOM@bes ExverixnKoTa, nupnabas SE Nynod- 
ral / 
2 elvat aToYpwrvTws. Kal O TOAEMOS OUTOS, KaiTrEp 

1 In the inner Ceramicus near the temple of Apollo 

2 Herodotus is doubtless one of the Hellenes here criti- 
cised. cf. vi. lvii., referring to the two votes; rx. liii., 
where he seems to have applied a term belonging to a deme 
(cf. Hdt. 111. lv.) to a division of the army. 


BOOK I, xx. 2—xx1. 2 

held off from him as forewarned, but wishing to do 
something before they were seized and then take 
their chances, fell in with Hipparchus, who was mar- 
shalling the Panathenaic procession near the sanc- 
tuary called Leocorium,! and killed him. There 
are many other matters, too, belonging to the 
present and not forgotten through lapse of time, 
regarding which the other Hellenes? as well hold 
mistaken opinions, for example, that at Lacedaemon 
the kings cast not one but two votes each, and that 
the Lacedaemonians have the “ Pitana company ” in 
their army, which never at any time existed. So 
averse to taking pains are most men in the search 
for the truth, and so prone are they to turn to what 
lies ready at hand. 

XXI. Still, from the evidence that has been given, 
any one would not err who should hold the view 
that the state of affairs in antiquity was pretty 
nearly such as I have described it, not giving greater 
credence to the accounts, on the one hand, which 
the poets have put into song, adorning and amplify- 
ing their theme, and, on the other, which the 
chroniclers have composed with a view rather of 
pleasing the ear® than of telling the truth, since 
their stories cannot be tested and most of them 
have from lapse of time won their way into the 
region of the fabulous so as to be incredible. He 
should regard the facts as having been made out 
with sufficient accuracy, on the basis of the clearest 
indications, considering that they have to do with 
early times. And so, even though men are always 

3 Public recitation was the ordinary mode of getting 
the works of the poets and early logographers before the 



a > , > ? \ A la \ , 
TOV avOpwray ev @ Mev AV TOAEM@CL TOY TApOYTA 
DEON / , / \ \ > 
alel péyloTov KpwovTwV, Tavoapévwy bé Ta ap- 
al a / > > > lal lal yy 
yata waddov GCavpalovtwr, amt avTav tov ép- 

la] , e a / 
yov oKxoToval Snrtoce Ouws pelCwv yeyevnuévos 
\¢a@ / s 
XXIT. Kai 60a pév ovo elroy Exactor f pér- 
) Pe * A A 
\ > / > \ A / al 
THY axpiBerayv avTny TaV AEXPEvTwY Siapynmoved- 
2 > 4 b di bene) vw \ a LY / 
e > 
mo0ev éuol atrayyéAXovow* ws © av eddoKavy pot 
7 \ ‘a 2 AN , \ / / . 
ExaoToL Tepl TOY alel TapoYTwY Ta SéovTAa wadiaT 
’ la 3 / 7 b] / al E / , 
A > la) / e/ ” \ 
Iu a , > lal / > > 
5 épya tTav mpaxGevtwy €v TH TOdeUw OVK eK 
rat / / > } / 
Tov TapatuxovTos TUVOavopevos nELwoa ypadeuv 
BOF ae > Lon FO > ’ = Se am an \ 
ovo ws éuol édoKxer, GAN ols Te avTOS Traphy Kal 
an oe y 
Tapa tov addwv\ dcov Suvarov axptBeia rep) 
/ , 
Exaatou émeceNOwv. emitovws O€ nUpta KETO, S.i0Tt 
lal 3. \ 

oi TapovTes TOIs Epyols ExdoToOLs OV TaUTAa Tepl 

lal b ] lal »- > ’ e e / > / 
ny / ” Las \ > r ” \ 
7) pvnuns Exot. Kal €s pev AKpoacwW lows TO 

un pv0@des avT@v ateprrectepoyv paveitar’ daot 


BOOK I, xxi. 2-xxn. 4 

inclined, while they are engaged in a war, to judge 
the present one the greatest, but when it is over 
to regard ancient events with greater wonder, yet 
this war will prove, for men who judge from the 
actual facts, to have been more important than any 
that went before. 

XXII. As to the Epacchen that were made by 
different men, either when they were about to begin 
the war or when they were already engaged therein, 
it has been difficult to recall with strict accuracy 
the words actually spoken, both for me as regards 
that which I myself heard, and for those who 
from various other sources have brought me re- 
ports. Therefore the speeches are given in the 
language in which, as it seemed to me, the several 
speakers would express, on the subjects under con- 
sideration, the sentiments most befitting the occa- 
sion, though at the same time I have adhered as 
closely as possible to the general sense of what 
was actually said. But as to the facts of the 
occurrences of the war, I have thought it my duty 
to give them, not as ascertained from any chance 
informant nor as seemed to me probable, but only 
after investigating with the greatest possible ac- 
curacy each detail, in the case both of the events in 
which I myself participated and of those regarding 
which I got my information from others. And the en- 
deavour to ascertain these facts was a laborious task, 
because those who were eye-witnesses of the several 
events did not give the same reports about the same 
things, but reports varying according to their cham- 
pionship of one side or the other, or according to 
their recollection. And it may well be that the 
absence of the fabulous from my narrative will seem 



\ / A , \ \ 
5€ BovAjcovtat TOV TE yEevowéevwv TO cages 
a lal / 
avOpwrivov ToLovTwY Kal TapaTANnciwy EcecOat, 
> t , “a vG.| > id Y A / 
opera Kpivery av’Ta apKxovvtas fer. KTHpa 
Te €5 alel wadrov 7) aywovicpa. és TO Tapayphpua 
axovew EvyKeiTat. 
XXTII. Tav 6€ mpotepov Epywv péyiotov érpa- 
, x a lal / 
xOn TO Mndckov, Kal TOVTO Ouws dvoiv vavpaytaw 
s Lal / 
Kal TeCowayiaw Tayelayv THY KpLaL Eayev. 7100- 
a“ iol , 
tov 5€ ToD Todéu“ov pHKOs TE péya mpovBn, 
/ / / / > > n a 
TaOnuata te EvynvéxOn yevéoOar év ai’T@ TH 
¢€ / a > 4 > ” Ud LA \ 
EdXabe ola ovy Etepa év iow Xpovw. ovTE yap 
/ /, al . 
ToAes Tocalde ANdUcioas nonuwoOnoay, ai pev 
e q / e ’ e \ ~~ ’ a 3 
imo BapBapwv, ai S vro chav adtav avtitrone- 
/ 2 pee”. § 3 Pay \ - , , 
povvtav (eat & ai Kal otxyjtopas petéBadov 
e / bd \ / > / \ 
addioKopevat), ovTe Puyal tocaide avOpoTav Kai 
Ul e \ ’ b) \ % , ¢ \ \ \ 
hovos, 0 wey KAT AUTOV TOV TrOAELOY, O dé Sta TO 
, n 
otaciavey. Ta TE TPOTEPOY akon meV AEyouEVa, 
, 4 
épyo O€ omavwtepov BeBatovpeva ovK amiocta 
lal / ¢ ral 
a / 
pépos ys Kal toxupoTatos ot avtol éméaxor, 
e~ / ? sf A \ Ee fal 
HALou Te €xrElers, al TUKVOTEPAL Tapa Ta éK TOD 
’ Ul 
mplv “povov pynuovevopeva EvvéBncar, avypot TE 
€oTt Tap ols peyddo. Kal am avTav Kal ALpol 

1 Artemisium and Salamis. 
2? Thermopylae and Plataea. 
3 As Colophon (111. xxxiv.), Mycalessus (vil. xxix.) 


BOOK I. xxi. 4-xxi1. 3 

less pleasing to the ear; but whoever shall wish to 
have a clear view both of the events which have 
happened and of those which will some day, in all 
human probability, happen again in the same or a 
similar way—for these to adjudge my history profit- 
able will be enough for me. And, indeed, it has 
been composed, not as a prize-essay to be heard for 
the moment, but as a possession for all time. 

XXIII. The greatest achievement of former times 
was the _Persian war) and yet thiswas quickly 
decided in_ two” sea-fights*)and two land-battles.*, 
But the Peloponnesian War was protractéd™to™a 
great length, and in the course of it disasters be- 
fell Hellas the like of which had never occurred 
in any equal space of time. Never had so many 
cities been taken and left desolate, some by the 
Barbarians, and others by Hellenes* themselves 
warring against one another; while several, after 
their capture, underwent a change of inhabitants.5 
Never had so many human beings been exiled, or 
so much human blood been shed, whether in the 
course of the war itself or as the result of civil 
dissensions. And so the stories of former times, 
handed down by oral tradition, but very rarely 
confirmed by fact, ceased to be incredible: about 
earthquakes, for instance, for they prevailed over a 
very large part of the earth and were likewise of 
the greatest violence; eclipses of the sun, which 
occurred at more frequent intervals than we find 
recorded of all former times ; great droughts also in 
some quarters with resultant famines; and lastly— 

* e.g. Plataea (111. Ixviii. 3), Thyrea (1Vv. lvii.), 

® e.g. Sollium (11. xxx.), Potidaea (1m. Ixx.), Anactorium 
(tv. xlix.), Scione (v. xxxii.), Melos (v. exvi.). 

VOL. I. C 41 


Kal 1) ovx HKicTa Brawaca Kal pépos TL POecipaca 
4 Tou ToNéuou dua Evverréeto. ipkavto dé avtod 
"AOnvaior cat [leXotrovynciot AVTaVTEs TAs TpLAa- 
KOVTOUTELS OTrOVOaS al avTois éyévovto peta Kv- 
5 Bolas adwouw. Ot & tte 8 EXvEaV, Tas aiTias 
mpovypawa mpatov Kal Tas Svapopds, TOD pr 
tia tnthoat Tote €& TOU TOTOUTOS TOAEMLOS Tots 
6”’EXAnoe Katéotyn. THY mev yap adrnOectatny 
mpobaci, apavertatny Sé hMoy@ Tous ‘APnvaious 
Hryobpar pmeyddous ytyvouévous Kal poB8ov rapé- 
xyovtas tois AaKxedatpoviols avayxdcas és TO TO- 
Neuery? al & és TO havepov Aeyouevas aitiar aid 
Aoav éxatépav, ap wv AVoaVTES TAS oTrOVdAS €5 
XXIV. ’Esiésapvos éott TOMS ev Sef éare- 
ovte Tov “lovioy KOoATOV* TpocotKodat S avdTiy 
2 Tavrdytiot BapBapot, Idvpixov EOvos. TavTnv 
an@xicay pev Kepxupaiot, oixiatns 8 éyéveto 
Marios "EpatoxXeldov, KopivOtos yévos, Trav ad’ 
‘Hpaxdéous, cata 81 Tov madaLov vopov ex THs 
untpoTrovews KaTakdnOeisy Evvexicay o€ Kal 
Kopiv@iwv tives kal Tod &ddAov Awpixod yévous. 
3 mpoedOovtos Sé Tod xpdvou éyévero 7) TOV ‘Ext- 
Sapviov Svvapis peyadn Kat trodvdvOpeTros. 
4 ctacidcavtes Sé é€v AXXAjAOLS ETN TOANA, @S 
Bapev épOapnoar kai THs Suvvduews THs Todds 
5 éotepnOnoav. Ta Sé TeXEUTALa Tpd TOvdE TOD 
ToNemou 0 Onmos avTav e&ediwke Tovs SuvaTous, 
of b¢ émeAOovtes peta Tov BapBapwy édAnfovTo 


c 3 
cs Oe OUI 
1G) = ee Sane Wily : 
i a ae UY 



O ene 

Stanford Ltd. London 


BOOK I. xxi. 3-xx1v. 5 

the disaster which wrought most harm to Hellas and 
destroyed a considerable part of the people—the 
noisome pestilence. For all these dis ters fell upon 

Sr ee 

them simultaneously with this war. | And the war™ 
/ began when the Athenians and Peloponnesians broke 

the thirty years’ truce,! pong ndce between them 

after the capture of Euboea.! The reasons why they 

broke it and the grounds of their quarrel I have first 
set forth, that no one may ever have to inquire for 
what cause the Hellenes. became involved in so great 
a war. The truest explanation, although it has been 
the least often advanced, I believe to have been 
the growth of the “Athenians to ‘greatness, which 
brought fear to the Lacedaemonians and _ forced 

them to war. /But the reasons publicly alleged-on— 

“either side which led them to break the truce and 
involved them in the war were as follows. 

XXIV. There is a city called Epidamnus on the 
right hand as one sails into the Ionian gulf, and its 
next-door neighbours are a barbarian tribe, the Tau- 
lantians, of Illyrian race. The city was colonized 
by the Corcyraeans, and its founder was Phalius, son 
of Eratocleides, of Corinthian stock and a descendant 
of Heracles, who was invited from the mother-city 
according to the ancient custom ; but some Corinth- 
ians and other Dorians joined the Coreyraeans in 
establishing the colony. As time passed the city of 
the Epidamnians became great and populous; but 
civil wars ensued, lasting, it is said, for many years, 
and in consequence of a war with the neighbouring 
barbarians they were crippled and stripped of most 
of their power. Finally, just before the Peloponne- 
sian war, the populace expelled the aristocrats, and 
they, making common cause with the barbarians and 

1 445 B.0.; of. ch. cxv. 1. 43 


s , ral / , n 4 / 
Tous €v TH TokEL KATA TE YyRV Kal KaTa Oddac- 
cav. ot 6€ ev TH TONE OvTes “Emvddpuriot 

em elon) emreCovTo, TEUTOVOW és TH Kepxupay 
Tpea Bers ws unTpoTody odaay, Cedopevor pn ohas 
Teplopav POerpouevous, ahha Tous Te hevyortas 
Evvadradtar ohict Kat Tov TOV BapBdpev to- 
hewov Katahtcat. taita oe ixérar cab elopevor 
és To “Hpatov édéovto. ot 6€ Kepxupaior tn ixe- 

7 > > / 3 ee 7 > / 

Teiav ovk ed€Eavt0, GAN ampdKxtous atréTeprpav. 

XXV. Dvovtes dé of "Emi dpvior ovdeuiay 

adiow amo Kepxupas TYL@piay otcav ev aT op 

elXovTo GécOat To Tapon, kal méprpavtes és 
Acrdous Tov Jeov é eT npoToy EL mapacotev Kopw- 
Giors Thy mohuy os oiKtoTais Kal Tuo play Twa 
TE/p@avT amt avTav toveicOa. o 8 avrtois 
aveike Tapadovvar Kal nyepovas TroveicOa. 
éXOovtes 6€ of "Emiédyuviot és tTHv KopivOov xata 
TO payTetov mapéoocav TH amouKiay, Tov TE 
olKia THY dr obeLKvUvTEs opav éx KopivOov 6 ovTa 
Kal TO XpneTpLov Onrodvtes, €O€0vTO TE pH 
chas Teptopav POerpopevous, aX’ emapivar. 
Kopiv@cou 6€ KaTd TE TO oikatov bmebeEavTo my 
TLL@piay, vopilovtes ovux Hooov éauTov eivat 
THY aTrouKiay 7 Kepxupatov, dpa 6€ Kai pices 
TOV Kepxupaiwy, OTL avTov Tapnwehouv OvTES 
GTOLKOL, ore Y4p ev Tavnyupect Tals Kolvais 
éLbovTes yépa Ta voyulopeva ote KopivOiw avdpi 

1 The xowal xavnyvpers are the four great games, here 
doubtless referring especially | to the Isthmian Games held at 
Corinth. The ‘‘ privileges” would be 7 of honour 
(xpoedplas), animals for sacrifice presented by the colonies of 


BOOK I. xxiv. 5—xxv. 4 

attacking Epidamnus, plundered those who were in the 
city both by land and sea. These, when they were 
being hard pressed, sent envoys to Corcyra, as being 
their mother-city, begging them not to look on and 
see them destroyed, but to reconcile them with 
the exiles and to put a stop to the war with the 
barbarians. ‘This petition they made, sitting as 
suppliants in the temple of Hera. But the Corcy- 
raeans denied their supplication, and sent them 
back unsuccessful. 

XXV. The Epidamnians, recognizing that no aid 
was to be had from Corcyra, were at a loss how to 

settle their present difficulty ; so they sent to Delphi | 

and asked the god whether they should deliver up 
their city to the Corinthians as founders and try to 
procure some aid from them. The god answered that 
they should deliver it up to them and make them 
leaders. So the Epidamnians went to Corinth and 
delivered up the city as a Corinthian colony, in 
accordance with the oracle, showing that their founder 
was from Corinth and stating the response of the 
oracle ; and they begged the Corinthians not to look 
on and see them utterly destroyed, but to come to 
their rescue. The Corinthians undertook the task, 
partly on the ground of right, because they con- 
sidered that the colony belonged to them quite as 
much as to the Corcyraeans, partly also through hatred 
of the Corcyraeans, for the reason that these, though 
Corinthian colonists, neglected the mother-city. For 
neither at their common festival gatherings } would 
they concede the customary privileges to Corinthians, 
nor would they begin with a representative of 

the mother-city, sending of delegates (@ewpof) to Corinthian 
festivals, etc. 


433 B.c 


U lal e a ¢ e ” 
arotkiat, Tepibpovoovtes 6€ avTods Kav KpPNLG- 

5) a / a 
tov duvdper dvtes KaT exeivov TOY Xpovov omota 
a ¢ a 
TapacKkevn SvvaT@tepol, vauvTtK@ dé Kat Tod 
mpovxyew éoTw Ste érraipomevol Kal KaTa THD 
/ a / 
Dardkawv tmpoevoixnaow ths Kepxvpas kdéos éxov- 
x a e \ n 
T@V Ta TEpt TAS Vads' 7 Kal MadAov éEnpTVOVTO 
TO vaUTLKOV Kal Hoav ovK advvaToL TpLpELs Yap 
elkoou Kal ExaTov UTHpxov avTols OTE HNpXoVvTO 
/ / 
XXVI. Ildvtwv odv tovtay éykAnpata éxov- 
tes of KopivOsor émepmov és tiv ’Emidapvov 
” \ ’ / > / / \ / 
aopmEevol TV w@perlav, OuKNTOPa TE TOV BovxXo- 
J a 
wevov iévar KedevovTes Kal "Awmpaxiwtav Kal 
Aeveadioy Kal éavtd@v hpovpovs. émopevOnaav 
\ Pee | > / / = > 
5é wetn és “AtroAXNwviav KopivOiwv ovoav aros- 
"i a / \ / 
clav, dée. Tov Kepxupaiwy pi K@AVw@VTAL UT 
av’tav Kata Oadaccay Tepatguuevol. Kepxupator 

% ? 

Sé érrevdt) HoPovto Tovs TE olKYTOpas Kat ppov- 

> / / , 
povs HKovtas és THY 'Enidauvov tTHy Te atrolKLay 
/ / > / \ / 
KopwOiow Sedoméevnv, exadretatvovy Kat mhev- 
cavtes evOvs TévTE Kal ElkooL Vaal Kal VoTEpoV 
U / / 
étép@ atom Tovs Te Pevyovtas éxéNevoy KAT’ 
/ > / \ 
érnpecay SéyecOar avtovs (Gov yap es THY 
a 2 / 
Képxupay of Trav Eridapviwy duyades tapous Te 
\ / aA “ , 
drrodecvuvtTes Kal Euyyéverav, hv Tpoicyopuevor 
la / 

édéovto ohas KaTayew) Tovs Te Ppovpovs ovs 
ineecelep aie! Atenas MER Nancie oe eM me ake se 
1 According to the custom obtaining in Hellenic cities, 
whereby a stranger could offer sacrifice only through a 
citizen who acted for hn. mpoxatapxéuevor, as the Schol. 

explains, d:ddvres mpdrepor (sc. } Tots aAAots) Tas KaTapXaGS, 1.€. 
giving the hair cut from the victim’s forehead to a repre- 


BOOK I. xxv. 4-xxv1. 3 

Corinth the initial rites at sacrifices,! as the rest of 
the colonies did, but they treated them with contempt. 
For at that time they were in point of wealth equal 
to the richest of the Hellenes, and in preparation 
for war even stronger, while in sea-power they some- 
times boasted that they were greatly superior, just 
because of the former occupation of the island by 
the Phaeacians,? whose glory was in their ships. It 
was for this reason that they kept on developing 
their navy, and they were in fact powerful; for they 
had on hand one hundred and twenty triremes when 
the war began. 

XXVI. So the Corinthians, having all these grounds 
of complaint, gladly sent the desired aid to Epidam- 
nus, inviting whoever wished to go along as settlers 
and despatching as a garrison some Ambraciots and _ 
Leucadians and a detachment of themselves. They 
proceeded to Apollonia, a colony of the Corinthians, 
going by land through fear of the Corcyraeans, lest 
they might be prevented by them if they should at- 
tempt to cross the sea. But when the Corcyraeans 
perceived that the settlers and the garrison had 
arrived at Epidamnus, and that their colony had been 
given up to the Corinthians, they were indizuant. So 
they sailed immediately with twenty-five ships, and 
later with a second fleet, and insolently bade the Epi- 
damnians dismiss the garrison sent by the Corinthians 
and the settlers, and also receive back their exiles; for 
the exiled Epidamnians had gone to Corcyra, and 
pointing to the sepulchres of common ancestors and 

sentative of Corinth, that he might throw it on the fire 

2 of. 11. lxx., where a sacred precinct of Alcinous in Corcyra 
is mentioned. The ancient belief that Corcyra was the 
Homeric Scheria has no support in the Odyssey. 



? / 3 / 
KopivO.or éreuryav Kai Tovs oixntopas atomép- 
‘ lal / 
mew. ol 6€ Emiddpuvior ovdev avtav UTNKOVCAa), 
’ \ / > >’ > \ e 7 
aXXa aoTpaTevovow em avTovs of Kepxvpaios 
\ lal 
TegoapaKxovTa vavol peTa Tav guyddav ws 
xatatovres, kal tovs “lAdupiovs mpocdraPovtes. 
, * \ , fal 5 
mpockabefouevor S€ THY TOodW TpoEitov ’Emt- 
/ \ / 
Sapviwv te Tov Bovdopevov kai Tous E€vous amra- 
a / c / , 
Geis amriévar' et Sé uj, WS TOdEmLOLS yenoecOaL. 
e > b > / e \ a v > 
ws & ov« érreiGovto, ot wév Kepxupatos (€ote 5 
> \ ‘ / > / \ / 
ic@ wos TO Ywplov) éTOALOPKOUY THY TOKLY. 
XXVII. KopivOi01 &, as avtots éx ths “Em- 
/ > ” id Lal 
Sdpvov 7AOov ayyedot OTL TOAOPKOVITAL, TApeE- 
, e 
oxevatovto aotpateiav, Kal Gua atroikiay és TH 
> / I] / > \ aw \ € , \ 
Eidapvov cenpvoooy ei TH toy cal opoig Tov 
BI \ 
Bovropevov iévar: et 6€ Tis TO TapavTixa peév 
\ b] / a / \ / a 
eOérer Evprrreiv, petéxerv b€ BovreTat T 
Re , ¢ s be x \ eel B yee * 
aTrotkias, TevTHnKOVTA Spaypas KaTabevta Kopuv- 
Gias péverv. Hoav O€ Kal ot wréovTEs ToAXOl 
Kal of Tapyvpiov KataBdrXrovtes. edenOynaav dé 
kal tov Meyapéwy vavol odds Evutrpotréuyar 
— : 
> » , e 4s / a . \ 
el dpa KwAVoWTO v7 Kepxupaiwy mretv: ot dé 
mapeckevatovto avtois oxT@ vaval Evpdeiy, 
kai Iladf#s KeharrAnvev téccapow. xal ’Em- 
Savpiov édenOncar, of tapésyov Tévte, Eppiovis 
Sé uiav Kal TporSnvioe dv0, Aevxddsor O€ S€xa Kal 
> a > , , \ , v 
Aputpaxi@tat onto. OnBatous S€ ypyyata HTNn- 
, > / \ lal ; 
cav kal Prevacious, Hrelous 5€ vads Te Kevas 


BOOK I. xxvi. 3-xxvir. 2 

invoking the tie of kinship had begged the Corcy- 
raeans to restore them. As the Epidamnians paid no 
heed to them the Corcyraeans proceeded against them 
with forty ships, accompanied by the exiles whom 
they intended to restore, and taking along the II- 
lyrians also. And sitting down before the city they 
proclaimed that the foreigners and any Epidamnians 
who wished might go away in safety ; otherwise they 
would treat them as enemies. But when the Epidam- 
nians would not comply, the Corcyraeans laid siege to 
the city, which is connected with the shore by an 

XXVII. But the Corinthians, when messengers 
came from Epidamnus announcing the siege, pre- 
pared an expedition and proclaimed at the same 
time a colony to Epidamnus, saying that any who 
wished might go there on a basis of equal rights for 
all, and that if anyone was not inclined to sail at 
once, hut wished to have part in the colony, he 
might make a deposit of fifty Corinthian drachmae! 
and remain at home. The number that sailed was 
large, as also of those who deposited the money. 
Request was also made of the Megarians to convoy 
them with ships, in case an attempt should be made 
by the Corcyraeans to prevent their sailing; and 
these were preparing to accompany them with eight 
ships, and the Paleans, from Cephallenia, with four. 
The Epidaurians, of whom a like request was made, 
furnished five ships, the Hermionians one, the Troe- 
zenians two, the Leucadians ten, and the Ambraciots 
eight. Upon the Thebans and the Phliasians a 
demand was made for money, and upon the Eleans 

* The Corinthian drachma was about equivalent to 6d., 

but of course had greater purchasing power. The Attic 
drachma = 93d. 





\ - > lal \ / ra 
kal xpynuata. autav de KopivOiwy vives tape- 
oxevalovto Tplakovta Kal Tptofyiduoe omAirat. 
e lal 
XXVIII. *Esresdy 5€ érvGovto of Kepxvpaio 
\ / 5 , ? , \ 
THv tmapacxeunyv, €dOovtes és KopivOov peta 
\ , 
Aaxedatpovioy kat Xuwxvaviov mpécBewr, ods 
mapéraBov, éxéXevov KopivOtovs tovs év ’Emida- 
\ > / 
pv@ ppoupovs TE Kal OlKNTOPAS aTrayELY, WS Ov 
nr > / > / lal 
petov avtois ‘Emidauvov. et O€ Te avtiro.obvTat, 
dixas OcXov Sobva ev IleXoTOvyNow Tapa To- 
Aeow als av audotepo EvpSa@ow: orotépov & 
x an 2 \ / — 4 p - 
av SixacO7n eivat THY aTroLKLay, TOUTOUS KpaTety: 
a a / 
nOerov 6€ kal TO ev Aedois pavteiw émitpéwar. 
U \ > v cal ? \ , \ > \ 
MOAEMOV O€ OVK ElwWY Toei: eb O€ LH, KAL avTol 
wayKxacOncec0ar Epacav, éexeitywy Bralopée 
avay n » eKELY bévov, 
A A > / 4 , cal 
dirous tovetcPar ods ov BovdovTat, ETEpous TaV 
a n / 
vov dvT@V parrov, @perias Evera. of 8 Kopiv- 
Oot amrexpivavto avtots, Hv Tas TE VAS Kal TOUS 
: / > x 3 / > / 7 
BapBapous amo ’Emidauvov amayaywor, Bovdev- 
/ >] lal 
cec0at' mpotepov & ov Karas Exely Tods pev 
cal \ \ / 
modtopxetaOar, Eavtovs bé€ SixdlecPar. Kepxv- 
cal de > / a ee a \ > > / 
patos S€ avtéXeyor, hv Kat éxetvor Tovs év ’Emida- 
vo atTayadywol, Tolncev TavTa: étoipor Sé 
elvar Kal wate ahotépovs pévery KaTa Yopay 
ba Oe 4 / @ Y x e bt / 
otrovoas 6€! moincacbat Ews av 7 Sixn yévnrat. 
1 Hude deletes 5é, after Poppo. 

1 A threat of an alliance with the Athenians, ray viv 
bvrwy referring to the Lacedaemonians and other Pelopon- 
nesians, not to the Illyrians (cf ch. xxvi. 7), as Poppo 


BOOK I. xxvit. 2—xxvinl. 5 

for unmanned ships as well as for money. And the 
Corinthians themselves, for their part, made ready 
thirty ships and three thousand hoplites. 

XXVIII. When the Corcyraeans learned of these 
preparations they went to Corinth, with Lacedae- 
monian and Sicyonian envoys whom they took with 
them, and bade the Corinthians withdraw the gar- 
rison and settlers at Epidamnus, on the ground that 
they had no part in Epidamnus. But if they made any 
claim to it they were willing, they said, to submit the 
matter for arbitration to any states in the Pelopon- 
nesus that both should agree upon, and to whichever 
party the colony should be > adjudged to belong, these 
should have it; and they were willing also to submit 
the matter to the oracle at Delphi. War, however, 
they warned them not to bring on; but if it must be, 
they too would be compelled, if the Corinthians forced 
the issue, to make friends with those for whom they 
had no wish, others beyond their present ones, in order 
to secure assistance.! The Corinthians answered that 
if the Corcyraeans would withdraw their ships and 
the barbarians from Epidamnus they would consider 
the matter, but that meanwhile it was not proper 
for them? to be discussing arbitration while the 
Epidamnians were undergoing siege. Whereupon 
the Corcyraeans replied that they would do this if 
the Corinthians on their part would withdraw their 
forces at Epidamnus; but they were also ready to 
arbitrate on condition that both parties should re- 
main where they were and that they should make a 
truce until the decision should be given.® 

2 4.e. the envoys and the Corinthians. 

3 Or, omitting dé, ‘‘that they were also ready to make a 

truce until the decision should be given, on condition that 
both parties should remain where they were.’ 



XXIX. KopivOsor dé oddév tovtTwy wrHKovor, 
> ’ > \ / > cad S e a \ e 
GXWN érrevdyn TAYYELS AVTOIS NoaY al VIEs Kal ol 
Evupayor Tapjoav, TpoTéuavtTes KnpuKa Tpd- 
Tepov TOAELov TpoepouvTa Kepxupators, apavTes 
/ e 
éSdounxovta vavol Kal révte SurxtdLo1s TE OTNE- 
tals émdeov emt THY "Emidapvoy, Kepxupators 
évavtia TodeunoovtTes’ eoTpaTHyer O€ TOV pev 
al e , 
veav “Aptotevs 0 TleAXiyou kat Kaddxpdtns o 
r 4 a na 
KadXiov cai Tindvop o Tiav@ous, tov 6€ mefov 
? € id 
Apyétios te 0 Evputiwou xat ‘Ioapyisas o 
"Icapxyov. émerdn 8 éyévovto év ’Axtiw Tis 
a e X ~ 3 / 
"Avaktopias ys, 0 TO lepov tod *AroAd@VOS 
A nw? fal 
éotiv, ml TO GTOmaTL TOD ApmpaktKod Kodzrov, 
oi Kepxupato. enpuxa Te tpovTeuwav avtois €&v 
axati@ atepotvTa pn Treiv él odas, Kai Tas 
la ¢ / 
vads dua erdnpovv, CevEavtés Te Tas Tadatas 
@ote TAwipous elvat Kal Tas addas eTLOKEYA- 
? c a > / 
cavtes. ws 6€ 6 KHpvE Te aTnyyetkey ovdev 
nr \ rn 3 , rn A 
eipnvaiov Tapa Tov KopivOiwv Kat ai vijes avtois 
émeTApwvtTo ovaat oydonKovta (TeccapaKxovTa 
/ / 
yap "Emiéauvov éroXopKxovy), avtTavayayopevot 
Kal wapatazapevor evavpdxnoav Kai éviknoav 
of Kepxupaio. mapa Tov Kat vals TEVTE Kat 
, / lal / An \ > lel 
Séxa SiébOecpav tev KopivOiwv. 7H O€ auth 
ec / > la / \ \ \ ID / 
nuépa autois Evvé8n Kal Tovs THY Eaiéapvor 
r / e / 
modLopKovyTas TapacTncacVat omodroyia wate 
\ \ b] / > / / \ 
Tovs pev émnyrvdas atroddcBat, Kopiv6vous dé 
/ Y4 oe x by / 
Sioavras éxew Ews av Addo Tt Oo€n. 
/ r a 
XXX. Mera 8 rHv vavpayiav ot Kepxupaior 
tTpotaiov oticavtes emt TH Aeuxiuvyn THs Kep- 
\ / e 
Kupalas akpwTnpi@ Tods ev Grdovs ods EXhaBov 


BOOK I. xxix. 1-xxx. 1 

XXIX. The Corinthians, however, would not listen 
to any of these proposals, but, as soon as their ships 
were manned and their allies were at hand, they 
sent a herald in advance to declare war against the 
Corcyraeans ; then, setting off with seventy-five ships 
and two thousand hoplites, they sailed for Epidamnus 
to give battle to the Corcyraeans. Their ships were 
under the command of Aristeus son of Pellichus, 
Callicrates son of Callias, and Timanor son of Ti- 
manthes; the infantry under that of Archetimus 
son of Eurytimus and Isarchidas son of Isarchus. 
But when they reached Actium in the territory of 
Anactorium, where is the sanctuary of Apollo at the 
mouth of the Ambracian gulf, the Corcyraeans sent 
out a herald in a small boat to forbid their advance, 
and at the same time proceeded to man their ships, 
having previously strengthened the old vessels with 
cross-beams so as to make them seaworthy, and 
having put the rest in repair. When “fheir herald 
brought back no message of peace from the Corin- 
thians and their ships were now fully manned, being 
eighty in number (for forty were besieging Epidam- 
nus), they sailed out against the enemy and, drawing 
up in line, engaged in battle; and they won a 
complete victory and destroyed fifteen ships of the 
Corinthians. On the same day it happened that 
their troops which were engaged in the siege of 
Epidamnus forced it to a capitulation, on condition 
that the other immigrants! should be sold into 
slavery but the Corinthians kept in bonds until 
something else should be agreed upon. 

XXX. After the sea-fight the Corcyraeans set up 
a trophy of their victory at Leucimne, a promontory 
in the territory of Corecyra, and put to death the 

1 4.¢e. the Ambraciots and Leucadians ; ¢f. ch. xxvi. 1. 

434 B.o 


, / 
aixyuarwrtous améxtewav, Kopuvbious 6 dyoavtes 
“ ? ef / nf \ e / \ e 
elyov. tatepov dé, érretdn ot KopivOsor cat ot 
Evupayor joonpévot Tals vavoiv aveywpnoav én’ 
oixov, THS Oadadoons amdons éxpatovy THs KAT 
a \ / a 
éxetva Ta ywplia,ot Kepxupaior, cal wrevoavtes 
3 s Neate / ? , a na 
és Aeuxdda thv KopivOi@v atrotkiay ths yhs éte- 
\ / Ny 2 / ? 7, ey! 
pov Kal KudAAnvny to 'HAelwv ériverov evérrpnoar, 
nr / fal 
OTL vals Kal ypnwata Tapécyov KopivOiois. Tod 
\ a \ 
émekpatouv ths Oadaoons Kal tovs tov Kopu- 
Oiwy Evppayous éemimréovtes EfOerpov,)wéeypt ov 
/ 4 a / / lal 
Kopiv@to. treptovtTe T@ Oéper TréeurpavTes vavs Kal 
lal € 4 / 
oTpatiay, evel ofav ot EVupaxor Errovovp, €oTpa- 
> \ / 
toTredevovto émi ‘Axtiw Kal mepl TO Xetpuépiov 
a / a 4 a / 
THs Oeot partidos, Pvrakis &vexa THs te Aevxados 
A / , / 
Kal TOV AAAwY TOAEWY Goat odict hirttat Hoav. 
/ A 
avtectpatoTedevovto O€ Kal of Kepxupaio: ért 
A / A / 
tH Aevkiuyvn vavot te nal melO. érrétdedv TE 
\ \ fa) 
, a > / > 
KabeCouevor Yetw@vos On avexw@pnoav én’ olkou 
\ \ 
XXXI. Tov 5€ éviavtov wavta Tov peta THY 
vavpaxiav Kal Tov vtoTtepov of KopivOror opyn 
hépovtes Tov pos Kepxupaious oXemov évavTrn- 
youvTo Kal TapecxevaloyTo Ta KpaTioTa veov 
atodov, &k Te avTHs IleXoTovvyncou ayeipovtes 
A © , a 
Kal THs GAAS “EAAdSos Eepétas picO@ reiPovTes. 
muvOavomevot 5€ of Kepxupaio: tiv tapacKevny 
a a 7 \ 
avtav époS8odrTo, Kai (Haav yap ovdevos ‘EXAN- 


BOOK I. xxx. 1—xxx1. 2 

prisoners they had taken, with the exception of the 
Corinthians, whom they kept in fetters. But after- 
wards, when the Corinthians and their allies had 
gone back home with their ships after their defeat, 
the Corcyraeans were masters of the whole sea\in 
that quarter, and sailing to Leucas, the colony of the 
Corinthians, they ravaged the country and burned 
Cyllene, the naval arsenal of the Eleans, because they 
had furnished ships and money to the Corinthians. 
And so for most of the time after the sea-fight they 
had control over the sea; and sailing against the 
allies of the Corinthians they kept harrying them, 
until the Corinthians, as the summer was drawing 
to an end,! seeing that their allies were suffering, 
sent ships and an army and encamped at Actium 
and near the promontory of Cheimerium in Thes- 
protis, as a protection for Leucas and the other 
cities that were friendly to themselves. And the 
Corcyraeans encamped on the opposite coast at Leu- 
cimne with both ships and infantry. Neither side 
sailed against the other, but they faced each other 
for the rest of this summer; it was not until winter 
had come that they each went back home. 

XXXI. During the whole year after the sea-fight 
and the next year the Corinthians, being angrily in- 
dignant about their war with the Corcyraeans, kept 
building ships and preparing a naval armament with 
all their might, and collected oarsmen from both 
the Peloponnesus and the rest of Hellas by the in- 
ducement of pay. The Corcyraeans, on the other 
hand, were alarmed when they learned of their pre- 
parations, and since they were without an ally among 

1 wepidyrt (as the MSS. read) = repudyr:. But Ullrich 
(Beitr. z. Kr. iii. p. 5) explains = év tG wepidvts tod Gépous, 
‘‘in what remained of the summer.” So Boehme. 



” > as. 9 / e \ ” > 
vov Evotrovoot ovde EveypaavTo EAUTOUS OUTE ES 
\ ’ / \ ” > \ S 
ras ’A@nvaiwy otovdas ovTe és tas Aaxedat- 
poviwv) eo£ev avtois éMOodaw ws Tors “AOnvai- 
ous Evpudyous yevécfar kal @pediav Twa TeLpa- 

> ’ > lal e / e \ / 

cOar am’ avTov evpioxea Oat. ot 6€ KopivOcor 
muOopevot TAUTA mrOov Kal auto. és Tas A@nvas 
mpeaBevoopevor, OT WS Hn opict mpos T@ Kep- 
KUPalwY VAUTLK@ Kal TO aUTaV T poo ryevopevov 
€uTr0OLov yevntas GécOar Tov TONE HOV 4 ©Bov- 
NovTal. KaTaoTdons 66 éxKANGlas és avTiAoylav 

ArAOov. Kal of wev Kepxvpaios édeEav tordde. 
XXXII. “Alxatov, ® ’AOnvaiot, Tovs pyre 
evepyetias peyadns unte Evppayias mpovderro- 
Levys hKovtas Tapa Tovs TéXas émLKOUpLas, wo- 
wep Kal jwels viv, Senoopévovs avadioagar Tpa- 
/ Seat \ , / > O\ 
Tov, wadiaTa mev ws Kal Evudopa Séovtas, et dé 
un, Te ye ove emitnpia, erecta S€ ws Kal THY 
/ f ¢ ? \ 4 \ \ 
yapw BéBaov EEovow: ei dé TovTwY pndev cages 
KataoTooUet, pn opyifec Oar hv aTUX@ow. Kep- 
Kupator dé pera TNS fuppaxias THS aitnoews Kal 
TavTAa TLOTEVOVTES exupa bmiv mapeter Oat amré- 
OTELAAY 1)LGS. TETUNNKE d€ TO avTO emeribevpa 

5 epat 

mpos Te Upas és THY Xpetay ayer aroyov Kal és 
Ta HyéeTepa avTov ev TO Tapovre a€vppopov. 

Evppaxot Te yap obdevés TW €V T@ TPO TOV x°% 

EXOUCLOL ‘YEvopevor viv addXwv TovTO Senoopevor 
Koper Kal dua és TOY TapovTa Trodeu“ov Kopu- 
Oiwv phot é0 avTo caléaTapen. Kal TEpte- 
otnKev  Soxodca Hua mpoTEepoy cwhpocvvn, TO 



BOOK I. xxx1. 2—-xxxit. 4 

the Hellenes and had not enrolled themselves in 
the alliance either of the Athenians or of the Lace- 
daemonians, they decided to go to the Athenians, 
become their allies, and try to procure some aid 
from them. But the Corinthians also, hearing of 
this, themselves sent envoys to Athens to prevent 
the addéssion of the Athenian fleet to that of the 

Corcyraeans, as this would hamper them in settling 

the war as they wished. And when an assembly 
was held opposing speeches were made, and the 
Corcyraeans spoke as follows: 

XXXII. “It is but fair, citizens of Athens, that 
those who, without any previous claim on the score 
of important service rendered or of an existing al- 
liance, come to their neighbours to ask aid, as we 
do now, should show in the first place, if possible, 
that what they ask is advantageous, or at least that 
it is not hurtful, and, in the second place, that their 
gratitude can be depended on; but in case they 
establish neither of these things ‘clearly, they should 
not be angry if unsuccessful. Now the Corcyraeans 
have sent us to ask for an alliance, and in full con- 
fidence that they will be able to give you guarantees 
on just these points. But it so happens that our 
policy has been at one and the same time incon- 
sistent, as it must seem to you, with our petition, 
and is also disadvantageous under present circum- 
stances to ourselves; for although heretofore we 
have freely chosen to be allies of no one, we have 
now come to ask others for an alliance, and at the 
same time, in the face of the present war with the 
Corinthians, we are, because of this very policy, 
isolated. And so what was formerly fondly imagined 
to be wise discretion on our part—to enter into no 




\ DJ AX / / a a a. , 
fn €v adXotpia Evppaxyia TH TOV Tédas youn 
7 a“ > Zz \ > / 
Evyxiduvevew, viv aBovria cat acbévera hai- 

vouern. THY “ev OY yEevouernv vavpaxiay avTol 
\ / > / / > \ \ 
KaTa povas atewoduela KopivOiovs: émerdy bé 
pelCove. tapackevn amo IleXorovvncov Kal Tis 
€ ’ a ral 
Gdns “EAXddos éf’ Huds wpunvrat cal jpeis 
b] ‘Af e la! ” a > / / / 
GOvVaTOL Op@pev dvTES TH OiKEela povoy Suvdpet 
~~ / \ we / e , eB / 
mepliyevec Oar, Kal Gua péyas 0 Kivodvvos, €i éoo- 
: ae ? a 1° % eon ee 
peOa um’ avtois, avayxn Kal tuav Kal adXov 
a \ 
mavtos émixoupias SetcPat, cal Evyyvopun, m1 
\ / , \ 6 rng (ae ma ’ 
peta Kaxias, do—ns 6€ wadXov apapTia TH Tpo- 
/ lal 
XXXII. “Vevycerac Sé tyiv recOopévors 
\ e / \ \ ol e / 
Katyn 7 EvytTvylia KaTa Toda THS NweTéepas 
xpelas, Tp@Tov pev Ste adixovpévois Kal ovy 
étépous BAamTovet THY émixovpiav TroinoedOe, 
évelTa TEpL TOV peyloTwy KWwduvevovtas beEa- 
fevol ws Gv padioTa eT alelvynoToU papTupiouv 
Tv xapiv KkatabnoecOe, vauvTixoy Te KEexTHwEOa 
\ fal ’ e nw “~ 4 / 
TAnY Tov Tap vuly TrELoTOV. Kal oxevadbe 
/ a / 
tis evmpakia oTaviwtépa Tis Tots ToNEpiols 
. a \ lal 
Twv Kal yapiTos éTiunoadGe Suvamiy vpiv Tpoo- 
yevécOar, attn Tadpectiv avTeTayyEeATOS, avev 
Kiwdvvev Kal datravns didovca éavtny Kal mpoc- 
, , 5) \ \ \. gf 9 , 2 82 
eT. hepovoa €5 pey TOUS TrOAAOUS apETNHY, Ols O€ 
a a lal > a 
évrapuveite yap, tyiv 8 avtois ioxvv: & ev TO 


BOOK I. xxx. 4—xxxill. 2 

foreign alliance, with the possibility of having to 
take our share of the danger of our neighbour's 
policy—has now, in the event, proved want of 
wisdom and a source of weakness. It is true that, 
in the sea-fight we have had, we repulsed the Co- 
rinthians single-handed ; but now that they have set 
out to attack us with a greater force, drawn from the 
Peloponnesus and the rest of Hellas, and we see 
that we are unable to prevail with our own strength 
alone, and since, further, our peril will be serious if 
we come into their power, we are constrained to ask 
help of you and of everyone else; and it is pardon- 
able if we now, actuated by no baseness, but rather 
acknowledging an error of judgment, venture upon 
a course that runs counter to our former policy of 
avoiding foreign entanglements. 

XXXIII. “ For yourselves, if you concede what we 
ask, by a happy concurrence of events Athens can 
get both honour and advantage in many ways: first, 
you will be giving your aid to those who are wronged 
and not to those who injure others; next, by taking 
into alliance men whose most vital interests are at 
stake, you will lay up for yourselves a claim for grati- 
tude with a record which will abide in our memories 
for ever; and, lastly, we havea navy greater than any 
but your own. Think of it now, what good fortune 
could be rarer, more vexatious to your foes, than 
this—that the power which you would have ac- 
counted it worth much money and gratitude to 
acquire should become yours unbidden, offering itselt 
to you without danger or expense, and bringing you, 
besides, a good name before the world, gratitude 
from those wlio are to receive your help, and en- 
hanced strength for yourselves? To few in all 



Tavtt ypovw ortyors 67 awa mayTa EvvéBn, Kal 
OALyoL Evppaxias Seopevor ols emKarOvVTAL 
ao paretav Kat Koo Lov ovx ‘acov dLoovTes 7 
Ane opevor TapayiyvovTar. 

3 “Tov € TOAEMOY, dv 6vTrep NENT WOU av elev, 
el TUS UEOY fy) OleTaL éeveo Oar, yvOLuNsS dpaptaver 
Kal ovK aia Paverat TOUS Aaxedatpovious poBw 
Oious, CURE MELOUS Tap avtois Kal vuiv exOpous 
ovTas," TpokaTadauPavovras meas vov é€> THY 
UmeTepav em iXelpnow, iva 1) T@ Kow@ é&xOer 
KaT avTovs eT adn ov oT Lev pnee évoiv 
pbdcat auapTwciy, } Kak@oa Huas 7) chads av- 

4 tous BeBaiwcacba. nuétepov 5é y av épyov 
TpoTEpHcat, TOV jev didovtav, Uuav 6é deFape- 
vov TV Evppaxiar, Kal TpoeTeBovrEvelw avTots 
MaAXov 7) avtTemuBoureverv. 

XXXIV. «Hp dé Neyoouy @s$ ov dixaLtov Tous 
apeTepous aTroiKous: vpas déxeo bat, pabovrav 
@S Taga aTrolKia ev pev TaaxXovea TULG THY 
pnt porrorsy, adixoupevy dé @XoTptovrar ov yap 
errl TO dodXot, aX €ml T@® Omotoe Tois NerTropeE- 

2 vots Elva EKTEMTOVT AL, @S oe NOLKOUD cahées 
cot” T poxrnbevres 1p. mept *Emiddpvou és 
Kplolv TONEM@ AadXAOV h TO low EVovd nOncav Ta 

3 éyxAnuata peTeNOetv. Kal Upiv Eotw TL TEKLN- 

1 kat, before mpoxataAauBdvovras in the MSS., deleted by 

1 This allegation is denied in the speech of the Corinthians, 
ch. xli. 1 

2 Or, retaining «af before mpoxataAauBdvortas, ‘‘and fails 
to perceive that the Lacedaemonians, through fear of you, 


BOOK I. xxximn. 2-xxxIv. 3 

history have such opportunities fallen all at the 
same time, and few are they who, when they beg for 
an alliance, come offering to those to whom they 
make their appeal as large a degree of security and 
honour as they expect to receive. 

“ Now as to the war which would give us occasion 
to be of service, if anyone of you thinks it will not 
occur he errs in judgment, and fails to perceive that 
the Lacedaemonians, through fear of you, are eager 
for war, and that the Corinthians, who have great 
influence with them and are enemies of yours,} are 
making a beginning with us now? with a view to a 
subsequent attack upon you, in order that we may 
not be led by our common hatred to take our stand 
together against them, and that they may not fail, 
before we unite, to attain their two objects—to 
harm us and to strengthen themselves. It is our 
business, on the other hand, to get the start of 
them—we offering and your accepting the alliance 
—and to forestall their schemes rather than to 
counteract them. 

XXXIV. “ But if they say that it is not right for 
you to receive their colonists, let them know that 
while every colony honours the mother-city so long 
as it is well treated, yet that if wronged it becomes 
alienated ; for colonists are not sent out to be slaves 
to those who are left behind, but to be their equals. 
And that they were in the wrong is manifest ; for 
when challenged to arbitrate the case of Epidamnus 
they preferred to prosecute their charges by war 
rather than by equity. And let their present treat- 
are eager for war, and that the Corinthians have great in- 

fluence with them and are enemies of yours, and are making 
a beginning with us with a view to a subsequent attack upon 

WOE, <as. 



a r lal 4 
plov & tpos nuas tors Evyyeveis Sp@ow, Bote 
aTaTn TE Ln TapayecOat UT avTav Seopévoss TE 

a“ € al c , \ 
€x Tov EvOéos ut) UTroUpyelv: Oo yap éAayloTas TAS 
peTaperelas €x Tod yapifecPat Tois évayTioss 
LauBavav acdaréatatos av d:aTeXoin. 

XXXV. “Avoete 5€ obdé Tas Aakedatpoviwr 
omovoas Seyomevot nuas undetépwy dvtas Evypa- 
\ r a ¢ 
yous. elpntat yap év avtais, tav “EdAnvidav 
A an lal > 
TOkewv Aris pndapod Evumayel, éEeivar wap 
oToTépous ay apécxntar deity. Kai Sewwov e 
Totade pev ATO TE TOY évoeTrOvowY ecTaL TANPOUY 
\ a \ s Anis a ¥ ©) / 
dé amo THs TpoKeméervns Te Evupayias eipEovar 
\ > \ fol »” / Q ’ / s 1 > 
Kal ato THS addOVEV Tofev @perias, eita! ev 
adixnuate Oncovtat TweccbévtTwv vuav & deopea: 

\ \ > , bey 4 e a \ / ~ 

ToAv O€ €v TrELoVL aiTia Tueis  TeicavTeEs 
cal a \ 4 
vuas EEomev’ Huds wev yap Kwduvevovtas Kal ovK 
€yOpovs dvtas ata@cecbe, tTavde Sé ovY STAs 
Ko@\uUTAal éxOpa@v dvTwYv Kal étiovT@Y yevnoedbe, 
adda Kal ao THS UpeTépas apyns SvvapLy mpoc- 
lal ’ 

AaBetv meprovrecbe: jv ov Sixaiov, GAN 4 KaxKel- 
vov KwAVELY TOUS Ex THS tweTépas picbodopous 7 
\ e a / , a a ’ / 
kat nuiv TeurTre KAO O TL av TEcOnTE @periav 

/ \ > \ al fa) / 
ddtota O€ ato Tod mpodavods deEapévous Bon- 
Geiv. modda Sé, WoTrep ev apxR UTreiTOpEV, TA 
Evudépovta amodetxvupev, Kal péytotov Ott of TE 

2 With the MSS.; Kriiger conjectures ef re, followed by 


BOOK I. xxxiv. 3-xxxv. 5 

ment of us, who are their kinsmen, be a warning to 
you, that you be not misled by their deceit, or, if 
they seek aid from you directly, that you may refuse 
it. For whoever finds fewest occasions to regret 
doing favours to his opponents will ever remain 
most secure. 

XXXV. “ Neither will you be breaking your treaty 
with the Lacedaemonians by receiving us, who are 
allies of neither party. For in this treaty it is stipu- 
lated that if any of the Hellenic cities is a member 
of no alliance, it is at liberty to join whichever side it 
pleases. And it is monstrous if they are to be al- 
lowed to recruit their navy, not only from their own 
allies, but also from the rest of Hellas besides, and 
particularly from your subjects, but are to debar us 
from the alliance that should naturally be open to us 
as well as from aid from any other quarter, and then 
shall count it a crime if you are persuaded to con- 
cede what we ask. Far more shall we hold you at 
fault if we fail to win your consent; for you will be 
repulsing us who are in peril and are not your enemies, 
while as regards these men, who are enemies and ag- 
gressors, you will not only not be thwarting them, 
but will even be allowing them to get fresh forces 
from your own dominions. To that they have no 
right; but it is right that you should either prevent 
them from raising mercenaries in places under your 
control, or else send aid to us also, on whatever 
terms you may be induced to make; but it would be 
best of all for you openly to receive and help us. 
And many, as we suggested at the outset,! are the 
advantages which we can show you, and the most 
important of all is this, that the enemies of both of 

1 Ch. xxxiii. 1, 



tte | / e a 2 4 4, 
avTol rodéutor nuiy joav (dTep capeoctaTy 
, \ 2x > > a > OR 4 \ 
mTiaTls) Kal ovTOL oOvK aabeEvEis, AAX iKaVOL TOUS 

/ / \ na \ > 
petactavtas Prawar. Kal vavTiKhs Kal ovK 
fa! 4 / e 
hmetpwtioos THS Evppaytas didowevns ovy opoia 
\ / 
4 adXoTpiwais, GAA padLoTAa péev, Eb duvacbe, 
rn r 4 > 
pndéva addov éay KextHaVar vais, & O€ pm, 
A / 54 
Satis éyupwtatos, TovToV dirov ExeL. 
XXXVI. “Kal étw tade Evpdhépovta pév Soret 
ral \ \ > \ , 
Aévyer Oa, hoBetras 5é wy de’ avta TeLOopevos Tas 
\ / , \ \ \ > os \ 
orovdas AVE, yUOTW TO pev dEedL0s aUTOD iaydY 
a nr \ x 
éyov Tovs évavtious wadrov hoBijaov, To dé Oap- 
ra / \ a \ > s, 
cobv pi deEapévov acbeves Ov pos toxXvVOVTAas 
f / 
tors €xOpovs abdeéctepov eaopevov, Kal awa ov 
A a / fa) \ / a \ lal > 
mept THs Kepxtpas viv To wAéov 7 Kal Tov ’AOn- 
la / An 
vav Bovrevdpevos, Kal ov Ta KpaTLcTa avTais 
lal ev ‘\ / 
mpovo@y, oTav €> Tov péANOVTA Kai Goov ov 
/ \ , a 
TapovTa TOAE“OY TO aUTIKa TEeploKOTT@V €v- 
/ “ 4é 
Sordtn xwpiov mpocdaSeiy 6 peta peyloTtwr 
ad lal / a fol 
Kalp@v olKELoUTaL TE Kal ToAEp“OUTAaL. THs Te 
, /, a 
yap “Itadias Kal ixedlas Kadk@s Tapdmdov 
a la \ lal 
KelTal, wate ponte éxellev vauTixov eacat IleXo- 
movynotos émedOeivy To Te évTedDOEv pos TaKet 
, / 
TmapaTéurpat, Kal és TaXXA Evphopwtatov éotwy. 

1 So jcay seems to mean here, where eiof was to be ex- 
pected ; cf. ch. xxxiii. 3. 

2 Sef or Eupdéper seems to be implied. 

3 The thirty-years’ truce with Sparta; ¢/. ch. xxiii. 4, 


BOOK I. xxxv. 5—xxxvi. 2 

us are, as we see,! the same—which is the surest 
guarantee of fidelity—and these are not weak, but 
able to injure those who withdraw from them. And 
furthermore, when the alliance that is offered is with 
a maritime and not with a continental power, the 
alienation of such an ally is not a matter of indif- 
ference ; on the contrary, you should? by all means, 
if possible, permit no one else to possess ships; but 
if that is impossible, you should have as your friend 
him who is strongest therein. 

XXXVI. “If anyone thinks that this course is in- 
deed expedient, but fears that if he yields to this con- 
sideration he will be breaking off the truce,’ he should 
understand that his fear, if backed by strength, will 
make his enemies more afraid ;* whereas, if he re- 
ject our alliance, his confidence ® will be unsupported 
by might and will therefore be less formidable against 
enemies that are strong. He should understand, 
furthermore, that he is deliberating upon the in- 
terests, not so much of Corcyra, as of Athens, and 
that he is not making the best provision for her 
when, in the face of the war that is impending and 
all but present, he hesitates, through cautious con- 
sideration of the immediate chances, to attach to 
himself a country which is not made a friend or a 
foe except with the most momentous consequences. 
For Corcyra is favourably situated for a coasting 
voyage either to Italy or Sicily,® so that you could 
prevent a fleet from coming thence to join the Pelo- 
ponnesians, or could convoy thither a fleet from here; 
and in other respects it is a most advantageous 

‘ te. of themselves breaking the truce. 

5 i.e. in the security of the truce. 

6 Ancient mariners preferred to hug the coast rather than 
sail through the open zea. 



x, A / = 
3 Bpaxyvtato & av xeparaio, tots te Evurrace kal 
> ee a >A \ / € a / 
Kal’ Exactov, TOD av pn TpoécOar Huas walouTe 
/ ‘ v / ” lal vf , 
Tpla pev Ovta Aoyou afva Tots EXAnoe vautixa, 
\ » Bea al \ \ = / \ \ , 
TO Tap viv Kai TO 7meTepov Kat TO KopwOtov: 
/ \ 7 al 
TovTwy dé et meptowerbe Ta dvo és TavTOV EOeiv 
a / 
kat KopivO:o. juas tmpoxatadnovtat, Kepxv- 
/ \ / 
paiows te Kal IleXorrovynctous apa vavpaynoerte 
/ pt Bina by 4 \ > \ , 
deEauevor 6€ nuas e€eTEe TpOs avTOUs TAéELoCL 
a / / E 
vavol tals nwetépats aywviferbas.” 
an a s 
4 Towadta pev of Keprvpaios eirov: ot 6€ Kopiv- 
Oot eT avTovs Tordoe. 
XXXVII. “’Avayxaiov Kepxupaiwv tavde od 
/ a a bé Q a \ / 
povov Tept Tod béEacOa ohas Tov oyov TroLnoa- 
, ’ x ¢ 4.) se a a a \ oy \ 
> / lal ral 
€ a \ > / e \ b \ \ ” 
/ v I ~ \ > ay ie an > / b] 
oyov lévat, iva THY ad tuav Te akiwow acda- 
a \ a 
Né€oTEpov TpoElonTe KaL THY TwVdE yYpElay pH 
aroyloTws atone. 
, % ral 
2 “acai dé Evppayiav bia TO cHdpov ovdevds 
\ A 
mw déFacbar: TO Oo éml Kakoupyia Kal ovK apeTH 
> / 4 / > / / = 
éreTnoevoay, Evppaxyov te ovdéva PovrAcpevor 
Tpos TadiKnuaTa oUTE! wapTUpa ExELY OvdE Trapa- 
3 KadouVTEs aicytvedOal, Kai 7) TONS aUTO@Y aya 
avtapkn Oéow Keimévn Tapéxer avTovs SixacTas 
/ ca) a 
@v Brartovci tia padrdrgov Kata EvvOnKas 
1 For ov5¢ of the MSS., Dobree’s conjecture. Hude reads 
ovde. .. ovde. 


BOOK I. xxxvi. 3—xxxvir. 3 

place. And by one briefest concluding word, which 
embraces both the whole issue and all separate facts, 
you will be convinced that you should not abandon 
us: The Hellenes have only three fleets that are 
worthy of mention, yours, ours, and that of the 
Corinthians; if, now, the Corinthians shall seize us 
first and you thus let two of these fleets become 
united, you will have to fight on the sea against 
both Corcyraeans and Peloponnesians at once; but 
if you accept us, you will be able to contend 
against them with your navy augmented by our 

Thus spoke the Corcyraeans, and after them the _ 

Corinthians as follows: ae 

XXXVII. “Since these Corcyraeans have not con- 
fined themselves to the question of their admission 
into your alliance, but have gone further and urged 
that we are the wrong-doers and they are unfairly 
attacked, we too must of necessity touch upon both 
these points before we proceed to our general argu- 
ment, in order that you may be more definitely 
forewarned of the nature of the demand we have 
to make, and may have good grounds for rejecting 
their petition. 

“They say that ‘a wise discretion’ has hitherto 
kept them from accepting an alliance with anyone; 
but the fact is that they adopted this policy with a 
view to villainy and not from virtuous motives, and 
because they wished in their misdeeds not to have 
any ally as witness, or to be put to shame if they 
invited his presence. Moreover, the insular and in- 
dependent position of this state causes them to be 
arbitrary judges of the injuries they do to others 
instead of being judges appointed by mutual agree- 





, \ \ = > \ \ / > / 
ryiyver Oat, dua TO HKLoTa él Todvs TéXAS ExT E- 
\ , 3 1 
ovTas “adtoTa TOUS addOUS aVayKNn KATALpovTas) 
, uv \ lal \ = \ BA > 
déyecOal.; Kai TOTO TO EvTpEeTés AoTTOVSOY Ov 
SNARE  eanase Cae = 
© nA > 
iva pn Evvadix@ow ETEpols TpoRBEBAnvTAaL, GAN 
7 \ r ? A \ ¢ Nan sp. betta 
OTWS KATA povas AOLK@oL Kal OTws \év © ev av 
KpaTaot Bialwvrat,\ob 8 adv AaPaat Tréov Eyo- 
ow, Hv “8é mod Te TporadBwow avaicyvvT@ciy’ 
KalTOL El Hoav avopes, BaTEP haciv, ayabol, bow 
> / = lal / / \ 
aXnTTOTEpOL Hoav Tos Tédas, TOTW Se havepw- 
/ IEA bd a \ 3 \ nr \ Z 
Tépay €€hv autos THv apeTny OLdovat Kal Sexo- 
pévols TA Sixata Serxvuvat. 
3 e al / > / Vv Lan 4 ’ a , 
és mas Tololde elolv, Atouor © dvTEs abectact 
\ \ \ a a / e 
ovK éTl TO KAKOS Ee? ise cxmeupietey. 7 [LElS 
dé ovd’ avtot dapyev emi to (brO Tauren) WBpite- 
aoOat KatToixioal, arr él TO Hyewoves TE elvas 
, e cal 
kal ta elkota OavyatecOar. ai yoov addrXat 
, \ A o ’ a , > + 
atepyouela: Kal Sjrov 6t1, et Tols TA€OTW apé- 
rf >] , ’ lal 
oKOVTES EgpEV, TOiTS dv povols OvK OpOas aTrapé- 
SiahepovTws Te adiKovpevot. Kadov & Hv, & Kal 
/ nr st ‘ol a 
Hwaptavouer, Toiade mev elEar TH HpeTépa opyn, 
rn \ \ 
nuiv S€ aiaxpov Bidcoacbar tHv TovTwY peTpE- 

BOOK I. xxxvil. 3—XXXxvIII. 5 

ment; owing to the fact that they resort very 
little to the ports of their neighbours, but to a 
very large extent receive into their ports others 
who are compelled to put in there. And mean- 
while they have used as a cloak their specious policy 
of avoiding alliances, adopted not in order to avoid 
joining others in wrong-doing, but that they may do 
wrong all alone; that wherever they have power 
they may use violence, and wherever they can escape 
detection they may overreach someone; and if, per- 
chance, they can steal a march on anyone, that they 
may brazen it out. And yet, if they were really honest 
men, as they pretend to be, the less liable they were 
to attack by their neighbours the more clearly they 
might have demonstrated their virtuous motives by 
offering and accepting proposals of arbitration. 
XXXVIII. “ But neither toward others nor to- 
ward us have they shown themselves honest men ; on 
the contrary, although they are colonists of ours, they 
have constantly stood aloof from us, and now they 
are at war with us, claiming that they were not sent 
out to be ill treated. But neither did we colonize 
them to be insulted by them, but to be their leaders 
and to receive from them all due reverence. The 
rest of our colonies, at any rate, honour us, and 
by our colonists we are beloved more than is any 
other mother-city. And it is clear that, if we are 
acceptable to the majority, it cannot be on good 
grounds that we are unacceptable to these alone; 
nor are we making war upon them in a way so 
unusual without being also signally wronged. And 
even if we were at fault, the honourable course for 
them would have been to make allowance for our 
temper, in which case it would have been shameful 



6 étTnTa: BBpe S€ Kal eEovcia wrovTOV TONKA és 
c al »” e / \ eo (6 e / 
Has dra Te HuapTHKact Kal Entdapvov nperte- 

/ \ al 
pav ovcav KaKovpéevnvy pev ov TpoceETroLoUVTO, 
€rOovtwv b€ Huav emt Ttiyuwpia érovtes Bia 
: hy peo pig ; 

XXXIX. “Kal daci 67) dixn mpotepov €Ge- 
a F. / 

Ajoas KpiverOat, hv ye ov TOV TMpovYoVTA Kai EK 
lal 5 la) / n 
Tov aoharovs mpoKxadovpevov Eyer TL Soxeiv 
ra > % \ ’ y / Bd e A \ \ 
/ \ , / Ag 

2 royous mpl SsayoviterOar Kafiotavta. ovToL 

x > \ a \ / > : A : e / 
d€ ov Tpliv TONLOpKELY TO KWPLOV, AX érretdn y- 
lal / / 
cavto Huas ov Tepiower Oat, TOTE Kal TO EVTIPETTES 
ol / \ n 
ths Sixns mapécxovto: Kat Sevpo ‘Kova, ov 
a /, \ a 
a > rn b a b] \ a \ 
vov akvodvres ov Evppayeiv, adrAa Evvadixety Kai 
/ v id va) / rn a ~ 
3 dsadopous dvtas npiv déyecPar ohas: ovs xXpHy, 
/ / / 
Ste aohadéoctato. Hoav, TOTE Tpocteval, Kal py 
év & tpuets pwev HorknucOa, ovTOL Oé KLWdUVYEVOUGL 
B Tels perv Hdcxijueba, 
? ¢€ a n b] a , 
und ev @ vpeis THs Te Svvduews a’T@Y TOTE OU 
, al >’ / lal / \ 
pevaraBovtes THs whedias vdv peTadwoeTe Kal 
rn 5 a —" r lal 
TOV GuapTnudtwyv amo Yyevouevor THS ad Huav 
aitias To lcov é€eTe, Tadat 5é KOWwoaVYTAS THY 
Sivamwy Kowa Kal Ta aTOBaivovta eye. 
ae < \ > eae \ , 
XL. ‘6 Os pev ovv autol Te peTa TpocnKoVYTwY 
’ / >’ f \ ~/ / \ 
eyxAnmatov épyowela kal olde Biarot Kat Teo- 
1 eyeAnudtav 5& pdvwv auetdxous ol Tws Tay weTa Tas mpdtets 
rovTwy wh Kowwveiv, ‘* As, however, you have had no share in 
the accusations, you should not share in the consequences.” 

This clause is omitted by all good MSS. except G, and by all 
recent editors except Bloomfield. 


BOOK I. xxxvitl. 5-xt. 1 

for us to outrage their moderation; but in the 
insolence and arrogance of wealth they have wronged 
us in many other ways, and particularly in the case 
of Epidamnus, our colony, which they made no claim 
to when it was in distress, but seized by force the 
moment we came to its relief, and continue to hold. 

XXXIX. “They pretend, forsooth, that they were 
the first to agree to an arbitration of the issue; 
but surely it is not the proposals of the one who has 
the advantage, and occupies a safe position when he 
invites arbitration, that ought to have weight, but 
rather those of the one who has made his actions tally 
with his professions before appealing to arms. These 
men, however, bring forward their specious offer of a 
court of arbitration, not before laying siege to the 
place, but only after they had concluded that we 
would not permit it. And now, not satisfied with the 
blunders they have committed themselves at Epi- 
damnus, they have come here demanding that you 
too at this juncture, shall be, not their allies, but 
their accomplices in crime, and that you shall receive 
them, now that they are at variance with us. But 
they ought to have come to you when they were 
in no peril at all, and not at a time when we are 
victims of their injustice and they are consequently 
in danger, nor when you, without having had the 
benefit of their power before, will now have to give 
them a share of your aid, and, though you had nothing 
to do with their at ea will have to bear an equal 
part of the blame we shall bestow. For only if you 
from the first had shared their power ought you to 
share the consequences also now of their acts. 

XL. “ Now it has been clearly shown that we have 
come with proper grounds of complaint against 



\ / 
véxtat eiot Sednrwtat: ws b€ ovK dv Sixatas 
’ \ / a / ’ \ v >’ 
avtous déyocbe pabety yp. ef yap elpntac év 
Tais otrovoais, e€etvar Tap’ omotépous tis Bov- 
na / a n 
AETal TOV aypadwy TorEewy edOEiv, Ov ToIs émh 
BraBn étépwv lodow 7 EvvOnkn éotiv, adn 
a \ yy e X\ > fal ’ , 
ooTls fn aXXoU EaUTOY aTrodTEepwYv aadandelias 
ra oe \ an / 
Settat Kal dotis pn Tois SeEapevois, eb swdpo- 
lal ’ ’ / , a a 
vovol, ToAELOV avT elpivNns ToLnceEl 0 viv bpels 
pn TweOopmevor Huiv waPorte av. ov yap Tolade 
4 > / 5 aN 4 bd \ \ Chie 3 \ 
fLovov €TLKoUpoL av yevotcOe, aNrAA Kal Huty avTl 
€voTovOwY ToNeulol. avayKn yap, eb ite peT 
la \ BA lal 
avuT@V, Kal auvvecOat un avev UL@V TOUTOUS. Kal- 
s ee HR. \ s \ > \ a 
ToL Oikalol y €oTe paddtoTAa meV exTTOd@Y aTHvaL 
> / ’ \ / > / 3 \ / ’ 
audotépols, eb d€ uy, TOUvavTiov él TovTOUS ped 
e a 7 , / 4 
npav tévart (KopivOios pév ye evotrovdoi éote, 
\ > a , > 
Kepxupaiows 6€ ovb€ bs avoxwyis teToTE éyé- 
\ , XN ae o \ 
vecOe), Kal TOV vopov un KabioTavat Wate TOUS 
el ye > / / > \ \ e “ 
étépwv adbiatapévous Séyer@ar. ovd€ yap nyeis 
/ > / a / ? 
Lauiov aroctavtwy Widov mpocebéueba évav- 
a a / 
tiav upiv, Tov addXwv IleXoTrovynciov diya én- 
4 lal lal A 
piopévav €b Ypn avTois apvvew, ghavepas 8é 
\ , 
aVTETOMEV TOUS TpoTnKoVTas Evupupayous avTov 
> \ \ al 
Tiva KoNaberv. €b yap TOUS KaKov TL SpavTas 
SeYyouevol TluwpHcete, haveltar Kal a TOV bpere- 

1 7.e. ““who will permit peace to be maintained by their 
new friends if they exercise ordinary discretion.” No new 
allies should be received who will render ordinary discretion 


BOOK I. xu. 1-6 

them and that they are violent and overreaching ; 
but you have still to learn that you have no right to 
receive them into your alliance. For even though it 
is stipulated in the treaty that any unenrolled city 
may join whichever party it pleases, the provision is 
not intended for those who apply to one side for 
admission with a view to the injury of the other, 

but for any one who, without defrauding another 

state of his services, asks for protection, and any 

one who to those who received him will not—if_ 

they are prudent—bring. war~instead of peace.} 
But this is precisely what will be your fate if you 
do not listen to us. For you will not merely be- 
come allies to them, but also enemies to us instead 
of being at truce with us. For it will be necessary 
for us, if you go with them, to include you when we 
proceed to take vengeance upon them. And yet the 
right course for you would be, preferably, to stand 
aloof from us both,—or else to go with us against 
them, remembering that you are under treaty with 
the Corinthians, but have never had with the 
Corcyraeans even anarrangement.-to- refrain from 
hostilities for a time,—and not to establish the 
precedent of admitting into your alliance those who 
revolt from the other side. Why, when the Samians 2 
revolted from you, and the other Peloponnesians were 
divided in their votes on the question of aiding them, 
we on our part did not vote against you; on the 
contrary, we openly maintained that each one should 
discipline his own allies without interference. If you 
receive and assist evil-doers, you will surely find that 

unavailing to prevent war, as the Corcyraeans are sure 
to do. 
2 440 B.c. cf. ch. cxv. 

VOL... D 13 




; / con , \ \ , >4? 
Pv OUK EAdaow ruiv TpocELcl, Kal TOV Vopov ep 
¢ ca > al lal Al *.S ew 2 lal / 
Upty avtols warrov 7 eh Hutv Oncoere. 
/ \ \ al 
XLI. “ Atvcar@pata pev ovv tTdde Tpos bpas 
4 e \ \ \ ¢ / / / 
Eyopuev, ‘Kava KaTa TouS EAXjVwY vo“ous, Tapal- 
veow 6€ kai akiwow YapiTos ToLdvde, Hv ovK 
4 / ? d 
€yOpol dvtes Wate BXaTTEL ovd avd didor WaT’ 
> 6 3 an e Lal > An / 
émixphoGar, avtTidoOjvar muiv év T® Tapovte 
na lal \ lal , 
dayev Yphvar. vedv yap paxpav onavicavtés 
\ \ > lal ¢e \ \ & \ » 
mote mpos tov Aliy.ntav vu7ep ta Mnédixa 
\ / fal , 
movenov tapa Kopiwéiwy eixoot vads édaPete: 
/ ef \ / 
Kal 7 evepyecia avTn TE Kab 1) és Laptovs, TO 
’ ¢e al / > “ y a 
62’ nas IeXotrovynatovs avtois pn BonOjcat, 
a al \ f 
mapecxev vuiv Aiywntov pev éetiKpatnow, La- 
piwy 5€ KoAacLY, Kal Ev KAaLpOts TOLOVTOLS EyEVETO, 
2 , ” aidsst> 25 \ \ D 
ois partota avOpwrro. em éxOpovs Tovs oderté- 
~ / / 
pous lovTes TOV ATaYTwWY aTrEpLOTTTOL EloL Tapa 
a J lal \ nr 
TO viKav' hirov Te yap NYyoUVTAaL TOV UTOUpyourTa, 
\ ? / \ 
hv Kal mpotepov €xOpos 7, TOAEmLOV TE TOV avTt- 
/ a % 4 / ” > \ \ \ > lal 
A / a en Dh 
yetpov TiWevtar dirovixias Eveka THs AUTLKA. 
-. \ , , 
XLII. “*Ov évOupnevtes Kai vewtepos tis 
\ / > ‘ \ > 4 lal 
Tapa mpecBuTépov avuta pabwyv aktovtw Tots 
a n / \ \ / , 
dpotors Huas apvverOar, Kal pH vouton OiKata 
/ / > / 
pev Tade rEéyecOat, Evudopa Sé, e6 Toreunoe., 
/ \ / b] ? A 
ddXra elvat. TO Te yap Evyuhepov ev w av TIS 

1 Sxtp 7a Mydixd Kriiger deletes, followed by Hude. 


BOOK I. xu. 6—xin. 2 

full as many of your allies will come over to us, and 
the precedent you establish will be against yourselves 
rather than against us. 

XLI. “ These, then, are the considerations of right 
which we urge upon you—and they are adequate ac- 
cording to the institutions of the Hellenes; but we 
have also to remind you of a favour and to urge a 
claim based upon it; and since we are not your 
enemies so as to want to injure you, nor yet your 
friends so that we could make use of you, we think 
this favour should be repaid us at the present time. 
It is this: when once, before the Persian war, you 
were deficient in battle-ships for the war you were 
waging with the Aeginetans, you borrowed twenty 
from the Corinthians. And this service and that we 
rendered in connection with the Samians—our pre- 
venting the Peloponnesians from aiding them— 
enabled you to prevail over the Aeginetans and to 
chastise the Samians. Both incidents happened, too, 
at a critical time, when men, engaged in assailing 
their enemies, are most indifferent to every con- 
sideration except victory, regarding any one who 
assists them as a friend, even if he was an enemy be- 
fore, and any one who stands in their way as an 
enemy, even if he happen to be a friend ; for they 
even mismanage their own i ests. in the eager 
rivalry of the moment. 

XLII. “ Bearing these favours in mind—let every 
young man here be told of them by one who is 
older—do you consider it your duty to requite us 
with the like. And do not think that this course 
is indeed equitable to urge in a speech, but that 
another course is advantageous if you come to war. 
For advantage is most likely to result when one 



/ € / / e¢ \ 
erdyiota dpaptdvn pddiota emetat, Kal TO 
/ lal 4 e lal ce lal 
uédAov TOD ToAépov @ PoBodvTes Upads Kepxv- 
patio. Kedevouow abixelv ev abavel Err KeiTaty Kab 
> ” 5] Gé > a \ 4 a nO 
ovK akiov érapOévtas avt@ pavepav exlpav non 
\ > / \ / / 
kal ov pédXovcav pos Kopuvdious KTHnocac0at, 
n / X 
ris 58 brapyovons mpotepov 61a Meyapéas vTro- 
vrias cabpov vdereivy wadrov (7 yap TeNeuvTaLa 
ydpis Katpov éxouca, Kiv éXdoowy 7, dwvaTat 
a 4 lal J / lal 
petCov eyKAnua AUcaL), Nd OTL VaVTLKOU Eup- 
/ / U / > / . 
paxlay peyarny b:8dacr, TovT@ eperAnerVau TO 
a ¢ / 
yap pr adixetv TOvS opolous ExUpwTépa SvVams 7) 
ra cal / \ / 
T® adtixa dhavep® éraplévtas bia Kivdvvwv TO 
Tréov EXEL. 
a / lol 
XLII. “‘“Hpets 8& tepuettmxortes ois év TH 
Aaxedaiuove avtol mpoeiropuev, Tovs odetépous 
/ > f / fa) ’ e lal 
Evppadyous avtoy twa Kodalev, viv Tap vmov 
X > ip > nn / \ \ ipl e , 
TO avTo akiodpev KopifecOar, Kal pn TH NMETEPA 
/ 3 7 lal ec / € r Fr 
wido apernGevtas TH vpeTEepa Nas Brawat. 
/ lal lal 
zo 8é loov avtaTobote, yvovTes TOUTOV éKeElvoOY 
e 6 
elvau Tov Kaipov, év @ 6 Te VToupyav pidos pa- 
\ / 
ALoTa Kal 6 avTiaTas exXOpos. Kal Kepxupatous 
/ / 4 / / ¢ rn 
ye tovode pate Evppayous déxecVe Big rjuov 
unre auvvete avtois adixodow. Kal Tade Tol- 
rn / \ 
obvTes TA TpoornKovTa Te Spdcete Kal TA apiota 
a na 9 
Bovrevoeabe vpiv avtois. 
XLIV. Toratta 5€ xal of KopivOsou eitzov. 
, al \ > / ’ / / 
A@nvaior S€ akovoavtTes apPpoTepwv, yevomevns 


BOOK I. xu. 2-xtiv. 1 

errs least, and the contingency of the war, with which 
the Corcyraeans would frighten you into wrong- 
doing, is still uncertain; and it is not worth while 
for you to be so carried away by it as to acquire 
an enmity with the Corinthians that will be from 
that moment on a manifest fact and no longer a 
contingency. It would be, rather, the prudent course 
to remove something of the suspicion which has 
heretofore existed on account of the Megarians!; 
for the favour which comes last, if conferred at the 
right moment, even though a small one, can cancel a 
greater offence. Nor ought you to be tempted by 
their offer of a great naval alliance; for to refrain 
from wronging equals is a surer strength than to be 
carried away by present appearances and seek an 
advantage by incurring dangers. 

XLIII. “ But we, since events have brought us 
under the rule which we ourselves proclaimed at 
Sparta, that each should discipline his own allies, now 
claim from you in return the same treatment—that 
you who were then_aided by our vote should not in- 

__ jure us by yours. ‘Pay back like with like, determining 
that this is thé supreme moment when assistance is 
the truest friendship—opposition the worst hostility. 
We beg you neither to accept the Corcyraeans as 
your allies in despite of us, nor to aid them in their 
wrong-doing. And if you do this, you will not only be 
taking the fitting course, but will also be consulting 
your own best interests.” eS 

XLIV. Thus spoke the Corinthians. And the 
Athenians, having heard both sides, held a second 

1 Referring apparently to the exclusion of the Megarians 
from all harbours within the Athenian dominion and from 
the market at Athens, ch. lxvii. 4. 




\ 8 > Xx / a \ / > ? 
kal Sis éxxAXnolas, TH ev TpoTepa ovyY Hocov 

r /, ’ / \ / b] »* ~ 
tav Kopiw0iwv amedéEavto tovs Noyous, ev b€ TH 

voTepata petéyvwmoav Kepxupators Evxpuaxiav pev 
un tonoacbat wate TOUS avTous €xPpous Kal 

f / ’ » > \ / > / 
dhirous voutfew (Ee yap émt KopivOov éxéXevov 

/ e 4 lal / ae! > an 
odio ot Kepxupatos: Evytrdety, €XvovT’ av avtois 

e \ / / > , \ 
ai mpos IleXotrovyncious otrovéat), émipayiav dé 
> , A > / A 27 ro 
erroinoavtTo TH AAAnAwY BonOeiv, Edv Tis ert 

> \ 
Kepxupav in 1 AGjvas 7) TOUS TOUT@Y EvmpaXous. 
edoxer yap oO ™pos IleAorovynaious TONELOS Kal 
as écecOat avtois, Kal THV Képeupav éBovrovro 
yn) mpoérbar tots Kopw@tois vavtixoy éyovoap 
r / ev \ 
tocouTov, Evyxpovew S¢€ OT: puddAlaTa avTOUS 
> / c/s > / Ss A / 
arrAnroLs, Wa aclevertépors ovow, hv Te S€n, 
Kopi@iors te Kat Tois adXots Tots! vauTiKoV 
éxoval €s TOAE“Ov KabiaoTa@vTal. apa de THs TE 
/ lal , al 

"Iranias Kai Xuxedias Kad@s epaiveTo avTois 1 
vijoos év TapaTA® Keto Oat. 

XLV. Toravtn pev yroun ot ‘A@nvaior TOUS 
Kepxupaiovs mpocedéEavto, cal tav Kopivbiwv 
aTeNOovT@yv ov ToAv UaoTtepov Séxa vads avTois 
> / / ’ / \ > nw” 
anéatekav BonOovs: eotpatnye 6€ avt@v Aake- 
in / / ec / \ , e 
Sapovios te 0 Kipwvos cai Acotimos 0 Xtpop- 

, \ / ng / a \ 
Bixov cat IIpwréas o ’Emixdéous. mpoetrrov dé 

cal al / \ 
avtois pn vavpayeiv KopivOios, yv pn emt 
/ / 
Képxupav mAéwot kal péAdwowv avroPaivew 7 és 

a / 

TOV €xelvOV TL Ywpiwy: oUTw SE KwAVELY KATA 
lal lal n \ 7 
Sivapuv. tTpoettov d€ TavTa TOU pH AvELY Evexa 

\ s 
Tas oTOVOdS. y 4 aaeq by Bekker. 

BOOK I. xiv. 1-x.v. 3 

session of the Ecclesia ; and although at the earlier 
one they were rather inclined to agree with the words 
of the Corinthians, on the second day they changed 
their minds in favour of the Corcyraeans, and decided, 
not, indeed, to make an offensive and defensive 
alliance with them, for in that case, if the Corcyraeans 
then asked them to join in an expedition against 
Corinth, they would have to break, on their own re- 
sponsibility, the treaty with the Lacedaemonians—- 
but they made a defensive alliance, namely to aid 
one another in case anyone should attack Corcyra or 

Athens or the allies of either..For they believed that.,_-, 

in any eventsthe war with the Peloponnesians would / 
have to be faced{ and they did not wish to give up 

Corcyra, which had so large a fleet, to the Corinthians, ~~ 

but hoped to wear them out upon one another as 
much as possible, in order that the Corinthians as 
well as other naval powers} might be found weaker 
in case they had to go to war with them. Besides, 
the island seemed to them admirably situated for a 
coasting voyage to Italy and Sicily.? 

XLV. With these motives the Athenians received 
the Corcyraeans into alliance and sent to their 
-aid,soon after the departure of the Corinthians, ten 
_ships commanded by Lacedaemonius son of Cimon, 
Diotimus son of Strombichus, and Proteas son of 
Epicles. Orders were given to these not to engage 
with the Corinthians, unless they should sail against 
Corcyra and attempt to land there, or to some ‘place 
belonging to the Corcyraeans; but in that case they 
were to thwart them if possible. The object of these 
orders was to avoid breaking the treaty. 

1 Referring especially to those mentioned ch. xxvii, 2. 
2 of. ch. xxxvi. 2, 



\ fal an 
XLVI Ai péev 8) vies adixvodvta és TH 
Képxupav. oi 8& Kopiv@tot, érretdn avtots mape- 
oKevacto, érAeov él THY Képxupay vavat TevTN- 
J > 
Kovta kal éxatov. joav be "Hrelwv pev déxa, 
/ , 
Meyapéwv 5é SHdexa cai Aeveadioy déxa, ’Apu- 
a BY > 
mpaxiotav dé€ émta Kal elkogt Kal “Avaxtoplov 
pia, avtav é KopiwOiev évevnxovta: otpatnyot 
/ / 
Sé tovTwV hoav pev Kal KaTa TOES ExdoTOD, 
— € 
KopwOiwy S¢ Bevoxreidyns 0 Evdudéous réurtos 
a \ 
avtos. é7evd1 5é mpocéuerEav TH Kata Képxupay 
/ \ / id , 
nreip@ amo Aevxddos mréovtes, oppilovTat és 
Xecpéprov ths Oecompawridos vis. éarte dé App, 
nr al \ 
Kal mods UTép avToD KeiTar amo OadXacons ev 
th Eraratide ths Oca pwridos Edvpy. €&inar de 
’ Ce tee , , . ; \ 
Trap avtnv Axepovoia ripyn és Oaraccav: dia 
S¢ ths Oecrpwridos “Axépwv Totapos péwv 
b] t I] > £ > ’ n \ \ > _4 
ésBadrer és auTnv, ap ov Kal THY eTTMVUMLAY 
cr / \ ec 
yer, per S€ cal Ovapis rotapes opifov thy 
Wcorpawrida xal Keotpivny, av évtos 7 axpa 
/ fol 
avéyer TO Xeupépiov. ot pev ov KopivOrot tis 
lal c 
Hareipov évtav0a oppuitovtat te Kal otpatomredov 
aA v 
XLVII. Of 8 Kepxupatos @s na8ovto avtous 
TpocmdéovTas, TANpwaavTEes O€KA KAL EKATOV 
rn > * 4 \ > , \ eons 
vais, av Apye Mixradys cai Aloiutdns kat Evpv- 
Batos, éotpatoTedevoavTo ev puad TOV VHTwY at 
o > a 
Kadovvtat SUBora, kal ai Attixai déxa Taphoav. 
éxl 88 7H Aevxipyy abtois TO axpwtnpio o Telos 
/ € al 
iv cal ZaxvvOiov yidvot oditar BeSonOnxores. 
» \ \ a , ’ nw >, / \ 
Aoav b€ Kal Tois KopwOiows év TH nTEelpw TOAXOL 
rn / Ul e \ / 
tav BapBapwv tapaBeBonOnxotes: of yap TavTy 
nr , / lal 
rep@tat aiel Tote pidou avTOIs Elo, 

BOOK I. xtvi. 1-xtvu. 3 

XLVI. These ships arrived at Corcyra, and the 
Corinthians, when their preparations had been made, 
sailed against Corcyra with one hundred and fifty 
ships. Of these ten belonged to the Eleans, twelve 

to the Megarians, ten to the Leucadians, sememteen!..... 

to the Ambraciots, one to the Anactorians, and ninety 
to the Corinthians. themselves. The several cities 
had each its own general, but Xenocleides son of 
Euthycles and four others commanded the Corin- 
thians. They sailed from Leucas, and when they drew 
near the mainland over against Corcyra, anchored at 
Cheimerium in the territory of Thesprotia. It isa 
harbour, and above it lies a city away from the sea in 
the Eleatic district of Thesprotia, Ephyra by name. 
Near it is the outlet into the sea of the Acherusian 
lake; and the river Acheron runs through Thesprotia 
and empties into the lake, to which it gives its name. 
There is also the river Thyamis, which separates 
Thesprotia and Cestrine, and between these rivers 
rises the promontory of Cheimerium. It was at this 
point of the mainland then that the Corinthians cast 
anchor and made a camp. 

XLVII. The Corcyraeans, when they became 
aware of their approach, manned a hundred and ten 
ships under the command of Miciades, Aesimides, 
and Eurybatus, and encamped on one of the islands 
which are called Sybota, the ten Attic ships being 
alsopresent. Their land-forces were at the promon- 
tory of Leucimne, and also a thousand hoplites of 
the Zacynthians who had come to aid the Corcy- 
raeans. The Corinthians, also, had the aid of many 
barbarians who had assembled on the mainland ad- 
jacent; for the dwellers on the mainland in that 
region have always been friendly to them. 



XLVIII. ’Eevd1) 6€ mapecxevacto tots Kopw- 
4 an a , 
Giows, NaBovTes TPL@Y HuEPp@V CLTia aVvyyoVTO 
2 ws éml vavpaxyla ao Tov. Xetpeplov vuKTos, Kal 
lal \ Qn 
dua Em TA€ovTES KaABopHat Tas TOV KepKupatov 
4 , a / 
3 vais meTewWpous TE Kal eTTL ohas TAEOVGAS. WS 
\ al b] / > yA > % 
\ \ \ , , ents \ 
pev TO SeEvov Képas Kepxupaiwy at “Attixal 
r \ \ v > \ ’ lal / / / 
al lal * » Lal Lal 
\ A 
Exdaotov els. ovTw sev Kepxupatoe étaéavto. 
\ \ \ / e 
4 KopwOiors dé TO ev SeEvov xépas at Meyapices 
yes elyov Kal. al "Apmpaxiwtioes, Kata Sé TO 
v / , 
pécov of adXAoL Evppmaxyor ws ExacToL, EevMVYUpOY 
x Pr / a / lal a 
dé Képas avtol ot Koptv@.or tals apiota TaY vewv 
/ \ \ > / \ \ \ 
mreoveats Kata Tovs A@nvaiovs Kat To dekov 
al / s » 
tav Kepxupawy etyov. 
3 — / lal 
XLIX. Euppeiéavtes 6é, éredn Ta onpueta 
e / ” bd / \ \ e / 
, \ lal 
‘ lol al 
ovs 6€ TofoTas TE Kal UKOVTLOTAaS, TO Taral@ 
, > , ” , 2 
2 Tpom@ ameporepoy éTL TapEecKevaapEvoL, Hy TE 
c a \ / > e 4 
1) VavLAYLa KAPTEPa, TH meV TEXVN OVY oOpLolws, 
/ x \ / \ 2 > \ 
3 Tweloua\la dé TO TA€Ov TpoaddgeEpis ovaa. érrEeLd7) 
yap mpoaBaXotev addXnXoLS, OV padiws aTredvoVTO 
© a ‘ \ r an rn 
€ / e 
omTAlTals €s THY ViKHY, ol KaTaTTaVTES éuayoTO 
novyalovea@y tav vewv: SiéxtAoL O€ OK Hoar, 
> \ A << \ , > , a 
G\rXa Oup@e Kal pwn TO TWAEOV Evavayouy 7H 

BOOK I. xiviu, 1-xLix. 3 

XLVIII. When their preparations had been made, 
the Corinthians, taking provisions for three days, 
put off by night from Cheimerium with the intention 
of giving battle, and at daybreak as they sailed along 
they descried the ships of the Corcyraeans out at sea 
and sailing to meet them. And as soon as they saw 
one another, they drew up in opposing battle lines, 
the Attic ships on the right wing of the Corcyraeans, 
who themselves held the rest of the line forming 
three divisions, each under the command of one of 
the three generals. So the Corcyraeans arrayed them- 
selves; but the right wing of the Corinthian fleet 
was held by the Megarian ships and the Ambracian, 
in the centre were the other allies with their several 
contingents, while the left was held by the Corinth- 
ians themselves with their best sailing ships, opposed 
to the Athenians and the right wing of the Corcy- 

XLIX. When the standards were raised on either 
side they joined battle and fought, both having many 
hoplites on the decks as well as many archers and 
javelin-men, for they were still equipped rather 
rudely in the ancient fashion. And so the sea-fight was 
hotly contested, not so much by reason of the skill 
displayed as because it was more like a battle on land. 
For when they dashed against one another they could 
not easily get clear, partly by reason of the number 
and throng of the ships, still more because they 
trusted for victory to the hoplites on the decks, 
who stood and fought while the ships remained 
motionless ; and there was no cutting of the line,! but 
they fought with fury and brute strength rather than 

1 SiéxmAovs was a breaking of the line so as to ram the 
enemy’s ship in the flank or astern. 



emer My TAVvTany pevy ovv Tous GopuBos 
Kal rapaxoons ay ” vaupaxia év 7 ab “Arrixal 
VES TaparyyVomeval Tots Kepxupaioss, el 17 
meCowvTo, poBov jev Tapetxov Tots evavTiows, 
payns 6€ ovK Hpxov OEOLoTES Ob oTparnyot TH 
Tpoppnaw TOV “AOnvaiov. padaora dé To deEvov 
KEepas TOV Kopw Gian € eTrovel. ol yap Kepxupaios 
elKogl vaval auTous TpeWapevor Kal KaTaoL- 
Eavtes omopadas €s Ti ym evpov Kal béype Tov 
oT patoméedou TAEvoayTeEs aut av Kal emrex BavTes 
évéTTpnaav TE TAS oKNVaS epmjwous Kal Ta Xprpara 
éiunptTacayp. TAUTD ev ovy ol Kopiv@tot Kai ot 
Evppaxor HoT@vTO Te Kab ot Kepxupaios €7T€- 
KpaTouv: m 6€ avtol HoaVv ob Kopiv@.00, éTl TO 
EVOVULO, TORU evik@Vv, Tots Kepxupaious TOV 
elKOoL vEe@Y ato Xda ovos mnGous € €k THS 610 - 
Eews ov TApouT@v. of dé "AOnvaior o op@vres TOUS 
Kepxupatous TLeComevous padhov 760 aT popa- 
clots errexoupour, TO pev T™ P@TOV amex ouevor 
@oTe pn euBarrew twit érerdn Sé 4 TpoTn 
evyiryveto Lap pas Kal eVEKELVTO ot Koptv@cot, Tote 
én Epyou TAS €LYETO 76n Kab OveKEK pLTO ovdev 
ETH, aXra Evverecev és TOUTO avaryKns WOTE 
emruxyelphoat addAnAols Tovs KopivOiovs cai ’AOn- 

L. Tis 6€ tpomis yevouévns ot KoptvOro ta 
cxabn pev ovx elAKov avadovpevot TOV VEeaV as 
povevew Ovex TAEOVTES padXov y Corypetv, TOUS Te 
aAvT@V pirous, ovK noOnpevot 6 OTL HooHVTO OL em 
T@ SeEL@ Képa, AyvoodvTes ExTEWov. TOAAMY Yap 


BOOK I. xuix. 3-1. 2 

with skill. Accordingly there was everywhere much 
tumult and confusion in the sea-fight. The Attic 
ships, if they saw the Corcyraeans pressed at any 
point, came up and kept the enemy in awe; but 
their generals would not begin fighting, fearing to 
disobey the instructions of the Athenians. The right 
wing of the Corinthians suffered most; for the 
Corcyraeans with twenty ships routed them and pur- 
sued them in disorder to the mainland, and then, 
sailing right up to their camp and disembarking, 
burned the deserted tents and plundered their 
property. In that quarter, then, the Corinthians and 
their allies were worsted, and the Corcyraeans pre- 
vailed ; but on the left wing where the Corinthians 
themselves were, they were decidedly superior, for 
the Corcyraeans, whose numbers were fewer to begin 
with, had the twenty ships away in the pursuit. But 
the moment the Athenians saw that the Corcyraeans 
were being hard pressed, they began to help them 
more unreservedly, and though they at first refrained 
from actually attacking an enemy ship, yet when it 
was conspicuously clear that they were being put to 
flight and the Corinthians were close in pursuit, then 
at length every man put his hand to work, and fine 
distinctions were no longer made; matters had come 
to such a pass that Corinthians and Athenians of 
necessity had_to attack one another. _ 

-L. After the rout of the Corcyraeans the Corinth- 
ians did not také in tow and haul off the hulls of the 
ships which had been disabled, but turned their 
attention to the men, cruising up and down and 
killing them in preference to taking them alive; and 
they unwittingly slew their own friends, not being 
aware that their right wing had been worsted. For 



ve@v ovcaVv apudotépwy Kali emt modv THs Oa- 
Adoons éTexXovear, erred) EvvéwervEav GAANXOLS, 
ov padiws Thy Sidyvwow é€rrotovvTO OTrotoL expd- 
Tovy 7) ExpaTouvTo’ vavpayia yap avtn “EdXnot 
mpos “EXAnvas ve@v TAINO peyiotn 51) TOV TPO 
3 avTns yeyévntar. éredyn b€ KatediwEav Tovs 
Kepxupaious ot KopivOsor és thy yhv, mpos Ta 
vavayla Kal TOUS vexpovs TOUS aeTépous EeTpa- 
TovTo, Kal TOV TWrEeloTwWY EexpaTnoaY WaTE 
Tpockopicat Tpos Ta LVBota, ov avtois o KaTa 
yiv otpatos tav BapBdpwv mpoceBeBonO Ker: 
éote 5€ Ta LvBota THs Oeowpwridos Asn 
éphymos. Tovto O€ Toincavtes avOis aOporcBévtes 
4 érémAeov Tots Kepxupaios. ot d€ tais mAWLpOLS 
Kal doar Hoav otTal peta TOV “ATTLK@Y vedv 
Kal aUTOL avTeTémAcor, SeicavTes mn es THY YH 
5 cdav Teipwow atoBaivev. dn O€ Hv oe Kal 
€TETALAVLOTO aUTols ws €$ éTrimAOUY, Kal ol 
Kopiv@ror €Eatrivns tpvpvav éxpovovto, KaTLOOVTES 
elxoot vats ‘AOnvaiwy tpocrXeovaas, as tatepov 
tav d€xa BonJovs é€émreuWav of "AOnvaion, det- 
TAVTES, OTTEP eryevETO, UH ViKYO@ TW of Kepxupaior 
Kal at opétepar O€xa ves OrALyYaL apuvELY WoL, 
LI. tavtas otv mpoidovtes of KopivOior Kat 
urotomnaavtes am “AOnvav eivar, ovy boas 
2 éEwpwv adda TELOUS, UTaVveYwpouV. Tois dé Kep- 
Kupato.s (€rémeov yap wadrov éx Tov adbavods) 

1 Thucydides makes allowance for Salamis, for example, 
where Greeks had fought against Persians, 


BOOK I. L. 2-11. 2 

since the ships or the two fleets were many and 
covered a great stretch of sea, it was not easy, when 
they joined in combat, for the Corinthians to 
determine just who were conquering and who were 
being conquered ; for this sea-fight was in number of 
ships engaged greater than any that Hellenes had 
ever before fought against Hellenes.! But as soon 
as the Corinthians had chased the Corcyraeans to the 
shore, they turned to the wrecks and their own dead,? 
and they were able to recover most of them and to 
fetch them to Sybota, an unused harbour of Thes- 
protia, whither the land forces of the barbarians had 
come to their aid. When they had accomplished 
this, they got their forces together and sailed once 
more against the Corcyraeans. And they, with such 
of their vessels as were seaworthy and all the rest that 
had not been engaged, together with the Attic ships, 
on their part also sailed to meet them, fearing that 
they would attempt to disembark on their territory. 
It was now late and the paean had been sounded for 
the onset, when the Corinthians suddenly began to 
back water; for they sighted twenty Attic ships 
approaching, which the Athenians had sent out after 
the ten as a reinforcement, fearing just what 
happened, namely that the Corcyraeans would be de- 
feated and their own ten ships would be too few to 
help them. LI. So when the Corinthians sighted 
these ships before the Corcyraeans did, suspecting that 
they were from Athens and that there were more of 
them than they saw, they began to withdraw. For the 
Corcyraeans, however, the Athenian ships were sailing 
up more out of view and could not be seen by them, 

2 The bodies of the dead which were on the disabled 



b e a“ \ b] 4 \ , 
ovy éwpavto, kat eBavpafov tots Kopiwiious 
/ / cd 
mpuuvav Kpovopévous, mpiv tives LOovTes etmov 
Ste vhes éxetvar emimdéovow. Tote 61 Kal avTOL 
> , / x A A e / 
aveywpouv (Evverxotale yap 76), kat ot KopivOcoe 
3 atotpaTomevot THY biddvoW ETTOLNTAVTO. OVTM 
\ c > b, tee. / > / Vict / 
/ a \ / 
4 éTedevTa és vUKTAa. Tots de Kepxupatots oTpato- 
rf / % rn 
medevomevors emt TH AevKipyn at eixoot vies at 
> a cy a z 2 = / © 
éx tav A@nvav atta, wv npxe lAavewy Te o 
, RPS / ¢ / \ r 
Aedypov cai “Avdoxidns 0 Aewyopov, dia Taev 
nr / a“ 
vexp@v Kal vavaylwv TpocKoma0elioar KaTETEOV 
és TO oTpaToTedov ov TOAA® baTepov 7) wPOnaar. 
rn \ / / 
5 of 6& Kepxupaio (Hv yap vv&) épo8nOncav pn 
a / / 
LIL. TH 6é torepaia avayayouevar at te’ Arti- 
, a \ a 
kal tpidxovta vies kal tov Kepxupaiwy doar 
/ b] e e / vw u 
tows Atméva, ev & ot KopivOtor wpuovy, Bovdo- 
2 evor eldevar eb vavpaynoovow. ot dé Tas pev 
S \ ral A \ 
yavs dpavtes amo THS ys Kal wapatakapevor 
, / / 
petewpous navyafov, vavpaxias ov dravoovpevor 
dpyew EXOVTES, OPAVTES TpoTyeyernuevas TE VAUS 
, r > nr ’ lal \ / x \ 
éx Tov AOnvav axpaipvets Kat opiot Toda TA 
v / 3 , \ 
aropa Evx~BeS8nkota, aiywadwrtov Te Tepl puda- 
Ks, ods év Tals vavaoly elxyov, Kal émiaKevnY OvK 
a lal / lal 
3 ovcay TaV veav ev ywpio épyjuw: Tod b€ olkade 
ToD parrov SecKoTrovy 67n Ko“icOnoovTat, de- 
/ a / 
Sudtes un) of “AOnvaior vouioavtes AedXVaBaL Tas 
/ lal = loa ~ 
otrovéas, SuoTt és yetpas HdOov, ovK eWar ohas 
arom Nelv. 
lal ¥ 
LIII. "Eéofev ody adtois avdpas és KeXnTLOV 


BOOK I. ut. 2-Lul. 1 

and so they wondered that the Corinthians were 
backing water, until some of them caught sight of the 
ships and said, ‘‘ Yonder are ships sailing up.” Then 
they too retreated—for it was already getting dark ; 
whereupon the Corinthians put their ships about and 
broke offthe action. Thus they separated, the sea-fight 
ending at nightfall. And while the Corcyraeans were 
encamping at Leucimne, the twenty ships from 
Athens, under the command of Glaucon son of 
Leagrus and Andocides son of Leogoras, having made 
their way through the corpses and the wrecks, sailed 
down to the camp not long after they were sighted. 
And the Corcyraeans—for it was night—were afraid 
they were enemies; but afterwards they recognized 
them and the ships came to anchor. 

LII. On the next day the thirty Attic ships and 
as many of the Corcyraean as were seaworthy put 
to sea and advanced against the harbour at Sybota, 
where the Corinthians lay at anchor, wishing to see 
whether they would fight. But the Corinthians, 
although they put out from shore and drew up in 
line in the open sea, kept quiet: for they had no 
thought of beginning a fight if they could avoid it, 
as they saw that fresh ships had arrived from 
Athens and that they themselves were involved 
in many perplexities, both as regards guarding the 
captives whom they had in their ships and the im- 
possibility of refitting their ships in a desert place. 
What they were more concerned about was the 
voyage home, how they should get back, for they 
were afraid that the Athenians would consider that 
the treaty had been broken, since they had come to 
blows, and would not let them sail away. 

LIII. Accordingly they determined to put some 



éuSiBaoavtas avev KnpuKeiov Tpoo me ura Tols 

2 “A@nvaios Kal Teipav mouncac Gar. TEMA AVTES 
Te éheyou * Totabe* “ ‘Adixcite, @ o avd pes ‘AOnvaior, 
TONE LOU apxovres Kal omoveas AvovTeEs” nly yap 
istacGe oTXa VT ALpopevot. et O° viv youn 
€oTl KwAVELY TE Nas emt Képxupav 7 adXoceE et 
an Bovropeba TrELY Kal Tas oToVdas RUETE, 
nas Tovcde mpwrovs AaPovtes yYpHncadbe as 

3 modemios.” of pev 67 ToLlavdTa eEitrov' TaV Se 
Kepxvpaiwy To wey otpatotredov bcov émnKkouvaev 
aveBoncev evOvs XaBety Te avTOVS Kal aTroKTEtvat, 

4 of 6€ “A@nvaios To.doe atrexpivavto: “ Ourte ap- 
Xopev TONE LOD, @ avopes Tedorovyncror, ouTeE 
Tas omoveas Avouer, Kepxupators bé Tota be Evp- 
payxos ovat Bono iAGouev. et pev odY AdroGE 
mot BovrecGe rely, ov K@hvopev" et Oe ent 
Képxupay Trevaeiabe 7; i) és TOV EXELYWY TL YWpLOD, 
ov mepiowopeOa Kata TO duvaTov.” 

LIV. Toratdta tav ‘AOnvaiwy atroxpivapévov 
of pev KopivOtor Tov Te TAOUY TOV ew oiKoU TapeE- 
axevalovto Kal TpoTatov Eotnaay év Tois ev TH 
HT E(p@ LuBoros: ol O€ Kepxupaior Td Te vavayla 
Kal VEKPOUS avethovTo 7a KaTa opas, efevex Oev- 
TOV vmo Te TOU pov Kal avémou, ds YEVOMEVOS TIS 
VUKTOS dueaxébacev auTa TAVTAXh, Kal TpoTtaiov 
avtéstncay €v Tois ev TH VD 2uBorous @sS 

2 vevixnxotes. yvopun 6€ Tordde Exatepos THY VviKnV 
mpocerotnaavto’ KopivOsor pev KpaTicavtes TH 

1 To bear a herald’s wand would have been a recognition 
of a state of war, whereas the Corinthians were anxious not 
to be regarded as enemies by the Athenians, 


BOOK I, tui. 1-tiv. 2 

men, without a herald’s wand,! into a boat and send 
them to the Athenians, to test their intentions. 
And these men bore the following message: “ You 
do wrong, men of Athens, to begin war and break a 
treaty ; for by taking up arms against us you inter- 
fere with us when we are but punishing our enemies. 
But if it is your intention to hinder us from sailing 
against Corcyra or anywhere else we may wish, and 
you thus break the treaty, first take us who are here 
and treat us as enemies.”” Thus they spoke; and 
all the host of the Corcyraeans that was within 
hearing shouted : “ Take them and kill them!” But 
the Athenians made answer as follows: “ We are not 
beginning war, men of the Peloponnesus, nor are we 
breaking the treaty, but we have come to aid the 
Corcyraeans here, who are our allies. If, then, you 
wish to sail anywhere else, we do not hinder you ; 
but if you ever sail against Corcyra or any place of 
theirs, we shall not permit it, if we are able to 
prevent it.” 

LIV. When the Athenians had given this answer, 
the Corinthians began preparations for the voyage 
homeward and set up a trophy at Sybota on the 
mainland ; and the Corcyraeans took up the wrecks 
and dead bodies? that had been carried in their 
direction by the current and by the wind, which had 
arisen in the night and scattered them in en! 
es and set up, as being, the victors, a rival _ 
troph n the island. \ Each side claimed ) 

| the —_ on the following grounds: The Corinth- / 
~ Jans™set up a trophy because they had prevailed in 

2 Taking up the dead bodies without asking permission of 
the enemy indicated that the field was maintained, and was 
therefore a claim of victory. 



vaupaxia HEXpL VUKTOS, OOTE KAL vavdya TreloTa 
Kai vexpous TporKkouicad Gat, Kal avopas ¢ EXOVTES 
aly LaXwTous ovK éXaoooUS Xo vaus Te KaTa- 
dvcavtes Trepl éBoounkovta éoTnoav Tpotatov: } 
Kepxupaior é€ TplaxovTa vavs pardtoTa ova Oet- 
partes, Kal emeon "AOnvaior 7Oov; aVENO EVOL 
Ta KaTa opas auToUS vavayla Kal vexpous, Kal 
OTL avtois TH Te 7 potepata Tpvpvav KpOvOopLevot 
UTeXwpnaav OL Kopiv@voe “iSévtes Tas ‘Artikas 
vaus, Kat eed) HAGov ot "AOnvaiot, ovK avTereé- 
TEov €x TOV LUBdTwr, dia TadTa TpoTaiov éoTN- 
cav. oUTw mer ExaTEpor ViKav HELovYS 

LV. Oc 6€ KopivO:oc aroméovtes é’ oixou 
"Avaxtopiov, 6 éotw éri TO oTopate ToD “Ap- 
TpaKlKOU KONTOV, elAOv amatn (AY Oe KoLVOY 
Kepxupaiwr Kal exeivav), Kal KaTaoTicavres 
év avT@ KopwOtous oLKnTropas avex@pno ay em 
olxou" Kat Tov Kepxupaiwy OKTAKOTLOUS bev ov 
oa dovA0L arédovTo, TEVTHKOVTA b€ Kai dLa- 
_Koclous Ojoavres epvhaccoy Kal év Jepareta 
elov TONAH, OTWS avTots THY Képxupav ava- 
Xopnravres Tpoomonceray” eT UY Xavov o€ (Kal 
Ouvapet avTay ot Welous Tparor ovTes Ths 
TONEWS. 7) ev ovv Képxupa ovtT# Tepuyiyverat 
TO TONE MD TOV KopwOwr, Kal a pijes TOV 
"AOnvaiay a avexopnoay é€ aur is. aitia &é abrn 
Tporn éryéveTo Tou TONELOU Tobs Kopivdtous és 
TOUS ’A@nvaious, 6Tt odiow év orovdais peta 
Kepxvupatwv evaAU LAX OUY. 

LVI. Mera tatta & etOis cali rade EvvéBn 

1 Zarnoav tooraiov bracketed by Hude, following Kriiger. 


BOOK I. tiv. 1 

the sea-fight up to nightfall, and had thus been able 
to carry off a greater number of wrecks and dead 
bodies, and because they held as prisoners not less 
than a thousand men and had disabled about seventy 
ships ; and the Corcyraeans, because they had de- 
stroyed about thirty ships, and, after the Athenians 
came, had taken up the wrecks that came their way 
and the dead bodies, whereas the Corinthians on the 
day before had backed water and retreated at sight 
of the Attic ships, and after the Athenians came 
would not sail out from Sybota and give battle— 
for these reasons set up a trophy. So each side 
claimed the victory. 

LV. The Corinthians, as they sailed homeward, 
took by stratagem Anactorium, which is at the mouth 
of the Ambracian Gulf, a place held by the Corcy- 
raeans and themselves in common, and establishing 
there some Corinthian colonists returned home. Of 
their Corcyraean prisoners they seld eight hundred 
who were slaves, but two hundred and fifty they 
kept in custody and treated them with much con- 
sideration, their motive being that when they re- 
turned to Corcyra they might win it over to their 
side ;! and it so happened that most of these were 
among the most influential men of the city. In this 
way, then, Corcyra had the advantage in the war Ss 
with the Corinthians, and the ships of the Athenians — ~ 
withdrew from it. {And this was the first ground | 

‘which the Corinthians had for the war against the\ 
| Athenians, because they had fought with the Corcy- ~ 
raeans against them in time of truce. 
“~~LVI. Immediately after this the following events 


1 cf. 111. lxx. 1, where the carrying out of this plan of the 
Corinthians leads to the bloody feud at Corcyra. 



ryeréa Oat TOIS: "AOnvaiows Kat TleXorovvncios 
dtapopa es 70 TONEMELY. TOV yap Kopibiwr 
pac covT@v Tas TLLOpnTovTaL avuTous, UroTo- 
mnoavtes THY ExOpav avTav ot “A@nvaios Tlorter- 
deatas, of oikovoty emt T® toOue@ tHS ladrAnvns, 
KopivOiwv atroixous, eauTav 6€ Evppaxous opou 
UTroTenets, exe NEVOV To €s Iladdnvnv tetyos Kabe- 
Aely Kal OmmpOUs dovvat, Tous TE emvdnpoupryous 
extreme Kal TO NoLTTOY wn SéxecOaL ods KATA 
étos éxactov Kopiv@tor. émeurrov, deicavtes pn 
aTooT@aL vTrd TE Tepdixxou TrevBopevor Kal 
Kopw0iwv, Tous Te GAXdous Tovs é7l Opaxns 
EvvaTootTnowat Evppaxous. 

LVII. Tadta 6€ epi rods Tlotevdedtas of 
"A@nvaior TpoT aper KevalovTo evdus peta TV év 
Kepxvpa vavpaxiay’ ol TE yap Kopiv@tor pavepas 
dn Sidhopor Haar, Tlepdixcas te 0 AneEavépou, 
Maxedovev Bacrrevs, _EMET ONE MOTO Evupaxos 
TpoTepov Kat piros OV. erro ew dé, OTL 
Dirinre TO éavTob AOENG@ kat Aépda xow7 
T pos | avTov evavTLOULEVOLS ot "A@nvator Evupayiav 
€moincavTo. Sediws Te ETpaccey és Te THV Aake- 
Saipwova TéuTOV OT WS TONE LOS yévntar avtois 
™ pos Tledorovyya ious, Kal TOUS Kop ious T poa- 
ETOLELTO TIS [orevdatas évexa aTOcTagEws* 
TpoaEepepe dé Aovyous Kal Tots el Opakns Nah«e- 
dedot nat Bor TLatoLs Evvaroarivat, voter, et 
Evppaya tavta ێyxot, duopa ovTa, Ta yopla, 

1 Son of Alexander, who had been a friend of the Hellenes 
in the Persian war. Perdiccas, who originally ee 
only Lower Macedonia, had deprived his brother Philip of 



7 7 by a ie b fad 
eq ~— tek ak orn o> 
, t , 

ane ; | 
We: we. ’ ehh a 
x de Oo mr 
ite A Niele + Aa ie 

p . 
.. - 
» = eS 
is + i 
es “?, et 
teat 20S 
a ay 
: : i. gts 
» =e 
; = f* 
at a 
a» a 

> Certs 

2 ve 2 
o + * 

a - a 
ra as, Tey a 

piven +7 he, i 

=) — = _ 


UOPUOT “P}'T psofunjgs panmpy “part ‘WUBUTAUTAT “wah 

Te ; 1s _ 
eypPig Hy ec @ 
ad Ls Ainupie Mae RS" 

S9]1IW 4s118U3 CCN 8 SS 






yy we: 
an Hid) Kaa 

3 ro ‘L 3 




: x ‘ 

BOOK I. tvi. 1-tvn. 5 

also occurred, which caused differences between the 
Athenians and the Peloponnesians and led to the 
war. While the Corinthians were devising how they 
should take vengeance on the Athenians, the latter, 
suspecting their enmity, required of the Potidaeans 
(who. dwell on the isthmus of Pallene and are 

‘colonists of the Corinthians but tributary allies of the” 

Athenians), to pull down their wall on the»side of 
Pallene and give hostages, and, furthermore, to send 
away and not receive in the future the magistrates 
whom the Corinthians were accustomed to send 
every year. For they were afraid that the Poti- 
daeans, persuaded by Perdiccas! and the Corinthians, 
would revolt and cause the rest of the allies in 
Thrace to revolt with them. 

LVII. These precautions the Athenians took with 
regard to the Potidaeans immediately after the sea- 
fight at Corcyra; for the Corinthians were now openly 
at variance with them, and Perdiccas son of Alexander, 
king of the Macedonians, who had before been an 
ally and friend, had now become hostile. And he 
had become hostile because the Athenians had made 
an alliance with his brother Philip and with Derdas, 
who were making common cause against himself. 
Alarmed at this he kept sending envoys to Lace- 
daemon, trying to bring about a war between Athens 
and the Peloponnesians. He sought also to win 
over. er Sir with a view to the revolt of 

Potidaea;)and, furthermore, he mad@“overtures to” 

the Chalcidians of Thrace and the Bottiaeans to join 
in the revolt, thinking that if he had as allies these 
countries, which bordered on his own, it would be 

Upper Macedonia, and now was king of all Macedonia. 
See, further, 11. xcix. ff. 


—- : 


fa A \ f ? » aes a 2 
6 pdov av Tov TOAEMOoV peET a” TaV TroLetcBaL, wY 
€9 A > , 1 € , 
ot A@nvator aicPouevoe Kat BovNopevot TpoKaTa- 
a \ 
la / / 
yap TplaKovTa vavs aTroaTédXoOVTES KAL YLALOUS 
e , RES, \ a ? nm ? / fal 
omiTas eml Thy iv avTov Apxeotpatov TOU 
AvKopnoous peT AXNWY Teccdpwy oTpaTHYyOUN- 
val Yi lal lal 
TOS), émlaTéAXOVGL TOs apxYovat TOV vewv IloTeL- 
5 e a \ ° cal 
SeaT@v TE opnpous AaBEiv Kal TO TeLyos Kabenety, 
la / \ ty 
lal \ 
LVIII. Tlotededtar 5€ méuravtes pev xal 
, / 
map ’A@nvaiovs mpécBes, ei Twas TELcELaY pH 
n / / / / \ \ 
odhav mépt vewtepifew pndév, éeXovtes dé Kal 
; on Neate SoM wii Oi tiks 
és tHv Aaxedaipova peta Kopiv6iov,! ores 
/ A 
éToluaocawto Tiuwpiav, nv én, émerdn Ex TE 
"AOnvav €k ToAXOD TpacaovTes ovdEY NUpoOVTO 
’ , 2 D) e a Cs RN , \ 
€mitndeov, GAN ai ves ai emt Maxedoviay Kal 
> \ a e / ” \ \ / lal 
él odas omoiws émEov Kat Ta TEAN TOV Aake- 
/ a 
Saimoviwv. UTécxeTo avTots, Hv emi Lloreidarav 
ral > \ a 
iwow "AOnvaio, és thy Attixny écBarelv, Tote 
57 KaTa TOY Kalpoyvy ToUTOY adiotayTaL peta 
r \ , A 
Xar«idéwv cai Bottiatwv xown Evvopocartes. 
t y / \ 
2 «al Ilepdixcas 7reiGer Nadkidéas Tas evi Oadacon 
/ , , 
> v , , , 5) \ 
cacbat és “OdvvOov piav Te Tod TaVTHY LoxUpaY 
a ’ fal / a fal 
al a / \ 
yns THs Murydovias mepi tiv BorBnv Xipuvny 
” / ¢ bal e \ ’ / / 
édwKe véwerOat, Ews av 0 Tpos ‘A@nvatous TroXe- 

1 %xpaccov, before drws in all MSS., deleted by Poppo. 

BOOK I. tvi. 5-Lvi. 2 

easier, in conjunction with them, to carry on the 
war. But the Athenians became aware of these 
designs, and wishing to forestall the revolt of the 
cities, ordered the commanders of their fleet (since 
they happened to be sending against the country of 
Perdiccas thirty ships and a thousand hoplites under 
the command of Archestratus son of Lycomedes 
and four others) to take hostages of the Potidaeans 
and pull down their wall, and also to keep a watch 
upon the neighbouring towns and prevent them 
from revolting. 

LVIII. The Potidaeans, on the other hand, sent 
envoys to Athens, to see if they could persuade 
them not to take any harsh measures with reference to 
themselves; but envoys of theirs went also to Lace- 
daemon in the company of the Corinthians, with 
the object of having assistance ready to hand in 
case of need. From the Athenians, with whom they 
carried on protracted negotiation, they obtained no 
satisfactory result, but on the contrary the ships 
destined to attack Macedonia proceeded to sail 
against themselves as well, whereas the magis- 
trates of the Lacedaemonians promised them to 
invade Attica if the Athenians went against Poti- 
daea; so they seized this opportunity and revolted, 
entering into a formal alliance with the Chalcidians’ 
and Bottiaeans. Perdiccas at the same time per 
suaded the Chalcidians to abandon and pull dowr 
their cities on the sea-coast and settle inland at 
Olynthus, making there a single strong city; and 
he gave them, when they abandoned their cities, a 
part of his own territory of Mygdonia around Lake 
Bolbe to cultivate as long as they should be at war 

s.e. the Chalcidians of Thrace, 



5 a eece \ : , , a 
pos . Kal of pev av@xifovto te KaParpodytes 
Tas odes Kal és ToAE“ov TaperKevafovTo: 
LIX. ai S€ tpraxovta vies TOV “AOnvaiwy adgi- 
Kvoovtas és Ta et Opaxns Kai katadapBavovor 
tiv Te Ilotetdacav Kal TAXA adeotynKOTa. vopt- 
cavtes 5& of ctpatnyot abvvata eivat pos TE 
Tlepdixxav Todeuety TH Tapovon Suvdper Kai Ta 
Evvadeot@ta ywpla, Tpérovtar emt THY Maxe- 
Soviav, édb’ Owep Kal TO mpa@Ttov é£eTéwTrovTo, Kal 
KaTacTavtes €mroNguouv peta DiritT0v Kal TOV 
AépSou aderpav avabev otpatid ésBeBXnKOTMV. 

LX. Kai &v tovt@ ot Kopiv@to1, ths Motedatas 
adectnkvias Kai Tov “Attixov vedv tept Make- 
Soviav ovadr, Sed.oTes TEpl TO Kwpio Kal oiKetov 
Tov Kivduvoyv Hyovpmevoe TéuTOVoW éavT@Y TE 
eOeXovTas Kal TOV a\Xov IleXoTOVYnGiwy p1cO@ 
metcavtes 飀axocious Kal ytdXiovs TOUS TavTas 
OmAitas Kal wWidovs TeTpaKkoclous. éaTpaTHyeL 
Sé aitav ’Apiotets 0 'Adetpavtou, kata pidiav 
TE QUTOD OvY HKLoTa of Teiatoe €x KopivOou 
otpati@tat eGerovtal Evvéctrovto: Av yap Tots 
Ilorevdedtais alei Tote émitndelos. Kai adixvovr- 
Tal TeccapakooTH nuepa vaotepov ert Opaxns 7 
Iloreiéara atréaTn. 

LXI. "HA@e 8€ Kal trois ’"AOnvatois evOvs 7 
ayyedia TaV Tokewy OTL apectact, KaL Tépu- 
qmovow, ws noGovTo Kat Tovs peta ‘AptoTtéws 
érimapiovtas, Suaxidiovs éauT@v omAiTas Kal 
TEegaapaKoVTa vads Tpos Ta adeoTata, Kai Kad- 
Aiav tov Kaddiabdov réurtov avtov atpatnyov 
of adixopevor és Maxedoviay rp@tov KatadapBa- 


BOOK I. tvur. 2-Lx1. 2 

with the Athenians. And so they proceeded to 
dismantle their cities, move inland, and prepare for 
war. LIX. But when the thirty ships of the 
Athenians reached the coast of Thrace, they found 
Potidaea and the other places already in revolt. 
Whereupon the generals, thinking it impossible with 
their present force to wage war with both Perdiccas 
and the places which had revolted, turned their 
attention to Macedonia, which was their destination 
at the start, and when they had got a foothold 
carried on war in concert with Philip and the 
brothers of Derdas, who had already invaded Mace- 
donia from the interior with an army. 

LX. Thereupon the Corinthians, seeing that 
Potidaea had revolted and the Attic ships were in 
the neighbourhood of Macedonia, were alarmed 
about the place and thinking that the danger came 
home to them, dispatched volunteers of their own 
and such other Peloponnesians as they induced 
by pay, in all sixteen hundred hoplites and four 
hundred light-armed troops. The general in com- 
mand was Aristeus son of Adimantus; and it was 
chiefly because of friendship for him that most of the 
soldiers from Corinth went along as volunteers; for 
he had always been on friendly terms with the Poti- 
daeans. And they arrived on the coast of Thrace 
on the fortieth day after the revolt of Potidaea. 

LXI. The news of the revolt of the cities quickly 
reached the Athenians also; and when they learned 
that troops under Aristeus were also on the way to 
support the rebels, they sent against the places in 
revolt two thousand of their own hoplites and forty 
ships, under Callias son of Calliades with four other 
generals. ‘These first came to Macedonia and found 



yougt TOUS TpoTépous xirtous B€punv apte 7Hp1- 
KOTAS KQL Ivdvay ToNopKobVTas, mpockabe- 
Copevor 6€ Kal avtol THY IIlvdvav emoMopenaav 
pév, erecta b€ EvpBaow TOLNTALEVOL al Eup- 
paxiav avaryKatay T pos TOV Lepéixcar, & @S aUTOUS 
KaTHTELYEV a Ilote(éata Kai o Aptotevs mapehn- 
AvG@s, atTavictavtat €K THS Maxedovias, Kal 
apicopevor és Bépovay KaKelOev ert =rpéyar! Kal 
TEelpacayTes Tp@TOv 7 TOU X.@ptov cal ouyx édovTes 
eT OpevovTO KaTa yiv Tpos Ty Tlote‘éavav 
TpLaYXLALOLS bev omAiTaus EAUTOV, Xepls d€ TOV 
Evppaxov Todos, iTTEVTL be é€axooious Make- 
Sovev Tots pera Dirimrov Kai Haveaviou: apa 
dé vies TapémAcov EBSdSourKovta. Kat’ odtyov 6é 
mpoiovtes tpttaio. adixovto és Tiywvov «al 

LXII. Iotededtar 6€ nat ot pera *"Apiotéws 
TleXorrovynciot mpocdeyopuevotr tovs “A@nvaious 
éotpatotedevovto mpos ‘OduvvGov ev TO tcOu@ 
Kal ayopav é&w THs TONEwS ETTETTOiNVTO. aTpa- 
THOU bev ovv TOU melod TAVTOS Ob Evupaxor 
7pNVvTo "Apiotéa, TAS 66 trmou Tlepdixxay: aTtéaTn 
yap evOUs Tad Tov ‘AOnvaiwv Kat Evvewayet 
Tols Tlorededrais ‘lohaov av? avtov KaTacTHoas 
apxovTa. av d€ 7 yvoun Tov "Apia téws, TO ev 
pe” EaUTOU OT pPATOTrEOY ExOvTL® év TO icOuod 
emeTnpely tovs A@nvaious, hv ériwat, Xan«udéas 
dé kal Tos &€w icO pov Evppaxous Kal THY Tapa 
Ilepdicxov Staxociav immov év ’OdivO@ péver, 

1 él Srpévav, Pluygers’ certain emendation for émorpé- 
Wavtes of the MSS. 
2 Madvig deletes, followed by Hude. 


BOOK I. ix. 2-Lxu. 3 

that the former thousand had just taken Therme 
and were besieging Pydna; so they also took part 
in the siege of Pydna. But afterwards they con- 
cluded an agreement and an alliance with Per- 
diccas, being forced thereto by the situation of 
Potidaea and the arrival of Aristeus, which compelled 
them to. hasten, and then they withdrew from Mace- 
donia. On their way they came to Beroea and 
thence to Strepsa,! and after an unsuccessful at- 
tempt upon this place proceeded overland to Poti- 
daea with three thousand hoplites of their own and 
with many of their allies besides, and with six 
hundred Macedonian cavalry, who were under the 
command of Philip and Pausanias; and at the same 
time their ships, seventy in number, sailed along the 
coast. And marching leisurely they arrived on the 
third day at Gigonus, and went into camp. 

LXII. The Potidaeans and the Peloponnesians 
under Aristeus were awaiting the Athenians, en- 
camped on the Olynthian side of the isthmus; and 
they had established a market outside of the city. 
The allies had chosen Aristeus general of all the 
infantry, and Perdiccas of the cavalry ; for Perdiccas 
had immediately deserted the Athenians again? and 
was now in alliance with the Potidaeans, having 
appointed lolaus as his administrator at home. The 
plan of Aristeus was as follows: he was to hold his 
own army on the isthmus and watch for the approach 
of the Athenians, while the Chalcidians and the 
other allies from outside of the isthmus® and the 
two hundred horse furnished by Perdiccas were to 

1 In Mygdonia, north of Therme. 

2 For his first desertion of the Athenians, see ch. lvii. 

3 i.e. the Bottiaeans, who, like the Chalcidians, lived out- 
side the isthmus. 



> ’ a ae A A A , 
kal 6tav A@nvaior eri spas YwpOot, KaTA vwTOU 
Lal lal Cal \ 
BonOodvtas év péow Trorety AVTA@V TOUS TrONEMLOUS. 
€ cal > / Z 
KadXias 8 at 6 tTav ‘APnvaiwy otpatnyds Kal oi 
\ y , € ~ 
Evvapyovtes tovs wev Maxedovas imméas Kal Tav 
, >] / > Ni , > / 
Evppayewv ortyous éri ‘OdvvOou aroréutrovaw, 
ev yv \ > tal > ral > \ ‘ 
OTWS Elpywat Tovs EexetOev EmiBonOety, adTo dé 
/ , 
avacTnaavTes TO oTpaTOTrEdoy Eywpouy él THI 
’ \ \ lal lal 
Ilotetdarav. Kal émecdn pos TO icOue éyévovTo 
Kai eldov Tovs évayTiovs TapacKxevalomévous ws 
, \ , 
és wayny, avtixabiatavto Kal avToi, Kal ov TOAD 
¢i \ \ \ a 
tatepov Evvéutoyov. Kal avTo pev TO TOD “Apt- 
\ Lal 
aTéws KEpaS Kal Ooo. Tepl Exetvov Haav KopivOiwy 
Te kal TOV addwy RAoydbes ETpeWav TO Kal 
€ \ \ > a“ , > \ , \ 
€autTous Kal éreEnNOov Stm@Kovtes ert TorU: TO 
5€ adddXo otpatoredov Lotedeatav xai IleXo- 
a \ lal > / \ 
movvnciwv nocato uTO TaV A@nvaiwy Kal és TO 
a , 
TELyos KaTEpuyeV. 
a = a fol 
LXIII. ‘Ezavaywpav $€ 0 “Apioteds aro ths 
, e an \ ww / 
duwEews, @S Opa TO AAO GTPaTEVLA oOoHMEVO?, 
€ / / 
nmopnoe pev oTroTépwae Siaxivduvevon Ywpyaas, 
h emt tis ‘OdvvOou 4 és thy Ilotetdarav: éoke 
, \ n 
8 otv Euvayayovtt tovs pel’ éavtovd ws és 
> , , , , > \ 
é\ayistov ywplov dpoum BracacBar és tip 
\ a \ \ 
Iloteiéarav, kai waphdOe Ttrapa thy ynrnv ba 
a / , \ 7 
THs Oardoons Bardopevos TE Kal yYaXeTas, OXI- 
, \ , , 
yous wév Tivas aToBadwv, Tous O€ TAELOUS Twaas. 
of © amo Tis (OdXvvOou trois Lotededrars BonOoi 


BOOK I. uxn. 3-Lxu. 2 

remain at Olynthus; then when the Athenians 
should move against the forces of Aristeus, the 
others were to come up and attack them in the rear, 
and thus place the enemy between their two divi- 
sions. But Callias, the commander of the Athenians, 
and his colleagues sent the Macedonian cavalry and 
a few of the allies toward Olynthus, to shut off aid 
from that quarter, while they themselves broke 
camp and advanced against Potidaea. And when 
they arrived at the isthmus and saw the enemy pre- 
paring for battle, they took up their position facing 
them ; and soon the two sides joined battle. And 
the wing led by Aristeus himself, which included 
the picked Corinthian and other troops, routed the 
forces opposed to them and pressed on a long dis- 
tance in pursuit; but the rest of the army of the 
Potidaeans and the Peloponnesians was worsted by 
the Athenians and took refuge within the walls of 

LXIII. When Aristeus returned from the pursuit 
and saw that the rest of the army was defeated, he 
was at a loss whether he should try to fight his way 
through towards Olynthus or into Potidaea. He 
determined, however, to bring his own troops to- 
gether into as compact a body as possible and to force 
his way into Potidaea on arun. And he succeeded 
in getting in by way of the breakwater through the 
sea, with difficulty, indeed, and harassed by missiles ; 
but though he lost a few men, he saved the greater 
number of them. Now when the battle began and 
the standards had been raised,! the auxiliaries of 

1 These signals were not for battle, but for the Olynthian 
auxiliaries to come, and as soon as it became clear, through 

the speedy success of the Athenians, that their object could 
not be accomplished, they were lowered. 



(améyer dé eEnKovTa padre oTadtous Kal éoTe 
KaTapaves), WS u) payn eylyvero Kal Ta onpela 
7pOn, Bpaxv pév Te _T por) Oov @S Bon? ycovtes, 
kat of Maxedoves imms avtitapetatavto ws 
KwAvaovTEs* émreldn b&€ dia Tayous H viKn TOV 
"A@Onvaiwy éyiyveto Kal Ta onpelta KaTeoTradOn, 
Tadw éravex@pour és TO Tetyos Kal of Maxedoves 
mapa tovs "A@nvaious: immys & ovdeTépors Trape- 
yévovTo. peTa O€ THY wdyNnVY TpoTatoy ~cTHnTaV 
of “AOnvaiot Kal Tous vexpovs voamovdous aTreé- 
Socav tots lotedeatais: améGavov 5é Wotedea- 
T@v pev Kal Tov Evupaywv orjLy@ éAdoaoOUS 
tpiaxootwyv, A@nvaiwy d€ avTav TevTHKOVTA Kal 
éxatov Kal KadXias 0 otpaTnyos. 

LXIV. To 6€ é« Tob LaO ov Tetxos! evOus ol 
"A @nvaior arrotevxia ares ep povpour TO &° és Thy 
Tadrxvny areiXoTov Av ov yap ixavol évopefov 
elvar év TE TO LoOUO poupeiv Kal és THY Tanr- 
AnvHY SuaBdvres revyitew, S€OLOTES ea odiotv ot 
Ilotesdeatac Kal ot Evppaxor yevouevors dixa 
émiOwvtat. Kal TuvPavoperoe ol ev TH TOEL 
"A@nvator thy TladAnvnv ateiyiotov ovcav, Kpovm 
istepov méutovow é€axoolovs Kal xXLALous 
omAiTas éauT@v Kal Popptwva TOV ‘Acwmiov 
oTparyyov" os APLKOMEVOS és THY Tadrnvny Kal eg 
"Advtios opp@pevos Tpoonyaye TH Llorerdaia tov 

1 Classen deletes, followed by Hude. 

1 On the Athenian side were 600 Macedonian cavalry 
(ch. lxi. 4), on the Potidaean side 200 Macedonian cavalry 
under Perdiccas (ch. lxii. 3). 

2 Thucydides omits the loss of the allies of the Athenians. 

2 The wall on the isthmus side of the Potidaeans is the 


BOOK I. vx. 2—LxIv. 3 

the Potidaeans in Olynthus—which is only about 
sixty stadia distant and can be seen from Potidaea— 
advanced a short distance to give aid, and the Mace- 
donian cavalry drew up in line against them to 
prevent it. But since the Athenians were soon 
proving the victors and the standards were pulled 
down, the auxiliaries retired again within the walls 
of Olynthus and the Macedonians rejoined the 
Athenians. And so no cavalry got into action 
on either side.! After the battle the Athenians set 
up a trophy and gave up their dead under a truce to 
the Potidaeans. There were slain, of the Potidaeans 
and their allies a little less than three hundred, and 
of the Athenians alone? about a hundred and fifty, - 
and also their general Callias. 

LXIV. The city wall on the isthmus side? the 
Athenians immediately cut off by a transverse wall 
and set a guard there, but the wall toward Pallene 
was not shut off. For they thought their numbers 
were insufficient to maintain a garrison on the isthmus 
and also to cross over to Pallene and build a wall 
there too, fearing that, if they divided their forces, 
the Potidaeans and their allies would attack them. 
Afterwards, when the Athenians at home learned 
that Pallene was not blockaded, they sent sixteen 
hundred of their own hoplites under the command 
of Phormio son of Asopius; and he, when he arrived 
at Pallene, making Aphytis his base, brought his 
army to Potidaea, marching leisurely and ravaging 
reixos of ch. lxii. 6; the wall to Pallene is that mentioned 
in ch. lvi. 2 as rd és MadAhyny tetxos. 

4 The investment of Potidaea was effected by walling off 
first the northern and then also the southern city wall by a 

‘blockading wall; on the west and east, where the city ex- 

tended to the sea, the blockade was made with ships. 

VOL. I. E 5 


oTpatov, kata Bpaxyd mpoiwy Kal Keipwv apa THI 
3 yi: ws b€ ovdels éemeEne és paynv, atreteiyic 
ves a / lal \ ef ww 
to ex THS LladdAnvns tetxos* Kal ottws HO Kate 
/ € , > / > A 
xpatos » Iloteidara audotépwhev érrodopKett 
Kal €x Gaddoons vavoly dua éboppoveats. 

> P > / 54 , a / > 
éATrida ovdeuiavy Exwv cwTnplas, hv wn TL an 
a ¥ 
IleXomtrovyxjcou  adXo Tapa Aoyov yiyvnTta 
EvveBovreve ev ANY TevTaKOTiwY AvEe“ov T 
/ lal Mv > lal 7 > \ / 
pyoacte tTols adrAols ExTTAEVTAL, OTWS ETL TE 
e a , \ » n 
0 altos avTicxn, Kal avTos H0eXe TAY pevovTe 
* e > > » , ae ae , 
elvat' ws © ovK érreiOe, BourNomevos Ta emi TOUTE 
, 5 A oy ¢ e ” 
TapacKkevatey Kal OTrws TA CEwOer E£er ws Apiar 
a \ a b] 
éxTAouv Trovettat AaV@y tHv dvraxny tov A€ 
/ \ , > a , »” 
2 valwv’ Kal Tapapuévwv ev Xadkidevot Ta TE AA 
, \ a \ 
Evvetrodkéuer Kal LepuvrAl@v Aoynoas mpos 


ToAEL TOANOVS SiePOerpev, és Te THY IleNorovt | , 

3 cov érpaccev brn wberla Tis yevijoeTar. pp # 

dé THs Llotedaias tHv arrotetyicw Popyiwv | m 

4 \ € \ P \ pe lo mi 
éxwv tors éEaxoctous Kal yihious THY Xadkioup 

| po 

\ / 
kat Botticny édyjov Kai éotw & Kal Toriop 
elev. es 
LXVI. Tots & ’A@nvaiows cai [leXotrovynofis | 5, 
ae. \ * , ix ? , , 
aitiat pev avtat mpooyeyévnvtTo! és adAANA 
lal \ 61 2 ¢ ‘ IL a) e l 
trois pev KopivOios” bt tTHv Lloteidarav éavps 
* ? / \ ” 5 e ‘ fin 
ovoav atrolKiav Kat avopas Kopivéiwy te fa 

1 Hude reads mpovyeyernvro, with BCE. 
2 Hude inserts, after Kopiv@los, the words és rods A@nvpus } Uy! 

following Reiske 





BOOK I. wtxiv. 2—txvi. 1 

the country at the same time. And as no one came 
out against him to give battle he built a wall to 
blockade the Pallene wall. And so Potidaea was at 
length in a state of siege, which was prosecuted 
vigorously on both sides of it as well as by sea, 
where a fleet blockaded it. 

LXV. As for Aristeus, now that Potidaea was cut 
off by the blockade and he had no hope of saving it 
unless help should come from the Peloponnesus or 
something else should happen beyond his expecta- 
tion, he advised all the garrison except five hundred 
men to wait for a wind and sail out of the harbour, 
that the food might hold out longer, and he himself 
was ready to be one of those who should remain. But 
since he could not gain their consent, wishing to do 
the next best thing and to provide that their affairs 
outside should be put into the best possible con- 
dition, he sailed out, unobserved by the Athenian 
guard, He then remained among the Chalcidians, 
whom he assisted generally in carrying on the war, 
and especially by destroying a large force of Ser- 
mylians, whom he ambushed near their city; and 
meanwhile he kept up negotiations with the Pelo- 
ponnesians to see if some aid could not be obtained. 
Phormio, however, after the investment of Potidaea 
was complete, took his sixteen hundred troops and 
ravaged Chalcidice and Bottice ; and he also cap- 
tured some towns. 

LXVI. As between the Athenians and the Pelo- 
ponnesians, then, these additional grounds of com- 
plaint had arisen on either side, the Corinthians 
being aggrieved because the Athenians were besieg- 
ing Potidaea, a colony of theirs with men in it from 



TleAorovynaiwy é€v auth ovTas émolopKow, Tots 
6é "AOnvaioss € és TOUS Ilehorovynatous OTL éauTa@v 
TE TONAL Evupaxioa Kab popov UmoTenh atré- 
oTnoay Kal ehOovtes adic ato TOU '™ popavous 
€uaXOvTO peta LlotedeaTov. ov HEVTOL 6 ve 
TONE LOS To Evvepparyet, GXN ett avoxwxn Vv 
ista yap TavTa ol Kopiv@.o1 én pakay. 

LXVII. [lodopkoupévns 8€ rijs Tloresdaias 
oux jovxatov, avdpav te ohicw évovTwy Kal 
dua mepl Te yopio deduoTes. TapeKad\ouy Te 
evOus és THY ANaxedaimova TOUS Evppaxous Kal 
KaTeBowy ehOovres Tov "AOnvatov OTL oTroveds 
Te NEAVKOTES Elev KAL aduxoiev THY IleXotrovvnaov. 
Atywihtat Te davep@s pev ov ™ peo Bevopevor, 
debz0 Tes TOUS ‘AOnvaious, Kpupa 5é, ovx Heir 
per’ avTav evyyov TOV TONELOD, AéyouTes OvUK 
elvat AUTOVOMOL KATA TAS omovods. ot 6€ Aaxe- 
Satpoveot MpooTapakanéa aves TOV Evpuaxyov 
kat! et tis'te aAXOS én) nHoiKHa Oat UTrO ‘AOnvator, 
EvARoyov ohav auTay TOLNTAVTES TOV eL@OoTa) 
Néyerv™ ex€eevOY. Kal aot TE TaplovTes éyKXn- 
pata €TOLODVTO @S xa ToL Kal Meyapijs, 5n- 
AOdVTES EV KAL ETEPA OVK oriya dudgopa, padara 
dé Lepevov TE elpryer Cat TOV ev TH "A Onvaiwv 
apyn kat THs AtTiKis ayopas Tapa Tas oroveds. 
mapedovres dé terevtaios Kopiv@sor Kal TOUS 
adXovus édoayTes mpa@tov tapokdvar Tovs Aaxe- 
Salpovious €7retTrov Towdoe. 

LXVELE *'To Toa TOY vpas, @ Aaxedatpovrot, 
Tis Kal’ buds avtods todTeias Kal opmidias 

1 Hude reads te xa} with C and some inferior MSS. 


i a 

BOOK I. vcxvi. 1-Lxvit. 1 

Corinth and the Peloponnesus, the Athenians, because 
the Peloponnesians had brought about the revolt of 
a city that was an ally and tributary of theirs, and 
then had come and openly fought with the Potidaeans 
against themselves. As yet, however, the war had 
not openly broken out, but there was still a truce 
for in these things the Corinthians had acted only on 
their own authority. 

LXVII. But when siege was laid to Potidaea they 
did not take it quietly, not only because Corinthians 
were in the town, but also because they were in fear 
about the place; and they immediately summoned 
the allies to Lacedaemon and, once there, they pro- 
ceeded to inveigh against the Athenians on the 
ground that they had broken the treaty and were 
wronging the Peloponnesus. The Aeginetans also 
sent delegates—not openly, to be sure, for they 
feared the Athenians, but secretly—and, acting with 
the Corinthians, took a leading part in fomenting 
the war, saying that they were not autonomous as 
stipulated in the treaty. Then the Lacedaemonians 
sent out a summons to all the other allies who. 
claimed to have suffered any wrong at the hands ot 
the Athenians, and calling their own customary 
assembly bade them~speak. Others came forward 
and stated their several complaints, and particularly 
the Megarians, who presented a great many other 
grievances, and chiefly this, that they were ex- 
cluded from the harbours throughout the Athenian 
dominions and from the Athenian market, contrary 
to the treaty. Lastly the Corinthians, after they 
had first allowed the others to exasperate the Lace- 
daemonians, spoke as follows :— 

LXVIII. “That spirit of trust which marks your 
domestic policy, O Lacedaemonians, and your relations 


f r > a 
a . ey 6 e 
, Tir. “ 

Tee 5 § 



> , bd \ ” ” 4 
n 4 
kabiotno.w: Kal at avtov cwdpocvyny ev 
” > , \ / \ \ A , 
éxete, auabla dé TAEoVL TPOS Ta EEW TPayyaTA 
a / rn 
ypnoGe. moddaKis yap Tpoayopevovtwy nuay 
& éuédAXouev UO “APnvaiwy BraTTecOat, od Trepl 
Sad b] / ¢ / \ / b] lal 
@y édi6acKopev ExdotoTe THY wana érroteic be, 
Gra THY AeyovTwY Madov UTEVoEITE ws EVEKa 
Tav avtois idia duapcpwv Aeyouowy Kal oe avto: 
ou | arply Tao XEL, ANN’ érrerdn Ev TR Epyo oa 
tous Euppdyous tovase mapexarécate, év ols 
a > val \ 
’ / ” e \ \ ? £ € , 
eyxAnuata exomwev, vo pev “A@nvatwv 
\ fal 4 
pevol, UTO O€ UUa@Y apedovpevol. Kal ef pepv 
a , A ¢€ 
adaveis tou évtes ndixouy THY Ed)déba, didacKa- 
, a fe 5 se , an \ , oa 
Alas dv ws ovK Elddct) Tpocéder viv 5é Ti Sei 
a \ \ / © he, 
paxpnyopety, ay Tovs pev Sedovd@pévous oparTe, 
cal >] b] / > 9 \ > 4 
tots 8 émiBovAevovtas avTovs, Kal ovxX HKLoTa 
n \ Lal 
Tois nuetépois Evppdyous, Kal €x ToAdOU Tpo- 
av Ké ty Te UTTOAaBorTES Bia Huav Eixov Kal 
adv Képxupay te vr s Bia ne Yov Kal 
, ? \ a / 
TloteiSatav érrodopKouv: @v TO meév ETT LKAaLpOTATOD 
/ \ \ > ae , > a e \ 
Ywplov Tpos Ta él Opakns aroyphaba, 7 Sé 
/ na 
vauTikov av péytotov Tapécye Tots IleXozrovn- 
al lal , a 
LXIX. “ Kal tavde byets aitior, TO Te MP@TOv 
27 ? \ \ / \ \ 
€dcavtTes avtov’s THY Tok peTa TA Mydixa 


BOOK I. vxvin. 1- “xix, 1 

with one another, renders you more mistrustful 
if we bring any charge against others, and thus 
while this quality gives you sobriety, yet because 
of it you betray a want of understanding in dealing 
with affairs abroad. For example, although we 
warned you time and again of the injury the 
Athenians were intending to do us, you refused to 
accept the information we kept giving you, but pre- 
ferred to direct your suspicions against the speakers, 
feeling that they were actuated by their own private 
interests. And this is the reason why you did not act 
before we got into trouble, but it is only when we 
are in the midst of it that you have summoned these 
allies, among whom it is especially fitting that we 
should speak, inasmuch as we have the gravest accu- 
sations to bring, insulted as we have long been by the 
Athenians and neglected by you. And if they were 
wronging Hellas in some underhand way, you might 
have needed additional information on the ground 
of your ignorance ; but as the case stands, what need 
is there of a long harangue, when you see that they 
have enslaved some of us! and are plotting against 
others, notably against your—own allies, and that 
they have long been making their preparations with 
a view to the contingency of war? For otherwise 
they would not have purloined Corcyra, which they 
still hold in despite of us, and would not be besieg- 
ing Potidaea—one of these being a most strategic 
point for operations on the Thracian coast, while the 
other would have furnished a very large fleet to the 

LXIX. “And the blame for all this belongs to 
you, for you permitted them in the first instance to 

+ ape especially to the Aeginetans, in the other 

cases to the Megarians and Potidaeans. 


a \ a , 
Kpatovat Kal boTepov TA paKpa oTHoal TELyN, ES 
a / > 
T0de TE alel ATooTEpOvVTES OV povoY TOUS UIT 
éxeivov SedovAwpévous eAevOGepias, GANA Kal TOUS 
e / + / > \ e / 
Upmetépous On Evpdyxous:; ov yap o dovdwad- 
oe 78 a na 
LEevos, GAN’ oO Suvdpevos wey TAavVcaL, TEeplopa@v Oé 
ir bé as 2% 5 a ” x \ vEL a 
arnbéctepov avTo Spa, elmep Kat THY akiwouy THs 
= A € Sf) 
apeThs ws éhevOepav tiv “EdAddda pépetar. pworss 
\ a / \ ’ \ ca > \ rad 
dé viv ye EvyyjAPopev Kati ovdé vov él dhavepois. 
an %& > rad > / 7 ra > \ 
Yphv yap ovK el adtxovpeOa ETL oKoTreEiv, adda 
Kal’ 6 Te auvvovpeba: ot yap! Spavres BeBounrev- 
/ \ > , 4 \ > / 
pévol Tpos ov dLreyvwKoTas On Kai ov pédXoVTES 
b] / \ > / / e a £')> 
émépyovtalt. Kal émiotduea ola cd@ ot ‘AOn- 
a > ’ / fa) 
vaio. Kal 6TL KaT OXLyOV, YwpovatW emt TOUS 
/ \ / \ DLA \ x 
méXas. Kal AavOdvery pev olouevor Sia TO 
avaicOnrov vuav hacov Capacovet, yvovtes Oé 
elOdTas Teplopayv iaxupas eyKElcOVTaL. novyd- 
\ , ¢€ / 9 / > aA 
fete yap povor “EXdAnvav, @ Aaxedatpoviol, ov TH 
, , 9 \ A , ’ , \ 
Suvdpet TLVa, ANNA TH meAAHoTEL Awuvopevot, Kal 
4 » a lal 
ovo. ovK apxouévny Thy av&now TeV éxOpar, 
/ \ / , > / 
diumAacoupévynv 6€ KaTadVoVTES. Kaito. éréyerOe 
’ val * 2 ” e Ud a b , 
acpanrels elvat, wy apa oO NOYOS TOU Epryou ExpaTel. 
\ a fol 
tov te yap Mijoov avtot iopev ex mepatav yijs 


ani ec , \ : 
mpotepoy émt tiv IleXordvyncov érXOdvta h Ta 

1 of yap, so MSS.: Hude reads of ye after Classen. 

1 See ch. xc. ff. 2 See ch. evii. 1. 
8 Referring to the recent increase of the Athenian navy by 
the accession of the Corcyraean fleet. 


BOOK I. vxix. 1-5 

strengthen their city after the Persian war,’ and _/ 
afterwards to build their Long Walls,? while up to 

this very hour you are perpetually defrauding of their 
freedom not only those who have been enslaved by 
them, but now even your own allies also. For the 
state which has reduced others to slavery does not 
in a more real fashion enslave them than the state 
which has power to prevent it, and yet looks care- 
lessly on, although claiming as its preéminent dis- 
tinction that it is the liberator of Hellas. And now 
at last we have with difficulty managed to come 
together, though even now without a clearly defined 
purpose. For we ought no longer to be considering 
whether we are wronged, but how we are to avenge 
our wrongs. For where men are men of action, it is 
with resolved plans against those who have come to no 
decision, it is at once and without waiting, that they 
advance. We know too by what method the Athen- 
ians move against their neighbours—that it is here 
a little and there alittle. And aslong as they think 
that, owing to your want of perception, they are 
undetected, they are less bold; but once let them 
learn that you are aware but complaisant, and they 
will press on with vigour. For indeed, O Lacedae- 
monians, you alone of the Hellenes pursue a passive 
policy, defending yourselves against aggression, not 
by the use of your power, but by your intention to 
use it; and you alone propose to destroy your 
enemies’ power, not at its inception,’but when it is 
doubling itself. And yet you had the reputation of 
running no risks; but with you, it would seem, repute 
goes beyond reality. For example, the Persian, as 
we ourselves know, came from the ends of the earth 
as far as the Peloponnesus before your forces went 



> lal / lel ~ 
Tap wpav afiws wpoatavticat, Kal viv Tovs 
"AG, / > e / 4 ] Lad An” > \ 
valous ovy ExdS, WaTTEP ExEiVOV, GAN eyyvs 
” rn \ ? \ n > a > \ 
6vTas Teplopate, Kal avtl Tov émedOeiy avTol 
/ 4 val 
auvverPat Bovrecbe padrrov éridvtas Kal és 
/ ~ \ XAG 6 / > fo 
TVXAS) TPOS TOAAG OuvaTwtéepous aywrilouevoe 
KATAOTHVAl, eTLaTapevor Kal TOV BapRapov avTov 
\ e al \ / / \ \ > \ 
\ > / 7 rn 
tous ‘A@nvaiovs mroddka Huas 6n Tols ayapTn- 
5) lal al Xa a 5] | e r / 
paciw avTav padrov 4 TH ad vuav Timwpia 
/ ir 4 
Tepryeyevnuevous* eel al ye vpéTepar edrridES 
, \ \ fel 
On Twas Tov Kal aTapacKevous 61a TO TLOTED- 
cat épOepay. Kal pnoels tudv én éxOpa To 
pav. PACES +e gs oar mile 
TrEov 4 aiTia vouion Tdbe AéyeoOat aitia pe 
7) : LG 7) Y t@ MEV 
D3 } > cal > id / 
yap ditwv avdp@v éotw apaptavovtwy, Katn- 
/ a7 a b , 
yopia bé éyOpav adixnoavtov. 
LXX. “Kat dua, elwep tivés kal adrot, vout- 
~ a a LU / > a 
Couev aksor eivar tots méXas Woyov émeveyxely, 
dAXws TE Kal weydrov Tov diahepovtayv KabecTo- 
Vie > , 4 e n tal ȢO? 
TwV, TEpl MY OvK aicOdvecbar Huiyv ye SoKette OVS 
b / , \ A eo See. 78 , 
éxroyicacGat TwToTE pos olous bpuiv ’AOnvaious 
” » aad e a \ e la} / e 
évTas Kal dcov vuov Kal ws wav Siadpépovtas oO 
ayov éctal. ob pév ye vewTEpoTrolol Kal ém- 
a > al \ b , 4 a x n 
vonoat ofets Kal éemutedécar Epyw & av yvaowr, 
e lal \ \ e / / / \ > ” 
bpets 6€ Ta UTdpKovTd Te OMLEW Kal emLyVavaL 
\ ‘) ” , \ > - >’ / 
pnodev kal Epym ovde tavayxaia é€ixécOas. 


BOOK I. txrx. 5-Lxx. 2 

forth to withstand him in a manner worthy of your 
power; and now you regard with indifference tiie 
Athenians who are not afar off, as the Persian was, but 
near at hand, and instead of attacking them your- 
selves, you prefer to ward them off when they 
attack, and incur hazard by joining in a struggle 
with opponents who have become far more powerful. 
Yet you know that the Barbarian failed mostly by 
his own fault, and that in our struggles with the 
Athenians themselves we have so far often owed 
our successes rather to their own errors than to any 
aid received from you ; indeed, it is the hopes they 
have placed in you that have already ruined more 
than one state! that was unprepared just because 
of trust in you. And let no one of you think that 
these things are said more out of hostile feeling 
than by way of complaint ; for complaint is against 
friends that err, but accusation against enemies that 
have inflicted an injury. 

LXX. “ And besides, we have the right, we think, 
if any men have, to find fault with our neighbours, 
especially since the interests at stake for us are im- 
portant. To these interests it seems to us at least 
that you are insensible, and that you have never even 
fully considered what sort of men the Athenians are 
with whom you will have to fight, and how very, how 
utterly, different they are from you. For they are 
given to innovation and quick to form plans and to 
put their decisions into execution, whereas you are 
disposed merely to keep what you have, to devise 
nothing new, and, when you do take action, not to 
carry to completion even what is indispensable. 

1 Alluding perhaps to the Thasiana (ch. ci.) and the 
Euboeans (ch. cxiv.). 



Ss \ e A ‘ \ / A \ 

adOis S€ of wev Kat Tapa Sivaplv TorApnTal Kal 
~~ a A 

Tapa yvaunv Kivduvevtat Kal év tots Sewwvois 

» We \ ~ id / fal Ye ? rn 

evédmides* TO O€ UpeTepov THS TE Suvdpuews (Evded 

mpata\ ths Te yyOuns unde Tois BeBators mo Ted- 
ca a / y 2 2 

cat Tav te Sewav pndémote olecPat atrodvOn- 
\ \ Vee \ e \ \ 

cecbat. Kal pny Kal aoKvot Tpos Uuas wEAANTAS 

Kal amoonuntal mpos évdnwotatous: olovta yap 

ot pev TH atrovoia av Te KTacVal, pels OE TO 

éfedOeiy nal Ta étoipa dv Prdwar. Kpatodvtés 

a lal a , 

Te Tov éxOpav él mrElotov eépyovTar Kal 

vik@mevol er eXaXLOTOY avaTiTTOVOLY. ETL OE 

Tols pev cwpacw adAdoTpLwTaTOLS UTEP TIS 

n A , > \ 

TOAEWS YP@vTal, TH Sé yvoOun olKELoTaTH €s TO 

a \ 

Tpaccew Te UTEép adTHS’ Kal & pev ay érLvon- 
age UA > , / € a 

cavTes pi eweEéXO wor, oixeiwy orépecbar jyovv- 
ry 3 XA b] / / >’ / \ 

rat, & & av émedOovtes KTHTwVTAL, OLya Tpos 

\ / a 4 a 5 vy \ 

Ta pédrovta TuXEly TpakavTes, HV O apa TOU Kal 

Telpa oparaaw, avterTioavtes adda eTANpwoav 

77s e 

Thy xpelav' jLovol yap EXovol TE oMolwWS Kal 
> / aa > / \ \ r \ 

erxrivovalw & av éemivonowot Oia TO TayYElay THY 

émiyelpnow troteicbar Oy av yvaouw. Kal TavTa 

> lal 

peta Tovey mavTa Kal Kxiwdvvwv d1 ddov Tov 

ai@vos poxGovat, kal aToNavovew éhayioTa TOV 

irapxovtav bia 7 alel KTaCOaL Kal pHTE EopTHY 

ra \ cal 

ddro Te HyeicOa 7 TO Ta Séovta mpaktar Evp- 

, > a 

gopdy Te ovX Nagov yovxiay aTpaypova 7 


BOOK I. txx. 3-8 

Again, they are bold beyond their strength, venture- 
some beyond their better judgment, and sanguine in 
the face of dangers; while your way is to do less 
than your strength warrants, to distrust even what 
your judgment is sure of, and when dangers come 
to despair of deliverance. Nay more, they are 
prompt in decision, while you are dilatory; they 
stir abroad, while you are perfect stay-at-homes ; 
for they expect by absence from home to gain 
something, while you are afraid that, if you go out 
after something, you may imperil even what you have. 
If victorious over their enemies, they pursue their 
advantage to the utmost; if beaten, they fall back 
as little as possible. Moreover, they use their bodie 
in the service of their country as though they were 
the bodies of quite other men, but their minds as 
though they were wholly their own, so as to accom- 
plish anything on her behalf. And whenever they 
have conceived a plan but fail to carry it to fulfil- 
ment, they think themselves robbed of a possession 
of their own; and whenever they go after a thing 
and obtain it, they consider that they have accom- 
plished but little in comparison with what the future 
has in store for them ; but if it so happens that they 
try a thing and fail, they form new hopes instead and 
thus make up the loss. For with them alone is it 
the same thing to hope for and to attain when once 
they conceive a plan, for the reason that they swiftly 
undertake whatever they determine upon. In this 
way they toil, with hardships and dangers, all their 
life long; and least of all men they enjoy what they 
have because they are always seeking more, because 
they think their only holiday is to do their duty, 
and because they regard untroubled peace as a far 



> / bJ / 4 ” > \ ‘\ 
9 acxorlay éritovoyy aaTe él TIS avTOUS EvYEedwv 
hain weduxévas él TH uNTEe avTOVs ExeELy Novyiav 
/ \ ” b , ba! ’ ~ a 
fnTe Tovs aAdovs avOpwrovs Eeav, opOas av 
LXXI. “Tavrns pévtor toravtns avtixabectn- 
/ / = ‘ / \ 
KULAS TTOAEWS, W Aaxedatpoviot, OvapéAXrETE Kal 
olecOe tiv Hovxiav ov TOUTOLs THY avOpaTrwV eri 
~ cal A nw , 
TAELTTOV apKeEiV, of av TH wey TapacKevy Sixata 
a a Lal a 
Tpdcocwol, TH S€ yroun, hv adixavtat, dHrou 
* ee / > 2 een a \ a 
\ ” \ > > Wer , \ / 
we , , ee , € , 
2 ro ico vepere. pores & av Toe Opoig Ta,pot- 
KovvTes eTUyYaveTe TOUTOU: Viv 8, OTrEp Kal ApTL 
/ lal A 
? / \ id / 
3 mpos avTovs éotiv. avdykn S€ waoTEp TéxVNS 
/ r 
aiel Ta émuytyvoueva Kpatelv’ Kal novyalovon 
/ v7 
pev TOAEL TA GKivNTA Vola apLoTa, TpOS 
/ , fol 
moAra 6€ avayKxalopévors iévat ToAARS Kal 
A A > cA A 
Ths émitexyvnocews Set. Oe Grep Kal Ta TOD 
> , > \ fol / pea, , e a 
A@nvaiwy aro THs TOAVTELpLas ETL TAEOY UU@Y 
“ / A 
4 ‘ Méyps peév oty Todde w@picOw tuav 7 Bpadv- 
, lal \ n lA \ / C4 
THs: vov O€ Tois Te GAXOLS Kal IloTedeaTats, BoTrEp 
umedéEacbe, BonOnoate kata Tayos éoBadovtes 
; \ > / / \ A ‘4 A 
és thv “Artixyy, va pn avdpas te dirovs Kai 
nw a , Ul fn . 
Euyyevets tots éx@iators mponaGe Kal nuas Tos 
IAN wOuuia mpos étépay tia EF 4 
GAXovs abvyia Tp p Uupaxiav 

1 7.e. you attempt to be fair on the principle that it is wise 
not to offend others and so run the risk of injury which may 


BOOK I. ixx. 8-Lxxi. 4 

greater calamity than laborious activity. Therefore 
if a man should sum up and say that they were born 
neither to have peace themselves nor to let other 
men have it, he would simply speak the truth. 

LXXI. “And yet, although you have such a state 
ranged against you, O Lacedaemonians, you go on 
delaying and forget that a peaceful policy suffices 
long only for those who, while they employ their 
military strength only for just ends, yet by their 
spirit show plainly that they will not put up with 
it if they are treated with injustice; whereas you 
practise fair dealing on the principle of neither giving 
offence to others nor exposing yourselves to injury 
in self-defence.! But it would be difficult to carry — 
out such a policy successfully if you had as neighbour 
a state just like yourselves; whereas now, as we have — 
just shown, your practices are old-fashioned as com- 
pared with theirs. But in politics, as in the arts, the 
new must always prevail over the old. It is true 
that when a state is at peace the established practices 
are best left unmodified, but when men are compelled 
to enter into many undertakings there is need of 
much improvement in method. It is for this reason 
that the government of the Athenians, because they 
have undertaken many things, has undergone greater 
change than yours. 

“Here, then, let your dilatoriness end; at this 
moment succour both the Potidaeans and the rest 
of your allies, as you promised to do,\ by invading | 
Attica without delay, that-you may not betray your 
friends and kinsmen to their bitterest enemies, and 
drive the rest of usin despair to seek some other 

arise in defending yourselves against the attacks you have 



A > A 
5 Tpéynte. Sp@puev & av adsxov ovdév ovTE pos 
an ral e \ lal 
Gedy TOY OpKiwy oUTE TpOS avOpwTrwY THY aidBa- 
vouevayv: AvovaL yap aTrovdds ovy ot Su’ épnutay 
] fal 
adXols TpoatovTEs, GAN ot wn BonBodvtes ols av 
, / \ e nw / 

6 Evvopocwaw. Bovropévwv dé vuav Tpobvpov 
elval pevOUMEV* OUTE yap Gola AV ToLOtMeY meTa- 
Barropevat ovte Evvnfeatépous dv adXovs evpor- 

7 pev. mpos tdde BovreverGe ed kai tHv Iledo- 

, val \ /, ] lal A e 
movynaov Teipacbe py éAdoow efnyetaPar 7) o1 
Tatépes upiv Tapédocav. 

LXXII. Totatdra peév of KopivOio: eirrov. §=tav 
ard , YA \ ‘A / > 
Sé "A@nvaiwy Etvye yap mpecReta mpotepov ev 
A , \ ” lal e 
th Aaxedaipow tept aA\Xwv Tapovoa, Kal ws 
” a LU 7 > a fy > 
nzOovto TaV AOywr, EdoEEv avTols TapiTNTEéa €s 
tous Aakedatpovious eivar, TOV pev éyKAN“aToV 
Tépt pndev aTroAoyncomevous, WY ai TOAELS évE- 
KdXovr, Onr@aat O€ TrEpt TOD TaVTOS) ws ov TAYEwS 
> a ls oy] > ss / / 
avutois BouvXeutéov ein, AAN ev TWAEOVL TKETTTEOV. 
atl - 4 \ / / > 4 a 
Kal dua THY odetépav TodW €BovrAoYTO onuHnVvaL 
don ein SUvaply, Kal UTOpYynoWw ToLncacBat Tots 
Te mpecButépors av yoecav Kal Tois vewTépols 
> / z BU 93 / A A 
éEnynow wv aTretpor Hoav, vouifovTes paddov av 
autous €k TOV AOywv pds TO Haovyalew TpaTreé- 

\ al lal 
2 c0at 7) Tpos TO TroNepeiv. TpocedOovTes odv Tos 
Aaxedaipoviows épbacav Bovr\ecPat Kal avToi és 
nr r al a e 
Sé éxéXevovy Te Taptévat, Kal tapedOovTes ob 
"AOnvaios éXeyov Todde. 

BOOK I. ixx1. A-LXXI1. 2 

alliance. If we took such a course we should be 
committing no wrong either in the sight of the gods 
we have sworn by or of men of understanding ; for 
treaties are broken not by those who when left un- 
supported join others, but by those who fail to 
succour allies they have sworn to aid. But if you 
mean to be zealous allies we will stay; for in that 
case we should be guilty of impiety if we changed 
our friends, nor should we find others more congenial. 
In view of these things, be well advised, and make 
it your endeavour that the Peloponnesian league shall 
be no weaker under your leadership than oes you __ 
inherited it from your fathers.” 

LXXII. Thus spoke the Corinthians. But there 
happened to be present at Lacedaemon an embassy 
of the Athenians that had come on other business, 
and when they heard the various speeches they 
deemed it advisable to appear before the Lacedae- 
monians, not indeed to make any defence on the 
charges brought by the cities, but to make clear with 
regard to the whole question at issue that the Lace- 
daemonians should not decide it hastily but should 
take more time to consider it. At the same time 
they wished to show how great was the power of 
their own city, reminding the older men of what 
they already knew, and recounting to the younger 
things of which they were ignorant, in the belief 
that under the influence of their arguments the 
Lacedaemonians would be inclined to peace rather 
than war. Accordingly they approached the Lace- 
daemonians and said that they also wished, if there 
was nothing to hinder, to address their assembly. The 
Lacedaemonians invited them to present themselves, 
and the Athenians came forward and spoke as follows: 



c / fal 
LXXIIT. ““H pev mpécBevois nuav ov és 
a / 
avtTiNoyiav Tots wvpetépors Evppayo éyéveto, 
GAXa TEepi MY 7 TOdS Ereurrev: aicPavopevas 5é 
\ > ’ Ld = e a / 
KaTtaBonv ovK oALynY ovcav Huav TapyndOopeED, 
ov TOs éyKAnp“acL TOV TOEWY avTEpOdVTES (ov 
yap tapa dixactais viv ovTE nu@Y OUTE TOUTMD 
ec , Aa / pI oad? s € , \ 
of Noyot av yiryvowvTo), AAX’ STrws pn padiws TreEpt 
, / ra / 
eyddov Tpaypatov tots Evypayors mevOopuevor 
yeipov PBovrevonobe, kat Gua Bovdopevor Trepi 
Tov TavTos AOyou Tov és Huas KafectaTos dynrAO- 
, 2 lal > / , > / 
TOALS Hu@Y a&la Noyou eaTLy. 

“Kal ta pev wavy taraia ti Set Néyetv, Ov 
aKOal “adXov AOywv wadpTupeEs 7) Oris TOV AxKov- 
/ \ \ \ \ Cd > \ , 
couévwv; Ta O€ Mnodixa nai Goa avtoi Evuorte, 
et kat st’ dyXov padrov Eotat aiel mpoBadXo- 
/ > 4 / \ \ ee > an ’ ’ 
Mévols, aVayKN Aéyetv. Kal yap OTe édpapev, er 

> xd > 5 / ca a \ ” / 
@pedia eExlvduvEevEeTo, 7S TOD pev Epyou pmépos 
/ a be / \ / ¥ > ae | 

atepioxwpeba. pnOncetrar dé (od trapaitnoews 

rn ov a» = / “a , \ 
PaAXov Eveka, 7) paptuplov Kai dnrAocews T pos 
‘/ e lal é, \ s , e ’ \ 
otav vuivy mod pn ev BovrEvopévolts 0 ayov 

\ lal / 

“Dayev yap Mapa@avi te povot mpoxiwédv- 

vedoat T@® BapBapw nai ote TO botepov FrGer, 

1 opera: E. 

BOOK I. cxxm. 1-4 

LXXIII. “Our embassy did not come here to 
‘enter into a dispute with your allies, but on the 
business for which our city sent us. Perceiving, 
however, that no small outcry is being made against 
us, we have come forward, not to answer the charges 
of the cities (for it can hardly be that either they or 
we are addressing you as judges), but in order that 
you may not, yielding to the persuasion of your 
allies, lightly make a wrong decision about matters 
of great importance. And at the same time we wish, 
as regards the whole outcry that has been raised 
against us, to show that we are rightfully in posses- 
sion of what we have acquired, and that our city is 
not to be despised. 

“ Now, what need is there to speak about matters 
quite remote,’ whose only witnesses are the stories 
men hear rather than the eyes of those who 
will hear them told? But concerning the Persian 
War and all the other events of which you have 
personal knowledge, we needs must speak, even 
though it will be rather irksome to mention them, 
since they are always being paraded. For when we 
were performing those deeds the risk was taken for 
a common benefit, and since you got a share of the 
actual results of that benefit, we should not be wholly 
deprived of the credit, if there is any benefit in that. 
And our aim in the recital of the facts will be, not 
so much to deprecate censure, as to show by evidence 
with what sort of city you will be involved in war 
if you are not well advised. 

“For we affirm that at Marathon we alone bore 
the first brunt of the Barbarian’s attack, and that 

1 The Schol. remarks 7a xara "AuaCévas wal @paxas xa 
‘HpaxaAcidas, favourite themes in eulogies, panegyric speeches, 



ovx ixavol OVTES KATA yy apvvecOar, éoRavtes 
és Tas vas mavdnpel ev Larapive Evvvavpaxi- 
ca, OTrEp Eoxe i) KATA TrONELS AUTOV emimeovTa 
TH [ledorovyncov mop Oeiv, aduvatov av ovT@Y 

5 pos vavs ToAhas aNANAOLS emt Bonbeiv. TEK MN 
prov dé péyrorov autos emoinoev™ vixnbels yap 
Tals vavolv as OUKETL AUTO omotas ovens THS 
éuvdwews KaTa TaXOS TO wréovt Too otTpatov 

LXXIV. “ Towovtov pevTOL TOUTOU EvpSartos 
Kal Tapas Snrobertos ore €v Tais vavol TOV 
‘EXAnvey, Ta Tpaypara éyéveTo, Tpla Ta opent- 
pwTaTa €$ avo Taperxopeba, a.pt8 pov TE VEY 
TNELo TOV Kat avopa oT parnyov VETWTATOV Kal 
7 poOupiap aoxvoTaTny- vas pev ye és Tas 
TeTpaKolas ory edoaous TOV dvo porpav, 
OepiotoKhéa dé apXovra, Os aitL@tatos év TO 
oT EVO vaU WAX To aL eyéveTo, Srep cabéctata 
evwoe Ta Tm pay para, Kal avtov da TOUTO vets 
ETLUNTATE padiora, 67) dvopa Eévov TOV WS vuas 

2 éXMovtar: mpobupiay 6€ kal ToD TON pOTaT NY 
édeiEapev, ot es émrelon npiv Kara yy oveeis 
éBonGer, THaV adrAwV 76 HEX pL TO douhevov- 
Kela SvapGetpavres und &$ TO TOV TEepiroiTT@V 
Evppaxov KOLVOV 7 ponuTrety poe oxebac Vertes 
ax petou auTOLS yever Oat, arr’ eo Barres es Tas 
vads Kwdvuvedoat Kal pn OpyoOjvar OTL Nuiv ov 

1 Probably a round number for 378 given by Hdt. va. 
xiviii., of which the Athenian contingent (200, t.e. 180 + 20 
lent to the Chalcidians, Hdt. viu. i.) could be spoken of as 


BOOK I. cxxim. 4-Lxxiv. 2 

when he came again, not being able to defend our- 
selves by land, we embarked in a body on our ships 
and joined in the sea-fight at Salamis. This prevented 
his sailing against you city by city and ravaging the 
Peloponnesus, for you would have been unable to 
aid one another against a fleet so numerous. And 
the weightiest testimony to the truth of what we 
say was afforded by the enemy himself; for when 
his fleet was defeated, as if aware that his power 
was no longer a match for that of the Hellenes, he 
hastily withdrew with the greater part of his army. 
LXXIV. “Such, then, was the issue of that battle, 
and clear proof was given thereby that the salvation 
of the Hellenes depended upon their ships. To that 
issue we contributed the three most serviceable ele- 
ments, namely, the largest number of ships, the 
shrewdest general, and the most_unfaltering zeal. 
Of the four hundred! ships our quota was_a_little 
less.than two-thirds. The commander was Themis- 
tocles, who more than any other was responsible for 
our fighting the battle in the strait, which most 
surely was our salvation; and on this account you 
yourselves honoured him above any stranger who 
ever visited you.2 And the zeal we displayed was 
that of utmost daring, for'when there was no one to 
help us on land, since all the rest up to our very 
borders were already slaves, we resolved to abandon 
our city and sacrifice all our possessions; yet not even 
in that extremity to desert the common cause of the 
allies who remained, or by dispersing to render our- 
selves useless to them, but to embark on our ships 

and fight, and_not to be angry because you failed to 

mAclous Tav jnutcéwy or with slight exaggeration as dAly@ 
éAdocous Tay Svo0 potpay. 
2 See Hdt. vi. exxiv.; Plut. Them. xvii. 3. 


/ 4 \ > ? > \ 
3 mpovTiuwpnoate. wate Papevy ovyY NaTov avToL 
adericar twas } Tuxely ToUTOV. pels pev yap 
amo Te oikovpévwy TOV TOAE@OY Kal éTL TO TO 
\ sf b \ > , e \ e a \ 
Nowtrov véwer Oar, emery edeicaTe UTEP UPMV Kal 
? eon \ , ’ / ” a le 
ovxY Huav TO TéoV, EBonOjcate (OTE your mpev 
4 la) / e a a / fol 
ere o@, ov mrapeyeverOe), mpets O€ amo Te THS OVK 
bd ” e / \ € \ n > / 
ovens. €Tt OpHa@pevor KaL UTEP TIS eV Bpaxera 
éxmide ovons Kivduvevovtes Evverwoapev vps TE 
4 TO pépos Kal Huds adtous. ef 5é Tpoceywpyaapev 
, A / / LA \ 
mpotepov TO Mnd@ detoavtes, @oTEp Kal adAoL, 
\ fol / a \ > / ef 3 a 
TEpl TH YOPA, 7) un ETOApNoapev VoTEpov eo Phvat 
> \ rn e / 2>O\ x »~ ” 
és Tas vads ws SiePOappévor, ovdev av Eder Ett 
ipas! un &yovtas vais ixavas vavpaxeiv, adda 
kal’ jouvyxiav av a’Te Tpovywpnoe TA TPaAYyHaTA 
7 €BovnrerTo. 
LXXV. “Ap dot éopev, & Aaxedatpovror, 
/ , a U , 
«al mrpobuptas €vexa THs TOTE Kal yyopns Evve- 
aie a ka Y4 a \ ee 
cews\apyns-ye Hs Exouev Tois"EAAnot my OUTAS 
A 7 b / a“ \ \ > \ / 
2 dyav éribOovas SvaxeicOat; Kal yap avtihy Tiv6E 
érdBouev ob Bracdpevor, add’ buav pev ovK 
re \ \ a 
CedncdvtTav Tapapetvat Tpos Ta UTOAOLTA TOD 
/ id al A / a , 
BapBapov, nuiv 5€ mpoceMovtav Tay Evppayov 
al / fal 
3 Kal aitav Senbévtwy tryepovas KatacThvat. €€ 
aitod 58 Tod épyou KatnvayxacOnpev TO TPa@ToOV 

1 §uas: Hude inserts mpbds before suas. 

1 ef. the taunt of Adimantus (Hdt. vii. lvii. 7), wep) ovde- 
puns tr warpidos vavuaxnoes, “ You will fight for a country 
that is no more,” and the famous answer of Themistocles 


BOOK I. cxxiv. 2-Lxxv. 3 

help us earlier. We therefore maintain that we on 
our part conferred upon you a_benefit at least as 
great as we received; for whereas the population of | 
the cities from which you brought aid was still un- 
disturbed and you could hope to possess them in the 
future, and your motive was fear for yourselves rather 
than for us—at any rate you did not come near so 
long as we were still unharmed—we on our part, 
setting forth from a city that was no more,! and 

isking our lives in behalf _of one whose future hung 

upon but_a slender hope, bore our part in saving 
both you and ourselves. But if we had acted as 

others did, and through fear of losing our territory 
had gone over to the Persians earlier in the war, or 
afterwards had_lacked_ the courage to embark on 
our ships, in the conviction that we were already 
ruined, it would from that moment have been use- 
less for you, with your inadequate fleet, to fight at 
sea, but the Persian’s plans would have moved on 
quietly just as he wished. 
LXXV. “Considering, then, Lacedaemonians, the 
_ zeal and sagacity of judgment which we displayed 
at that time, do we deserve to be regarded with this 
excessive jealousy by the Hellenes just on account 
of the empire we possess? And indeed we did not 
acquire this empire by force, but only after you had 
refused_to_continue to oppose what was left of the 
barbarian forces, and the allies came to us and of 
their own accord asked us to assume the leadership. 

It was under the compulsion of circumstances that 

(Hdt. vit. lxi. 8), &s ef cad modus Kal yij méCwv Frep Kelvorwr 
Zor’ by Sinxdoiat vées ogi Swot TeMANpwueva, ‘* We have a city 
and a country greater than yours as long as we have two 
hundred ships fully manned.” 



a > \ b] , 4 \ e XN 
Tpoayayely autTny és Toe, paddioTa pev VITO 
déous, Eerta Kal Tins, DoTepov Kal wdeXias, 

\ > , \ v b] / s r A 
kal ovk acdhanrés ete eddKer elvat, Tois moAXois 
aTnxOnuévous Kal TiWwY Kat On atrooTayTwV 

ca) e rad , 

/ >  € 4 \ v 2 SP 
dirwv, aX UroTtav Kal dvaddpwv dvtwv, avév- 
tas Kivduveverv (Kal yap ay ai atootdces Tpos 
e nn ] / lal \ > / \ 
buds éyiyvovto)* mace de avetibOovov ta Evp- 
pépovTa TaV peyioTwy rept KiwWdtvwY ev Ti- 
Gea bat. 

¢ A A 

LXXVI. “‘Tueis yotv, @ AaxeSaipoviol, Tas 
’ A / / ae | Se. a > f 
ev 7H IleXotrovynow@ mrodets Ertl TO Upiv @hedALMOV 
KaTaoTnodmevo. e&nyeicbe: Kal ef TOTE Uro- 

\ a 
pelwavtes 1a Tavtos amnyOecbe ev TH HyEmovia, 

A \ nr 
WoTrEp Huets, EV lopev un av Rocov bas AVTN- 
pous yevopévous Tols Evppadyos Kai avayxacba- 
Tas ‘av 7) apyew éyxpaTa@s  avtovs xivduvever. 

a \ 
ovTws ovd ueis Oavyactoyv ovdev TeToLnKapev 
ovd ato Tov dvOporeiou TpoTrov, eb apxny Te 
diSopevny edeEapeBa Kal TavTnY py aveipey 
v7o! tev peyiorov vixnbévtes, ToS Kal d€éous 
Kal @pertas, od ad mp@tot Tov ToLovTOV UTap- 
Eavtes, GAN alel Kabect@tos TOV ocw wo TOD 
” , 

Suvatwtépov KatelpyecOat, akvot Te Gua vopi- 
Covtes elvar kal vtyiv Soxovyvtes, méxpt ov Ta 

/ , al / f a 
Evudépovta Roylouevot TO Sixaiw rAOyo viv 

1 Hude inserts rpiév before rév peylorwy, with van 
Herwerden and Weil. 


BOOK I. txxv. 3-Lxxvi. 2 

we were driven at first to advance our empire to its 

present state, influenced chiefly by_fear, then by. 

honour also, and lastly by self-interest_as well; and 

after we had once incurred the hatred of most of 
our allies, and several of them had already revolted 
and been reduced to subjection, and when you were 
no longer friendly as before but suspicious and at 
variance with us, it no longer seemed safe to risk 
relaxing our hold. For all seceders would have gone 
over to you. And no man is to be blamed for making 
the most of his advantages when it is a question of 
the gravest dangers 
LXXVI. “ At any rate you, Lacedaemonians, in 
the exercise of your leadership over the Pelopon- 
nesian states regulate their polities! according to 
your own advantage; and if in the Persian war 
you had held out to the end in the hegemony 
and had become unpopular in its exercise, as we 
did, you would certainly have become not less ob- 
noxious to the allies than we are, and would have 
been compelled either to rule them with a strong 
hand or yourselves to risk losing the hegemony. 
human nature in what we also have done, just because 
pted-an~empire when it was offered us, and 
then, yieldingto.the strongest motives—honour, 
fear, and sélf-interest— declined to give it up. Nor, 
again, are we-the-first who have entered upon such a 
course, but it has ever been an established rule that 
the weaker is kept down by the stronger. And at 
the same time we thought we were worthy to rule, 
and used to be so regarded by you also, until you fell 
to calculating what your interests were and resorted, 

1 i.e. by setting up oligarchies in them, cf. ch. xix. 



Thus there is nothing remarkable or inconsistent with _ 


rn a > , X 3 A / 
ypiabe, dv ovdeis TH TapatUXOY LoXUL TL KTI- 
fa \ f 
cacOat poles Tod jut) TAEOY EXELY ATrETPATFETO. 
al / ‘/ A 
émratvelcGai te aol, oltives Ypnodpevor TH 
> / / ¢ € / BA , 
avOpwteia pices Bate ETépwv apyew OdiKaLO- 
s 4 
Tepol ) KATA THY UTapyYovaay SuVamLY yévwvTAL. 
ddXous y av ovv oloueba Ta nuétEepa ANaPBovTas 
” vn / v / Aes \ \ 
SetEar dv pdduota el TL peTpialoper, Hut dé Kal 
> a fal 5] , \ / a »” > 
€x Tov émetxovs abokia TO TEOV 7 ETAaLVOS OVK 
LXXVII. ‘Kai édaccotvpevor yap év tats 
/ \ \ / /, \ 
EvuBoraiats mpos tovs Evupdxous Sixais Kal 
a val a e 
Tap nuiv avtois ev Tots Omolols VomoLs TOLNTAVTES 
\ , rf an \ > A 
tas «pices didodixetvy Soxodpev. Kat ovdeis 
me rely a : eee / ” 2 «7! 
a \ , / 
a / 
ovat St 6 TL TOdTO ovK oveldivetar: BrafecPa 
yap ols av é&F, SindlecOar ovdev mpocdéovtar. 
€ AAS , \ etn Sad a» c a 
of 6¢ €(0tc wévot TPOS Mas Aro TOU icov optreiy, 
» \ fol a 
nv Te Tapa TO pn olecOar xpjvar } yvoun 7 
a e lal 
Suvaper TH Oia THY apxnv Kal oTwoodY éhaccw- 
al A / 
» > \ 2s ‘a , / 
éxouo, adda Tod evdeods yareTwTEpov hépovary 
, / \ na 
4 ef avo mpatns atobéuevor TOV vouov davepas 

1 These seem to have been disputes in matters of trade 
tried before federal courts elsewhere than in Athens ; whereas 
Tas Kpioeis refers to compulsory jurisdiction which Athens 
enforced upon her allies in her own courts. 


BOOK I. txxvi. 2-Lxxvil. 3 

as you do now, to the plea of justice—which no one, 

oppor ing by 
main strength, ever yet put before force and ab- 
stained from taking advantage. And they are to be 
commended who, yielding to the instinct of human 
nature to rule over others, have been more observant 
of justice than they might have been, considering 
their power. At least, if others should seize our 
power, they would, we think, exhibit the best proof 
that we show some moderation; but in our case the 
result of our very reasonableness is, perversely enough, 
obloquy rather than commendation. 

LXXVII. “Tor although we are at a disadvantage 
in suits! with our allies arising out of commercial 
agreements, and although in our own courts in 
Athens, where we have established Spat the 
same laws apply to us as to them, we are thought 
to insist too much upon our legal rights. And 
none of our allies observes why it is that those 
who hold dominion elsewhere, and are less mode- 
rate than we are toward their subjects, are not 
reproached on this account. It is because those 
who may use might have no need to appeal to right. 
But if ever our allies, accustomed as they are to 
associate with us on the basis of equality, come off 
second best in any matter, however trivial, contrary 
to their own notion that it ought to be otherwise, 
whether their discomfiture is due to a legal decision 
or to the exercise of our imperial power, instead of 
being grateful that they have not been deprived of 
what is of greater moment,” they are more deeply 
offended because of their trifling inequality than if 
we had from the first put aside all legal restraints 

® Namely, their equality before the law. 


3 a 229 1 9.039 5a PAT en ee 
érreovextovpev. exelvas O€ OV av avTol avTeE- 
¢ > \ \ ce A a 
a ¥ / U 
imoxwpetv. adiKovpeEvot TE, WS EoLKeED, ol avOpa- 
a ? / x / \ \ \ 
mot wadXov opyiGovtar 7 Bialopuevor’ TO pev yap 
>] \ n 7 “a a \ >] > \ . 
ajo Tov loov SoKxel tAEOVEeKTEtcOal, TO OS AaTO 
Tov Kpelocovos KaTtavayKxdlecGat. vio your TOD 
/ / 
Mndou Sewotepa TovTwV) TacTXoVTES HVELYOVTO, 
e \ e / > \ \ a 3 > , 
Se juetépa apxyn YareT? SoKxel Eivat, eLKOTwS 
TO Tapov yap aiel Bapd Tols UrnKools. pels y 
Ry =: Ra , rdecok ae 2 yaa VS N 
dp obv\el KadeXovtes Huas apfaite, Taya av THY 
> a yh es Oo ae zs / oF 
evvotay Hy Sia TO HwéTEpov Séos EtAnpaTe peTa- 
, \ \ a 
Bddoute, eltrep ola Kat TOTe mpos Tov Mydov bv 
? / e , e / e n \ ral 
OdLyou Hynoduevor wrredelEaTe, omoia Kal vov 
>! 3 a 
yvocerbe. auerxta yap Ta TE KAP pas avToUS 
a \ 
voulpa Tois ddXrows EXETE Kal TPOGETL els ExaTTOS 
a Yi c \ 
é£.w@v ovTEe TOUTOLS YpHTaL OVE ois 7 AAAN ENAas 
LXXVIII. “ Bovretverbe otv Bpadéws ws ov 
\ , \ pe , , \ 
mept Bpaxéwv, Kal py AdXoTpials yvomats Kai 
> a 
éyxAnpact TercOévTes OlKetov Tovoy mpocOnabe. 
rn \ / \ 4 id > , \ 
tov 6€ ToAéu“ov TOY TapdNoyoy aos é€oTi, mpl 
9 . A , , : , \ 
év avT@ yevécOar TpodidyvaTe pnkuvomevos yap 
"al ed / \ \ 4 e yy 
direi és TUXaS TA TOANA TepLictacOaL, wv ico 
e y 
Te aTéyouev Kal oTroTépws EoTaL ev adyrw KW- 
Suvevetat. lovtes Te of avOpwrot és TOUS TOdE- 
fw v , 4 \ A Qn 
mous Ta Epywv mpoTepov Eyov Tal, & Yphv VaTepov 


BOOK I. vxxvit. 3-Lxxvil, 3 

and had openly sought our own advantage. In that 
case even they would not be setting up the claim 
that the weaker should not have to yield to the 
stronger. Men, it seems, are more resentful of in- 
justice than of violence ; for the former, they feel, is 
overreaching by an equal, whereas the latter is 
coercion by a superior. At any rate, they submitted 
to more grievous wrongs than these at the hands of 
the Persians, while our rule is hard to bear, as they 
think ; and no wonder, for the present yoke is always 
heavy to subjects. Certainly you, should you, over- 
throw us and obtain supremacy, would soon lese the 
good will which you have gained through fear of us— 
if indeed you mean again ‘to show such | temper as you 
gave a glimpse of at that time when for a little while 
you had the hegemony against the Persian.! For the 
institutions that prevail among you at home are in- 
compatible with those of other peoples, and, besides, 
each one of you when he goes abroad uses neither 
these nor those which the rest of Greece is accustomed 

LXXVIII. “Be slow, then, in your deliberations, 
for no slight matters are at stake; and do not, 
influenced by the opinions and accusations of others, 
burden yourselves needlessly with trouble of your 
own. Realise before you get into it how great are 
the chances of miscalculation in war. For when it 
is long drawn out, it is wont generally to resolve it- 
self into a mere matter of chance; and over chance_ 
both sides equally have no control, and what the 
outcome will be is unknown and precarious. Most 
men rush into war and proceed to blows first, 
although that ought to be the last resort, and then, 

1 ¢.g. the conduct of Pausanias described in ch. cxxx. 



A la ha” / a / LA 
Spav, kaxoTrabovrtes S€ 76n TOV NOywv arTovTat. 
n an / 
jets O€ ev ovdemid TH TOLAUTN adpaptia ovTEs 
> ’ e an e ca a 
ovtT avtol ov vuas opa@vTes Aéyomev Upiy, Ews 
” b] / > fd e > / \ 
étt avOaipetos audotépors 7) evBovrAia, otrovdas 
\ / \ / \ cd x \ 
un Ave pndé tapaBaivery Tovs SpKous, Ta OE 
/ 7 
Siadopa Sixn AVecIar Kata thy EvvOynKnv, 7 
\ \ e / Pa / 
/ ¥ / 
ucla apvvecOar Todéuov apyovtas TavTn 7 av 
a bb] 
lal ee A s 
LXXIX. Toradta dé of “AOnvator eitrov. ére- 
\ \ a , 4 e 4 
87 6€ Tov Te Evppaxwrv Heoveav ot Aaxedaipovior 
\ > / \ b \ ’ / \ ” 
Ta éykAnuata Ta és Ttovs "AOnvaious Kal Tav 
? / a - / ‘ 
A@nvaiwv & édreEav, petactnodpmevor TavTas 
cal \ an 
€BourevovTo Kata odas avTous Tept TOV Tapov- 
lal / la 
Tov. Kal TOV ev TAEOVWY ETL TO AUTO al yYo@paL 
Edepov, adixeiv Te TOUS "APnvaious 76n Kal Tode- 
/ > > / Oa be , / e 
pntéa elvar év Taye: TrapedOawv de Apyidapos o 
a ‘\ \ nS a 
Bactrevs atvtav, avnp Kal Evvetos Soxav eivat 
Kal copper, éreke Tordde. 

LXXX. “Kal avros rodd\ov 75n Todtéuov 
éurrerpos eiut, @ Aaxedatpmoriol, Kal Uw@V Tovs eV 
fel > Pine’ / € a ef i. > / b fol 

lal e / 
cat Twa TOD épyou, OTEp Av of TodXOL TUOozeE?D, 
/ > \ \ > \ , ev > 
unre ayaboyv Kai acparés vouicavta. evpote 6 
av tovde trept ov viv BovrevecGe ovK av éda- 
foto. pos pev yap IleXomovynciovs Kal tous 


BOOK I. txxvin. 3-Lxxx, 3 

when they are in distress, at length have recourse to 
words. But since we ourselves are not as yet involved 
in any such error and see that you are not, we urge 
you, while wise counsels are still a matter of free 
choice to both of us, not to violate the treaty or 

hs ag aera ee differences be 
settled_by arbitration according to thé agréément. 
But if you refuse, we shall invoke as witnesses the ~~ 
gods by whom our oaths were sworn, and shall en- 
deavour to make reprisals on those who begin the war, 
following that path in which you have led the way.” 
LXXIX. Thus the Athenians spoke. And when 
the Lacedaemonians had heard the charges brought 
by the allies against the Athenians, and what the 
latter said in reply, they caused all others to with- 
draw and deliberated by themselves on the situation 
before them. And the opinions of the majority 
tended to the same conclusion, namely, that the ~» 
Athenians were already guilty of injustice, and that | 
they must go to war without delay. Ko oeeeane 
their king, a man reputed to be both sagatiousand = 
prudent, came forward and spoke as follows: | 
LXXX. “ I have both myself, Lacedaemonians, had 
experience in my day of many wars, and I seemen ™ 
among you who are as old as I am; no one of them, 
therefore, is eager for war through lack of experience, 
as would be the case with most men, nor because 
he thinks it a good or a safe thing. And you 
would find that this war about which you are now 
deliberating is likely to prove no trifling matter, if 
one should reflect upon it soberly.—¥orin a contest 
with the Peloponnesians or the neighbouring states ! 
1 By the Peloponnesians Thucydides means the Spartan 

alliance ; the neighbouring states would then be the Pelo- 
ponnesian states not in the alliance, e.g. Argos. 




> , , con C39 bx \ \ 
y, ar 9,9 of > lal \ A 
Tayéwv otov Te Eh Exacta éeiv: pos dé avdpas 
i. a v y 
of yy te éxas éxovot Kal wpocéts Oaddoons 
/ ral 
2Enptuvtal, wArovUT@m Te ldiw Kal § ( I 
éEnpTuvTalt, TOUTS Loto Kat Snuwociw Kal 
A > 
vavol Kat immo Kat OmXoLs Kal BY Boos OvK 
/ ¢e al 

év addw Evi ye xopio EddAnvike éortw, ete dé Kal 

U lal lal 
Evppayous trodXovs Popov UToTEXEls EyouaL, TAS 

Xpn Tpos TOVTOUS padlws TroAEuov apacBat Kal 
tive TioTEvoaVvTaS aTapacKevous eTELyOnvaL; 
, la , > ? ed > / > \ 
4 TOTEpOV Talis vavolv; aX Hocovs éeopév: ef be 
MeNETHCOMEV Kal avTLTAapacKEevacouela, Ypovos 
évéoTalt. Gada TOS XpHuacW; GAA TOANO 
/ ” 4 _ “4 \ ” > a 
"4 lal 
mal by y ¢i al 
LXXXI. “Tay av tis Oapooin ote Tots br- 
5) lal \ a / c f °¢ 

Nols av’T@V Kail TO TAHOE UTEepPhépopev, WoTe 
2 Thy yhv Snovv emipoit@vtes. Tots dé aAAH YA 

bd \ a8 v \ > , > 
éoTt TOAAN 1S apyouvcl, Kat ex Padaaons ov 

, 5) , > > > \ , 
3 déovtar érdfovtar. ae 8 av Tovs Evupayous 
; / , are , 
adictavat Teipacopeda, dence. Kai ToUTOLS Vavat 
n \ “ 2 , / oS 
4 BonOeivy TO TA€OY OvaL VnTLwWTAaLs. Tis OdY EcTaL 
a e / > \ \ x \ 
> / 
}) TAS Tpocodous adarprycopev adh’ WV TO VaUTLKOV 
, \ / 
5 tpéhovalt, BrawroucOa Ta TrElw. Kav TOUT@ 

ovde KatadvecOar Ett Kadov, GAXwS TE Kal Et 
1 «.¢, it is military rather than naval ; similar, too, in the 

matter of wealth, equipment, absence of foreign resources, 
tributary allies, etc, 


BOOK I. xxx. 3-Lxxxi. 5 

our power is of the same type with theirs! and we can 
be upon them quickly at every point ; but when op- 
posed to men whose territory is far away, who besides 
are beyond all others experienced in seamanship and 
are best equipped in all other respects, with wealth 
both private and public, ships, horses, arms and a 
larger population than is to be found in any other single 
district in Hellas, who have, moreover, numerous 
allies subject to tribute—against such men why should 
we lightly take up arms? In what do we place our 
trust that we should attack them unprepared? In 
our ships? But there we are inferior; and if we 
train and make ourselves ready to encounter them, 
that will take time. In our wealth then? But in 
that respect we are still more deficient, neither having 
money in the treasury of the state nor finding it easy 
to raise money from our private resources by 

LXXXI. “ Perhaps some of us are emboldened by 
our superiority in arms and numbers, which enables 
us freely to invade and lay waste their territory. 
But there is other territory in plenty over which 
they hold sway, and they will import by sea what- 
ever they need. And if, on the other hand, we try 
to induce their allies to revolt, we shall have in 
addition to protect them with a fleet, since they are 
chiefly islanders. What then will be the character 


of the war we shall be waging? | Unless we ¢an— 

‘either win the mastery on the sea or cut off the 
revenues by which they support their navy, we shall 
get the worst of it. And; if it~comes-to-that, we 
‘can no longer even conclude an honourable peace, 

2 The poverty of the Peloponnesians is referred to by 
Pericles in ch. cxli. 3, The statement is true especially of 
the Spartans, but also of all the rest except the Corinthians. 

VOL. I. F 37 


6 d0fopev dp~ar wadrov THs diahopas. pn yap dy 
e / \ an lal 
GETAL O TOAELOS, HY THY Yhv av’Tav Téuwperv. 
/ \ a \ \ a \ My ec 
déd0.xa 6€ wadXov 7 Kal TOlS TAaLalY aUTOV UToO- 
, ef Md \ ’ / / A 
Aitrw@pev OUTS eiKos ’AOnvaiovs dpovnpate pHTeE 
Th yn SovAEedcaL pte WoTrEp aTELpoUS KaTa- 
LXXXII. “Od pny ot6€ dvatcOjtws adtovs 
i / / e€ lal IA 4 
KeXevw Tovs TE Evupayous nuay éav BraTTELVY 
Kal émuBovrevovtas pn KaTapwpav, ad\r\}a bra 
pev nto Kiveiv, TéwTre O€ Kal aitiacOar pHTeE 
/ A a ‘fp e b] , 
ToNE“ov ayav OnrodvTas uO ws éeriTpéWouer, 
, ? cal 
Kav TOUT@ Kal Ta HuEeTEp avTav e€aptierBaL 
A € 
Evupayov te Tpocaywyn, Kal “EXAnvev Kal 
BapBdapovel Toév Tiva 7} vavTiKoD } YpnudTwv 
Svvamww mpoornYopnela (aveTipovoyv Sێ, dcot 
ev Mier (Sep ie ul oe Om1 , 2 r 
@oTrep Kal tuets UT "AOnvaiwy ém1Bovdevopeba, 
un” EAAnvas povev, AAA kal BapBapovs rpocda- 
rf a oy 
Bovtas S:acwOfvat), Kal Ta avT@Y aya extropt- 
2 Cwpeba. Kal hv pwev Ecaxovwot TL mpec Bevomevev 
e fad ra y 5 xX be , é 06 b] rn 
HuaV, TADTA apiota* Hv Sé pr, SeAOovT@Y éeTaY 
Sv0 Kal TpL@y dpevov H5n, hv SoxH, Teppaypévor 
€ “~ “ 
3 iuev rr avtovs. Kal lows opa@vtes Huay Hdn THY 
, a e al 
Te TapacKeuny Kal TOS AOYOUS avTH Opmola UtTo- 
onpaivovTas madrXov ay eixovev, Kal yh ete ATEN - 
/ fal > 
Tov éyovTes Kal Tepl TapovTway ayabay Kai ovTw 


BOOK I. txxx. 5-LXXXIl. 3 

especially if it is believed that we rather than they 
began the quarrel. For we assuredly must not be 
buoyed up by any such hope as that the war will 
soon be over if we but ravage their territory. I fear 
rather that we shall even bequeath it to our children, 
so improbable it is that the Athenians, high spirited 
as they are, will either make themselves vassals to 
their land, or, like novices, become panic-stricken at 
the war. 

LXXXII. “Yet assuredly I do not advise you 
that you should blindly suffer them to injure our 
allies and allow their plotting to go undetected, but 
rather that you should adopt the following course: 
Do not take up arms yet, but/send envoys to them 
and make complaints, without indicating too clearly < 
whether we shall go to war or put up _with-their 
conduct ; also in the meantime, let us proceed with 
‘our own preparations, in the first place by winning” 
allies to our side, Barbarians as well as Hellenes, in 
the hope of obtaining from some quarter or other 
_ additional resources in ships or money (for those who, 
like ourselves, are plotted against by the Athenians 
are not to be blamed if they procure their salvation 
by gaining the aid, not of Hellenes only, but even of 
Barbarians) ; and let us at the same time be developing 
our resources) at home. And if they give any heed 
to our envoys, there could be nothing better; but if 
not, then, after the lapse of two or three years, we 
shall at length be better equipped to go against 
them, if we decide todo so. Or perhaps when they 
see our preparations, and that our words correspond 
thereto, they will be more inclined to yield, for they 
will both have their land still unravaged and their 
deliberations will concern goods that are still theirs 



4 épOappevav Bovrevopevor. pt) yap arAXo TE 
vouicnte THY yHv avTav H Ounpov Eyew Kal ovy 
Hocov bo@ apevov éefeipyactar js dheldecOar 
Vpn @s éml TrEloTOY, Kai py) €S ATOVOLAY KaTa- 

5 oTHcavTas avToUs aAnTTOTépous Eye. Eb yap 
aTapacKevor Tots Tov Evppayov éyKAnpacw 
emery OevTes TE“ovMEV aUTHV, opate OTws p71 
alcyov Kal atropwtepov TH LleXoTovyijcw mpako- 

6 wev. eyKAnwaTa pevY yap Kal TodEwy Kal 
LOlwT@v olov Te KaTaXDGaL’ TOrNEnov Sé EvpuTrav- 
Tas apapévous évexa TOV idiwy, dv ovy UTapyxer 
eidévat Kal’ 6 Te Xwpyoel, ov padioy evrpeTas 

LXXXIII. “Kai avavdépia pndevi rordovs pa 

2 moder py TAXY ETENOeEty SoKEiTw eivar. eiol yap 
Kal éxelvols ovK éAdocOUS ypHuwaTta dé€povTes 
Evupaxor, Kal got Oo TOAEMOS OVX STAwY TO 
wréov, adra Satravyns, Ov hv Ta bTAA where, 

3 ddrXws TE Kal Hre_pwTats Tpos Padaaciouvs. To- 
picw@peba ody TPOTOv avTHY, Kal pun TOIS TOV 
Evpayov Aoyos MpoTEpov eTrarpwpmeOa, otTrep é 
Kal tTav amoBaivovtwy TO TAéov em’ aupoTtepa 
Ths aitias €€ouev, odToL Kat Kal’ yovyiav te 
avTa@v Tpoldwper. 

LXXXIV. “Kat ro Bpadv cai pérrev, 6 pép- 
hovtar padrioTa nuav, pn alayuverGe. oTev- 
Sovtés Te yap ayodaltepoy av Tavaoaabe dia TO 
amapacKkevoe éyxerpely, Kal Gua édevOépav Kal 


BOOK I. ixxxi. 3-Lxxxiv. 1 

and as yet not ruined. For do not regard their land 
as anything but a hostage for us to hold, and a better 
hostage the better it is cultivated. You should there- 
fore spare it as long as possible, instead of making them 
desperate and thus having a more intractable foe to 
deal with. For if, without adequate preparation, 
egged on by the complaints of our allies, we shall 
ravage their territory, beware lest we adopt a course 
which might rather! result in disgrace and diff- 
culties for the Peloponnesus. For complaints, in- 
deed, whether brought by states, or by individuals, 
may possibly be adjusted ; but when a whole con- 
federacy, for the sake of individual interests, under- 
takes a war of which no man can foresee the issue, 
it is not easy to end it with honour. 

LXXXIII. “And let no man think it pusillanimous 
that many states should hesitate to attack a single 
city. For they also have allies not less numerous 
than ours who pay tribute; and war is a matter not 
so much of arms as of money, for it is money alone 
that makes arms serviceable, especially when an-inland | 
opposes a maritime power. Let us therefore provide 
ourselves with money first, instead of being carried 
away prematurely by the eloquence of our allies; 
and, just as it is we who shall bear the greater part 
of the responsibility for the consequences, whether 
for good or evil, so let it be our task also calmly to 
get some forecast of them. 

LXXXIV. “And so be not ashamed of the slow- 
ness and dilatoriness for which they censure us most ; 
for speed in beginning may mean delay in ending, 
because you went into the war without preparation, 
and, moreover, in consequence of our policy we have 

1 4.¢, than the opposite course. 



evdofoTaTny moduw dia TavTos vewopeBa., Kak 

4 / / ” sone as. 
dvvatat padiota cwdpocvyy Eudpwv TovT eivar: 
povot yap Ov avTo evTpaytats Te ovK eEUBpifomev 

yap pay piloper 

\ a a (oe A ” rn \ 
kat Evydopais Hocoy eTépwv etxouev, TOV TE Evy 
5) , ’ id thpab a) > al \ \ \ \ 
érraive éEoTpuvovT@y amas emi Ta Selva Tapa TO 

lal a / A 
doxovv nutv ovK éetratpopeOa ndovn, Kal Hv TIS 
bya \ / / > \ \ lal 
apa Evy katnyopia trapoEvvn, ovdev On padXov 
b] / 3 / , \ 
axylecOévtes aveTretcOnuev. TrOdEMLKOL TE Kal 

v \ \ ” / \ \ a 
eUBovro 1a TO EVKOTMOY ylyVouEla, TO peEV OTL 

, \ - a / ’ / \ 
aldws cwppogvvns TrEloToV peTéexvet, alaxvvys O€ 
evpuxia, evBovror Oé apaléctepoy TOV vopwv 

a e / / \ \ , 
THS UTEepowias TaLdevopevor Kai Evy yadreTroTHTL 

a a \ 
Twppovértepov 7) WATE AUT@V aVNKOVOTELV, KAL 
, \ > a re ” \ an 
py Ta aypeta Evvetol ayay ovtes, Tas T@Y TrOdE- 
, la) “i 
piov TapacKkevas OYO KAN@S pEeupomevot avo- 
, ” b / / be / } / 
potms Epy@ émekvévat, vomiferv O€ Tas Te dtavotas 

a be 

TOV Tédkas TapaTANCLoUS ElvaL Kal TAS TpoTTT- 
dé / > / / b Dae, VY 18 \ 
TToVaas TUXAS OV OY SiatpeTas. atei dé WS TrPOS 
> / \ b / v 
ev BovdXevopevous TOUS EVAVTLOUS Epy@ TapacKeva- 
/ e 7 
CoueOa: Kal ove €& Exelvwy ws amapTnToMEevwV 
a / ’ lal a 
exew Sel Tas EATrLOaS, GAN’ WS juoY aiTaV acda- 

nm ‘ / cal 
ABs Mpovoovpevwyv, Tov te ciadépew ov Set 


1 The speaker uses e¥coouov, rather than Bpadd employed 
by the critics of Sparta, to suggest the contrast with im- 
pulsiveness or undue haste. 


BOOK I. uxxxiv. 1—4 

ever inhabited a city at once free and of fairest 
fame. And, after all, this trait in us may well be in 
the truest sense intelligent self-control, for by_ 
reason of it we alone do not become insolent in 
prosperity or succumb to adversity as much as others 
do; and when men try to goad us by praise into 
dangerous enterprises against our better judgment, 
we are not carried away by their flattery, or, if any- 
one goes so far as to attempt to provoke us to action 
by invective, we are none the more moved to com- 
pliance through vexation. Indeed, it is because of 
our orderly temper! that we are brave in war and 
wise in counsel—brave in war, because self-control is 
the chief element in self-respect, and respect of self, 
in turn, is the chief element in courage; and wise in 
counsel, because we are educated too rudely to 
despise the laws and with too much severity of 
discipline to disobey them, and not to be so ultra- 
clever in useless accomplishments? as to disparage 
our enemy’s military preparations in brave words 
and then fail to go through with the business with 
corresponding deeds, but rather to consider that the 
designs of our neighbours are very much like our own 
and that what may befall from fortune? cannot be 
determined by speeches. , But it is our way always 
to make our preparations by deeds, on the presump- 
tion that we go against opponents who are wise in 
counsel ; and we ought never to build our hopes on 
the chance that they are going to make mistakes, 
but on the belief that we ourselves are taking safe 
precautions. And we must not believe that man 

? With a glance at the Athenians’ attention to culture, 
especially the art of elegant speech. 

> cf. the Corinthians’ charge, ch. lxix: 5, that the Spartans 
trusted to chance, — 



\ 2 
vouitey avOpwrov avOpwtov, Kpatictov Sé elvat 

LXXXV. “Tavras otv Gs of watépes Te Hpiv 
f , \ > v \ Nes , 
Tapédocay medETAas Kal avToL dia TaVTOs whEdov- 
r / 
pevoe ExXouev pn Tap@pmev, pnde éreryOevTes €v 
Bpaxet popiw nuépas Tepl TOAN@Y TwOLATwY Kal 
, \ / \ / J 
XpnuaTwv Kal Todkewy Kal Oofns Bovrevowper, 
’ >) a lal ‘ 
ara Kal iovyiav. eé€eatt O Hytv panddop érte- 
tee , \ \ \ 334 , , 
2 pwv ota toxuv. Kal mpos Ttovs “AOnvatous TéEu- 
an / 
mete pev wept THS Ilotedaias, wéutete S€ Trepl 
/ a 
av ot Evppayot dacw adieicOar, dXXrXws TE Kal 
lal , fal 
éToimov dvT@v auTav dixas Sovvar: éml dé Tov 
> lal 
Sid0vta ov TpoTepov vopupmov ws eT adiKodVTA 
+/ / \ \ / oe 
iévat. twapackevdfecbe dé Tov TOAEuOY dua. 
fal \ / a 
TavTa yap Kal Kpaticta BovdevoecOe Kai Tos 
, , p] 
évavtios hoBepwtata.’ 
e > / fal = 
3 Kalo pev “Apyidapor toratta eitev’ traped- 
/ tal n 
Gav S& LOevedadas TerevTaios, els THY éhopov 
Tote wy, édekev Tots Aaxedaipoviots! dbe. 
LXXXVI. “Tovs pév Aoyous Tovs TOAXNOUS TOV 
> , > , bd] /, \ \ 
AOnvaiav ov yiyvocKkm: éTatvécavtes yap TOANG 
nuetépous Evspayous Kat tHv Ledorovyvncov: 
\ , 
Kaltot et mpos Tous Mndous éyévovto ayaol Tote, 
\ > c al \ lal , , ” , 
mpos & nuas Kaxol viv, diumdactas Enutas aELoi 
2 eiow, OTL avtT ayalav Kaxol yeyévnvTat. pets 
5é Omotos Kal TOTE Kal viv ecpev, Kal Tovs Evppa- 
1 Hude deletes with Kriiger. 

BOOK I. cxxxiv. 4—Lxxxvi. 2 

differs much from man,! but that he is best who is 
trained in the severest discipline. 

LXXXV. “These are the practices which our 
fathers bequeathed to us and we ourselves have 
maintained from the beginning to our profit; let us 
not abandon them, nor allow ourselves in a small 
portion of one day to be hurried into a decision which 
involves many lives, much money, many cities and a 
good name ; but let us deliberate at our leisure. And 
this course is permitted to us more than to the sup- 
porters of the other view because of our strength. And 

_ send envoys tothe Athenians to take up the question 

_ of Potidaea, and also to take up the matters wherein 

\ our allies claim that they are wronged. The chief 
‘reason for this is that they are-ready 2 to submit to 
arbitration, and it is not lawful to proceed forthwith 
against one who offers arbitration as though against a 
wrong-doer. But all the while prepare yourselves 
for the war. This decision will be best for yourselves 
“and will inspire most fear *., your foes.” 

Thus spoke Archidamuse and finally Sthenelaidas, — es 

one of the ephors at that time, came forward and 
addressed the Lacedaemonians as follows : 
LXXXVI. “The long speeches of the Athenians 
I cannot understand; for though they indulged in 
much praise of themselves, they nowhere denied that 
they are wronging our allies and the Peloponnesus. 
And yet, if they conducted themselves well against 
the Persians in former times but are now conducting 
tiiemselves ill toward us, they deserve two-fold 
punishment, because they used to be good and have 
become bad. But we are the same now as we were 

1 ¢f. the Corinthians’ praise of Athenian superiority, ch. lxx. 
® of. ch. lxxviii. 4. 




a lal > / > 
yous, iv cwppovapuev, ov meptoiroueBa adixov- 
/ ’ \ / lal e 3 > / 
pévous ovde pedAAHoOpMEV TiwwpeEty: of & OvKETL 
sf la , ” \ \ / 
pata éote Kal vies Kal immos, tiv dé Evppaxot 
> , A > , ae , ’ , 
aya0ol, ods ov Tapabotéa Tols “APnvatos éotiy, 
ovdé dixais Kal Aoyows StaxpiTéa p1) AOYO Kal 

E ¥ fey Nays 
> \ , > \ / > / 
Kal Tavtl cOéver. Kal ws nuas peter Bovrev- 
ec0at adlKovpévous pnoels dL6acKéeT@, AAA TOUS 
BovrevecOar. wWndifecde orv, ® Aaxedatpoviot, 
a \ 
akiws Ths Lmaptns Tov TwoAEMoY Kal pTE TOUS 
"A@ / baal / / a) / \ 
nvatous é€ate pelfous yiyver0ar, mnte Tous 
/ a > \ \ lal val 
Evpuaxous KataTpodloapev, adda Evv tots Geois 
émiwpev el TOUS abLKovVTAS.” 
LXXXVII. Tovadta réEas ereWydifev avtos 
” BY hat | A 3 , A A 5 , 
Epopos av és! THv exxdrAnaotav Tov Aaxedatpoviwr. 
\ rn 
6 8€ (xpivovas yap Bon cai ov Whdw) ovK &py 
, \ x / / > \ 
SiaylyvwcKer THv Bony ToTépa peilwv, adda 
Bovropevos avtovs havepas aTroderxvupevous THY 
, > \ a a e a /- 
yv@pnv és TO ToNEuEtY waddov opyncaL EdeEev" 
“Orem pev tuav, ® Aaxedaiporiot, Soxodat e- 
AVcOat ai otrovdal Kal ot “AOnvaior ad.xeir, 
avacTyTw és éxeivo TO ywpiov, SetEas TL Ywpiov 
iP ghbe sels A ? . 2s) ba » 
autos, “Tw 5é un Sokovaw, €s Ta emi OadTepa. 
> / \ / \ an / 
avactdvtes b€ SiuéoTnoav, Kal TOAXB TreElous 
’ / s > / e \ / 
éyévovto ols eboKovv ai otrovdai Nedvabat. Tpoc- 
1 Hude deletes, after Fr. Miiller. 

BOOK I. txxxvi. 2-Lxxxvil. 4 

then, and if we are in our right minds, we shall not 
permit our allies to be wronged or even put off 
avenging their wrongs, since they cannot longer put 
off suffering them. Others, indeed, may have money 
in abundance and ships and horses,! but we have 
brave allies, and they must not be delivered over to 
the Athenians; nor must we seek redress by means 
of legal processes and words when it is not in word 
only that we ourselves are being injured, but we 
must avenge them speedily and with all our might. 
And let no man tell us that it befits us to deliberate 
when a wrong is being done us; nay, it befits rather 
those who intend to do us a wrong to deliberate a 
long time. Vote, therefore, Lacedaemonians, for the 
war as beseems the dignity of Sparta, and do not 
permit the Athenians to become too great; and let 
us not prove false to our allies, but let us with the 
favour of the gods go against the wrong-doer.” 
LXXXVII. When Sthenelaidas had thus spoken, 
he himself, since he was an ephor, put the vote to 
the assembly of the Lacedaemonians. Now in their 
voting they usually decide by shout and not by 
ballot, but Sthenelaidas said that he could not distin- 
guish which shout was the louder, and wishing to 
make the assembly more eager for war by a clear 
demonstration of their sentiment, he said: “ Who- 
ever of you, Lacedaemonians, thinks that the treaty 
has been broken and the Athenians are doing wrong, 
let him rise and go to yonder spot (pointing to a 
certain spot), and whoever thinks otherwise, to the 
other side.” Then they rose and divided, and those 
who thought the treaty had been broken were found 
to be in a large majority. Then they called in the 

+ of. ehzlzxx, 3; 


/ A \ 4 s id , 
Kadéoavtés Te Tos Evppaxous eimov OTL odhiat 
lal lal “ \ 
pev Soxolev adixeiv ot “A@nvaior, Bovrecbar Sé 
Kal ToUs TavTas _Evppaxous TapaKanéo ares 
Vapov emayaryet, CT WS KOT Bovrevo apevor TOV 
Toe MOV TOL@VTAL, hv 60K}. Kab ov pev amexo- 
pnoav é€m otKov Svar pakapevoe TavTa, Kal ob 
"AOnvalwv mrpéa Bers taotepov ep arrep HAO ov xXpN- 
| patioavTes. 

id \ , oA fel >? / a \ 

H &€ d:ayvepn avtn THs exKANTLasS TOU Tas 

da / @ 1 PD] / > / \ Py 
KeYopnKkuov, al éyévovto peta Ta EvPoixa. 
LXXXVIII. éWndicavto 6é of Aaxedatpovior 

\ 8 , \ / - > 
Tas omrovoas AEAVTOaL Kal TONEUNTEA ElVaL, OU 
TocovTov Tav Evppaywov recPertes Tos Noyots 
vf / \ , / \ > \ lal 
dcov hoSovpevor Tovs “AOnvatous pn emt petfov 

a e lal 5] a \ \ a ¢ , 
Suvnbaciy, op@vtes avTOIs TA TOANA THS EAXa- 
Sos UToyelpla 757 ovTa. 

LXXXIX. Oi yap ’A@nvaio tpoTr@ toi@de 
Ss Bees \ / > = > / > \ 
ArOov ert Ta Tpaypata ev ols HVENOncay. érrELd7 
Miédoau aveywpnoav éx ths Edpwrns wendévtes 

\ \ \ en ec 1.7 / \ e 
Kal vavol Kal Teg vTO EXAnva@v Kal ol KaTa- 

, > A Qn \ > / 4 
dhuyovtes avTav tats vavolv és Muxaddny d:epOa- 
/ \ e \ r 
pnoav, Aewtvxidns pev 0 Bactrevs Tov Aaxedat- 
, ec e cad A > / ¢ "4 
pLoviwr, daTrep nryetto Tov ev Muxadryn EXAnvar, 
amteywpnoev em oixov &ywv Tovs ato Iledorrov- 

/ s e se 9 an \ e by \ 
vycov Evypayous: ot b€ ‘A@nvaio: Kal ot atro 

1 ted Tas onovdas AeAUoOa:, omitted by Hude, following 
van Herwerden. 


BOOK I, txxxvi. 4-Lxxx1x. 2 

allies and told them that, in their opinion, the Athe- 
nians were doing wrong, but that they wished to 
summon the whole body of the allies! and put the 
vote to them, in order that they might all deliberate 
together and together undertake the war, if it should 
be so decided. And so the allies who were there 
went back home, having brought these matters to a 
settlement, and so did the Athenian envoys later, 
after they had finished the business on which they 
had come. 

This decision of the assembly, that the treaty had 

been broken, was made in the fourteenth year? from 
the beginning of the thirty years’ truce, which was 
made after the Euboean war. LXXXVIII. And 

the vote of the Lacedaemonians that the treaty had= 

been broken and that they must go to war was 
determined, not so much by the influence of the 
speeches of their allies, as by fear of the Athenians, 
lest they become too powerful, seeing that the greater 
part of Hellas was already subject to them. 

LXXXIX. For it was in the following manner that = 

the Athenians found themselves face to face with 
those circumstances in dealing with which they rose 
to greatness. When the Persians had retreated from 
Europe, defeated on both sea and land by the Hel- 
lenes,* and those of them who with their ships had 
taken refuge at Mycale had perished there, Leoty- 
chides, king of the Lacedaemonians, who was com- 
mander of the Hellenes at Mycale, went home with 
the allies from the Peloponnesus. But the Athe- 
nians, together with the allies from Ionia and the 

1 A general convocation of the allies; at this time only 
part of them had been invited, according to ch. Ixvii. See 

ch. cxix., where the plan is carried out. 2 445 B.c. 
de ch. exiy. * At Salamis, Plataea, Mycale. 



/ / 
‘Twvias cat ‘EXXnorovtov Evupayor, dn adeotn- 
/ / \ 
KoTeEs ATO Buctréws, Utropetvaytes Xnotov éro- 
ALopKovv Mrydav éxovtwv, Kal éTiyerwaoavTes 
= > \ ? / lal s \ \ 
elXov avTiy éxdiTovT@y TaY BapBapev, Kal peTa 
a > / bd € / e a4 
TovTo aTémAevcav €& EXANoTOVTOU ws EXaTTOL 
x , > , \ \ , ) \ 
Kata roves. “AOnvaiwy 6€ TO KoLvov, érreLdy 
> lal rc. f. > lo yy: > 4 
avtots ot BapBapor €x THs ywpas awHdOon, Siexo- 
/ b] \ e/ e of lal % A 
pilovto evOvds G0ev UTeEEevTO Tratéas Kal yuvat- 
rn \ \ 
lal \ / cal 
avolKosomely TapecKevalovTo Kal TA TELYN* TOU 
/ / e A 
Te yap TeptBorou Bpayéa eiotHKer Kal oikiat ai 
\ \ 2 , Ie \ an b] 
pev TONAL erreTTM@KETAY, ONiyat SE TEPinaaD, év 
€ lal lal 
als avtol éoxyjvacav ot dvvatot Tav Hepaav. 
/ \ 
XC. Aaxedarpoveor 6€ alc Popevor TO wéAXOV HA- 
/ \ \ e nr 
Gov mpecBetav, Ta ev Kal avTOl HoLov av opavTes 
Wu - m 2 | / / ” SYA / a ” 
pnt éxelvous punt adrov pNdéva TEtXos ExovTA, 
an / 
TO 6€ TACOV TaY EVvumaywy eEoTpUYVOYT@Y Kal 
lal fal an x la) a 
hoBoupévwy Tov TE VaUTLKOV aUT@Y TO TAHOOs, O 
\ > e a \ \ > \ / 5 \ / 
Tpiv ovy UTHpXE, Kal THY €s TOV MyndiKov Trode- 
/ / 
pov TOApaVv yevouevnv. n&lovy TE avToOvs py 
Teryiferv, ara Kal TOV €Ew LleXoTrovyrjcou par- 
Nov Oaos elatyKer Evyxalenely peta shav Tovs 
, \ 7 \ ef lel 
meptBorous, TO uev PovroOmevoyv Kal VTOoTTOY THs 
, > A bd \ ’ , c \ 
yvouns ov dnrovvtes €s Tovs ‘AOnvatous, ws 6é 
a / ? ef b] / > x »” 
Tov BapBapov, et avis érédOot, ovK av ExXoVTOS 

1 The contingents from the islands and the coast of Asia 
Minor, who, in consequence of the battle at Mycale and the 


BOOK I. txxxtx. 2—xc. 2 

Hellespont,! who were already in revolt from the 
King, remained at their task and besieged Sestos, 
which was held by the Persians; and passing the 
winter there they took it, as it had been deserted by 
the Barbarians; and after that the contingents of 
the several cities sailed away from the Hellespont. 
But the Athenian people, when the Barbarians had 
departed from their territory, straightway began to 
fetch back their wives and their children and the 
remnant of their household goods from where they 
had placed them for safety,” and to rebuild the city 
and the walls; for of the encircling wall only small 
portions were left standing, and most of the houses 
were in ruins, only a few remaining in which the 
chief men of the Persians had themselves taken 

XC. But the Lacedaemonians, perceiving what 
was in prospect, came on an embassy, partly because 
they themselves would have preferred to see neither 
the Athenians nor anyone else have a wall, but more 
because their allies urged them on through appre- 
hension, not only of the size of the Athenian navy, 
which had hitherto not been large, but also of the 
daring they had shown in the Persian war. So they 
requested them not to rebuild their walls, but rather 
to join with them in razing the walls of whatsoever 
towns outside the Peloponnesus had them standing, 
giving no indication of their real purpose or of their 
suspicion with regard to the Athenians, but repre- 
senting that the Barbarian, if he should attack them 
again, would not have any stronghold to make his 

advance of the victors to Abydos, had been received into the 
Hellenic alliance. 
2 Salamis, Aegina, and Troezen; cf. Hdt. vir. xli. 



amo éxupov mobev, OoTEp vov éx« tav OnBoar, 
oppacbat, THY TE Tletorovyncov Taow epacay 
avaxepnoty TE Kal adopyny teavny elvau. oa 8 
*AOnvaios OcurrroKéovs youn TOUS pev Aaxe- 
Satmovious TavT elTOVTas, aTroxpwapevol OTL TEL- 

ovclY @S avToUS Tpéa Bets Tept Ov Aéyouow, 
ev0us anipragav- éavTov © exehevev aToaTéX- 
Nev @S TAaXYLTTA O Oem ToKAAs és tnv Aaxedai- 
pova, addous dé mpos éavT@ EdopEvous T peo Beus 
p42) evOvs € ERTEMTEEY; aX emia xe pexpe Tooov- 
Tov €ws av TO Teixos (KaVOV Apwol WOTE aTrO"a- 
xerGar € éx TOU avarykaLoTaTov Dypous: Tevx (Few bé 
mavTas Tavonpel Tous €v TH TonEL,) Kal avTous 
Kal yuvaixas Kal Tatas, devdouévous pire idtou 
Lyre Onpoctov oik0b0f.7/4aT os 60ev Tis apedia 
eo Tal és TO épyov, adda cabarpodvras Tara. 
Kal c pev TavTa OddEas Kal UrevTov, TaAXA OTL 
aUTOS TAKEL mpakor, @XETO. Kal €s THY Aaxedai- 
pova ed Oav ov Tpoo ret pos Tas apxas, Gra 
Oufiye Kat mpouvpacivero. “Kal “OT OTE “TUS avrov 
Epoto (TOV év TENEL OVT@V\S TL ovK em epXeTar €Trl 
TO KoLVOV, EbN TOUS Evpm peo Bers avamevelv, AZKO- 
déyerOat pévtor ev Taye iEew Kal Oavyalew ws 
¥ ; 

XCI. Of &€ adxovovtes TH pev OepiotoKkre? 
éreiGovto dia diriav, Tov? b€ ad\rXwY adixvov- 
uévov Kal cabas KaTnyopovvTwy OTL Taxi erat 

1 ros ev rH wédet, Kriiger brackets, followed by Hude. 
Kal abtovs... maidas also bracketed by Hude, as not read by 

2 Hude adopts Shilleto’s conjecture aitomtay, 


BOOK | I. xe. 2=xcr. 1 

base of operations, as lately he had made Thebes; 
the Peloponnesus, they added, was large enough for 
all, both as a retreat and as a base of operations. To 
these proposals of the Lacedaemonians, the Athe- 
nians, by the advice of Themistocles, replied that 
they would send ambassadors to Sparta to discuss 
these matters, and so got rid of them without delay. 
Themistocles then proposed that they should send 
himself as speedily as possible to Lacedaemon; that 
they should then choose other ambassadors in addi- 
tion, but, instead of sending them immediately, 
should wait until they should have raised the wall to 
such a height as was absolutely necessary for defence ; 
and that the whole population of the city, men, 
women, and children, should take part in the wall- 
building, sparing neither private nor public edifice 
that would in any way help to further the work, but 
demolishing them all. After he had given these 
instructions, and an intimation that, for the rest, he 
would himself look after matters at Sparta, he 
departed. And when he came to Lacedaemon he 
did not present himself to the magistrates, but kept 
putting it off and making excuses; and whenever 
any one of those in authority asked why he did not 
come before the people, he said that he was waiting 
for his colleagues, who had stayed behind on account 
of some urgent business; he expected them however 
to come soon, and wondered that they were not 
already there. 

XCI. And the Lacedaemonian magistrates were 
disposed to be content with this reply by reason 
of their friendship for Themistocles ; but when every- 
body who came from Athens declared quite positively 




\ v ef / 3 s 4 \ 
Te Kal On Dros AapPBaver, ovK elyov OTaS XPT) 
amicthoat. yvors S€ exelvos KehevEL aUTOVS LN 
, lal lol 
Aoyous paAXov trapayerOar 7 Téurpar chav av- 
~ ” cal 
T@v avdpas oltwes YpNeTOL Kail TiaTHs avayye- 
Novat oKxerldpevot. aToaTéANovew odY, KAaL TEpL 
a e ~ al > / 
aitav 6 QeuctoxrAAs Tots “AOnvaiow xpvda 
Kal py adeivar mpl av adtol madw Koptc@oow 
v7 \ \ @ > A e / ¢ , 
(H8n yap Kali jKeov avt@ ot EvyrpecBes, ABpa- 
, e / 
viyos te 6 Avowxdéovs Kal ’Apiortetdns o Avot 
/ fal cal 
pdyou, ayyédNovtes Exe ikava@s TO TELXOS): 
>] “ \ \ € / an e , 
époBeito yap py oi Aaxedatpovior ofas, omoTe 
cabas axovceav, ovKéTL apo. of TE odv 
’ lal \ / ef ’ / rf 
AOnvaiot Tous Tpéa BEls .WOTEP emeoTahn Kar el- 
Xo, kal 6 OewatoxrHs éredOwv tots Aaxedat- 
poviors evtadéa 87 pavepas eimrev OTL ” bev TONS 
chav teteiyiotar On Wate ixavyn eivar owlery 
\ > a ? / / 

Tous évoixobvtas, et 5€ Te Bovrovtar Aaxedat- 
, ry t , / \ na 
poviot 4) of Evppaxor mpecBevecOar Tapa opas 

, \ \ / 
@S POs SiayeyvarKovr as TO AoLTTOV Léval Ta TE 
cdhiow avtois Evudpopa Kal Ta Kowa. THY TE yap 
vads eo Bivat, avev éxelvav Epacav? yvovtTes ToX- 
a > , , 
pnoa, Kal boa av peT exelvor Bovreveo Pat, 
ovoevos t borepot motty Pavan ae, Soxelv ovv odiat 
Kal viv dpewov elvar Thy éavT@v TOdW TeEtXoS 

1 Hude omits with Lex. Vindob. 
2 Deleted by Kriiger, followed by Hude. 


BOOK I. xc1. 1-6 

that the wall was going up and was already attaining 
height, they did not know how to discredit it. 
Themistocles, however, when he perceived this bade 
them not to be misled by reports, but rather to send 
some trustworthy men of their own number who 
would see for themselves and bring back a faithful 
report. They did so, and Themistocles sent word 
secretly to the Athenians to detain the envoys as 
covertly as possible and not to let them go until they 
themselves returned—for by this time his colleagues, 
Habronichus son of Lysicles and Aristides son of 
Lysimachus, had joined him, with the news that the 
wall was high enough—the reason for his precaution 
being that he was afraid the Lacedaemonians, when 
they heard the truth, would then refuse to let them 
go. Accordingly the Athenians detained the envoys 
as they were directed, and Themistocles, appearing 
before the Lacedaemonians, at length told them 
frankly that the city was now walled and therefore 
in a position to protect its inhabitants, and that if 
the Lacedaemonians or their allies cared to negotiate 
any matter with them they must hereafter come to 
them with the understanding that they were dealing 
with men who were fully aware of what was for 
their own and the general interest. For when they 
thought it best to abandon their city and embark on 
their ships, they had resolved, said the ambassadors, 
upon this bold step without the advice of the Lace- 
daemonians, and again in all matters in which the 
Athenans took counsel with the Lacedaemonians 
they had shown themselves inferior to none in 
judgment. Accordingly in the present instance also 
it seemed to them best that their city should have 
a wall, and that this course would be of great 



oa \ 307 lal x ‘ bd \ / 
éxyewv, Kal dia Tots TodiTaLs Kal €s TO’S TaVTas 
‘ ’ , yy > \ / , 
Evpudxous apedtpw@tepov EcecOat- ov yap olov + 
elvat pu) aro avTLTadoV TapacKeEUAS omotov TL 4) 
” ’ \ \ s Q A , > 
icov és TO Kolwwov BovrevecOar. 7 Tavtas ov 
ateryiatous é€bn yphvar Evupayeivy Kai rade 
vouilew opbas évew. 
XCII. Of S€ Aaxedatpoviot axovcavtes dpynv 
\ \ > > a a eI , »O\ 
bev davepav ov« érroovvtTo Tots ’AOnvaiors (ovdé 
\ > a, 4 ’ \ , / A 
yap é7l KwAUUN, AAA yvouns Tapaivécer S7HOev 
an a 5] / A \ \ cal 
T® KOLV@ ETrpecBevoavTo, awa O€ Kal tpocdireis 
» A U \ \ ag 
évTes €v T@ TOTE 1a THY es TOY MAdov tpoOupiav 
‘ om / i 
Ta waddicTa avTos ETUYXaVOV), THS pévToL Bov- 
, e , > / v iA 
AnTEwWsS ApapTavovTes adyrws 1)xOovTO. of TE 
/ 4 / > a >) 3 v > ff. 
mpéa Bets Exatépwv amndOov em’ oikov aveTiKAn- 
al €+3 a 
XCIII. Totte 7 tpoTe ot “AOnvaio: thy o- 
x >] / b] XL / \ 8 Xr e ’ 8 
w éteiyicay ev Odiyw ypove@, Kal dnd 1) OiKOb0- 
pla éte Kal viv éotiy OTL KaTAa oTrOVONnY éeyéveTO. 
« \ , , , e. BS \ 
of yap Oeuérto. Tavtoiwy ALGwy voKeWTaL Kal 
> / ” e > ] id (cA / 1 
ov Evvepyacuevmy eat 4, GNX ws ExaTTOL 
/ , n > \ , 
twv Kal ALGor eipyacpévor eyKaTeréynoav. pel- 
\ ¢ Aa > / ‘ol 
Cwv yap o mwepiBoros wavtayn €&nyOn THs To- 

1 Hude reads €xaorov with C. 

1 The remains of the walls now seen around the Peiraeus 
are not those of the Themistoclean walls, which were de- 
stroyed at the end of the Peloponnesian War, but of the 
walls built by Conon in 393. A small part of these remains, 


ot fp A en > 

ian ae Foner A 


yet ts say =% ont 
PrmEVE UR, f: . 
Lint, that iver e. "tt 
A eniuny ec ie wis 



ise Bey 
re * 

his ie a3 

os .) TOSS 2 e 
} : 

nied ag By 

\ i A Bote ahi 
Hn Sy's<, > dome 

vopUoT “PIT PLofunjigs panmpg Seine eat Ee 

SIJeM JO SuIeuURY =S=—= ant 
Oa Ss) 
118M P1]OG Je Sulewayy """\ AAS 

I, ; 
Z3SSa4 161 : 
Gs ce PLL f (Ws NS 

rly Wy 


ey \ Hc 



BOOK I. xcr. 6—xcur. 2 

advantage both to themselves in particular, and to 
the whole body of the allies; for it was impossible 
for them, he added, to have equal or similar weight 
in the general councils of the alliance except on the 
basis of a military strength that was a match for 
theirs. Therefore, he concluded, the members of 
the alliance should either dispense with their walls 
one and all, or regard this act of the Athenians as 

XCII. On hearing this, the Lacedaemonians did not 
openly show any resentment against the Athenians ; 
for they had sent their embassy to Athens, not to 
stop the work, but to offer, as they professed, a sugges- _ 
tion in the common interest, and besides, they enter- 
tained at that time the most friendly feelings for the 
Athenians on account of their zeal in opposing the 
Persians; since, however, they had failed in their 
purpose, they were secretly vexed. So the envoys 
on either side returned home without making any 
formal complaint. 

XCIII. It was in this manner that the Athenians 
got their wall built in so short a time, and even 
to-day the structure shows that it was put together 
in haste.1 For the lower courses consist of all sorts 
of stones, in some cases not even hewn to fit but just 
as they were when the several workers brought 
them, and many columns from grave monuments 
and stones wrought for other purposes were built in. 
For the circuit-wall of the city was extended in 

on the flat ground north of the Peiraeus toward the main- 
land, answers exactly to Thucydides’ description—being of 
solid stone and over 25 feet thick—but most of the remains 
are of two outer faces of stone, the intermediate spaces filled 
in with rubble and earth. On Munychia there is no trace 
anywhere of a solid wall of the age of Themistocles. 



A ral e , cal 
hews, Kal Sta TOUTO TaVTa Opoiws KLVOUVTES 
nmelyovTo. émerce O€ Kal TOD Llerpar@s Ta AOLTTA 

fal nw ral , lal 
0 @cepyiotoKANs otKodopety (UTHpKTO O avUTOU 
MpoTEpov él THS ExElvoU apYAs hs KaT éviauToV 
b | / ss / / 7, \ 
AOnvaio p&e), voutfov to Te Ywpiovy Kaov 
elvar ALuéevas EXOV TpEls aUTOpvEls, Kal avTOUS 

/ , 
vauTlKous yeyevnuévous péya tmpopépe és TO 
4 fal \ - Lal 
ctncacbar Svvamw (ths yap 6) Cardcons Tpa- 
Tos €TOAMNnoev eitrety WS avOexTéa éaTi), Kal THY 
\ 4 \ ? 
apynv evdus Evyxatecxevalev. Kal oxodounoav 
Qn 4 / ral 
Th éxelvou yV@puN TO TAXOS TOV TElLYoUs OEP VUV 
v 4 / °’ x \ lal 4 \ cA 
ére SHAOv Eote Tepl Tov Lleparas dvo0 yap apakar 
A / r 
évavtiat ddAnAaLS TOUS ALOoUS errfryov, évTOs Sé 
ote YarE ovTE TAOS Hv, ara Evy@Kodopnpe- 
vou peyaror ALOoL Kal evTopH eyywviol, aLdynpw 
TT pos GAANHAOUS Ta &wbev Kai pworvPdo Sedepévor. 
\ \ ee ¢ / ’ / e nr 
70 6€ Uvvos Huicu pdriota éTehéOn ov duevoetto. 
b} / \ lal / \ a 4 > / 
€BovreTo yap TO peyeOa Kal TO Taye AdioTavat 
/ \ > »” Pb] \ Qn 5 / 
duraxkyy, Tos © aAXous és TAS vads ec PryjcecOat. 
tails yap vavol pddtoTa TpocéKeELTO, LOWY, ws 
€wel doKel, THS Bacikéws oTpaTlids THY KaTa 
Ouraccav épodov evtopwtépay Ths Kata yhv 
ovcav: Tov Te Iletpara mpeAtpwrtepov evoule THs 
dvw Toews, Kal TOANAKLS TOs "AOnvaiols Tapy- 

1 The Peiraeus, here in widest sense, is the peninsula, the 
heart of which is the steep height of Munychia, from which 


BOOK I. xc. 2-7 

every direction, and on this account they laid hands 
upon everything alike in their haste. Themistocles, 
moreover, persuaded them also to finish the walls of 
the Peiraeus, a beginning of which had been made 
during the year in which he was archon of the Athe- 
nians ; for he considered that the Peiraeus with its 
three natural harbours! was a fine site to develop and 
that to have become a nation of seamen would be a 
great advantage to the Athenians themselves, with a 
view to their acquisition of power—uindeed it was he 
who first dared declare that they must apply them- 
selves to the sea—and so he immediately took the 
first steps in this undertaking.* And following his 
advice they built the wall round the Peiraeus of the 
thickness that may still be observed ; for two wagons 
carrying the stones could meet and pass each other. 
Inside, moreover, there was neither rubble nor 
mortar, but stones of large size hewn square were 
closely laid together, bound to one another on the 
outside with iron clamps and lead. But the wall 
was completed to only about half of the height he 
originally intended, for what he wished was to be 
able to repel the assaults of the enemy by the very 
height and thickness of the wall, and he thought 
that a few men, and these the least effective, would 
suffice to guard it, while all the rest might man the 
ships. For Themistocles devoted himself particularly 
to the navy, because, as it seems to me, he had 
observed that the approach of the King’s forces was 
easier by sea than by land; and he thought that the 
Peiraeus would prove more serviceable than the upper 
city, and often advised the Athenians, if ever they 
it stretches into the sea like an indented leaf, forming three 
natural basins—the Peiraeus, Zea, Munychia. 

* Others render: immediately began to help them to lay 
the foundation of their empire. 



DI vw 5 \ a a / 
vel, Vv apa ToTe Kata ynv BracOadat, kataBavtTas 
\ a 
és avTov Tais vavol Tpos atavtas avbictacbat. 
] a \ 93 e b] 4 \ ~~ 
A@nraios pév odv oUTws éTELytaOnoav Kai TANNA 
Katecxevabovto evdvs peta THY Mrydwp avaxo- 
XCIV. Havaavas 6€ 0 KieouBpotov éx Aake- 
, lal 3 , 
Saiuovos otpatnyos Tov “EdXXAnvev é£eTEéEwhOn 
. na \ 
peta eixoot vea@v aro IleXorovvncov: Evvétdeov 
\ » tk Lal / \ ‘ fa) A 
dé kal "AOnvaios tpidxovta vavoi Kal TOY adrwY 
Evpudyov TARGs. Kal éotparevoav és Kuzrpov 
és Bufavtiov Mrydav éyovtwmy Kai é£etrodtop- 
fol a / 
Knoav év THSE TH NYyEemovia.t 
\ > nf / ?. 
XCV. "Hén dé Biaiov dvtos avtod ot Te GAXOL 
EdAnves 7xGovTo Kai ovy Axicta ot “lwves 
\ ef > \ / \ ,’ / 
Kal 6c0t ato PBaciiéws vewoTti ndevOépwvTo: 
a \ \ ? / tof 
dhoitavrés Te Tpos Tovs “A@nvatovs nftovy av- 
\ r “ / 
Tovs yenovas odhav yiyverPar Kata To Evy- 
yeves cal Ilavoavia ph émitpérev, qv tov 
a / / 
Budknrar. of dé “AOnvaior édéEavta te Tovs 
. a \ , 
oyous Kal TpocEtyov THY yYvouNnY ws Ov TeEpt- 
U 2 , , ? , 
» Lad \ e 
dpista avtois. év tovtTm b€ ot Aaxedatporior 
/ a 
peteTréuTrovto Llavoaviay avaxpivodrtes @v Tépt 
‘ \ / \ ° 
éruvOidvovto: Kal yap abiKia TOA KaTNYOpEtTO 
’ la ¢ \ lal € / r > , 
avtov uTo Tav EXAnvav tov adixvovpEevor, 
\ , lal > / / x 
kal tupavvidos padrpov édpaiveTo piunos 7 

1 Hude transfers, with Kriiger, év rHde tH Hyeuorlg to 
ch. xcv., deleting 5¢ after #57. 


BOOK I. xem. 7—xev. 3 

were hard pressed on land, to go down to the*Pei- 
raeus, and resist all their opponents with their fleet. 
It was in this way, then, that the Athenians got 
their walls built, and came to be engaged upon their 
other fortifications, immediately after the withdrawal 
of the Persians. 

XCIV. Meanwhile Pausanias son of Cleombrotus 
was sent out from Lacedaemon in command of the 
Hellenes with twenty ships from Peloponnesus, 
accompanied by thirty Athenian ships and a multi- 
tude of other allies. They made also an expedition 
against Cyprus, subduing most of it, and afterwards, 
at the time of Pausanias’ leadership, besieged By- 
zantium, which the Persians then held, and took it. 

XCV. But, since he had already become head- 
strong,! the rest of the Hellenes became disaffected, 
especially the Ionians and all who had been recently 
emancipated from the King. So they waited upon 
the Athenians and begged them in the name of 
their kinship? to become their leaders, and to resist 
Pausanias if he should attempt to coerce them.? The 
Athenians accepted their proposals and gave full 
attention to the matter with the determination to 
endure Pausanias’ conduct no longer and to settle 
all other matters as should seem best to them- 
selves. Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians recalled 
Pausanias in order to interrogate him about re- 
ports they were hearing, for much wrongdoing was 
charged against him by the Hellenes who came to 
Sparta, and his behaviour seemed an aping of des- 
potic power rather than the conduct of a general. 

1 of. ch. cxxx. 2. 
2 As the mother city; ¢f. ch. ii. (end), 
3 478 B.C. 






s / > a a , ef 
aotpatnyia. EvvéBn Te avT@ KadeloGat Te aua 
\ \ r Aoagt , ” \ 29 
Kal tous Evppdyous TO éxeivou EyPerrap ’AOn- 
, / ‘ al ’ \ 
vatous petatatacOat. mANVY Tov aro IleXoTor- 
/ “ > 34 \ > / 
vycov atpatiotav. édAOav bé és Aaxedaipova 
TOV meV LOLA GpO \ ad itTwov nuove 2 
be 2 Tpos Tia) adicnuatov nvovvOn, Ta 
Sé péyiota aroNveTas py adsxety' KaTNYOpEtTO 
\ > la] > isd \ \ bi , / 
Sé avTod ovy HKioTa pndiopos Kal edoxer cade- 
OTATOV Eival. Kal éxelvoy pev ovKEeTL ExTréUTTOU- 
” ’ \ x 9 \ > 
aw apxovta, Aopkw d€ Kat addovs TiWas per 
avTov otpatiay éyovTas ov ToAAHVY* ols OvKETE 
’ , e FA \ € 7 e \ > 
édlecav ot Evupayoe THY ryEwoviavy ot O€ al- 
4 > a \ A > / ef 
cOopevoe amrndOov, Kal addous ovKETL UoTEpOV 
éférreurav of Aaxedatpoviot, poBovpevor pi 
/ , /, 
adic ot é&ovtes Yelpous yiyvwvTal, OTEp Kal 
év 7@ Ilavcavia éveidov, ataddakelovtes b€ Kar 
tod Mnoixod trodéuou Kal tovs ’A@nvaious vopt- 
Covtes ixavovs éEnyeicOar Kal cdhiow év TO TOTE 
’ a 
XCVI. IlaparaBovtes S€ ot “AOnvator thy 
an / ca 
Hyemoviavy TOUT® T@ TpoT@ ExovT@V TaV Evypd- 
\ \ / n yy ee ” 
yov dia TO Ilavoaviou picos, éra€av as Te edet 
Tapéexelv TOV TOoEWY XpPnuwaTA Tpos TOV Bap- 
fal “ 
Bapov Kai as vais Tpocxnua yap Hv auvverOat 
? ” a \ i“ , \ 
ap érabov Snodvtas tiv Baciiéws yopav. Kal 
Cy , , lal >] /, , 
EXAnvotapuiar Tote Tp@Tov “AOnvatows KaTécTH 
b] / + ee / \ / e/ \ ’ / 
apyn, ot édéyovto Tov Popov: ovTw yap wvonacOn 


BOOK I. xcv. 3-xcvi. 2 

And it so happened that he was cited before the 
court at the very time that the allies in vexation at 
him had gone over to the side of the Athenians, all 
except the soldiers from the Peloponnesus. And 
although, on his return to Lacedaemon, Pausanias 
was held to account for any personal wrongs he had 
committed against individuals, yet on the principal 
charges he was acquitted of misconduct; for he was 
accused most of all of treasonable relations with the 
Persians, and it seemed to be a very clear case. And 
they did not again send him out as commander, but 
Dorcis, together with some others, with an incon- 
siderable force; but the allies did not entrust these 
with the chief command. And they, being now 
aware of the situation, went back home; and the 
Lacedaemonians sent out no other commanders 
thereafter, fearing that any who went out might be 
corrupted, as they saw had happened in the case of 
Pausanias ; they also wanted to be rid of the Persian 
war, and thought that the Athenians were com- 
petent to take the leadership and were friendly to 
themselves at the time. 

XCVI. After the Athenians had succeeded in this 
way to the leadership over the allies, who freely 
chose them on account of their hatred of Pausanias, 
they assessed the amount of their contributions, both 
for the states which were to furnish money for the 
war against the Barbarians and for those which were 
to furnish ships, the avowed object being to avenge 
themselves for what they had suffered by ravaging 
the King’s territory. And it was then! that the 
Athenians first established the office of Hellenic 
treasurers, who received the tribute; for so the 

1 476 B.O. 



nm / e / S 8 e A , 
Tay XpnuaToY 1 dopa. nv 6 o mpaTos Popos 
TaxOels térpacoows TadavTa Kal eEjovta, Ta- 
puciov te Afitos Fv adtois kal ai Evvodou és TO 
lepov éyiyvovTo. 

XCVII. “Hyovpevor dé avTovopoy TO TP@TOV 
trav Evppayov Kal(ato Kowev Evvobav) \Bovrev- 
ovT@Y TOTAbE er idOov ToNéu@ TE Kal Siaxerpioet 
mpaypatwov petaEY Tove TOU ToAEuOU Kal TOD 
Mnérxod, & éyéveto mpos Te TOY BapBapov avtois 
Kal mpos Tors odetépous Evppayous vewrepi- 
Covras Kai Hedorovynciay tovs alel mpootuyya- 

> iq / 7 \ > \ A \ 
yovtas €v ExaoT@. eéypawa b€ avTa Kat THY 
> \ Tal / b] / A / 4 a 
exBodny Tov Aoyou érorncapny Sia TOE, OTL TOIS 
po énod imac €xrduTrés TOUTO HY TO Ywplov Kal 
Ta po TOV Mnoicav “EXAqviKd Euverifeoay 7 7) 
aita ka Myéuxed: tovtwy &€ boTep Kal HyyaTo 
év th Atrixh Evyypadh “EAXavixos, Bpayews Te 
Kal Tots Ypovols ovK aKplB@s éTEeuvijcOyn: apa de 

\ aA ’ a ) , ” Prat a ? , 
Kal Ths apyns amobeEw exer THs TOV 'AOnvatov 
év olm TpOT@ KaTéoTY. 

XCVIII. [Ipaérov pév Hiova thv éxl Xtpupove 
Mijdav éyovtwv todopkia eldov Kal nvdpamo- 
Sicav Kipwvos tod MiAtiddou otpatnyodrtos, 
recta SKdpov tHy év TO Aiyaiw vijcov, tv @Kxouv 
Aodxrorres, nvdparrodicav | Kat @Kicay avTol. mpos 
S¢ Kapvotious avtois dvev Tov addov EvBoéwv 

/ ’ / \ , / > 
modewos eyéveto, Kal xpove EvvéBnoav Kal 

1 Deleted by Hude, after Cobet. 

BOOK I. xevi. 2—xcvut. 3 

contribution of money was termed. The amount 
of the tribute first assessed was four hundred and 
sixty talents, and the treasury of the allies was 
Delos, where the meetings were held in the temple. 
XCVII. Exercising then what was at first a leader- 
ship over allies who were autonomous and took part 
in the deliberations of common assemblies, the 
Athenians, in the interval between this war and the 
Persian, undertook, both in war and in the adminis- 
tration of public affairs, the enterprises now to be 
related, which were directed against the Barbarian, 
against their own allies when they attempted revolu- 
tion, and against such of the Peloponnesians as from 
time to time came into conflict with them in the 
course of each attempt. And I have made a 
digression to write of these matters for the reason 
that this period has been omitted by all my pre- 
decessors, who have confined their narratives either 
to Hellenic affairs before the Persian War or to the 
Persian War itself; and Hellanicus, the only one of 
these who has ever touched upon this period, has in 
his Attic History treated of it briefly, and with 
inaccuracy as regards his chronology. And at the 
same time the narrative of these events serves to 
explain how the empire of Athens was established. 
XCVIII. First, then, under the leadership of 
Cimon son of Miltiades, they took by siege Eion 
on the Strymon, which the Persians held, and en- 
slaved its inhabitants!; then they enslaved Scyros, 
the island in the Aegean inhabited by Dolopians, 
and colonised it themselves. And a war arose 
between them and the Carystians, the other Eu- 
boeans taking no part in it, and after a time terms 

1 476 B.O. 


4 dporoyiav. Nakiow 8& atoctaot peta tavta 
/ / , 
Te avtn mods Evupayls wapa TO KaleoTHKOS 
? , v \ \ ~ v e 4 / 
edovAwbn, erretta S€ Kal TOV ANAwWY WS EXAOTH 
XCIX. Aitias 6€ &\XaL Te Hoav TOV aTooTa- 
e a / an 
TEWY Kal wéyloTat al TOY Popwv Kal vedv Exerat 
l AutroaTpatiov el Tw eyéveTo* of yap AOnvat 
Kal ALTOTTpPaTLOV El TW EY ol yap nvator 
> a ” \ x US > > , 
axpiBas érpaccov Kal AvTNpOl Hoav ovK ElwOo- 
aw ovde Bovropévors TAXALT@pElY TpocayovTeEs 
2 Tas avaycas. Hoav 6€ Tas Kal adres ot “AOn- 
rad je / a\ 
vaio ovKéete (Opmoiws év nOovn)apyovTes, Kal oUTE 
lal / 7 
Evveotpatevov amo Tov icov padiov Te Tpocd- 
vad \ / ‘ 
yerOar Hv avtois Tov’s apiatapévous: MY av7ot 
/ e / \ \ 
3 alton éyévovto of Evppayor Sia yap THY azro- 
> > 5 / 
iva pn am olxov wot, ypnuata étaEayto ayTl 
a a Wa ¢ 4 > / cal 
\ >] / A \ \ > \ lal , 
pev "AOnvaiors niEeto 70 vavtiKov amo THs Sama- 
lal / / e 
vns iw éxeivor Evpdépovev, avtol dé, o7oTe atro- 
rn v 
otaiev, aTapdoKevot Kal a7retpor €s TOV TOAELOV 
> \ lol 
C. ’Eyéveto 8& peta tadta cat 9 én’ Kvpupé- 
Sovts Totapue@ év Llaydhvadia® wefomayia Kal vav- 
Be ppurig pax 
, ’ , \ n ‘4 ‘ ‘ 
paxtia APnvaiwy cal rav Evxppaxev pos Mnéovs, 
, a > ral / > / Suj n 
Kal évikwv TH avTH Huépa audhotepa “APnvaio 
1 Deleted by Hude as probably not read by Schol. 
2 éy MaupvAig, omitted by Hude and Stahl, with Codex M. 

BOOK I. xcevu. 3-c. 1 

of capitulation were agreed upon. After this they 
waged war upon the Naxians,! who had revolted, 
and reduced them by siege. And this was the first 
allied city to be enslaved in violation of the estab- 
lished rule; but afterwards the others also were 
enslaved as it happened in each case. ‘ 

XCIX. Now while there were other causes of 
revolts, the principal ones were the failures in bring- 
ing in the tribute or their quota of ships and, in 
some cases, refusal of military service; for the 
Athenians exacted the tribute strictly and gave 
offence by applying coercive measures to any who 
were unaccustomed or unwilling to bear the hard- 
ships of service. And in some other respects, too, 
the Athenians were no longer equally agreeable as 
leaders ; they would not take part in expeditions on 
terms of equality, and they found it easy to reduce 
those who revolted. - For all this the allies them- 
selves were responsible ; for most of them, on account 
of their aversion to military service, in order to 
avoid being away.from home got themselves rated 
in sums of money instead of ships, which they should 
pay in as their proportionate contribution, and con- 
sequently the fleet of the Athenians was increased 
by the funds which they contributed, while they 
themselves, whenever they revolted, entered on the 
war without preparation and without experience. 

C. After this occurred at the river Eurymedon in 
Pamphylia the land-battle and sea-fight of the 
Athenians? and their allies against the Persians; 
and the Athenians were victorious in both on the 

1 406-B.c. 
* For this glorious victory of Cimon’s, whose date (466 B.c. ?) 
is not certain, cf. Diod. xi. 60; Plut. Cim. xii. 



Kipewvos tod Midtiaddou otpatnyodrtos, Kai eldov 
/ , \ / \ 4 > 
tpinpers Powikwv cai dvépOerpay tas Tacas €s 
é , , be e/ E 28 e / 
lakoglas. Yypovm oe vatepov Evvé8yn Oacious 
auT@y atrooThvar OieveyOévtas Tepl TOV ev TH 
/ \ lal 
avtiTépas Opakn €uropiwy Kat Tov peTaddXouv, 
& 3. f \ \ \ > \ / / 
& évémovto. Kat vavol pev ert Oacov mrev- 
> al '* 
aavtes of ‘A@nvaio: vavpayia expdtncay Kal és 
\ na > , > \ \ ta / 
Thy ynv anéBnaoav: emi dé Xtpupova wéwravtes 
fLuplous olxnTopas auTa@y Kai Tov Evpydywv vTO 
, a \ 
/ en 4 lal \ / vad 
Kadoupévas Evvéa odovs, viv d€ Auditory, Tav 
\ > , e lal > \ > 4 a > ? 
pev *Evvéa od@v adtot éxpatynaay, as eiyov "Héw- 
, a / $ , 
vol, mpoedOovtes O€ THS Opanns és pecoyerav 
a a?) a lal 
diehOapnoav év ApaBynorkd 7H’ Hdauxry tro tTav 
a / ? rd s \ / 2 
Opacav EvyTravT@v ols Toheutovy HY TO YwpPLoV 
CI. Odcvor 5€ wixndévtes udyn Kal TodopKoOU- 
/ r 
pevo. Aaxedatmovious érexandovvto Kal érapvverv 
éxéXevov éeoBarovtas és tHv “Attixjy. ot O€ 
e / \ tA lal > / \oy» 
trécyovto péev epuda TOV AOnvatwy Kal EwerdXor, 
X fa) fal 
duexwrAvOnoay S€ UTO TOD yEevopevou TEL MOD, EV @ 
¢/- a nm “ 
kal ot Kitwtes avtois Kal TOV TepLoixay Ooupra- 
, \ > fal > ’ , > / a 
tai te kal Aidaris és “lO@unv aréctncav. mTei- 

1 gi ’Evréa 660i, in the MSS. after xwplov, rejected by 

1 465 B.C. 

2 The Thasians had a gold mine at Skapte Hyle on the 
Thracian coast, from which they drew rich revenues ; ¢/f. 
Hdt. vi. xlvi. f. 


BOOK I. ec. 1-c1. 2 

same day under the command of Cimon son of 
Miltiades, and they took and destroyed triremes of 
the Phoenicians to the number of two hundred all 
told. And some time afterwards it came to pass 
that the Thasians revolted from them,! a quarrel 
having arisen about the trading posts and the 
mine? on the opposite coast of Thrace, of which 
the Thasians enjoyed the profits. Thereupon the 
Athenians sailed with their fleet against Thasos, 
and, after winning a battle at sea, disembarked on_ 
the island. About the same time they sent to the 
river Strymon ten thousand colonists, consisting of 
Athenians and their allies, with a view to colonising 
the place, then called Nine Ways, but now Am- 
phipolis; and though these colonists gained posses- 
sion of Nine Ways, which was inhabited by Edoni, 
yet when they advanced into the interior of Thrace 
they were destroyed at Drabescus in Edonia by the 
united forces of the Thracians, to whom the settle- 
ment of the place was a menace. 

CI. As for the Thasians, who had been defeated 
in battle and were now besieged, they appealed to 
the Lacedaemonians and urged them to come to 
their aid by invading Attica. This, unknown to the 
Athenians, they promised to do, and intended to 
keep their promise, but were prevented by the 
earthquake ® which occurred at the time * when both 
their Helots and the Perioeci of Thuria and Aethaea 
revolted and went to Ithome.® Most of the Helots 

8 Called ‘‘the great earthquake” in ch. exxviii. 1. 

* 464:3.c. 24/6 S- 

5 The Perioeci were the old inhabitants of the country, 
chiefly of Achaean stock, reduced to a condition of depen- 

dence, t.e. were not citizens, though not state-slaves as the 
Helots were. 

VOL, I. g 3 69 



oto. d¢€ Tav Eikwtar éyévovto of TaY Tadal@v 
Meconviwy tote SovAwPevT@v amoyovers 7H Kal 

3 Meaconvor éxrAnOncay oi TavTes. Tpos péev ovv 

tous év “l@@un rodepos Kabevotnker Aaxedar- 
/ / \ , by4 / 
poviowss Odcroe dé tTpitw ETEer TrodLopKovpevor 
e / >] , a U / \ 
@pmoroynoav "AOnvators Tetyos Te KaleXovTeEs Kai 
vads wapacovtes, ypywatd Te boca dee aTo- 
a , \ 
Sodvar avtixa taEduevot Kat TO Aovrov hépewy, 
, a \ \ f bf / 
/ A 
CII. Aaxedatpovior dé, a avTots mpos Tovs év 

~ "TOwun éunxtveto 0 TdAE“OS, aAXoUS TE ETTEKANE- 

cavto Evupayous Kat *“AOnvaiouvs: of & *AAOov 
ppd , 

2 Kiwwvos otpatnyodvtos TANCE: ovK GAiyw. pd- 

= / wn“ 
Micta 8 avtovs emEeKadécavto, OTL TELyouaxetv 
> J lol / a 
édoxouv duvatol elvat, THs 6€ ToALopKias paKpas 
, / ’ na b] / / x 
xabeotnkvias TovTov évded épaiveto: Bia yap 

/ n 
3 dy elNov TO Ywpiov. Kal Siadhopa é€x TavTns THs 

r fal / ». a , 
otpatetas mp@tov Aaxedatpoviows Kal 'A@nvators 
dhavepa éyéveto. of yap Aaxedarpoviot, érerdn TO 

fal > 
yopiov Bial ovy AtoKeTo, Seicavtes Tov “AOn- 
\ \ / 
> / ee ¢ , / a 
adropuAovs ALA NYNTapEVOL, MN TL, HY Tapa- 
pelvoow, UT Tav év “lOapun TrevaOévtes vewTept- 
A \ 
cwol, movous Tov Evpudyov atréTveurav, THY meV 
Cs , > a > , \ ef »O\ 
Umowiav ov Sndodvtes, elmovtes O€ STL ovdev 

4 mpocdéovtar avTav ett. ot 8 "AOnvaior éyvwoav 

1 Kriiger deletes, followed by Hude. 
170 ? 

BOOK I. ct. 2-c1. 4 

were the descendants of the early Messenians who 
had been enslaved of old,! and hence were all called 
Messenians. The Lacedaemonians, then, were in- 
volved in war with the rebels on Ithome; and so the 
Thasians, who were in the third year of the siege, 
came to terms with the Athenians, pulling down 
their walls and delivering over their ships, agreeing 
to pay forthwith whatever sum of money should be 
required of them and to render tribute in future, and, 
finally, giving up both the mainland and the mine. 
CII. The Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, 
when their war with the rebels on Ithome proved a 
long affair, appealed to their allies in general and 
especially to the Athenians, who came with a con- 
siderable force under the command of Cimon. The 
principal reason why an appeal was made to them 
was that they were reputed to be skilful in siege 
operations, whereas the long continuance of the siege 
showed their own deficiency in this respect; for other- 
wise they would have taken the place by assault. And 
it was in consequence of this expedition that a lack of 
harmony in the relations of the Lacedaemonians and 
the Athenians first became manifest. For the Lace- 
daemonians, when they failed to take the place by 
storm, fearing the audacity and the fickleness of 
the Athenians, whom they regarded, besides, as men 
of another race, thought that, if they remained, they 
might be persuaded by the rebels on Ithome to 
change sides; they therefore dismissed them, alone 
of the allies, without giving any indication of their 
suspicion, but merely saying that they had no further 
need of them. The Athenians, however, recognized 

1 Referring to the mythical time of the first Messenian 




> > A , / b / > / 
oun éml T@ BedTiove NOY aTroTE“TTOMEVOL, adda 
TiVOS UTOTTOU yEevouévou, Kal Sevov Tromnodpevot 

\ > 3 , ead , aA 
Kal ovx aktooavtes Ud Aakedatpovimy TtovTo 

al > \ > \ > / > l4 \ 
mabeiv, evOvs émrerdy) aveyopnoav, adévtes THV 
/ srr a / / \ > \ 
yevouevny emt TO Mydm Evypaxtav mpos avtous 
’ / n > / / / > / 
Apyelous Tois éxeivwv trodeutors Evupayor eye- 
\ \ \ ¢ ? , e 
vovto, Kal tpos Beccarovs awa apgorépors ot 
avtol OpKot Kal Evppayia KatéoTn. 

CIII. Of & ev “lOeéun Sexato eter, > ovKéte 
307 > , P: \ \ 
édvvavto avtéxew, EvveBnoav mpos tovs Aaxe- 

, > m2 ze 2g/ > / e , 
Satpovious eh & é€tacww é€x IleNoTrovyncov vTo- 
\ / >? / > An a / 
oTrovool Kal pndétroTte ETLUBHTOVTaAL aUTHAS* Hv Oé 
a 4 a 

2 tis adlokntal, TOD AaBovTos eivar SovrAov. Hy Sé 
\ / a / \ 
TL Kal xpnatnpiov tots AaKedarpovious TvOiKxov 

\ rf A e ‘ ral \ we. / > / 

mpo Tov, Tov ikeTHV TOU Atos Tov ‘lGwpunra adie- 
fol \ Lal r 
3 vat. €EANOov S€ avTol Kai Traides Kal yuvaixes, Kal 
avtous of "A@nvaior deFapuevor kata €xOos Hdn TO 
Aaxebatpovioy és Navmaxtov Kkatwxicav, iv 
€ \ a x a 
Eruyov ypnKotes vewott Aoxpav tav ‘Oforav 
4, éxovTwy. mpocexwpnoav dé kal Meyapijs ’AOn- 
Ks , / 
vaio (és Evppaytay Aaxedaipovioy atoctartes, 
eo > \ , \ a ef , 
Ste autovs KopivOcot tmept yiis opav toréu@ 
r > Lal 
Kateiyov. Kal éryov A@nvaios Méyapa xa IIn- 
\ / > / al 
yds, kal TA paxpa Telyn @Kodounoay Meyapedor 

1 455 B.O. 


BOOK I. cu. 4-cr11. 4 

that they were not being sent away on the more 
creditable ground, but because some suspicion had 
arisen; so because they felt indignant and con- 
sidered that they had not deserved such treatment 
at the hands of the Lacedaemonians, the instant 
they returned home they gave up the alliance which 
they had made with the Lacedaemonians against the 
Persians and became allies of their enemies, the 
Argives. And an alliance at the same time, on the 
same terms and confirmed by the same oaths, was 
concluded by both the Athenians and the Argives 
with the Thessalians. 

CIII. In the tenth year! the rebels on Ithome 
found that they could hold out no longer and surren- 
dered to the Lacedaemonians on condition that they 
should leave the Peloponnesus under a truce and 
should never set foot in it again; and if any of them 
should be caught there, he was to be a slave of his 
captor. Moreover, before this time the Lacedae- 
monians also received a Pythian oracle, which bade 
them let go the suppliant of Ithomean Zeus. So 
the Messenians left the Peloponnesus, themselves 
and their children and wives; and the Athenians 
received them, in consequence of the enmity to the 
Lacedaemonians already existing, and settled them 
at Naupactus, which they happened to have lately 
taken from its possessors, the Ozolian Locrians. And 
the Megarians also entered into alliance with the 
Athenians, revolting from the Lacedaemonians be- 
cause the Corinthians were pressing them hard in 
a war about boundaries; and thus the Athenians 
secured Megara and Pegae,? and they built for the 
Megarians the long walls which run from the city to 

* Pegae was the Megarian harbour on the Corinthian gulf: 
Nisaea, a nearer one, on the Saronic gulf. 



Ta aro THS Toews és Nicarav Kxal éppovpouy 
auto. Kxai KopivOiows pev ovy iKicta amd TODSE 
\ \ r pA fa b] : , 
TO ahodpov picos npEato mpwtov és ’AOnvaious 
yevéo Oat. 
CIV. “Ivdpws 5€ 0 Vapypntixyov, AiBus, Bact- 
\ 4 lal in! > / € s > 
Aevs AuBvav trav mpos AtyuTT@, opum@pevos éx 
n € / 
Mapeias tis vUmrép Pdpov todews aréotncev 
Aiyumtov Ta Trelw amo Bacihéws "AptaképEov, 
/ . 
Kal autos apxwv yevouevos “AOnvaious érnyd- 
yeto. of 5€ (€tvxov yap és Kumpov otpatevo- 
pevol vavol Staxocials avT@v te Kal Tov Evp- 
, s b] / \ 4 \ 
paxyov) iAOov amodTovtes THY Kumrpov, Kal 
> & ’ \ / >] \ nr nr 
avaTAevoarvtes ato Carxacans és tov NeiXov tov 
T€ ToTauov KpatoovTes Kat THS Méudidos tay 
an \ / , a 
dvo mEep@v Tpos TO TplTOY pépos 0 KanreiTaL 
Aevxov tetyos érodguour: éevjcav 5€ avToOs Tep- 
a / , 
cav cai Mndov ot catadvyovtes kai AiyuTrtiov 
ot un EvvatrooTavtes. 
OV. ’AOnvaiow b6é€ vavoly aroBaow és ‘AXas 
\ x / \cs / 4 Siid 
mpos Kopwiovs xal ‘Emidaupious udyn éyéveto, 
\ > Ee , \ cA > fal 
kal évixkwv KopivOcot. Kai vaotepov "AOnvaios 
évaupaynoav émt Kexpudareta erorovvncioy 
vavol, kat évixwv AOnvaio. moréuov &€ Kata- 
>] 7 al 
otavtos mpos Aiyintas "A@nvaiors peta tadta 
/ / 9*9 : aed / > , 
vauvpayla yiyvetat em Alryivn peyadn ‘AOnvaior 
a , / 7 
kal Aiyivntav (Kal ot Evupayo. éExatépos traph- 
> ee ae > a“ \ nn € / 
cav), cal évicwy A@nvaiol, kai vads éE8dounKorvta 
AaBovtes avTav és THY yhv awéBnoayv Kai érro- 
Avopxouv Aewxpatous Tov XtpoiSov ctpatnyoovr- 


BOOK I. ci. 4-cv. 2 

Nisaea and held it with a garrison of their own 
troops. And it was chiefly because of this act that 
the vehement hatred of the Corinthians for the 
Athenians first arose. 

CIV. Meanwhile Inaros, son of Psammetichus, a 
Libyan and king of the Libyans who are adjacent to 
Egypt, setting out from Mareia, the city just north 
of Pharos, caused the greater part of Egypt to revolt 
from King Artaxerxes,! and then, when he had 
made himself ruler, he called in the Athenians. 
And they left Cyprus,? where they happened to be 
on an expedition with two hundred ships of their 
own and of their allies, and went to Egypt, and 
when they had sailed up the Nile from the sea, 
finding themselves masters of the river and of two- 
thirds of Memphis, they proceeded to attack the 
third part, which is called the White Fortress. And 
in this fortress were some Persians and Medes who 
had taken refuge there, and such Egyptians as had 
not joined in the revolt. 

CV. The Athenians also made a descent with a 
fleet upon Halieis, where they had a battle with 
some Corinthians and Epidaurians, in which the 
Corinthians won. And afterwards the Athenians 
fought a sea-fight at Cecryphaleia with a Pelopon- 
nesian fleet, in which the Athenians won. After 
this war broke out between the Athenians and the 
Aeginetans, and a great sea-fight occurred between 
the Athenians and the Aeginetans off Aegina, in 
which the allies of both sides were present. This the 
Athenians won and having taken seventy Aeginetan 
ships they descended upon their territory and 
laid siege to the city, Leocrates son of Stroebus, 

1 460° B.O. ® of. ch. xciv. 2, 
4571 175 


3 Tos. émerta IleXorrovynciot autvery Bovropevor 
Aiywntats és pev thy Aiyivav tpiaxocious 
e , —a , , “i prs / 
omAitas, mpotepov Kopiwiwv kal *Emidaupiov 
bd 4 / \ Vow fol / 
émixoupous, dLeSiBacar, Ta 6€ axpa THs Tepaveias 
/ \ > nm , / 
katékaBov Kat és thv Meyapida xatéSnoav 
lal / 
Kopivéco. peta Tov Evppaywv, vouifovtes ddv- 
vatous ésec@at “AOnvaiovs Bonbeiy trois Meya- 
pevow év te Alyivy atovens otpatias Tos 
ae -> / x \ \ n ’ : 13.37 
kai ev Aiyitte@: Hv 6 Kal Bonbacu, at’ Aiyivns 
b] , ’ e € 2 al \ A 
4 avactncecOar avtovs. ot dé “AOnvaios TO pev 
/ lal 
mpos Aiyivn otpatevpa ovK exivnoay, Tov 8 éx 
, b) a > \ As 4 
vewTatot adixvovyTa és Ta Meéyapa Mupwvidov 
A“ \ 4, / > 
5 OTpAaTNYOUVTOS. Kal waxns yevouevns icoppoTrauv 
, / 
mpos KopwO@tovs SuexpiOncav an’ addr nrwv, Kal 
évouloav avTol ExdTEpol OUK EXacaoY ExEW ev TO 
” \ e \ >? al > / \ 
6 épye. Kal of pev AOnvaior (exparnoav yap 
ev a lal 
Suws padrXrov) aveovtav tav Kopiwbiwv tpo- 
val / 
matov éornaoav: of S¢ KopivOvor caxilopevor td 
Tov év TH TOME TpEeTBuTEépwy Kal TapacKevacd- 
pevol, Nuépars UaTepov Owdexa pddiota édOovTes 
avOictacayv TpoTraiov Kal avTol ws viknoavtes. 
\ a a ] / I] lal / 
kal of A@nvatos éxBonOnoavtes éx Tov Meydpav 
Tous Te TO TpoTraiov iatdvTas StapOeipover Kal 
nr , 
Tots aAdows EvpBarovtes Expatnoav. OVI. of 
, / cal 
Sé viKwpevol UTEXWpOUY, KAL TL AVT@V pépos OvK 
ddiyov mpoaBiacbev Kal dtapaptov ths odod 
, > , 
écémecev &5 Tov Xwploy idtwTov, @ ETUXEV 


BOOK I. cv. 2-cv1. 1 

being in command. Thereupon the Peloponnesians, 
wishing to aid the Aeginetans, sent into Aegina 
three hundred hoplites, who had previously been 
assisting the Corinthians and Epidaurians. More- 
over, the Corinthians occupied the heights of Gera- 
neia, and made a descent upon the territory of 
Megara in conjunction with their allies, thinking 
that the Athenians would be unable to aid the 
Megarians, since many of their troops were away in 
Aegina and in Egypt, or if they should attempt it 
that they would have to withdraw from Aegina. 
The Athenians, however; did not disturb the army 
besieging Aegina, but with such forces as were left 
in the city, consisting of the oldest and the youngest } 
men, marched into Megara, the general in command 
being Myronides. An indecisive battle was fought 
with the Corinthians, whereupon they separated, each 
side thinking they had not got the worst of it in the 
action. And the Athenians, who had in fact got 
rather the better of it, when the Corinthians with- 
drew, set up a trophy; but the Corinthians, being 
reproached by the older men in their city, made 
their preparations and about twelve days later came 
back and set up for themselves a rival trophy, as 
though they had won. Hereupon the Athenians 
made a sally from Megara, slew those who were 
setting up the trophy, and joining battle with the 
rest defeated them. CVI. The vanquished party 
now retreated, and a not inconsiderable portion 
of them, being hard pressed, missed their way 
and rushed into a piece of land belonging to 

1 These performed military service only in extraordinary 
cases ; the former were between fifty and sixty, the latter 
under twenty years of age. 


2 Spuyywa péya Tepretpyov cal ouK 7 eEob0s. ol 
dé "AOnvaior yvoures Kara T po WT OV TE elpryov 
Tols omAitats Kal TEpLaTn saves KUKA® TOUS 
wirovs KaTénevo av TavTas TOUS écedOdvas, Kal 
mabos peya ToUTO Kopi ios éyéveTo. TO be 
TAO os aveyopnoev avtois Ths otpaTias én 
CVI. pis pEavto | dé Kata TOUS Xpovous TOUTOUS 
Kal Ta pax pa TELYN ‘AOnvator és Garaccav 
oixodopely, TO TE Darnpovee Kal TO és Tletpasd. 
2 kai Pwxéwy ctTpatevodyTwv €s Awpias THY Aaxe- 
Satpoviwy LNT POTONLD, Bowvov cat Kurtiviov rai 
"Epweov, Kal éXNovT@y Ev TAY TOM LAT @Y TOUT@V 
OL Aaxesarpoviot Nexopdous Tov KXeouBpotou 
Umep Tero toavaxros Tou Ilavcaviov Bacrréas, 
véov ovTOs eT, HrYyOUpLEVOU éBonbnaav tois Aw- 
Tas Kal TOV Evppaxov puptots, Kal TOUS Poxéas 
ouodoyia avayKkKdaoavTes amooobvas THY mohuy 
3 amex @pouv Taw. Kal KaTa Oaraccay bev 
avtovs, dia TOU Kpioatiov KohTov él BovrowTo 
mepawovobat, "AOnvaios vavat TepiTevo aves 
EweXAOV Kohvael dua 66 TIS Tepavetas OuUK 
aapanres avtots épaiveto ‘AOnvaiwv eXOvT@Y 
Méyapa Kal IInyas mopever Oa? ddcodes Te yap 
7) Depavera Kal eppoupeito aiel wo "AOnvaiwy, 
Kal TOTe naOavovTo auTovs HédOVTAS Kal TAUTH 
4 KwAvoew. édoke be avrois év Botwtots eptpet- 
vact oxeyrac bar OTw TpoT® aopareorata d1a- 
TopevoovTat. TO Sé 71 nal dvdpes érivyov adtods 

1 wopevecOa: deleted by Hude as not read by Schol, 

BOOK I. evi. 1-cvit. 4 

some private person, which was enclosed by a great 
ditch and had no exit. And when the Athenians 
perceived this, they shut them in by barring the 
entrance with hoplites, and stationing light-armed 
troops all round stoned all who had entered. And 
this was a great calamity to the Corinthians; the 
main body of their army, however, returned home. 
CVII. About this period! the Athenians began to 
build their long walls to the sea, one to Phalerum, 
the other to the Peiraeus. And the Phocians made 
an expedition against the land of the Dorians, the 
mother-country of the Lacedaemonians, namely the 
towns of Boeum, Citinium, and Erineum, one of 
which they captured; whereupon the Lacedae- 
monians, under the lead of Nicomedes son of Cleom- 
brotus, acting for King Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, 
who was still a minor, sent to the aid of the Dorians 
a force of fifteen hundred hoplites of their own and 
ten thousand of their allies, and after they had forced 
the Phocians to make terms and restore the city 
they began their return homeward. Now if they 
wished to take the sea-route and make their passage 
by way of the Crisaean Gulf, the Athenians were 
sure to take their fleet round the Peloponnesus and 
block their way; and to march over the Geranaean 
pass appeared to them hazardous, since the Athenians 
held Megara and Pegae. Besides, the Geranaean 
pass was not easy to traverse and was at all times 
guarded by the Athenians, and at this present time, 
as the Lacedaemonians perceived, they intended 
to block their way. So they decided to wait in 
Boeotia and consider how they might most safely 
cross over to the Peloponnesus. To this course they 
were partly influenced by some Athenians, who were 
1 457 B.O. 


tav AOnvaiwy xpuda, érricavtes Shudv Te KaTa- 
Tavcel Kal Ta paKkpa TElyn olKodomovpeva. 
éBonOnaav bé ém’ avdtovs ot "AO@nvaios travdnpel 
kal "Apyeiwy yidior Kal TOY ad\rAwv Evppdyov 
ws €xacto EvuTravtes O€ éyévovTo TeTpaKiaxt- 
LoL Kal puplol. voplcavtes 5é atopety Orn 
SEM wou, EmecTpaTEevoay aUTOIS, Kal TL Kal TOD 
Sipov Katarvoews vTowia. rAOov Sé Kai Oec- 
carov immis tots “A@nvatows cata To Evppayi- 
KOV, of petéoTncay év TO éEpyw Tapa Tovs 

CVIII. Tevopévns 6€ tis wayns ev Tavdypa 
THs Bowwtias évicwv Aaxedarwomot cal ot Evp- 
payot, Kal hovos éyéveTo audhotépwv Torvs. Kal 
AaxeSaipoviot péev és THY Meyapiéa éXOovtes Kal 
SevdpotounoavTes Tadiv amndOov ém olxov Sa 
Tepaveias kat icOpod: “A@nvaio: de devtépa rab 
EEnkooTh Nméepa meTa THY waxXnV éaTpaTEVCAD €s 
Botwrovs Mupavidov otpatnyotvtos, Kal payn 
év Oivoditos Borwrtovs wxjoavtes THs TE YwOpas 
éxpatncay THs Bowwtias Kat Pawxidos cat Tava- 
ypaiwy TO Tetyos TepietAov Kat Aoxpav Tav 
’Orrouytiwy éxaTov avdpas opnpous tos mrov- 
ciuwTatous éhaBov, Ta TE TELYN EAUTOY TA pwaKpa 
ametédXecav. wporoynoav 6é kal of Aiyivhras 
peta Tadta Tois A@nvaiors, Teryn TE TepLeAoYTES 
Kal vais Tapadovtes Popov te TaEdwevor és Tov 
éxerta ypovov. Kat IleXotrovynaov TrepiémrEvcay 
"AOnvaios Torpidou tod TorAmaiou orpatnyovvtos, 


BOOK I. cvu. 4-cvit. 5 

secretly inviting them into their country,in the hope 
of putting an end to the democracy and to the build- 
ing of the long walls. But the Athenians went out 
against the Lacedaemonians with their whole force 
and with one thousand Argives and contingents of 
the several allies, the whole body amounting to 
fourteen thousand men. And they undertook the 
expedition against them because they believed that 
they were at a loss how to get through, and partly 
too on a suspicion of a plot to overthrow the 
democracy. The forces of the Athenians were 
strengthened by some Thessalian cavalry, who came 
in accordance with the terms of the alliance, but 
they deserted to the Lacedaemonians in the course 
of the action. 

CVIII. The battle took place! at Tanagra in 
Boeotia, and in it the Lacedaemonians and _ their 
allies were victorious, and there was much slaughter 
on both sides. The Lacedaemonians then entered 
the Megarian territory, cut down the trees, and went 
back home by way of Geraneia and the Isthmus. 
But on the sixty-second day after the battle, the 
Athenians, having made an expedition into Boeotia 
under Myronides, defeated the Boeotians at Oeno- 
phyta, got control of Boeotia and Phocis, pulled 
down the walls of Tanagra, and took one hundred 
of the wealthiest men of the Opuntian Locrians as 
hostages. Meanwhile they completed their own long 
walls. After this the Aeginetans also capitulated to 
the Athenians, pulling down their walls, delivering 
up their ships, and agreeing to pay tribute in future.? 
And the Athenians, under the command of Tolmides 
son of Tolmaeus, sailed round the Peloponnesus, 

1 456 R.O. 2 455 B.O. 


kal TO vewptov tav Aaxedaipovioy évérpnoay 
kat Xadkida KopiwOiwv etrov Kal Sixv@viovs ev 
aToBacet THS ys maxXn expatnoav. 
CIX. Of & &v tH Alyirt@ *A@nvaior Kal ol 
/ ’ / x > cal A > , 
Evupayo. éméuevov, Kal avtois moddai idéar 
2 Tohkéuwv KaTéoTnoaV. TO Lev yap TpwWTOV éKpa- 
n : , 4 e >] r \ \ 
touvv THs Alyurtov ot ’A@nvaiot, kat Baotrevs 
méutrer €s Aaxedaipova MeyaBafov avipa Ilép- 
onv xXpnuata éyovta, STws és thy “AtTiKny 
* ; nr / ral , > > 
éoBareiv teccbévtwv tov IleXotovynciwy at 
’ / > 4 >] / e 7 > lal > 
3 Aiyirrou amayayot A@nvaious. ws 5€ avT@ ov 
mTpovywper Kal TA YpnuaTa arAwS avydodTO, 0 
pev MeyaBafos nal ta AoLTA TOY XpHn~adToV 
marw és thv “Aciapv avexopiabn, MeyaBufov 6€ 
tov ZLwmvpov téutrer avdpa Iléponv peta otpa- 
4 TLaS TOAANS' Os adhixdpevos KATA Yhv TOUS TE 
Aiyumtious cal trols Evppdyous payn éxpatnoe 
Kal ex THS Méudidos éEjAace Tors “EXAnvas Kal 
téros és Ipocwmitida tHv vicov KaTéxdnoeV" 
Kal érodlopKes ev aUTH eviavTov Kal €& phvas, 
péexpe ov Enpdvas THhv Swpuya Kal Tapatpéwas 
arn TO Udwp tds Te vais emt TOD Enpod érroince 
\ n / \ \ ’ , \ \ 
Kal THS vycov Ta ToAAA HTEipov, Kal diaBas 
CX. Otto pév ta tov ‘EXAnvoY tpaypata 
3 / ral v / \ ’ / > A 
TOAA@Y Topevopevor Sia THS AtBuns és Kupryynv 
5] , - \ a“ > , wv 
2 écwOnoar, ot d€ TAELoTOL aTwAOVTO. AiyuTToOS 
Sé wdaduv U7 Baciréa éyéveto ANY ’Apuvptaiov 


BOOK 1. cvut. 5-cx. 2 

burned the dock-yard! of the Lacedaemonians, took 
Chalcis, a city of the Corinthians, and making a de- 
scent upon the territory of the Sicyonians defeated 
them in battle. 

CIX. Meanwhile the Athenians and: their allies 
stayed on in Egypt and the war took on many forms. 
At first the Athenians had the mastery in Egypt, and 
the King sent to Lacedaemon Megabazus a Persian , 
with a supply of money, in order that the Lacedae- 
monians might be induced to invade Attica and the 
Athenians thus be drawn away from Egypt. But 
when he found that matters did not advance and the 
money was being spent in vain, Megabazus betook 
himself back to Asia with the money that was left, ~ 
and Megabyzus son of Zopyrus,? a Persian, was des- 
patched with a large army.* He marched thither by 
land, and defeated the Egyptians and their allies in 
battle, drove the Hellenes out of Memphis, and fin- 
ally shut them up in the island of Prosopitis, where 
he besieged them for a year and six months, then 
finally, by diverting the water into another course, 
drained the canal and left the ships high and dry, 
converting the greater part of the island into main- 
land; then he crossed over dry-shod and took the 

CX. Thus this undertaking of the Hellenes came 
to naught after a war of six years;* and but few out 
of many, making their way through Libya into 
Cyrene, escaped with their lives; the most of them 
perished. And all Egypt again came under the 
King’s dominion, except Amyrtaeus, the king of the 

1 Gytheum, on the Laconian gulf. 

? Hero of the capture of Babylon, Hdt. 111. clx. 

3 Diodorus gives him with Artabazus 300,000 men (xi. 75) 
and 300 ships (xi. 77). * 454 B.O. 




Tov ev Tolis €éXEct Bacthéws: toorov 6 ba 
peyeBos te Tov €dovus ovK edvvayTo Edeiv Kal apa 

3 paxypararot Elol TOV Alyurtiay oi €Xevor. ‘lva- 
pos 5¢ 6 ArBiwv Bacirevs, b5 Ta Tavta Empage 
mept tis Aliyimtov, mpodocia Andeis avertav- 

4 pwOn. , ex b€ TaV "AOnvav Kal THS adAdns Evp- 
paxiBo 0s TEVTHKOVTA Tpunpets diddoxyou AEovoaL 
és Alyutrtov Eaxov KATA TO Mevdnovov Képas, 
ovK ElOoTES TOY YyeyovoTwY ovdév" Kal avTOtS Ex 
Te yhs émimecovtes Tebol Kal éx Oaracons Poi- 
vixwv vauTixoy rébOerpav Tas TOAasS TMV vEewr, 

5 ai & éddacous Siédvyov Tad. Ta pev Kata 
Ti peyarnv otpateiay “A@nvatwy cai tov Evp- 
payer és Alyurtov otTws éTehevTyC ED. 

CXI. ’Ex 68 Oeccaria¥ Opéatys 0 'Exexpari- 
Sou vids ToD Oeccarav Baciréwspevyav Ereta ev 
"AOnvatovs éavtov KaTayew: Kat tapadaBovTes 
Bowwtovs Kal Pwxéas dvTas Evppaxous ot ’A@n- 
yatot eoTpatevaay THS Ococanrias emi Papoarov. 
Kal THs pev YS exparouv 6 60a LN Tpoiovtes “arONU 
éx TOV OTAwDY) (Ot yap immys tTav Oeccarav 
eipyov); Ty 88 méduv ox eiXov, ovd adXO ™ pov- 
Koper avtois ovdév @v Evexa éaTpdrevoay, aXX 
arexaopnoay mardww Opéatny Exovtes ampaxTot. 

2 Mera S€ tadta ov woAX@ BaTepov yirsor 
’"AOnvaiwy éml Tas vais tas év IInyais emiBavres 
(eiyov S avtot tas IInyas) TapéT\Nevoay €s 
Licvova Tlepuedcous TOU RavOimmov oTparn- 
youvros, Kal atoBavtes Xuxvwviwy Tovs Mpocpel- 


BOOK I. ex. 2-cxr. 2 

marshes!; for the Persians were unable to capture 
him, both on account of the extent of the marsh and 
because the marsh people are the best fighters 
among the Egyptians. Inaros, however, the king of 
the Libyans, who had been the originator of the 
whole movement in Egypt, was taken by treachery 
and impaled. And when fifty triremes, which sailed 
to Egypt from Athens and the rest of the con- 
federacy to relieve the fleet there, put in at the 
Mendesian mouth of the Nile, quite unaware of what 
had happened, the infantry fell upon them from the 
shore and a Phoenician fleet from the sea and de- 
stroyed most of the ships, a small number only 
escaping. So ended the great expedition against 
Egypt of the Athenians and their allies. 

CXI. And now Orestes son of Echecratidas, king 
of the Thessalians, who was exiled from Thessaly, 
persuaded the Athenians to restore him. And they, 
taking along some Boeotians and Phocians who were 
allies, made an expedition against Pharsalus in 
Thessaly. And though they made themselves masters 
of the land, so far as this was possible without going far 
from their camp—for the Thessalian cavalry hemmed 
them in—they failed to capture the city and indeed 
none of the other objects of their expedition was 
attained, so they went back home again unsuccessful, 
having Orestes with them. 

Not long after this? one thousand Athenians, em- 
barking on the ships at Pegae, which was now in 
their possession,® sailed along the coast to Sicyon 
under the command of Pericles son of Xanthippus, 
and disembarking defeated in battle the Sicyonians 

1 cof. Hdt. 1.-oxl.; m1. xv. 
2 454 B.C, 3 cf. ch. ciii. 4. 



3 Eavtas paxn expatnaav. Kal_ evOus Tapana- 
Bovtes “Axavous Kal SuaTrrevoarres mepay, THs 
‘Axapvavias és Oivadas eat patevoay Kal €7r0- 
AcopKour, ov pévtor eldov ye, GAN aTreywpnoay 
ém olKou. 

CXII. “Yorepov € Ssaditovtwy éTav TpL@v 
oTrovoal Yeyvovrar IeAomovynctors Kal "AOnvaiors 

2 WevTeTeEls. Kal ‘EXAnvixod pev TONE LOU éoyov ot 
"A@nvaior, és be Kumpov | eo TpaTEvovTo vavat 
diakoglals AUT@V TE Kal TOV Evppaxov Kipovos 

3 oTpatnyoovTos. kat éEnxovta pev vies es At- 
yumTov aT aut ay émevoav "Auuptatou peTa- 
TéuTovtos Tov év Tois EXeot Bacidéws, at dé 

4 adraL Kirov eTTONLOpKOUY. Kipevos dé aTro- 
Gavovtos Kal ALpLod ryevopevou aTexwpnoay amo 
Kuitiov: Kal TEVTAVTES umép Larapivos TIS €v 
Kurpe Poin kat Kumptows Kai KineEw € €vavU- 
paxnoav Kal érrelouaxnoav apa, Kat veKncavres 
apporepa aTeXapnaav €’ olKoU Kal at €& Ai- 

5 yumtTou vies T adwieeten Boba au per avutav. Aake- 
Oatpovior O€ pera TaUTa Tov lepov Kadovpevov | 
Tohewov €aTpaTevoar, Kal KPaTHoavTes Tov év 
Acr¢ois (epou Tapédocay Aer dois: Kat avdis 
baTepov "AOnvatot aTroxwpne dvt oy auT@Y oTpa- 
TEVTAaVTES Kal KPaTHO AVTES mapésoaav PDoxevow. 

CXIII. Kai Xpovou eyryevopevov peta TavTa 
"AOnvaion, Bowwrav TOV pevyovTay exovTov ‘Op- 
Nomevov Kal Xatpwverav Kat arr’ arta wpia THS 
Bowwtias, éotpatevoay eauTav bev XtALoLs omi- 
Tals, TaY O€ Evppaywv ws ExaoTols él TA Ywpia 
Tavta Toéuwa ovta, Torpidov tod Todpaiov 
atpatnyouvtos. Kai Xarpwverav édovtes Kal 


BOOK I. cx. 2-cxut. 4 

who came out against them. Immediately thereafter, 
taking along some Achaeans and sailing across the 
gulf, they made an expedition against Oeniadae ir 
Acarnania and laid siege to it; but failing to take it 
they went back home. 

CXII. Three years afterwards! a truce was made 
between the Peloponnesians and Athenians, to last 
five years. And the Athenians did abstain from war- 
fare against Hellenes, but they made an expedition 
against Cyprus with two hundred ships of their own 
and of their allies, under the command of Cimon. 
Sixty of these ships sailed to Egypt on the summons 
of Amyrtaeus, the king in the marshes, while the 
others laid siege to Citium. But Cimon died and a 
famine arose, and so they withdrew from Citium ;? 
and on their way home, when off Salamis in Cyprus, 
they fought the Phoenicians, Cyprians and Cilicians 
by sea and on land. Gaining the victory in both 
battles they went back home, and with them returned 
the ships that had been in Egypt. After this the 
Lacedaemonians undertook the so-called sacred war, 
and getting possession of the temple at Delphi, de- 
livered it to the Delphians; and afterwards, when 
they had withdrawn, the Athenians made an expedi- 
tion, got possession of it, and delivered it again to 
the Phocians. 

CXIII. Some time after this? the Athenians under 
the command of Tolmides son of Tolmaeus, with one 
thousand hoplites of their own and the respective 
quotas of their allies, made an expedition against 
Orchomenus and Chaeroneia and some other places 
in Boeotia, which were in the possession of the Boeo- 
tian exiles and therefore hostile. And after taking 

1 451 B.o. 2 449 B.o, 8 447 BO. 


avdpaTrodicavtes aTreX @pouV pudaKny KATaOTN- 
oaVTES. TopevopLevors & avtois é€v Kopowreia 
emuTiOevtat ot Te ex THS ‘Opxonevod puyases 
Botwtrav Kal Aoxpol per QuTay. Kal EvBoewy 
puyaces Kal boot THs aurijs YVOLNS hoa: Kal 
waxy KPATHTAVTES TOUS [ev d1ePOerpav tav 'A@n- 
valwy, Tors dé CavTas éXaBov. Kal THv Bowwtiav 
eféhutrov AOnvato: Tacav, atovdas Tomnodpevot 
ep @ Tovs avopas KomLovVTaL. Kal ol hevyovTes 
Bowwt@yv KateNOovTes Kat of AAAOL TavTES avTO- 

CXIV. Mera dé TavtTa ov TOAD Uo TEepov 
EiBora aréctn ato “A@nvaiwv. Kal és avtny 
SvaBeSnnoros 76n Tlepucdeous oTpaTea AOnvatav 
nyyérOn adt@ Ott Méyapa adéotnxe Kal Ieno- 
Tovvnalo, péAXovaww eg arrewy és THY’ ATTLKHY 
Kat ot dpovpolt “AOnvaiwr dvePOappévor eicly bro 
Meyapéwv, mAHY boot €s Nicaay am epuyov" érra- 
yaryopevor bé Kopw8iovs Kal LiKvevious Kab ’Eqe- 
Savptous a anéo tno av ol Meyapis. o dé Lepixrjs 
Tadw Kata TAXOS exopute THY oTpatiav ék THs 
EvBoias. Kati peta TovTO ot [leXotrovynaiot TAS 
"Arrikis és "EXevctva kal Opiate é€o BaXovtes 
ésnwoav Iderotoavaxtos tov Maveaviov Bact- 
Aéws Aaxedatpoviwy ayouuévov, Kal TO mAéov 
ovKEeTL TpoEAOovTES aTEXMpHoaY eT olkOV. Kal 
‘AOnvator madw és EvPoav d.aBavtes Tepe- 
Khéous oT patnyovvTos KaTeoTpeyavto Taoay, 
Kal Ty pev adXnV omororyia KATETTHNTAVTO, 
‘Eotiaiads 6€ é€orxicavtes avtot Thy yi Eoxov. 

44h B.C. 

BOOK I. cxm. 1-cx1v. 3 

Chaeroneia and selling its inhabitants into slavery, 
they placed a garrison in it and departed. But 
while they were on the march they were attacked at 
Coronea by the Boeotian exiles from Orchomenus, to- 
gether with some Locrians and Euboean exiles and 
others who held the same political views, and were de- 
feated, some of the Athenians being slain and others 
takenalive. Accordingly the Athenians evacuated the 
whole of Boeotia, making a treaty upon the stipula- 
tion that they should receive back their prisoners. 
And so the Boeotian exiles were restored, and they 
as well as all the rest of the Boeotians again became 

CXIV. Not long after this! Euboea revolted from 
Athens; and Pericles had just crossed over to the 
island with an Athenian army when word was brought 
to him that Megara had revolted, that the Peloponne- 
sians were about to invade Attica, and that all the 
Athenian garrison had been destroyed by the Mega- 
rians except such as had escaped to Nisaea. The 
Megarians had effected this revolt by bringing Corin- 
thians, Sicyonians and Epidaurians to their aid. So 
Pericles in haste brought his army back again from 
Euboea. After this the Peloponnesians, under the 
command of Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, king of the 
Lacedaemonians, advanced into Attica as far as Eleusis 
and Thria, ravaging the country; but without going 
further they returned home. Thereupon the Athen- 
ians again crossed over into Euboea under the com- 
mand of Pericles and subdued the whole of it; 
the rest of the island they settled? by agreement, 
but expelled the Hestiaeans from their homes and 
themselves occupied their territory. 

? Setting up democracies, ete. ¢f. C.I.A. iv. 27 a. 


CXV. ‘Avaxopioavtes 6é at’ Evoias ov 
TOAN@ Dorepov gmovoas €TOLNTAVTO TpOsS Aake- 
Saipovious Kal Tovds Eupuaxo ous TpLaxovTouTels, 
atrodovtes Nicaray kal ny s kat Tpoifjva Kai 
"Ayatiav: tadta yap eixov “A@nvaior Uedotrop- 

"Exto 6é eTEl Laptors Kal Maanators TONELOS 
eryéveTo Tepl Tpurjuns- Kal ot Mirae €Xac- 
covpevoL T@ ToAguwm tap *“AOnvatous édOovres 
kateBowv Te Saplov. EvvetreAaBovto 6é Kal €& 
avis THS 2 dpov avopes tOL@Tal, vewrepioat 
BovrAopevoe THY moNTelay.” mMrEevoavTes ovV 
"AOnvaiot és Lawov vavol teccapaKovta dnpo- 
Kpatiay KatéoTnoav Kal ounpous éaBov tav 
Laplov TevTjKovTa mev Tratoas, iaous 5é avdpas, 
kat katéGevto és Afuvov Kat dpovpay éyxata- 
ALTrOVTES avex@pnoay. Tav 6é Lapiov joav yap 
TLVES OF OVY UTEMEWaY, ann’ Epuyov és THY Hrrel- 
pov, Evv0épevor (Tav év TH Tod) ‘Tots SuvaTo- 
TaTOLS Kal Tec oov8vy 70 ‘Totdorov  Evxppaytay, 
os exe Lapoers TOTE, eT LK OUPOUS TE Evdréeavres 
és émtakoaious 6uéByoay t vTo vUKTO és THY 2dyov. 
Kal Tp@Tov bev TO nue emavéeg tno ay Kal expa- 
THoay TOV mreiaTor, emerta ‘rous _ Opn pous €K- 
KheyarTes ex Anpvov Tous aAUTOV aneoTnoay, 
kal TOUS ppoupovs Tous "AOnvaiwy Kal Tovs 
dpyovTas ot noav twapa odiow) é&édocav Ilic- 
covlvy, érit te Midntov evdus mapecxevdlovTo 
otpatevev. Evvatéctncav 8 avtois cai Bv- 

1 hy wodcrelay seems not to have been read by the Schol., 
and so is deleted by van Herwerden and Hude. 

190 2 


BOOK I. cxv. 1-5 

CXV. Withdrawing their troops from Euboea not 
long afterwards they made a truce with the Lacedae- 
monians and their allies which was to last for thirty 
years, restoring Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaea; 
for these were the places belonging to the Peloponne- 
sians which the Athenians then held. 

Six years later! a war arose between the Samians 
and the Milesians about the possession of Priene, 
and the Milesians, who were being worsted in the 
war, went to Athens and cried out against the Samians. 
They were seconded in their complaint by some 
private citizens from Samos itself who wished to 
revolutionize the government. So the Athenians 
sailed to Samos with forty ships and set up a de- 
mocracy, taking as hostages of the Samians fifty boys 
and as many men, whom they deposited in Lemnos; 
then they withdrew from Samos, leaving a garrison 
behind. Some of the Samians, however, did not 
stay, but fled to the mainland, first making an alliance 
with the most influential men who remained in the 
city and with Pissuthnes son of Hystaspes, then 
satrap of Sardis; and collecting mercenary troops to 
the number of seven hundred they crossed over by 
night to Samos. First they attacked the popular 
party and got most of them into their power; then 
they secretly got their hostages out of Lemnos and 
revolted from Athens, handing over to Pissuthnes 
the Athenian officers and garrison that were on the 
island, and at once set about preparing an expedition 
against Miletus. And the Byzantines also joined in 

their revolt. 
1 440 B.o, 


CXVI. ’A@nvaio: Sé es AoOovTo, wAEVoavTES 
vavolv éEjxovta érl Xdwou tais pev ExKaldexa 
TOV veov ovK éexpnoavto (éTUXoV yap at pev 
éxt Kapias és mpocxornv tav Dowicoay vedv 
oiyopevat, ai dé érl Xiov Kai AéoBou meprayyér- 
ANoveat BonOeiv), recoapaKovta Sé vaval Kal Téc- 
capat Ilepixréous Sexatov avtod atpatnyouvTos 
évavpdynoav mpos Tpayia TH vic@ Laplov 
vavolv EBSopnxovta, OY Hoav ai Elkool oTpaTLW- 

tides (€ruxov 8 at macat aro Midntov mré- 

oveat), Kai évixwv "A@nvatot. tatepov € avtois 
éBorOncav éx tov AOnvav vies TEeccapaxovTa 
kal Xiwv cal AeoBiwv mévte Kal eixool, Kal 
amtoSdvrTes Kal Kpatovvtes TO Tel@ éTOLOpKOUY 
Tplol Teiyece THY TOAW Kal éx Oaddoons apa. 
Tlepuxrjs 8€ AaBov éEnxovta vais aro Tov 
éhopuovaay @yEeTO KaTa Tayos emi Kavvou kat 
Kapias, écayyerOévtwv Str Doiviccar vijes err 
aitovs TA€oveW: OxXETO yap Kal ex THs Lapov 
mévte vavot Ltynoayopas Kal ardour emt Tas 

CXVIIL. Ev tovto 8€ of Ladpior éEativatws 
éxmAovv tromnoduevos AbapKT@ TO oTpaToTéd@ 
erie OVTES TAS TE TpOPuAaKloas vais d1édOerpav 

\ “ \ > Lf 
Kal vavpaxouvTes Tas avTavayopevas Eviknoar, 
kal ths Oadacons Ths Ka? éavtovs éexpatnoav 
Huépas wept Téecoapas Kal déxa Kal éoeKoutcayTo 
kal é£exouicavto & éBovrovTo. édOovTos é 
IlepuxXéous maddy tais vavol KcatexdnoOnoar. 
kal é« tav "AOnvav totepov mpoceBonOnacav 


BOOK I. cxvi. 1-cxvu. 2 

CXVI. But when the Athenians heard of this they 
sailed for Samos with sixty ships. Sixteen of these, 
however, they did not make use of on this enterprise, 
for these had already gone, some toward Caria to keep 
watch upon the Phoenician ships, others towards Chios 
and Lesbos to summon aid ; but with forty-four ships, 
under the command of Pericles and nine others,! 
they fought a sea-fight at the island of Tragia against 
seventy ships of the Samians, of which twenty were 
transport-ships, the whole fleet being on the way 
back from Miletus; and the Athenians were vic- 
torious. Later, having received a_ reinforcement 
_ from Athens of forty ships and from the Chians and 
Lesbians of twenty-five, they disembarked, and being 
superior to the Samians with their infantry proceeded 
to invest the city with three walls, at the same 
time blockading it by sea as well. But Pericles took 
sixty ships away from the blockading fleet and de- 
parted in haste towards Caunus in Caria, a report 
having come that a Phoenician fleet was sailing 
against his forces; for Stesagoras and others had 
gone from Samos with five vessels to fetch the 
Phoenician ships. 

CXVII. Meanwhile the Samians suddenly made a 
sally and fell upon the Athenian naval station, which 
was unprotected bya stockade, destroying the guard- 
ships and defeating in a sea-fight the ships that 
put out against them. And for about fourteen days 
they were masters of the sea off their coast, bringing 
in and carrying out whatever they wished ; but when 
Pericles came they were again blockaded by sea. 
And afterwards a reinforcement came from Athens 

1 Sophocles was on the fleet, as one of the ten generals of 
the year. 



TeccapaKovTa pev at pera Bovevdi dou Kal “Ay- 
vovos Kal Poppiwvos VIIES, elkooe dé at pera 
TAnroréguov cat "Avtixdéous, é« b€ Xiov kat 
AécBov tpidxovta. Kal vavuaxiay pev Tova 
Bpaxetav €ToljcavTo of LYdpto., advvaror be 
évTes ay Tio XeLV eferroduopxn Ona av evare@ pnvi 
Kal Tpooexwpnaav oporoyia, Tetyos Te Kale- 
avres Kal opr) pous dovtes Kal vas mapadovres 
kal Xpypata Ta avadwlévta TAFapEvoe KaTa 
xpovous arrodobvat. EvveBnoav dé cal BuSavtioe 

woTTEp Kat 7 pOoTepov Um KOOL eival. 

CXVIII. Meta tavta 6€ 67 yeyvetae ov 
mToXXois ETECLY _borepov Ta T poeipnueva, Ta Té 
Kepxupaixa. kat Ta Toredeatixa Kal 60a Tp0- 
dacs Tobde TOU TToNémoU KaTeoT. Tatra oé 
Evpravta dca émpatav ot “EdAqves Tpos TE 
aXdjhous kat tov SapBapov eyeveTo év éreae 
TEVTHKOVTA padora peTakv THS TE Eépfou ava- 
Xopnrens Kal Tis apxiis Tove Tob TONE MOU" €y 
ois ot ’“A@nvator Tay TE apxny eyKpatertepay 
KATETTHTAVTO Kal avtol éml péeya ex@pne ay 
Suvdpews. ol 6é Aaxedarpmovior aicOopevor ouTE 
EX@AVOV EL p7) ETL Bpaxy, novxatov TE 70 THEO 
Tob xpovov, OVTES meV Kal 7 po Tov pny Taxeis 
iévat és TOUS TONELOUS, ay py dvayKdafovrat, TO 
dé Te Kal qroAéuots olKetors EF erpyopuevot, piv 67 
4 Sivas Tov “AOnvaiwy capes npeto Kai THs 

17> 5é rt, so MSS.: rove ® &r: is read by Hude, after 
Reiske (Dion. H. rére dé r:). 

1 Possibly the historian, as some have thought; others 
explain as the son of Melesias and opponent of Pericles ; 
still others as the poet from the deme of Acherdus, 


BOOK I. cxvu. 2-cxvi. 2 

of forty ships under the command of Thucydides,} 
Hagnon and Phormio, twenty under Tlepolemus and 
Anticles, and thirty from Chios and Lesbos. Now 
the Samians did indeed put up a sea-fight for a 
short time, but they were unable to hold out, and in 
the ninth month ? were reduced by siege and agreed 
to a capitulation, pulling down their walls, giving 
hostages, delivering over their ships, and consenting 
to pay back by instalments the money spent upon 
the siege. The Byzantines too came to terms, 
agreeing to be subjects as before. 

CXVIIT. It was not many years? after this that 

the events already narrated occurred, namely the 
Coreyraean affair,t the Potidaean,® and all the other 
incidents ® that furnished an occasion for this war. 
And all these operations of the Hellenes, against one 
another and against the Barbarian, took place in the 
interval of about fifty years between the retreat of 
Xerxes and the beginning of this war.’ It was in 
this period that the Athenians established their rule 
more firmly and themselves advanced to great power. 
And. the Lacedaemonians, though aware of their 
growing power, made no attempt to check it, except 
to a trifling extent, remaining indifferent the greater 
part of the time, since they had never been quick to 
go to war except under compulsion, and in this case 
were in some degree precluded from interference by 
wars of their own.® But at last the power of the 
Athenians began clearly to exalt itself and they were 
2 439 B.c. 

* Hardly four years, since the naval battle between the 
Corcyraeans and Corinthians seems to have occurred 435 B.o. 

* Chs, xxiv-—lv. ® Chs. liv—lxvi. 
§ The transactions in the Spartan assembly, chs. lxvii- 
Ixxxviii. 7 479-432 B.c. 

8 The Helot rebellion, ch. ci. et seq. 195 


A . , 

Evupaxias avtav hrTovtTo. Tote S€ ovKEeTL ava- 
\ b a > + > / IQ 7 J 
, 6 , \ é , e ? s = rte 
Tdaon TpoOvpla Kai Kalatpetéa H ioxus, Av bv- 

/ \ / \ 
VovTal, apamwevors On TOVSE TOY TOAEpOV. 
Avtois pév odv tots Aaxedatmovios S1éyvwoto 
AeAVa Cat Te TAS oTOoVvdas Kal Tov’s "AOnvatous 
a / 
adiceiv, wéeuravtes Sé és Aedhovs ernp@twv tov 
Geov ef ToXcuodow dpyetvov Ectat. o b€ avetrev 
al f ral 
écec Oat, kal avtos &py EvAAWecWar Kat Tapa- 
KaNovpevos Kal akAnTOS. CXIX. Adis bé rods 
Evupayous Tapaxadécavtes Widov éBovdovto 
a > \ a lal 
érayayely ef yp) ToNepety. Kal éXOovtwv Tav 
\ a , 
mpeaRewv aro THs Evppaytias cal Evvddou yevo- 
Va vA y >? a b] / 
pévns of Te AddoL eitov & éBovAOVYTO, KaTNYO- 
A id , ial > / \ \ / 
pouvtes ol TAELOUS TOV AOnvaiwy Kal TOV TOAEMOV 
ak.obvtes yiyvecOat, Kai ot KopivOror dSenbévtes 
yey Kal KaTad TONES MpoTepov Exdotav idia 
ote Wndicac0at Tov Trodremov, SedioTEs Tepl TH 
, \ a / 5 \ , 
Tlotesdata wn mpodiaplapi, TmapovTes 5€ Kal TOTE 
a > » / 
Kal TeNeuTaion EmreNOovTES EXeyov ToLdbe. 
CXX. “Tovds péev Aaxedaipoviovs, & davdpes 
Evupayolt, ovK av Ett aitiacaipeOa ws ov Kal 
> \a2 , \ Ld L > A ice et ? 
avtol éyrndicpévor TOV TOAEMOV EloL Kal Huds és 
A a / \ \ \ ¢ , 
TovTo vov Evynyayov. xpn yap TOUS 7YyE“ovas 
\ a 
Ta ida €& icov vésovtas Ta KoWa TpocKoTel)D, 
/ a 
@omep Kal év adXaLs €x TadvTwY TpoOTLMaVTAL. 


BOOK I. cxvin. 2-cxx. 1 

laying hands upon their allies. Then the Lacedae- 
monians could bear it no longer, but determined 
that they must attack the Athenian power with all 
zeal and overthrow it, if they could, by undertaking 
this war. 

The Lacedaemonians themselves, then,! had de- 
cided that the treaty had been broken and that the 
Athenians were in the wrong, and sending to Delphi 
they asked the god if it would be advisable for 
them to go to war. The god answered them, as it is 
said, that if they warred with all their might, victory 
would be theirs, and said that he himself would help 
them, whether invoked or uninvoked. CXIX. But 
they wished to summon their allies again and put 
to them the question whether they should go to 
war. And when the envoys from the allies had 
come and an assembly was held, the others said 
what they wished, most of them complaining of the 
Athenians and demanding that the war should be 
entered upon, and especially the Corinthians. They 
had already, before the meeting, privately begged 
the allies city by city to vote for the war, fearing lest 
Potidaea would be destroyed before help came, and 
now, being also present at this meeting, they came 
forward last of all and spoke as follows: 

CXX. “Men of the allies, we can no longer com- 
plain of the Lacedaemonians that they have not both 
themselves voted for the war and also brought us to- 
gether for this object. And that is right; for it is 
the duty of leaders, while equitably considering 
their particular interests, to have special regard for 
the general weal, just as in other matters they are 

1 Resuming the narrative interrupted at the end of ch, 


432 B. 


lal : > 
2 *uav b€ dco. pev “AOnvators 4dn Evynd\raynoav 
fel 4 
ovyt Sidayfs Séovtar date purdEacOar avtovs: 
Tovs S¢ THY pecoyeray padrov Kal pH ev Tope 
, \ lal a A 
KaT@Knéevous eldévat xpr OTL, Tols KATO HY wy 
duivoct, yareTrwtépav EEover THY KaTaKopLdyy 
TOV @paiwv Kal Tadw avTikn bw ov 7 Baracoa 
a lal fa) / \ 
Th nTeipw Sidwol, Kai TOV voV eyomEvaV BN 
J \ A / 
yeo Oar Sé Tote, eb Ta KATW TpPOOLWTO, KAY MeXpt 
a \ \ a \ X e lal > 
ophav To Sevov mpoedOeiv, Kal TEpl AUTWY OVX 
lal wy Sr \ vad 
3 hooov viv BovrevecOar. Sv brep Kal pa oKvetY 
a b) \ \ LU b ’ > / / 
al \ ‘ > \ 
very. avdpav yap cwppovwy pév e€oTLv, eb p1) 
> a“ e / > a pe / > 
adiKoivTo, novyatew, ayalapy O€ adiKovpevous EK 
\ > / ~ = \ \ > / 
pev elpyvns modepuetv, ed € Tapacyov EK To)eE- 
/ A A / lal \ / 
pov madw EvpBhvat, Kai prjTe TH KATA ToOhELOV 
> / 3 , / An et / lal > / 
edTuxla erraiper Oar pte TO NoOVXw THS elpynvys 
£56 18 a Q P 7 \ Py \ \ 58 \ 
4 Hddmevov adiKetcPar' 6 TE yap Sta THY HoovnY 
> cal / : ee | b / a € , \ 
éxvav TaxioT av agpatpefetn THS pacTwrns TO 
\ PS > e > n > ¢ / 1 4 b] 
TepTvov os Oiep Oxvel, eb NovXaloL,, Oo TE EV 
ré > / Dr, / > b] Av 
Toheu@ evTvxla mrEovalwy ovK evTeuunTar 
/ b , > , \ \ Le 
5 Opdoe atiot@ éTratpopevos. TOAAA Yap KaKWS 
/ > / ca) / U 
yoocbévta aPovroTépwy TOV evavTiwY TUXOVTA 
, \ ” / lal rn 
katwp0ebn, Kal ett Trew Karas doxodvTa 
a > f lal / 
BovrevOjvat és Tovvaytiov aloyp@s TeEplecTy® 

1 ci jovxd or deleted by Hude, after Lehner. 

BOOK 1. cxx. 2-5 
“honoured above all. Now those of us who have 
had dealings with the Athenians in the past do not 
need to be taught to be on our guard against them. 
But those who dwell more in the interior and away 
from any trade-route should be warned that, if they 
do not-aid-those who are on the seaboard, they will 
find it more difficult to bring the products of the 
land down to the sea and to get in return what the 
sea gives to the mainland; and that they should not 
be careless judges of what is said here, as though it 
were no concern of theirs, but should expect that, if 
they abandon the seacoast to its fate, the danger 
may possibly some day reach them, and that>they 
are deliberating upon their own interests no less 

- than_upon ours. They ought not, therefore, to 

hesitaté a moment to adopt war in place of peace. 
For though it is the part of men of discretion to 
remain tranquil should they not be wronged, it 
behooves brave men, when wronged, to go from 
peace to war, but when a favourable opportunity offers 
to abandon war and resume peace again, allowing 
themselves neither to be elated by success in war nor 
to be so enamoured of the quiet of~peace as to sub- 
mit to wrong. For he who for the sake of his comfort 
shrinks from war is likely, should he remain tranquil, 
very speedily to forfeit the delights of ease which 
caused him to shrink ; and he who presumes upon his 
success in war has failed to reflect how treacherous is 
the confidence which elates him. For many enter- 

_.prises which were ill-planned have succeeded because 

the adversary has proved to be still worse advised, 

and yet more, which to all appearances were well 

advised, have turned out the opposite way and 
brought disgrace. For no one ever carries out a 



yOumet dp oveels opola TH miote Kal ~, 
évOupettat yap ovdeis opola* TH Epyo 
/ ’ , 
érreEepyeTal, GANa peT aoharelas wev OoEdfopuer, 
\ / 3 a > 4 
peta Séous Sé év TO Epyw EAreElTOpED. 
CXXI. “‘“Hyeis 5é viv nal adccovpevor tov 
4 \ 
TONELOV eyEelpopeV Kal ixava ExovTES eyKAnpaTA, 
\ ev > / P / / 
kal dtav apvvepeba ’AOnvaiovs, Katanoopeba 
ae 28. > n x \ \ Cae: ER > & 
avtov év Kalp@. KaTa Toda Sé Has ElKOS 
a lal / 
> / fal y e / s 5 \ 
€umerpla TONELLKH, EeLTa opolms Tavras €s Te 
, .7 b] 4 
a / e 
ovolv, ato THs UTapxYovons TE ExdoToLs OvCLAas 
N nw a 
éEaptucopeba Kal amo tov év Aeddois xa 
’ / / / \ ’ 
Ordvuptia xXpnudtov: ddvercpa yap Tornoapmevos 
a / , b \ A / \ / 
itrokaBeiv olot T éopev prcG@ petfove tors Ee- 
am a / ? \ \ e. 9 ‘ 
vous avtT@v vavBdatas. wyvntn yap 7 'A@nvaiwv 
, ral xX , / id \ e , a x 
Svvapts “adXov 7) oikeia: 1) O€ HueTEepa Nooov av 
~ a , \ / > 
a a /, , 
Tols Ypyjpacw. pia Te vixn vavpayias KaTa TO 
> \ ¢ , > ’ > / / 
eikos adioKovTat' et & avTicyolev, medeTHO OmEV 
a / , \ 
Kal Hweis ev WA€OVL YPOV@ TA VavTLKd, Kal OTaV 
/ a 
ev uyla dimou Teprecopefas 6 yap npuels Exowev 
xta 87) pleco yap pels Exower 
/ U > , > A an 
duce ayabov, exetvois OUK av YEVOLTO duday7, 6 

1 Reiske’s correction for 8uoia of the MSS. 

1 cf. u. xiii. 4, where Pericles suggests a similar resource. 
The Delphic oracle favoured the Peloponnesians, according 
to ch. exviii. 3. 


BOOK I. cxx. 5-cxx1. 4 

plan with the same confidence with which he con- 
ceives it; on the contrary we form our fond schemes 
‘with a feeling of security, but when it comes to their 
“execution, we are possessed by fear and fall short ot 
_ suecess. 

CXXI. “ And so now in our own case, it is because 
we are suffering wrongs and have ample grounds for 
complaint that we are stirring up this war, and_as 
soon as we have avenged our wrongs upon the 
Athenians we will bring the war to an end when 
_oceasion offers. And for many reasons we are likely 
to prevail : first, because -we_are-superior in_point of 
numbers and in military experience ; secondly, because 
we all with one accord obey the word of command; 
and, thirdly, on the sea, where their stréngth lies, we 
shall be able to equip a fleet, not only with ‘the 
means which we severally possess, but also with the 
funds stored up at Delphi and Olympia! For by 
contracting a loan we can use the inducement of 
higher pay to entice away from them their mercenary 
sailors ; for the forces of the Athenians are made up 
of hirelings rather than of their own citizens, where- 
as ours, whose strength lies more in-the quality of 
the menethan in the pay they get, would be less 
subject to such defection. And so, if we win a single 
victory at sea, in all probability they are defeated.? 
If, however, they should still hold out, we on our 

part shall have more time for practice in seaman-. 
ship, and as soon as we have brought our skill to a 
parity with theirs, in_coura , assuredly, we shall be 

superior. For the excellene ‘that nature has given 
ustannot become theirs Wccah instruction, whereas 

* Through the mercenary sailors flocking to the Pelopon- 
nesian side for higher pay. 

VOL. I. H 201 


f / / al 
& éxetvor eT LOT NLT) ™ povxovar, xaBarper ov * pty 
5 éoTt pedeTy. xpnwara dé wore exe és ava, 
olc open’ q Sevvoyv av ein ef ot pev éxelvwr Fim 
HaxXor él Sovreld TH AVTOV Pépovtes OUK amre- 
povowr, pets 5 (ert TO TLpM@POUMEVOL TOUS €y- 
Opovs Kai avrol apa F@lecOar) OUK dpa daTravn- 
copev Kai emi TO pn br’ éxelvov ata gig 
Oévtes avTots ToUTOLs KAKMS naoxew 
CXXII. “‘“Yardpyouvo. 6€ cai GrXat odo TOD 
ToNenov Hui, Evpayov Te aTooTacls, uddLoTA 
~~ / 
Tapaiperis ovca THY TpoTOdwY als iayvoUCL, Kal 
- r /, ¢ 
lal is4 / an 
vov tpoldol. HKicTa yap ToAEmos él pyTois 
cal DEAN \ ? > ¢e a \ \ a 
YWpel, AUTOS Y apm avtTov Ta Toda TEYVATAL 
\ 3 ws \ 

Tpos TO TapaTvyxdvov' év w oO pev Eevopyntws 
+ rn / / e , > \ 
avT® Tpocopirnoas BeBarotepos, 0 8 dpyioGeis 

Tept avTov? ovK éX\doow TTaLEL. 
2 ‘?RKv@uvuepeba 6€ cal OT, eb pev Huav oav 
\ rn 
an \ \ 4, 
dhopat, oiatov av nv: viv Sé mpos Evpravtds Te 
c a 2 a € \ \ \ , y 
nas A@nvaior ixavol Kal Kata TwoAWw ete duva- 
, > \ / 

TWTEPOL' WOTE, EL gt) KaL ABpoor Kal Kata EOvy 
yy & ” A“ , > / > , 
Kal Exacrov dory ped youn apuvovpeba avtous, 

, v e a“ > , 
diya ye OvTas Huds atovws Yelipwoovtat. Kal 
THY Hoocav, & Kal CeLvoY TW AakOVaGAaL, icTW OK 
1 xaSaipetdv, Which Hude adopts from C and G (ez corr.), 
against «aBaiperéov of the other MSS., is confirmed by the 
echo in Dio C. xliii. 11, 7d wey yap xrnrdv 5:4 Bpaxéos Tors Toy 

vovv avTa mpocéxovert Kal Kabaperdy medrETD elvat. 
2 Dobree’s correction for aérdy of nearly all MSS. 


BOOK I. cxxt. 4-cxxu. 2 

the advantage they have in skill can be acquired by us 
through practice. And as to the money we need to 
accomplish all this, weshall provide it by contributions; 
or strange were it, if their allies should never fail to 
pay tribute to ensure their own slavery, but we, to 
secure at once vengeance upon our enemies and safety 
for ourselves, shall prove anwilling to spend money, 
aye, and that we may not be robbed of that very 

wealth and withal have it used to our-destruction.... 

CXXII. “ But we have other ays also of waging 

War nee their allies to. to..revolt, which is the 


best™mean o& them of the revenues in 
whichtheir ical Consists, the planting of forts in 
their territory, ad all the other measures which one 
cannot now foresee. For war least of all conforms 
to fixed rules, but itself in most cases _has to form 
its plans~to~suit’ the occasion as its own resources 
allow ; when, therefore, a man keeps his temper 
cool while dealing with war, he is more likely to be 
safe, while he who loses his temper over it! makes 
more blunders. 

“ And let us reflect also that, if we individually 
were involved in a dispute about mere boundary-lines 
with an enemy who was no more than our equal, 
that might be borne; but as the case stands, the 
Athenians are quite a_match for us all together, and 
still more powerful a against us ‘city by city. “Heiice, 
unless all of us together, every nation and town, with 
one accord resist “them, “they will easily overpower 
us because we shall be divided. And as to deé- 
feat—even though this is terrible to hear, let it 

1 Or, reading airéy with the MSS., ‘‘makes blunders 
through his own fault as much as any thing,” ve. ‘the man 
who loses his head has only himself to blame for his disasters.” 



3 GAXo Te dépovcav  avtixpus Sovrciayv 6 Kal 
Noy@ évdotacOjvat aticypov TH Lerdotovyncw 


/ , ca) lal 
Kal TONELS TOTaT OE UTO plas KaKoTrabeiv. ev @ 
a 8 / é ” x , x é \ é / Sieve 
i) Oixalws Ooxolmev av Tacyew 7 dia Serdiav avé- 
year Kal TOY TaTépwyv Yeipovs faivesOat, of 
thy “ErXdrdba HrevGépwcav: nueis b€ odd Hyuiv 
lal fal / An 
avtois BeSatodpev avto, Tupavvov 5é é@pev éey- 
/ / \ > b a 4 
kabectavat woduw, Tors 5 év pid povdpxous 
a \ U e 
4 akiodpev KaTaNUELY. Kai OUK iopEV OTTWS TAbE 
a lal , al / 
Tplav TOY peyiotwy Evudopwav amnddaxTaL, 
> / x / x» > / > \ \ 
afvvecias 7) pmadakias 7) apedetas. ov yap $1) 
, > \ > \ \ , \ 4 
mehevyoTes aUTA éTL THY TAELTTOUS 67 BAdrracav 
a a 
Katappovnow KeywpnKate, ) €k TOU ToAXOUS 
/ \ > / v > 4 / 
opaddetv TO evavTiov ovoxa adpoovvn peTwvo- 
/ /, al 
OXXIII. “Ta pév otv trpoyeyevnuéva ti Set 
A lal / n 
paxpotepov % és Gcov Tols viv Evydéper aitia- 
a / lal r 
Oat; Twepl 6€ Tov EvTELTA peAOVTwY TOls TapOD- 
al \ lal / \ 
ot BonOovvtas yp7 éeTLTAaAalT wpe (TaTpLOY yap 
A a / \ by \ ca) ‘ \ 
fyutv! éx TOY TOovwY Tas apeTas KTaCOaL), Kal pn 
/ \ 4 2. / lal \ 
peTaBarrew TO 00s, Eb Apa TAOUT@ TE VV Kal 
é£ovcia odiyov mpopépete (ov yap Sixatoy & TH 
‘ ‘ 
imopla exTHOn TH TWeplovaia amod€cOat), adra 
amopia é€xTnOn TH TEp pS Oat), a 
a 7/7 \ > 
Oapcodvtas iévat KaTa TOANA €S TOV 7TOAELOD, 
tov te Geod ypyncavtos Kal avTov UToaKXopévov 

1 With C, the other MSS. have dyiv. 

1 xatadpdvnots is that proud and haughty spirit which pre- 
cedes and invites a fall. It seems impossible to reproduce in 


BOOK I. cxxm. 2-cxxmt. 1 

be well understood that it brings nothing else than 
downright slavery. That such an outcome should 
even be spoken ofgas a possibility, or that so many 
cities might suffer ill-at the hands of one, is a 
disgrace to the Peloponnesus. In such a case men 
would say of us, either that we deserved our fate, or 
that through cowardice we submitted to it, and that 
we were clearly dégenerate sons of our fathers, who 
liberated Hellas, whereas we, so far from making 
this liberty secure, should be allowing a city to be 
established as a tyrant in our midst, though we claim 
the reputation of deposing the monarchs in single 
states. We know not how such a course can be ac- 
quitted of one of the three gravest errors, stupidity 
or cowardice, or carelessness. For I cannot suppose 
that, escaping those errors, you have reached that 
most fatal spirit of proud disdain! which has ruined 
so many men that it has taken on a new name, 
that of despicable folly. 

CXXIII. “ With regard, however, to what is past 
and done, what need is there to find fault at 
length, except in so far as that is profitable for what 
is present? But with a view to what shall be 
hereafter, we should devote every effort to the task 
in hand—for to win virtue? by toils is our heritage 
—and make no change of custom because.-you 
now have a Slight superiority in wealth and _ power ; 
for -it-is*not right that attributes which have 
been won through poverty should be lost through 
prosperity. Nay, you should go into the war with 
confidence, and for many reasons: the god has 
spoken through his oracle and promised that he 

English the assonance of the words katagdpdéyynats appooivn. 
Thucydides was fond of paronomasia ; ¢f. ch. xxxiii. 4. 

* Or, ‘‘the rewards of virtue”—honour, renown. 205 


EurArXjWecbat, Kal THs adAAns “EAAdbos araons 
Evvaywviovpévns, Ta pev PoBo, Ta 5é opedia 
yovloupévns, TA p 2, z. 
, U ef € \ 
omovods Te OU AVGETE TPOTEPOL, as ye Kal Oo Geos 
KeAEVOV TrOoAE“EY vomifer TapaBeBacPa, HOd:- 
Knpevars 6€ wadAXrov BonOynceTe? AVOVGL yap OvY 
Of duvvopevol, GAN ot TpdTEpoL ETLOVTES. 
CXXIV. ““Oote tavtaydbev caras brapyov 
ipiv jTodepety Kal nuav Kown TAde TapawvovYTw?, 
” , \ ( a AVG, L \ 
elrep SeBatotatov To \tavta’ Evydepovta Kat 
/ \ >] , ‘ a \ la 
moXeot Kal ldr@tats) elvat, un pédreTe Lortes- 
Seatais Te ToletcGar Tipwpiay ovat Awpievor 
Kat uTo “lovey TodLopKoupévols, OU mpoTEpov 
5 > , \ a v a \ 
ehevdepiar, @S OUKETL evdexerart Te pi pevovTas 
TOUS pev On Sranrec at, TOUS 8, el prod Ona o- 
pba EvvehOovtes ev, dutveaOar dé atoAporTes} 
\ \ ef \ > \ i] 7 2 ‘ / 
un To UoTEepov TO avVTO TdoxXeELVY’ GAA vopi- 
> > / > ca] > ” / 
cavtes és avayxny adpiyPa, ® avdpes Evppayo, 
\ ef 4 v / , \ 
Kal Gua Tdabe dpiota éyecCar, Whdicace Tov 
morenov pn hoByOévtes TO adtixna Sewov, Ths 6 
> 9 ? a _\ ! > / > (Jere 
aw avtov (61a TrElovos Eelpnuvns)émLuunoavTes’ 
] / \ \ > , a r 
€x ToANéu“ouv pev yap elpyvn wadrov BeRaovrat, 
> >] id / \ \ fol > e / > / 
ad’ jovxias S€ mi) TodEUHOAL OVX Omolws aKLV- 
\ ‘ la > A c / 
Suvov. Kal tiv Kabeotnxviav év tH “EdXabu 
TOAW TUpavvoy Hynoamevor éeTL TAacW opoLws 
Kkaleotaval, WoTe TOY pev Hon apyew, Tov Sé 
2 So Hude, after Reiske (raita I, ravta; Taira 

BOOK I. cxxm. 1-cxxiv. 3 


, himself will help you; all the rest of Hellas will join 
you in the struggle, partly through fear and partly 
through self-interest; and, finally, you will not be 
the ones to break the treaty, inasmuch as the god, in 
bidding you go to war, considers it to have been 
transgressed already, but you will be going to the 
defence of a treaty that has been violated. For it 
is not those who fight in self-defence that break a 

treaty, but those who attack others unprovoked. 
CXXIV. “So then, since from every quarter a 
favourable opportunity offers itself to you to go to 
war, and since we recommend this course in the 
common_interest—if it be true that identity of 
interest! is the surest policy for states and individuals 
‘to follow—make haste to succour the Potidaeans, who 
‘are Dorians and besieged by Ionians—the reverse of 
what used to be—and to recover the liberty of the 
rest ; since it will no longer do for us to wait, when 
some are already being injured, and others, if it shall 
become known that we have had a meeting and 
dare not defend ourselves, will soon suffer the same 
fate. On the contrary, men of the allies, recognize 
that we are now facing the inevitable, and at the 
same time that this proposal is for the best; and 
vote for the war, not fearing the immediate danger, 
but coveting the more enduring peace which will 
result from the war. For peace is more firmly 
established when it follows war, but to refuse to 
go to war from a desire for tranquillity is by no means 
so free from danger. And so, in the conviction that 
the state which has set itself up as a tyrant in Hellas 
is a menace to all alike,ruling over some already and 
1 Or, reading taira, ‘‘if it be most certain that this course 
(i.e. declaration of war) is advantageous for states as well as 




Siavocio Fat, TapacTnowpela emedOovtes, Kal 
vov dedovAwpévous “EAAHvVas érevOepaawpev.” 
CXXV. Toradtra pév ot Kopiv@ior eitrov. ot 
dé Aaxedarpovror émelon) ag’ aT avT@v Heovo av 
yvrouny, Wijpov emnryaryov Tols Evupayos a draco 
OgoL Tapigav éENs Kal petCove Kal é\doocov TO- 
Rew Kal 70 THO OS evn picavto mohepelv. dedoy- 
pévov dé avTois evdus fev advvaTa Hv émruxerpety 
aTrapac Kevous ovolr, Exrropiver Bar 5é edoKer éExa- 
oToLs & mpoagpopa Hv Kal pn) elvan peddyow. 
Suws € Kadiotapévors wv eer EVLAUTOS pev ov 
SueTpiBn, éNagaov dé, mplv éaBareivy és thy 
"ATTLKNY Kal TOV TONE MOV apac bar pavepas. 
CXXVI. "Ev tovTe@ 6é ém peo Bevovto TO xXpove 
T pos TOUS 'AOnvaiovs eyKAn LATA TOLOUpEvOL, 
OT WS opiow OTe peylarn Tpopaces eln TOU TONE- 
pew, Hv pn Te ecaxovaow. Kal TpaTov pev 
mpéa Bets TEU AVES ol Aaxedarpovtot éxeevov 
TOUS "AOnvaious TO ayos ehavverv THs Oeod. TO 
dé ayos ip TOLOVOE. Kurov my "A@nvaios avnp 
‘Orvprriovixns TOV TadaL evyevns TE Kal SuvaToOs: 
eyeryaprjKer dé Guyarépa Ocayévous Meyapews 
avdpos, 0s KaT exeivov TOV Xpovov ETUPAVVEL 
Meyapov. Xpopmevep dé TO Kvrove €v Aeros 
avetnev 0 Geos év tod Ards TH peylotn eopTi} 
kataraPelv tiv AOnvaiwy axpotrodw. o 6é Tapa 
Te TOD Bcayévous Stvapyiv AaBwv Kai Tovs Pirous 
avateiaas, é7revdn ew ipOev ‘Odbpria Ta ev 
Hedorovvyjc, katédaBe THY dic poT ody as é€ml 
Tupavviol, voulcas éoptnv te TOV Auos peyioTny 


‘ earn) 

BOOK I. exxiv. 3-cxxvi. 5 

designing to rule over others, let us attack and reduce 
it, and henceforth dwell in security ourselves and set 
free those Hellenes who are already enslaved. 
CXXV. Thus spoke the Corinthians. And the 
Lacedaemonians when they had heard the opinions 
of all, put the vote in succession to all the allied 
states which were present,.both great and small; 
andere ae majorit voted for war. But though the , 
decision’ Was made it was impossible for them to 
take up arms at once, as they were unprepared ; it 
was determined, howéver, “that the several states 
should make the fitting preparations and that there 
should be no delay. Nevertheless, in providing them- 
selves with what was needed there was spent, not 
indeed a full year, but somewhat less, before they 
invaded Attica and took up the war openly. 
CXXVI. During this“interval-they~kept sending 
embassies to the Athenians*and-making complaints, 
that they might havé-as"gbod a pretext as possible 
for making war, in case the Athenians should refuse 
to consider them. And first the Lacedaemonian 
envoys bade the Athenians drive out_the “curse of 
the goddess.” [The curse was as follows: There 
was an Athenian in days of old namédf Cylon, a 
victor at Olympia, of noble birth and powerful ;~ and 
he had married a daughter of Theagenes, a Megarian, 
who was at that time tyrant of Megara. Now Cylon 
consulted the oracle at Delphi, and the god in 
answer told him to seize the Acropolis of Athens 
“at the greatest festival of Zeus.” So he obtained a 
force from Theagenes and, persuading his friends to 
help, when the Olympic festival in the Peloponnesus 
came on he; seized the createed 2 a view to 
making himself tyrant; for he thought that the 




elvar Kal éavTd Te TpoojKew ‘OdvpTLa veviKn- 
Kot. ef 56 ev TH ATTLKA  GAXOOL Tov % peylaTH 
Eoptn elpnto, ovte éxeivos ETL KaTEVONTE TO TE 
pavteiov ove édydov (€oTe yap Kal ’AOnvators 
Audowa, & Kadeitat, Aros éopti Metdrytov pe- 
ylotn, &&w THis Toews, ev  Tavdnpel Bvovet, 
modrol! ovy iepeia adda Ovpata éemiywpia), 
Soxav Sé 6p0as yryy@oKew ETTEXELPNTE TO EPYO. 
of 5€ “A@nvatot aicQopevar éBonPnacav te Tav- 
Snuel ex TOV aypav ér avTouvs Kal TpocKale- 
Comevor ETTOALOPKOUY. XpoVvoU Sé eyyuyvopevov ot 
’"AOnvaior tpuxXopevor TH Tpocedpla aTnAPov ot 
morXol, emitpépavtes Tols evvéa Apyovat THY 
puraxny\re Kal TO TaV avToKpaTopar dialeivat 
fh av apicta SiayityveoKkwow: ToTe Sé Ta TOA 
TOV TOALTLKOY OL evvéa ApyYovTes ETPagaor. 
of 6€ peta TOU KudAwvos trodcopKovmevor PrAVPS 
elyov citov Te Kal vaTos amropia. oO kev ovV 
Kirov kal 0 aderdas €xdsdpacKovaly> ot & adrot 
@s éméCovto Kat Ties Kal atéfynoKov vo TOD 
ALpov, KaOiSovow eri Tov Bwpmov iKéTUL TOV EV TH 

1 wodAol: Hude adopts C. F. Hermann’s conjecture woAAd, 
and, after Madvig, inserts ayva before @vuata. 

1 On this first attempt to establish a tyranny in Athens, 
see also Hdt. v. Ixxi ; Plut. Solon, xii. It was not a rising 
of the people against the nobles, but the attempt of an am- 
bitious man who aspired to royal power, supported only bya 
few friends and » body of Megarian soldiers. To the mass 


BOOK I. cxxvi. 5-10 

Olympic festival was not only the greatest festival 
of Zeus, but also in a manner was connected with 
him as having won an Olympic victory.t But 
whether the oracle meant the greatest festival in 
Attica or somewhere else he did not go on to con- 
sider, and the oracle did not make it clear. For, in 
fact, the Athenians also have a festival in honour of 
Zeus Meilichius, the Diasia, as it is called, a very 
great festival celebrated outside the city, whereat 
all the people offer sacrifices, many making offer- 
ings? peculiar to the country instead of victims. 
But Cylon, thinking that he was right in his opinion, 
made his attempt. And the Athenians, when they 
were aware of it, came in a body from the fields 
against them and sitting down before the Acropolis 
laid siege to it. But as time passed the Athenians 
grew weary of the siege and most of them went 
away, committing the task of guarding to the nine 
Archons, to whom they also gave full power to settle 
the whole matter as they might determine to be 
best; for at that time * the nine Archons transacted 
most of the public business. But Cylon and those 
who were being besieged with him were in hard 
straits through lack of food and water. So Cylon 
and his brother escaped ; but the rest, when they 
were in great distress and some of them were even 
dying of hunger, sat down as suppliants at the 

of the people it seemed to portend subjection to Megara, so 
they flocked in to crush the movement, not, as Cylon hoped, 
to support it. 

2 A scholiast suggests cakes (réuuata) made in the forms 
of animals. 

* i.e. before the legislation of Solon ; from that time the 
power of the Archons decreased, and was restricted chiefly 
to judicial functions. 



/ / \ > \ e ’ 

ll axpomoXe. avacticavtes 5é avTovs oi Tav 'AOn- 
/ > / \ / e Caf 
vaiwy émiTeTpappevoe THY PuAAaKIV, wS EWPwV 
> Q / > lal ° Qn > ’ e be \ 
atoOvncKovtTas €v T@ lep@, Eh w pw jOEV KAKOV 

> 3 / / 
Tolncoucly, aTayayovTes aTéxtewav: KabeCope- 
\ a lal a n 
vous 6€ Tivas Kal éml TOV ceuvav Oedy Tois 
ral cal / > / \ 
Bwpois év TH Tapodm ateypncavto. Kal amo 
a \ > / r f r , 
ToUTOU évayels Kal aXLTIHpLOL THS Beod érelvol TE 
> lal \ \ / \ > ’ > & BA 
12 éxaXovvTo Kal TO yévos TO aT éxeivwv. }NacAaV 
ue! val \ a / 
peev ovv Kat ot ‘AQnvator Tovs évaryets touTous, 
/ ¢€ , 
nrace de Kal Kreopévns 0 Aaxedarpovos taTtepov 
, / , lal 
peta “A@nvaiwv aotacialovtwy, tovs te Cavtas 
lal / \ ral 
> / n / ef \ \ / 
é&éBadov: KaTHdOov pevtot VaTEpov, Kal TO yévos 
al a / 
lal \ \ v e , 
CXXVII. Totdto 8) 70 ayos of Aaxedaipovior 
/ a as lal lal 
éxéXevov eXavverv S7Gev Tols Peots mp@Tov Timo- 
r / \ , \ 
povvtes, eldotes Sé Llepuxdéa tov Eavbimrov 
U A \ \ / , 
Ul > a en x / 
fovtes éxtecovtTos avTov pdov av! adiot rpo- 
a % 3 \ a ? / / a 
2 ywpely Ta aTro TMV ~A@nvaiwv. ov pévToLTOG07- 
lal \ a 
tov HAMLov Tabety av avUTOV TOUTO Gao diaBorrV 
lal \ / 
oloev avT@ Tpos THY TodW, ws Kal dta THY 
9 , \ \ , ” € / a 
3 éxeivou Evpdhopav TO mépos EaTal Oo TOAEMOS. wv 
1 Added by Stahl. | 

1 Of Athena Polias. 
2 The sanctuary of the Eumenides, which lay between the 
Acropolis and the Areopagus. 


BOOK I. cxxvi. 10-cxxvu. 3 

altar! on the Acropolis. And the Athenians who 
had been charged with guarding them, when they 
saw them dying in the temple, caused them to arise 
on promise of doing them no harm, and leading 
them away put them to death; and some who in 
passing by took refuge at the altar of the Awful 
Goddesses? they dispatched even there. For this 
act both they and their descendants? were called 
accursed and sinners against the Goddess. Accord- 
ingly the accursed persons were driven out not only 
by the Athenians but also at a later time by Cleo- 
menes the Lacedaemonian, with the help of a 
faction of the Athenians, during a civil strife, when 
they drove out the living and disinterred and cast 
out the bones of the dead. Afterwards, however, 
they were restored, and their descendants are still 
in the city. 

CXXVII. It was this “curse” that the Lacedae- 
monians now bade the Athenians drive out, prin- 
cipally, as they pretended, to avenge the honour of 
the gods, but in fact because they knew that Pericles 

son of Xanthippus was implicated in the curse on ~ 

his mother’s side,* and thinking that, if he were 
banished, they would find it easier to get from the 
Athenians the concessions they hoped for. They 
did not, however, so much expect that he would 
suffer banishment, as that they would discredit him ‘ 
with his fellow-citizens, who would feel that to some 
extent his misfortune® would be the cause of the 

8 Chiefly the Alcmaeonidae, whose head was Megacles, 
Archon at the time of Cylon’s attempt. 

4 Pericles was a descendant in the sixth generation from 
Megacles, his mother Agariste being niece of the Alemaeonid 
Cleisthenes (Hdt vr. cxxxi.). 

5 As belonging to the accursed fainily, 



7 , a or, ce \ wv b 
yap Suvat@tatos TOV Kal” éavTov Kal dywv THY 
ToXLTELav HvavttovTo TavtTa Tois Aaxeda:povioss, 

\ > y e / > wh 3 \ ‘+s ef 

\ ’ / 
tous ’A@nvaiovus. 
> lal 

CXXVIII. ’AvtexéXevov Sé cal ot “AOnvator 

\ / \ > \ / ” , 4 
tous Aaxedaipoviouvs TO ato Tatvdpouv ayos éXav- 

\ , / 
very. of yap Aaxedaipouo, avactncavTés TroTE 
> la) e a lo) 80 > \ Ai /, 1 
€x Tov lepov tov Iloceda@vos amo ‘lawvapov 
tov Eik@tov ixétas amayayovtes StébOerpav’ Ov 
a \ \ , 5) n jaz \ t 

0 67 Kat odiow avtots voyifovcr Tov péeyav 
\ / BI / bp / \ \ \ 

ceo pov yevécOar ev Xraptyn. éxédevov 6é Kal TO 
fal / v > 4 > # > / \ 
THs Nadkoixouv ayos €Navvewy avToUs: eyéveTo Oé 
, > \ / e , \ 
Totovee. e7re!dy Ilavoavias 0 Aaxedatpovios TO 
Tp@Tov petarveudbels vo LraptiaTt@v amo THs 
> a wn > ¢€ / \ ‘ c , > nr 
apxns THs év “EXXnoTOVT@ Kal KpLO Els UT avTOY 
aTréervOn 1 adieety, Snuocia peéev ovKéte é€eTép- 
Ui] #7) 2 Tied ya lad be 

, \ \ 
hOn, idia dé adros tpijpn AaBav ‘Epwovisa 
n ¢ 

avev Aaxedatpoviov adixvettar és “EXXnoTovTor, 

a \ XZ S28 \ r Mustv’ aS A ne 

éopyw Ta mpos Baciléa Tpayuwata mpdoce, 
fal / s fo) 
n fol / cal 
“EdAAnuixis apxns.  evepyeciavy b& amo Tovde 
mpa@tov és Baciiéa KxatéGeto Kal Tov TavTos 
Tpaypatos apynyv émoujcato. Bufavtiov yap 

1 Van Herwerden deletes, followed by Hude. 

1 of. ch. ci. 2. 


BOOK I. cxxvut. 3-cxxvill. 5 

war. For being the most powerful man of his time 
and the leader of the state, he was opposed to the 
Lacedaemonians in all things, and would not let 
the Athenians make concessions, but kept urging 
them on to the war. - 

CXXVIIL The Athenians answered with the 

demand that the Lacedaemonians should drive out 
the curse of Taenarus. For the Lacedaemonians had 
on one occasion caused some suppliant Helots to leave 
their refuge in the temple of Poseidon at Taenarus, 
then had led them off and put them to death; and 
the Lacedaemonians believe that it was because 
of this sacrilege that the great earthquake! befell 
them at Sparta. And the Athenians also bade them 
drive out the curse of Athena of the Brazen House.? 
And this is the way it was incurred. After Pau- 
sanias the Lacedaemonian had been recalled by the 
Spartans, on the first occasion,? from his command 
on the Hellespont, and on trial had been acquitted 
of wrong-doing, he was never again sent out in a 
public capacity, but privately and on his own account 
he took a trireme of Hermione without authority of 
the Lacedaemonians and came to the Hellespont, 
to take part, as he pretended,in the Persian war, but 
in reality to carry on an intrigue with the Great King 
—an enterprise to which he had set his hand in the 
first instance also, his aim being to become master 
of all Hellas. He had namely first laid up for him- 
self with the King a store of gratitude in the follow- 
ing circumstances, and thus had begun the whole 
affair. When he was in that quarter before, after 

2 So called from her temple or shrine in the citadel at 
Sparta. Pausanias says (111. xvii. 2) both temple and statue 
were of bronze. 3477 8.0. ef. ch. xcv. 3. 






ey \ a . \ \ b / 
Eloy TH TpoTépa Tapovota peta THY é€x Kutrpou 
> , 5 \ aA > \ \ , 
avaxyopnow (eiyov 6€ Myjéor avto nai Baoirews 
a \ f' > 
mpoonkovTés tives Kat Evyyeveis, of Eddwoav ev 
> fal / "h A i > / 
avuT® TOTE) TOUTOUS ods EXaPev aTroTéuTrEL Bact- 
a a f- A \ i 
Nel Kpvpa Tav adrdr\,wv Evppadywv, TO O€ AOYH 
Yj \ a \ 
avédpacay avtov. émpacae b€ TavTa peta J'oy- 
4 a?) lal = bl / , / 
yuXou Tov Epetpids, omep éemetpevre TO Te BuCav- 
Tlov Kal Tovs aixpwarwtous. émeurbpe 5é Kal 
b] \ Ni 4 / > a > 
éemioToAny tov L'oyyvAov Pépovta avT@. €ve- 
yéypatrto 5é Tabe év avTH, ws UaTEpov avnupEeOn: 
id \ a / / 
“ Tlavoavias 0 nyep@v THs Lraptns Tovade Té 
/ / > / te, , 
cor xapitecOar Bovropevos atroTréuTret Sopl EXov, 
tal > \ \ a 
Kal yv@uNy TroLovpmat, e& Kal cot Soxel, Ovyatépa 
TE THY ONY yhuat Kal cor YSraptynv te Kal THV 
c e f. fal 
ddAnv “EXXdéba Urroxeiprov Toincar. Svvatos 6é 
lal lal lal \ Lal 
S0x@ elvar Tav’Ta Tpatat peTa TOD BovrEvOpLEVOS. 
5 / 
> ade / ? 2 \ \ \ Ul 
éml Oddaccav 6s ov TO AOLTTOV TOUS NOYOUS TrOLN- 
/ » a \ ¢e I 
couela.” tocaita pev 7 ypadn €d1Xov. 
\ a A 
CXXIX. BépEns 5€ hoOn te tH éeiaToAR Kal 
atoaTtéxree “AptaBafov tov Papvakov emi Oa- 
» ra > \ /, ra 
Aacoav Kal KedXevEeL auvTOv THV TE AacKvXriTLW 
catpateiay twapadkaBety MeyaBdtnv amandXa- 
Eavta, 0s mpoTepov apyxe, Kai wapa Ilavoaviav 
> / > \ > / > fal td 
és Bufdvtiov émictoAny avtetetiver avT@® ws 
/ / \ \ a 5) tal 
Taylota OvaTréwrpat Kal THY oppayioa arrodetEat, 
b) a , a 
kal nv TL avT@ Ilavoavias TapayyéAXy Tepl TOV 
a / 
€avTOU TpayLaTwV, Tpdocelvy ws aploTa Kal 
4 , / 

BOOK I. exxvii. 5-cxxix. 2 

the return of the Hellenic fleet from Cyprus,! he 
had taken Byzantium, then in the possession of the 
Persians, and certain connections and kinsmen of 
the King were captured in the place when the city 
fell. These prisoners he sent back to the King 
without the knowledge of the allies in general, whom 
he gave to understand that they had escaped from 
him. And he was carrying on this intrigue in con- 
cert with Gongylus the Eretrian, the very man whom 
he had placed in charge of Byzantium and the 
captives. And he also sent a letter by Gongylus 
to the King, in which the following was written, 
as was afterwards discovered : 

“ Pausanias, the Spartan commander, wishing to 
do you a favour, sends you back these men whom 
he took with the spear. And I make the proposal, 
if it seems good to you also, to marry your daughter 
and to make Sparta and the rest of Hellas subject to 
you. And I am able, I think, to accomplish these 
things with the help of your counsel. If any ot 
these things pleases you, send a trusty man to the 
sea, and through him we shall in future confer.” 
So much the letter disclosed. 

CXXIX. Xerxes was pleased with the letter, and 
sent Artabazus son of Pharnaces to the sea, com- 

manding him to take over the satrapy of Dascylium, 
superseding Megabates, who was governor before ; 
and he charged him with a letter in reply to 
Pausanias, bidding him transmit it to him in By- 
zantium as quickly as possible and to show him 
the seal, and if Pausanias should give him any 
direction about the King’s affairs, to execute it with 
all care and fidelity. And he on his arrival did 

1 of. ch. xciv. 2. 




Got ep elpnto Kal thy émictoNny drétreprper. 
avTeveyeypamtTo dé Tabe" 
«* (de ever Bactrevs EépEns Iavoavia: Kai 
TOV avo pay c oUs pot Tépav Oaracons € ex Butavriou 
/ , J 
érwoas) KeiceTal cot evepyeoia év TO TMT Ep@ 
olk@ és aiel avarypaTTos, Kab Tois Aéyors Tots aro 
gov apéoKopalt. Kat ce pare yok pie mpEpa 
> / (4 
Umityvel, poe xpucod Kal apyvpou dSaTravn 
KEKWAUTO poe oTpatuas Tet, el mou Sei 
maparyiyves Gat, adra pet “AptaBafov dvd pos 
ayabob, 6 6yv cot emeppa, Tpacce Capo av Kal Ta 

éua Kal TA oa 67n Kd\MOTA Kal apiota ee 


CXXX. Tatra AaBav o Haveavias ta ypap- 
para, @v Kat ™ pote pov ev peyar@ a&iopate b vmo 
TOV “EXAgjvev 61a Tip Trataraow HysHoviay, 
TOAN® TOTE peaddov ApTo Kal OVKETL eduvato €v 
TO KabecTOrt TOT Beorevery, aAXa oKEVaS Te 
Mnbucas évduomevos €K TOU Bulavtiov €Ener Kal 
dia THS Opakns T Opevo“EvoVy avtov Mijdot Kat 
Alyurttot edopupopour, Tpamelay TE Tlepoveny 
mapeTideTo Kat KaTeX el THY OLdvolay ovK €dv- 
VaTO, aA Epyous Bpaxéoe Tpovonrov & TH yvoun 
perloves és Evrerta Emedde Tpagew. Svampocodev 
TE QUTOV Taperye Kal 7H opyn ovTm yareTTA 
EXpHTO és mavTas omotes OoTE pndéva dwvac bar 
T poovevar’ 6: émep Kal 7 pos tovs "A@nvatous ovx 
HKLOTA 1 Evppaxia peTéeo Ty. 

CXXXI. O: oe Aanedarpovtor aicBopevor 70 
Te TpaTov dv a’Ta TavUTAa uvexaddecay avTOY, Kal 


BOOK I. cxxix. 2-cxxx1. 1 

other things as he was told and transmitted the 
letter. And this reply of the King ran as follows: 

“ Thus saith King Xerxes to Pausanias: As touch- 
ing the men whom thou didst save for me out of 
Byzantium beyond the sea, a store of gratitude is 
laid up for thee, of record, in our house forever, and 
with thy words also I am pleased. And let neither 
night nor day stay thee to make thee remiss in 
performing aught of what thou dost promise me; 
and let nothing hinder thee, either expense of gold 
and silver or number of troops, if there be need of 
their presence anywhere; but with Artabazus, a 
good man, whom I have sent to thee, transact with 
confidence my business and thine as shall be most 
honourable and best for both of us.” 

CXXX. When Pausanias received this letter, 
although even before this he had been held in high 
consideration by the Hellenes because he had led 
them at Plataea, he was then far more elated and 
couid no longer bring himself to live in the usual 
manner of his people, but clad himself in Persian 
apparel whenever he went forth from Byzantium, 
and when he travelled through Thrace a body-guard 
of Medes and Egyptians attended him; he had his 
table served in Persian style, and indeed could not 
conceal his real purpose, but by such trifling acts 
showed plainly what greater designs he purposed in 
his heart to accomplish thereafter. And so he made 
himself difficult of access, and indulged in such a 
violent temper towards everybody that no one could 
come near him; and this was one of the chief 
reasons why the allies went over to the Athenians. 

CXXXI. Now it was just this conduct that had 
caused the Lacedaemonians in the first instance to 



> \ ae / \ \ 7 > 7 
éretd1) TH Eppuovids vn to Sevtepov éextreUvoas 
la! / , 
kal éx tov Bufavtiov Bia bm’ ’AOnvatwv éxtroX- 
opxnbels és pev THY Lardptyy ovK éeTaveywper, és 
\ \ / 
Sé Kortwvas tas Tpwddas idpv8els rpdocwv Te 
DI] / > a 3 \ f \ > 
e€onyyérreTO auTois és Tovs BapBapous Kai ovK 
a \ 
er ayad@ THy povny ToLtovpevos, OUTw 57 OvKETL 
Madea > \ f , mer x 
émécxov, Ara TEurrayTes KNPUKA ol Efopot Kat 
lal \ , 
uy, TOAEMOY avT@ LmaptTiatas mMpoaryopeverv. j 
6 6€ BovAomevos ws HKLoTAa UroTTOS elvat Kal 
/ 4 ld \ \ > 
TioTevov YXpipact dvadkvoew THY diaBornV ave- 
yoper TO SevTepov és XaapTyy. Kal és pev THY 
/ lal \ n / 
> ra / ‘ / 6 fal 
(€£ecte 5€ Tots Efopors TOV Bacidéa Spacat TovTO), 
yy / ef Jen \ / 
érerta Statrpakapevos tatepov €EAAVe Kal Kali- 
\ / Taal 
aotnow éavtov és Kpiaw Tots Bovropévors Trept 
avToV edeyyelv. 
CXXXII. Kai davepov pev eiyov ovdév ot 
Lraptatat onpetov, ovtEe of ExXOpoi ovTE 1) Taca 
/ a 
TOMS, Tw av TiaTEvoavTes BEeBaiws ETLULwWpodYTO 
avépa yévous te Tod BaciXelov dvTa Kal év TO 
\ / \ 
mapovTe tiny exovtas (IlXetctapyov yap Tov 
» / 
Aewvidouv dvta Bactréa Kal véov Ett averios Ov 
’ ‘ e , \ \ a a 
émeTpoTrevev), UToias 5é Todas Tapetye TH TE 

1 The oxvrdAn was a staff used for writing dispatches. 
The Lacedaemonians had two round staves of one size, the 
one kept at Sparta, the other in possession of commanders 


BOOK I, cxxxi. 1-cxxxtl. 2 

recall Pausanias, when they learned of it; and when 
this second time, on his sailing away in the ship of 
Hermione without their authority, it was evident 
that he was acting in the very same manner—when, 
after being forcibly dislodged from Byzantium by 
the Athenians, instead of returning to Sparta, he 
settled at Colonae in the Troad and was reported to 
the ephors to be intriguing with the Barbarians and 
tarrying there for no good purpose—then at length 
they held back no longer, but sent a herald with a 
skytale-dispatch,! in which they told him not to lag 
behind the herald, or the Spartans would declare 
war upon him. And he, wishing to avoid suspicion 
as far as possible, and confident that he could~ 
dispose of the charge by the use of money, returned 
the second time to Sparta. And at first he was 
thrown into prison by the ephors, who have the 
power to do this in the case of the king himself ; 
then, having contrived after a time to get out, he 
offered himself for trial to any who might wish to 
examine into his case. 

CXXXII. There was, indeed, no clear proof in 
the possession of the Spartans, either his personal 
enemies or the state at large, on the strength of 
which they could with entire confidence proceed to 
punish a man who was of the royal family and held 
high office for the time being—for as cousin of 
Pleistarchus son of Leonidas, who was king and 
still a minor, he was acting as regent for him; but 

he, by his disregard of propriety, and particularly by 

abroad. A strip of paper was rolled slantwise round the staff 
and the dispatch written lengthwise on it; when unrolted 
the dispatch was unintelligible, but rolled slantwise round 
the commander’s skytale it could be read, 



2 0 / x o x, , a B Ba S Lae 
mapavopia Kal (nrooe Tov BapBapav pn ioos 
/ fal s i a la \ 1 / ” 
Bovrecbat eivat Tols Tapoval, Kal” Ta TE adda 

lal ’ / 2 rn 
avtov avecKoTrouy el Ti mov e€ededinTnTO TOV 

/ % \ 
KabecT@ToY vopimeorv Kal OTL éml Tov Tpitroda 
\ a a / raed 
mote tov év Aeddois, dv avéPecav ot “EXXnveEs 
> \ lal Af > / b] , b] / 
aro tav Mydwv axpobiviov, n&iwoev émiypa- 
> \ 207 \ b] a , 

wacbat avtos idia TO édeyetov TOG 

“EXXijvov apynyos érel ctparov deve Myjdav, 
Ilavcavias PoiBeo pri avéOnne TObe. 

S a e / ‘ 
TO ev oov édeyelov ot Aaxedammovior eEexodarvav 
\ a / n / 
evovs TOTE ATO TOD TplTr0b0S TOUTO Kal eTéypapav 
\ \ / ee 4 \ 
ovopaatl tas mores boat Evyxaedovoat Tov 
\ / n 
BdpBapov éotncav TO ayvdOnpa> tov pévTor 
, \ | a / 3 
Ilavoartov adiknua Kat ToT edcxet eivat, Kal éTrel 
/ fal lal 
ye 67 €v TOUT@ KabeLaTIKEL, TOAXK@ pbaddov 
a / a ve 
Tapoporoy TpaxOnvar épaiveto TH Tapovon ova- 
, > , \ \ ’ \ ¢/- 
voila.  €muvOavovTo 6é kat es tovs EiAwtas 
, > A 2 x ef > lA / 
meadooew TL avToV, Kal Ry Sé ovTwS* EhevOEpwolv 
al Qn \ / 
Te yap wUmiryvelTo avTols Kal moX.Telay, iV 
r XN a , 
Evveravact@ct Kal To wav EvyKcatepyaowrTal. 
ind Lal id 7 tal 
GN dS Hs )odvdé TOV EiXo@t@v pynvutais tot 
v4 / / / lal 
miotevcavtTes 7Eiwoav vewTepov TL Totty Es 
"1 Added by Ullrich. 

1 A golden tripod set upon a three-headed bronze serpent 
(Hdt. 1x. lxxxi.). he gold tripod was carried off hy the 
Phocians in the Sacred War (Paus. x. xiii. 5), but the 
bronze pillar, eighteen feet high, of three intertwined snakes, 
was removed by the Emperor Constantine to Constantinople 



BOOK I. cxxxi. 2-5 

his aping of the Barbarians, gave them much ground 
for suspecting that he did not want to remain an 
equal in the present order of things at Sparta. And 
they went back into his past and scrutinized all his 
other acts, to see if perchance he had in his mode 
of life departed from established customs, and they 
recalled especially that he had once presumed, on 
his own authority, to have inscribed on the tripod 
at Delphi,! which the Hellenes dedicated as first 
fruits of the spoils they had won from the Persians, 
the following elegiac couplet: 

«When as captain of the Hellenes he had 
destroyed the Persian host, Pausanias dedicated 
this memorial to Phoebus.” ? 

Now the Lacedaemonians had immediately chiselled 
off these verses and inscribed on the tripod by 
name all the cities which had had a part in over- 
throwing the Barbarians and had together set up 
this offering. The act of Pausanias, however, was 
felt at the time to have been a transgression, and 
now that he had got into this further trouble, it 
stood out more clearly than ever as having been 
but a prelude to his present designs. They were 
informed also that he was intriguing with the 
Helots; and it was even so, for he was promising 
them freedom and citizenship if they would join 

-him in a revolt and help him accomplish his whole 

plan. But not even then, nor relying on certain 
Helots who had turned informers, did they think it 
best to take harsh measures against him; they 

and placed in the hippodrome, the modern Atmeidan, where 
it still is. It contains the names of thirty-one Greek states 
which took part in the Persian War. 

2 The distich was composed by Simonides. 



a U . 
AUTOV, YPO/LEVOL TO TPoTw wTED el@lacw és 
val n 3 
adas avtous, mi) Taxels elvar TEpl avdpos Yrap- 
TlaTov avev avaudicBnTyT@V Texunpiwy PBov- 
a / al 
Nedoal TL avnKeotov, Tpiv ye 62) avTois, ws 
\ a 
AéyeTal, O péA\AWY TAS TerAeUTAias Bactrel 
émusto\as mpos “AptaBalov Komeiv, avynp ’Ap- 
\ / , \ / 
ExelvO, MNVUTIS ylyveTat, detcas Kata évOvunoly 
lal XN lal 
Tia 6Tt ovdcis TH TV TPO éavTOD ayyéXov 
/ 0) 
Tandw adixeto, Kal Tapacnunvapevos, va, Hv 
ral an / a \ > FI) / 
evan ths OoEns 7} Kal exeivos TL peTaypdryyat 
aitnon, £1 ETLyVa, AVEL TAS ETTLTTONGS, ev als 
UTovoncas TL TOLOUTOV TpocEeTTETTaAOaL Kal av- 
TOV NUpEV eyyEryPa-pevov KTELVELV. 
CXXXIII. Tote 8% of &bopot beiEavtos adtod 
n \ / ~T 
Ta ypappaTa paddov pev eTLTTEVTAV; AUTHKOOL 
\ / yy — / > lal VW , 
dé BournOévtes Ett YevérOar avtov Ilaveaviouv tt 
AéyovtTos, amo TapacKevns Tov avOpwrov én 
Taivapov ikérov otyouévov Kal oxnvecapéevou 
nm , / a 
Sutrny dradpdypate KarvBnv, és hv tav 
, U 1. , 4 \ li / e 
éhopwv! évtos Twas Expuwe, kal Hlavoaviov ws 
avtov éhOovtos Kal €pwT@vTos THY Tpohpacw Tis 
ixetelas a000vTo TavTa capas, aitiwpévov Tov 
> , , \ > a / \ S ’ 
avOpwirov Ta TE TEPL AVTOU ypaderTa Kal TAAX 
atopaivovtos Kal’ Exactov, ws ovdéy TwTOTE 
TE > a \ 4 / , 
avtov év Tais mpos Baciiéa Scaxoviats tapaBa- 
x ~ / be ? yy a Rr lal la 
ovto, mpoTiunlein S€ év tow Tois ToAXOIs THY 
1 ray te épdpwv in the MSS.; Poppo deletes re, 

BOOK I. cxxxu. 5—cxxxitl. 

adhered to their usual method in dealing with men 
of their own class—not to be hasty, in the case of a 
Spartan, in adopting an irrevocable decision unless 
they had indisputable proofs. But at last, as it is 
said, the man who was to take to Artabazus 
Pausanias’ last letter to the King, a man of Argilus 
who had once been a favourite of his and had 
hitherto been most loyal to him, turned informer. 
For he took fright when he called to mind that no 
previous messenger had ever come back again ; and 
so, having made a counterfeit seal, in order that his 
act might not be discovered, in case he should be 
wrong in his suspicion or in case Pausanias should 
ask to make some alteration in the letter, he opened 
the letter and in fact found written therein, as he 
suspected he should find something of the sort to 
have been directed, an order for his own death. 
CXXXIII. At this point the ephors, when the 
man showed them the letter, were at last more 
nearly convinced, but they wished besides to hear 
with their own ears some word from Pausanias’ own 
lips; so in accordance with a prearranged plan the 
man went as a suppliant to Taenarus and put up 
there a hut divided by a partition. In the inner 
room of the hut he concealed some of the ephors, 
and when Pausanias visited him and asked the 
reason of his taking the position of a suppliant, they 
heard clearly everything that was said: they heard 
the man accuse Pausanias of having written the 
order about himself, reveal the other items of the 
plot in detail, and protest that, though he had never 
yet compromised Pausanias in his errands to the 
King, the special honour awarded him was no better 
than that which the common run of his servants 



cal / F fal 
Staxovwv aobavely, KaKEivoU avTad TE TAUTA 
a \ nr , 
Evvoworoyobvtos Kal tepl tov TapovTos ovK 
2A >? / > \ / b] fal r Al 
€avtos opyifecPat, ara TiotLv éx Tod Lepod 
S.66vTOs THs avactacews Kal akLodvTOS ws Ta- 
: / \ \ U 
yiota TopeverOat Kal pn Ta Tpaccopeva OLaKw- 
> \ a , 
CXXXIV. ’Axovcavtes 88 axpiBas ToTe pev 
an / > > ’ rn 
amArGov ot Ebopot, BeBaiws dé 76n etdotes Ev TH 
a / ] \ 
monet THY EVAAHWL éTroLodVTO. éyeTat 6 avTov 
/ a e a \ \ 
péerrovta EvrArANPOncecOar ev TH 0O@, Evos peEV 
a / \ , f 3 
Tav épopev TO TpocwTOY TpoTLoVTOS ws ELE, 
a 5 Ds 9 , ” be Ys ,’ lal 
yvavar eb @ €yopel, AXAov O€ vevwaTe apavei 
, ff \ N Xi 
ypnoapmevou Kal OnrWcaVTOS EvVOLA, TPOS TO Lepov 
GRRE S ; \ 
Ths Xadkoixov ywphoa: Spoum Kat mpoxatadu- 
a ? p] \ \ / \ 
yeiv: WV O eyyds TO Téwevos. Kal és olka OU 
/ A 9 “A e a 3 f ef me / 
péya & Hv Tov lepod écedOwr, iva pun Ural pros 
, e e \ \ 
TadaiTwpoin, novyatev. ol O€ TO TapauvTixa pev 
A , \ \ rn r 
totépnoay TH Ov@éer, peta S€ TOUTO TOD TE OLKN- 
\ v by) ~ \ X , y 
patos Tov dpopov adethov Kal tas Oupas évdov 
évTa THpyNCavTes avTOV Kal atroXaBovTes Ecw 
U / / U4 
ar@kodouncav, tpocKkabefouevot te &€eTrodop- 
fal dh a 
Knoav ALlu@. Kal péAdOVTOS aUTOU aTro vyeELY 
ef a / / 
darep elyev ev TO olKnpatl, aicOopevor é€a- 
ral ¢ nm» lj v 
youow €k Tov lepov éTL EuTrvoUY dvTa, Kal éEax- 
nr \ \ 
Gels adméOave Tapaxyphua. Kal avTov éuédAnoav 
ail © \ / 
pev és Tov Katdédav, ovmep Tous Kaxoupyous, éc- 

1 2 rod fepov deleted by Hude, after Kriiger. 

1 The temple would have been polluted if he had been 
allowed to die there. 


BOOK I. cxxxmi.—cxxxiv. 4 

received—to be put to death; and they heard 
Pausanias acknowledge these same things, urge the 
man not to be angry with him this time, offer him 
a guarantee that he might leave the temple in 
safety, and finally request him to go on his way 
with all speed and not frustrate the negotiations. 
CXXXIV. When the ephors had heard all the 
details they went back home for the present, but 
inasmuch as they now had certain knowledge, they 
were planning to make the arrest in the city. And 
the story goes that when Pausanias was about to be 
arrested in the street, he saw the face of one of the 
ephors as he was approaching and realised for what 
purpose he was coming, and that another ephor out 
of friendship warned him by giving a covert nod, 
whereupon he set off on a run for the temple of 
Athena of the Brazen House, and reached the refuge 
first, as the sacred precinct was near by. Entering 
then into a building of no great size belonging to 
the temple, that he might not suffer from exposure 
under the open sky, he kept quiet. For the 
moment then the ephors were distanced in their pur- 
suit, but afterwards they took the roof off the build- 
ing and, watching until he was inside and shutting off 
his retreat, walled up the doors; then they invested 
the place and starved him to death. And when he 
was about to expire, imprisoned as he was in the 
building,! they perceived his condition and brought 
him out of the temple still breathing; but when he 
was brought out he died immediately. It was their 
first intention to cast him into the Caeadas,? where 
2 A cleft in the mountains not far from the city, probably 
near the modern Mistra, into which in early times prisoners, 

in later, corpses of criminals, were thrown; cf. Strabo, vim. 
v. 7; Paus. Iv. xviii. 3. 



/ / 
Barre: éreta eof wAnciov mov KaTopvEa. 
e e a ef 
o 6€ Geds o ev Aerois tov te Taphov voTEpov 
rn r * 
€ypnoe tots Aakedatpoviors peteveyKxety ouTrEp 
/ \ fal a a a 
antéOave (kal viv xeitar év TO TpoTEpEeviopatt, O 
an n ra Xx e ov > a xX \ 
ypadhn otirat Snrovot), Kai ws ayos avTois Ov TO 
/ / , > > tag, oe an / 
Tem paypévov v0 cwopata avd’ évos TH Xadk1oiK@ 
n na 4 
atobobval. of dé Tolnaodmevor YadKovs avdptav- 
7 id b \ / > / 
tas dvo ws avti Lavoaviou avébecav. 
> a \ a! al 
CXXXV. Of & ’A@nvaiot, os Kal tod Geod 
, lal , 
diyos Kplvavtos, avtetétatav Tois Aaxedatpoviors 
éNavvely AUTO. 
Tod Sé€ pundtcpod tod Iavoaviov oi Aaxedar- 
/ / / x \ ’ . 
povioe Tpéa Pers Te avtes Tapa ToLs AOnvatous 
EvverrnTi@vTo Kal Tov OeutoToKrEéa, ws NUpLaKOV 
fal / / al al 
éx Tov Llavcaviou éhéyxov, nEtovy Te Tois auUTOIS 
/ > & € \ / ” \ 
KkonatecOar avtov. ot € Terabévtes (ETUYE yap 
@otpaxicpévos Kat éyov Slartav pev ev “Apyet, 
lal \ , 
émiportav bé kal és tHv &ddnv IleXotrovynoor) 
\ la 5) 
méuTovol peta THY AaKedatpoviwr éToimwV OvT@V 
Euvdioxerv avdpas ois eipnto ayev Smov ap 
¢ ‘ fol 
CXXXVI. ‘O d€ QemictokrAHs tpoarcPopevos 
, > / b] / x > fal 
devyet €x LleNorrovvncou és Képxupar, ov avtav 
> / , \ / ag , 
evepyéTyns. Sedsévas b€ hackovtTwv Kepxupatov 

1 of. ch. cxxviii. 1. 

2 evepyerns, benefactor, a title of honour bestowed upon 
him, either because he took the part of the Corcyraeans ina 
dispute with Corinth (Plut. 7’hem. xxiv), or because he had 


BOOK I. cxxxiv. 4-cxxxvl. 1 

they throw malefactors ; but afterwards they decided 
to bury him somewhere near the city. But the god 
at Delphi afterwards warned the Lacedaemonians by 
oracle to transfer him to the place where he died 
(and he now lies in the entrance to the precinct, 
as an inscription on some columus testifies), and that 
they should recompense Athena of the Brazen House 
with two bodies in place of one, since their act 
had brought a curse upon them. So they had two 
bronze statues made and dedicated them to Athena 
to be a substitute for Pausanias. 

CXXXV. Thus it was that the Athenians,! in re- 
sponse to the demand of the Lacedaemonians, 
ordered them to drive out the curse of Taenarus, 
seeing that the god also declared it to be a curse. 

But when Pausanias was thus convicted of treason- 
able dealings with Persia, the Lacedaemonians sent 
envoys to the Athenians and accused Themistocles 
also of complicity in the plot, in accordance with 
discoveries they had made in connection with their 
investigation about Pausanias; and they demanded 
that he be punished in the same way. The Athenians 
agreed, but as he happened to have been ostracised, 
and, though living in Argos, frequently visited other 
parts of the Peloponnesus also, they sent some men, 
accompanied by the Lacedaemonians (who were 
quite ready to join in the pursuit), with instructions 
to arrest him wherever they chanced to find him. 

CXXXVI. But Themistocles, forewarned, fled 
from the Peloponnesus to Corcyra, since he was a 
benefactor? of the Corcyraeans. As they, however, 
alleged that they were afraid to keep him and thus 
excused their absence (Schol.) in the Persian war (Hdt. vir. 
exv). Themistocles relied upon the right of asylum, which 

had doubtless been decreed him as evepyérns. 


éyew avtov wote Aakedarpoviors Kal "A@nvaiois 
atexyGécbat, Siaxouifetar bm attav és Thy 
Hymrespov THY KaTAaVTLKpU. Kab St@xopevos vTrO 
avayKabeTal KATA TL dm opov Tapa "Abpntov TOV 
Mondooc av Bacvréa ova, avUT® Ov pidrov KaTa- 
doar. Kal O per ovK eTUYEV errdmua, 6 0 é THs 
yuvarKkos iKéTnS yevouevos OtddoKeTar tT? auras 
Tov Taida opp AaBov cabélec bar em THD 
éotiav. Kal eXGovTos ov TOND UVoTEpov rod 
“Adprjrov Ondot Te OS éore Kal ovx akLot, el Tt 
apa autos avTelrev avTo ‘AOnvaiov Soper, 
devyovta TiwpetcOa. Kal yap av um exelvou 
TOAXN@ aaGevertépov? ev TO Tapovre KAKOS Ta- 
oXEW, yevvatov oé elvat Tous onotous aro TOD 
icou TYpopeta Oar. Kal apa autos ev éxelva 
Vpelas TWOS Kal OvK és TO coma o@cerdar é évav- 
Te@O var, exelvov é av, et éxdoin auTov (etre 
id’ av «al ep @® OvoKeTat), cwTynpias av Tijs 
puxns amooTephaat. bis on 
CXXXVIL. O 6é dxovoas dvictnat Te avrov 
pLeTa TOU éavTod viéos (@omep Kal éy@v avrov® 
exablelero, kal fey lo Tov HY (KEéTEVLA TOUTO) Kal 
UaTEepovy ov TOAA@® Tots Te Aakedatpoviors Kal 
"A@nvaiots éXGotot Kal wodAAa ElTOovoW ovK 
EKOLO@TLY, AAW dmroaT EXEL Boudouevov ws Bact- 
hea Topevijvat éml TV eT épay Gddaccay meoH 
és Hvdévav tyv ’AdeEdvdpov.j év 7 oAKdbos TUY@V 

1 The reading of nearly all the better MSS.; Hude and 
many other recent editors adopt the correction of Graevianus 

2 Hude deletes, as not read by the Scholiast. 


BOOK I. cxxxvi. 1—-cxxxvil. 2 

incur the enmity of the lLacedaemonians and 
Athenians, he was conveyed by them across to the 
mainland opposite. And being pursued by those 
who had been appointed to the task, according as 
they could learn the course he was taking, he was 
forced in some strait to take lodging with Admetus, 
king of the Molossians, who was not friendly to him. 
Admetus happened not to be at home, but Themis- 
tocles approached his wife as a suppliant and was 
instructed by her to take their child and_ seat 
himself on the hearth. And when Admetus re- 
turned after a short time, Themistocles declared 
who he was and urged that, if he had ever opposed 
any request Admetus had made to the Athenians, 
he ought not to take vengeance on him when a 
fugitive ; for in his present plight he might come to 
harm at the hands of a far weaker man _ than 
Admetus, whereas the noble thing to do was to 
take vengeance on fair terms upon equals. Besides, 
he added, he had opposed Admetus merely in the 
matter of a petition and not of his personal safety ; 
whereas Admetus, if he gave him up to his pursuers 
(telling who these were and what the charge against 
him), would deprive him of the salvation of his life. 
CXXXVII. Admetus, hearing this, raised him up, 
together with his own son, even as he still sat 
holding him, this being the most potent form of 
supplication. And when, not long afterwards, the 
Athenians and Lacedaemonians came and made 
urgent demands for him, Admetus would not give 
him up, but, since he wished to go to the King, gave 
him an escort overland to Pydna on the other? 
sea, the capital of Alexander.?, There he found a 

1 The Aegean, 2 King of Macedonia. 



> / a ey) / \ b] \ , 
avayonevys é€7 Iwvias Kal émiBas Katadépetar 
a b] X42 fa} , / a > 
yemwave és TO AOnvatwyv otpatotedov 6 éroXt- 
/ / \ 3 X ] \ rn ’ rf , 
opxet Nafov. Kal (qv yap ayvas Tots €v TH vn) 
, , A / ov > \ \ xa 
Seicas Ppave. TS vauKAnpw OoTis éotl Kal Sv & 
/ \ > \ , > / yv > a A 
/ \ > \ BUA \ WV. v2 / 
Xpnwact TevoGeis avTOV ayer’ THY d€ acdareLar 

/ a > fol \ lal 
eivar pndéva éexBivar ex THS vews péexXpe Tods 
/ > a 
yévntar weiPonévw & avtT@ Kapiy atopuvncecbau 
¢ \ / a “ 

Kat agiav. o O€ vavKEAnpos Tolel TE TaUTAa Kal 
4 , 7 \ rn 
/ ec > a > v \ e 
méoouv vaTepov adixvettar és “Edecov, Kal o 

a relgug / 

OewictoxAs exeivov te eVepdtevce YpNudTov 
, 5 \ 3 a e/ 4 b a 
doce (HAGE yap avT@® vaTepov Ex te ’AOnvaev 

tal / \ wv € 
Tapa Tav pirwv cai €€ “Apyous & vmeEdxeTo), 
Kal peta Tov KaTw Ilepa@y Tivos Tmropevbels avw 
/ \ / > 
éorméuTrer ypdupata tmpos Baoihéa “AptaképEnv 
tov Zépfou vewoti Bacidevovta. édyrov be 7 
Loo «<Q wile \ yw \ 
val € / i . 
pev wretota EXXAjvev eipyacmarctov vpéTepov 
t \ \ s 2 
olkov, Gaov Ypovoyv Tov cov TaTépa eTrlovTa euol 
Sd > , \ 8 ” sp  ~Ws / 
avaykn nuvvouny, ToAV €TL TAElL@ ayaba, 
> \ b] tal > al A b] / > , \ > 
émevon €v TO acharel pev Eepmol, exeiv@ Sé év 
> / , e. 2 XY Def / 
/ / / cal 
evepyecia odetreTat (ypawas tiv Te éx Ladapivos 
n / na 
TpoayyerAclv THS avaywpnoews Kal THY TOV 
= A al / , ’ 
yehupav, ty v~revd@s mpocetroincato, tote du 


i A LAI 

BOOK I. cxxxvi. 2-4 

merchant vessel putting off for Ionia, and going on 
board was driven by a storm to the station of the 
Athenian fleet which was blockading Naxos. Themis- 
tocles became afraid and told the captain who he 
was (for he was unknown to those on board) and 
why he was in flight, adding that if he did not 
save him he would tell the Athenians that he 
had been bribed to give him passage; their only 
chance for safety, he explained, was that no one 
be allowed to leave the ship until the voyage 
could be resumed, and he promised that if he com- 
plied with his request he would make a fitting 
return for the favour. The captain did as he was 
bidden, and after riding out>the gale for a day and 
a night just outside the Athenian station, duly 
arrived at Ephesus. And Themistocles rewarded 
him handsomely with a gift of money (for he soon 
received from his friends in Athens and from Argos 
the funds which he had deposited for safekeeping) ; 
then proceeding into the interior with one of the 
Persians who dwelt on the coast, he sent on a letter 
to King Artaxerxes son of Xerxes, who had lately 
come to the throne. And the letter ran as follows: 
“1, Themistocles, am come to you, who of all Hel- 
lenes did your house most harm so long as your 
father assailed me and I was constrained to defend 
myself, but still greater good by far when, his 
retreat being in progress, I was in security and he 
in dire peril. And there is a kindness due to me 
(here he related the timely warning to retreat given 
at Salamis, and the failure of the Hellenic fleet to 
destroy the bridges at that time,! which he falsely 

1 For Themistocles’ advice given to Xerxes to retreat before 

it was too late and his claim about the non-destruction of 
the bridges, ¢f. Hdt. vim. cviii-cx. 

VOL, I. I 


> \ > / \ le) v / 
avTov ov diddAvowV), Kai vdv Eywv oe peydra 
\ ca / fal ¢ 
ayada dpacat Taperpt StwKopevos UTO TAY EXX1- 
\ \ \ / / >] 
vov dia THY anv diriav. PBovropuar & éviavTov 
> \ F / \ oe. ef an ” 
CXXXVIII. Baoirevs 5é, ws Aévyetar, eOav- 
/ > an \ / \ > / lal 
pacé Te avTov THY didvolay Kal éxédeveEe TroLety 
A e ie ae lal Ud a > f n 
oUTw. 00 év TO Xpov@ bv erécye THs Te Ilep- 
/ / is > 7 , \ lal 
gidos yAooons Goa édvvato KaTevonoe Kal ToV 
’ / ral , > f \ \ 
eTLTNOEVLATOY THS Kwpas’ adtKopevos b€ peta 
/ > rn 
Tov évlauTOY ylyveTal Tap aUvT@ péyas Kal bcos 
c \ 
ovdeis Tw EXXAjvav oid TE THY TpoUTTapYoUcaY 
n lo) , 
akiwow Kat ToD “EXAnuxod érrida fv vretiber 
b] ~ / / \ ’ \ a lal 
avT® dovrwcev, padiata S€ amo TOD Teipav 
\ € a 
did0us Evvetos haivecOatr. tv yap 0 OemotokdAs, 
BeBavotata 61 hdvcews icydy dnrwoas, Kal dia- 
/ ’ > ‘," lal e / ” 
hepovTws TL €s avTO maddov ETepov akios Pav- 
4 >? / X / \ BA »' > 
pdoat olxeia yap Evvécer Kal ovTEe Tpopalay és 
> \ Oe vw? ] 2 , yA r ra 
avTny ovdev ovT eripabwv, TOv Te Tapaxphya 
’ > / cal / , ‘\ , lal 
bu éXLaytoTns BovArs Kpatiatos YVOU@V) Kai TOV 
f “A a / ‘ 
> HPAI a \ \ a y \ 
b) / yy = % a ” cal 
éEnynoacbat olds te, ay 8 atrerpos ein, Kpivat 

. aA > > / , cae. KR a > 
LEAVWS OUK aTNAAAKTO, nS Labrie = a EtVOV 7) XElLpOv €V 

1 Or, as some take it, ‘‘ character.” cf. Plut. Them. xxviii 
rd ppdyvnua Kal Thy TéApuay avtod, the boldness of his spirit. 


BOOK I. cxxxvit. 4-cxxxvill. 3 

claimed to have been due to his own efforts), and 
now I am here, having it in my power to do you 
great good, being pursued by the Hellenes on 
account of my friendship to you; and my desire is 
to wait a year and then in person explain to you 
that for which J am come.” 

CXXXVIII. The King, it is said, marvelled at 
his purpose! and bade him do as he desired. And 
Themistocles, in the interval of his waiting, made 
himself acquainted, as far as he could, with the 
Persian language and with the customs of the 
country; but when the year was ended he came to 
the King and became more influential with him 
than any of the Hellenes ever had been before, both 
because of the reputation he already enjoyed and 
of the hope which he kept suggesting to him that 
he would make all Hellas subject to him, but 
most of all in consequence of the insight he mani- 
fested, of which he gave repeated proofs. [or 
indeed Themistocles was a man who had most con- 
vincingly demonstrated the strength of his natural 
sagacity, and was in the very highest degree worthy 
of admiration in that respect. For by native in- 
sight, not reinforced by earlier or later study,’ he 
was ‘beyond other men, with the briefest delibera-- 
tion, both a shrewd judge of the immediate present 
and wise in forecasting what would happen in the 
most distant future. Moreover, he had the ability 
to expound to others the enterprises he had in 
hand, and on those which he had not yet essayed 
he could yet without fail pass competent judgment ; 
and he could most clearly foresee the issue for better 

2 i.e. without knowledge acquired either before or after 
the occasion for action had arisen. 



vo ao , 4 \ \ / 
T@ abavel étt Tpoewpa paddiota. Kal TO Edwrrav 
> val / \ / , \ , 
eitretv hucews pev Svvapet, wedéTHs O€ BpayuTnte 
Kpatiatos 61) ovTos avTocyedidfeww ta SéovTa 
a \ , 
Noonoas 6€ TedkevTa Tov Piov: Réyouvar Fé 
4 cal 
Tives Kal éxovctov dapudKkw arobavetvy avTov, 
> / / ie > / nr a 
aovUvaToV voulcavTa eivat émiTEeXNecar Bacirel a 
e / a \ s > n> , 
UmEecXeTo. pyyetov pev OvY avTOU eV a Ear. 
> A “~ A nr nr 
éott Th Aciavh év TH ayopa: TavTns yap Apye 
A , U /, > fal / 
THs xX@pas, Sovtos Bacir€ws avT@ Maryvyoiav 
f / ~ 
ev apTov, ) TMpocépepe TWEVTHNKOVTA TadaVTA TOD 
fal \ 
éviavtov, Aduwaxov 6€ oivoy (éddxer yap ToXv- 
, a , v3 a \ v 
olvoTatov Ta@v ToTe elvat), Mvovvta Sé dor. 
a nm A e 
ta 6€ dcTa hace KopicOivat avTod ot Tpoon- 
, cad 
/ nr fol \ a 
xkpvhda “AOnvaiwy év tH “AtTiKh: ov yap é&nv 
, 5 | t. ’ \ / / \ \ 
Ganrrew! ws eri mpodocia devyovtos. Ta pev 
\ / \ / \ 
kata Ilavoaviav tov Aaxkedatpovov Kat Oepi- 
otoxréa Tov A@nvaiov AaumpoTatous yevopévous 
fal Be Ae \ ¢ / iA bp / 
Tav Kad éavtovs EXAnvwrv ovT@s ETENEUTNCED. 
CXXXIX. Aaxedarpovior 6é él pév THS Tpo- 
, an / 

Ts wpecBelas Tovavta emétatday Te Kai avTe- 
4 a lal an / 
KerevcOnoayv tmepl TOV evayav THS é€AaoEws’ 

lal \? , , 
vatepov 6€ hortavtes Tapa AOnvatous Ilotedatas 

Te atvraviotacbar éxéXevov Kal Ai’'yivay avTovomov 
> / \ / / / ‘72 / 
adtévat, kal wadLoTa ye TavT@V Kal evdnroTaTa 

\ / / a 
mpovreyov TO Tept Meyapéwv Wh pio pa KaberXovat 

Hude deletes, after Cobet. 

236 : 

BOOK I. cxxxviit. 3—-cxxx1x. 1 

or worse that lay in the still dim future. To sum 
up all in a word, by force of native sagacity and 
because of the brief preparation he required, he 
proved himself the ablest of all men instantly to 
hit upon the right expedient. 

He died a natural death, an illness taking him off, 
though some say that he put an end to his own life 
by poison! when he realised it to be impossible to 
fulfil his promises to the King. There is a monu- 
ment to him at Magnesia in Asia, in the market- 
place; for he was governor of this country, the 
King having given him, for bread, Magnesia, which 
brought in a revenue of fifty talents a year, for wine, 
Lampsacus, reputed to be the best wine country of 
all places at that time; and Myus for meat. But 
his bones, his relations say, were fetched home by 
his own command and buried in Attica unknown to 
the Athenians; for it was not lawful to bury him 
there, as he had been banished for treason. Such 
was the end of Pausanias the Lacedaemonian and of 

Themistocles the Athenian, the most distinguished 

of the Hellenes of their time. 

CXXXIX. The Lacedaemonians? then had on 
the occasion of their first embassy directed the 
Athenians, and received a counter demand from them, 
to take such measures about the expulsion of the 
accursed. Later, however, they frequently repaired 
to Athens and bade them withdraw from Potidaea, 
and give Aegina its independence, and above all 
they declared in the plainest terms that they could 
avoid war only by rescinding the decree about the 

1 For the various accounts, see Cie. Brut. xi. 43; Plut. 
Them. xxxi.; Diod. xi. 58; Ar. Yq. 83. 
2 Taking up the narrative from ch, exxvi. 



pn av yiyver Pan TONE HOV, év o elpnro avTous pay 
xphoGar Tots Apert Tots €v mH ‘AOnvaiwv apxin 
pade TH “ATTURA ayopg. | of 8 "A@nvaiot ovte 
TaAXA UITHKOVOY OTE TO Wihdiopa KaBy pour 
émiKaovyTes éemepyactav Meyapebou THS YS THS 
lepas Kab THS aopiarou Kal avépar odo bmroboxny 
TOV adioTapevor. TENS dé ah Ko Weveov TOV 
TeAEUTAL@Y Tpea Bear € ex Aaxkedaipovos, ‘Papdiou 
te Kal MeXnoinmovu Kal 'Aynodvdpou, Kal reyov- 
T@Y AAO pEV OVdEV WY T poTEpov el@Berar,” aura 
be TAOE OTL “Aaxedarpoveor Bovrovrat THY epnuny 
elval, evn) & adv, eb Tous “EXAjvas avTOVOLOUS 
adeite, Tomjocavtes exxrnaiav ot “A@nvaio: yvo- 
pas opiow avtois mpouTifecay, kal edoxes dtraké 
Tepl aTavT@v BovArevoapevous aToxpivacbau, 
Kal Ta pLovTes QNAOL TE Tool Edeyov; en ap 
hotepa yoyvopevor Tas yropats Kal as Xp) 
Tone pel Kal @S pn ep 0OLov elvat TO Whdiopa 
eipnvns, anrra caver, Kab rapeav Tlepexdijs 
) Bavbinrouv, avnp Kat exelvov TOV Ypovoyv Tpa- 
TOS "AOnvaior, éyery Te Kal Tpdooew SvvaTo- 
TATOS, Tapnvelr TOLAOE. 
CXL. “Tis ev yvouns, ® “A@nvaior, alel THs 
avTns EXO MAL tz) ele Tedorovynaioss, KaLTrEp 
elOws Tous avOpwrrous ov TH auth opyn avaredo- 
pévous TE ToNEpely Kal év 7@ Epy@ Tpaocovtas, 
mpos € Tas Evypopas Kal Tas yvomas TpETTOME- 

1 cidbeoay deleted by Hude. 

1 See ch. lxvii. 4, and the references in Ar. Acharn. 520-3 
and 533 f. The date of the decree must have been near the 
outbreak of the war (432). 


a —— 

BOOK I. cxxxix. 1-cxL. 1 

Megarians,! in which they were forbidden to use any 
of the ports in the Athenian empire or even the 
Athenian market. But the Athenians would pay no 
heed to their other demands and declined to rescind 
the decree, charging the Megarians with encroach- 
ment upon the sacred land and the border-land not 
marked by boundaries,? and also with harbouring 
runaway slaves. But at last a final embassy came 
from Lacedaemon, consisting of Ramphias, Mele- 
sippus, and Agesander, who said nothing of the 
demands they had hitherto been wont to make, 

_but only this: “ ‘The Lacedaemonians desire peace, | 

and there will be peace if you give the Hellenes’ 

\ their independence.’’ Whereupon the Athenians 

called an assembly and gave their citizens an oppor- 
tunity to express their opinions ; and it was resolved 
to consider the whole question and then give their 
answer once for all. And many others came forward 
and spoke, in support of both sides of the question, 
some urging that war was necessary, others that the 
decree should not stand in the way—of peace, but 
should be rescinded; and finally /Pericl ee of 
Xanthippus, the foremost man of the Athenians at 
that time, wielding greatest influence both in speech 
and in action, came forward and advised them as 
follows : 

CXL. “I hold, men of Athens, to the same judg- 
ment as always, that we must not yield to the Pelo- 
ponnesians, although I know that men are not as a 
rule moved by the same spirit when they are actually 
engaged in war as when they are being persuaded 
to undertake it, but change their judgments in 

2 The reference is, first, to the tillage of land dedicated to 

the Eleusinian goddesses ; ; second, to land still in dispute 
between Athens and Megara, and therefore unmarked. 


c A \ a c ral / 
vous. op@ 5€ Kal viv ouoia Kal mapatdyjota 
EvuBovrevtéa pot dvta, Kal Tos avatrerOopévous 
Uuav Sixaia Tois Kown SoEacw, hv apa TL «al 
sharroueba, BonGeiv, 7 wndé katopBovvtas Ths 
Evvécews petatroeicOat. evdéxyeTar yap Tas 
Evpdopas Tav TpayuaTwov ovy jaocov apabas 

an / A 
Yophcar » Kal tas diavolas Tod avOpwirou: bu’ 
ee \ \ uA e x \ , fol 
dep Kal THY TUXYNY, Oca av Tapa Aoyov Evy PH, 
elwOapev aitracOat. 
/ , a 

“ Aaxedatpovioe 5€ mpoTtepov te SHroL Hoav 
éruBovrevovTes Huiy Kal VOY OvY HKLOTa. e€ipn- 
pévov yap Sixas pev Tov dtagpopa@v adrdnXoLs 

/ \ / 4 2748 / a vy 

diddvar nal déyerOar, Eyew O€ Exatépous & Exouer, 
déyovtat, Bovrovtas 5é€ TOAEUWM MadXAOV 7 AOYyoLS 
Ta eyxAnuata SsarvecOa, Kal éritdooovtes HON 
Kal ovKéTL aitt@pmevor Tapecow. Lloterdaias Te 

\ > , , \ oy abe, 
yap anaviotacGat Kedevoucr Kal Aiyivay adto- 

vouov adiéevar Kai TO Meyapéwy Widiowa xabai- 
peiv' of S€ tTedXevTaior olde HKovTes Kal Tods 
“EAAnvas mpoayopedovow adtovduous adzévat. 
c lal / / . 
tpav Oé pnoeis vouion Tept Bpaxéos av wodeuelp, 
, \ 
ei TO Meyapéwy Wadiopa pn xabérorper, (Omrep 
uaddiota Tpovyovtar eb KabapeBein wn av yi- 
\ , “7 i he oer 9 ahd wy ee 
yvecOar Tov TodrEpoV, unde év buiv avTols aitiay 
e , e \ a \ > / \ \ 
itonrimnaGe ws Sia pKpov ETOAEUHTATE. TO yap 
la lal a »” \ 

Bpaxv tt TovTO Tacav Upav eye THY BeBaiwouw 

BOOK I, cxt. 1-5 

accordance with events. And now also I see that 
I must give you the same or nearly the same advice 
as in the past, and I demand that those of you who 
are persuaded by what I shall say shall support 
the common decisions, even if we should in any way 
fail, or else, in case of success, claim no share 
in the good judgment shown. For it is just as 
possible for the course of events to move perversely 
as for the plans of men; and it is for that very 
reason that we commonly lay upon fortune the blame 
for whatever turns out contrary to our calculations. 
“As for the Lacedaemonians, it was perfectly 
clear before that they were plotting against us, and 
it is now clearer than ever. For whereas it was 
expressly stipulated that we should submit our 
differences to arbitration, each side meanwhile 
keeping what it had, they have never yet asked for 
arbitration themselves nor do~they~accept— 
when we make the-offer|What they want is to 
redress their grievances by war rather than by 
eee on fandl they are here dictating already and 
no longer expostulating. For they order us to raise 
the siege of Potidaea, restore the independence of 
Aegina, and rescind the Megarian decree ; and these 
men that are just come boldly proclaim that we must 
give all the Hellenes also their independence. But 
“Tetno one of you think that we shall be going to 
war for a trifling matter, if we should refuse to 
rescind the Megarian decree—the thing they espe- 
cially insist upon, saying that there will be no war 
if it is rescinded—and do not let there remain 
in your minds any self-reproach that it was a 
small matter for which you went to war. For 
this trifling thing involves nothing less than the 



a A , e > / \ 
Kal Telpav THS yvopuns, ois eb Evyywpnoere, Kal 
ay a 2X 2 s re / 
Gro te petlov evOds eritaxOncecbe ws hoo 
a / 7 / A 
Kal ToT wraKkovcayTes\, aTicxXupLcauevor Sé 
cadeés av KaTacTHcalTe avTois ato TOV iaov 
al a / / \ 
buiv padrov mpocdépecGar. CXLI. airoler 6 
/ XA e 4 , a xX > 
dtavonOnte 7 UTaKovew Tpivy TL PrAaRHVaL,H e 
y val 3 
ToNEunoouev, WoTTEP Ewouye Apmewvov SoKeEl Eivat, 
Kal él weyddy Kal ért Bpayela opoiws tpodacer 
i él peyddy paxela dpoiws mp 
\ \ [ ° a / 
un el€ovtes unde Edv PoB@ eovtes a KexTijpeVa. 
\ \ 7 / , 
THY yap avTny Stvatat SovAwoW 1 TE peyloTn 
\ lal ¢€ , 
Kal ) édX\ayloTn Sixaiwots aTO THY Opolwy Tpo 
a A / 
diens Tols wéXNas ETLTATT OMEN. 
«TA Se n rd ne FS Salt Ye ; e 
a 6€ TOU TOAE“OU Kal TOV ExaTépols UTTAp- 
/ e > > / / ial > 
YovT@V ws ovK aaOevéctepa EEopev yvaTe Kal 
ry / / 
éxaoTov akovovtTes. avToupyol Te yap eiot LleXo- 
/ \ ” > / | el, b] n / / 
Tovynolo. Kal ote idla ovT ev KoLWme YpHnMaTAa 
, / / 
€oTlv, Teta Ypoviwy Tokeuwy Kal SLaTrovTiMV 
¥ \ \ / > \ b] ’ > / c \ 
are:pot Ova TO BpaxXéws\avtTol én’ adANAOUS VTTO 
/ £ fa) a 
mevias émipépelv. Kal ol ToLovTOL OUTE VadS TAN- 
val » \ 
poov ovte melas oTpatias ToAAdKIS éxTréwrreLy 
is A / 
Sivavtat, ato THV idiwv Te Gua aTOVTES Kal ATO 
TOV avT@V SaTavarvTes Kal TpocéTt Kal Oadacons 
, / 
eipyouevory ai O€ TepLovalat Tovs TrOAEém“ous 
a dR e , , qty , , 
padXov 7 ai Biator Eopopai aveyovoty. Twopmact 
Te €TOLMOTEpoL of avTovpyol TeV avOpwTer 1) 

1 4.¢. by the superior navy of the Athenians, 


BOOK I. cx1. 5—cxut. 5 

vindication and proof of your political conviction. 
If you yield this point to them you will imme- 
diately be ordered to yield another and greater 

one, as having conceded this first point through | 

fear; whereas by a downright refusal you will give 
them clearly to understand that they must be more 
disposed to deal with you on terms of equality. 
CXLI. So make up your minds, heré-andnow, 
either to take their orders before any damage is 
done you, or, if we mean to go to war,—as to me 
at least seems best—do so with the determination 
not to yield on any pretext, great or small, and not 
to hold our possessions in fear. For it means en- 
slavement just the same when either the greatest or 
the least_claim is imposed by equals upon their 
neighbours, not by an appeal to justice but by- 

“ But as regards the war and the resources of 
each side, make up your minds, as you hear the 
particulars frem~me, that our position will be fully 
as powerful ras het For the Peloponnesians till 
A aa eir own hands; they have no 
wealth, either private or public; besides, they have 
had no experience in protracted or transmarine wars, 
because, owing to their peverty, they only wage brief 
campaigns separately against one another. Now 
people so poor cannot be manning ships or frequently 
sending out expeditions by land, since they would 
thus have to be away from their properties and at 
the same time would be drawing upon their own 
resources for their expenses, and, besides, are barred 
from the sea as well.! Again, it is accumulated 
wealth, and not taxés levied under stress, that 
sustains wars. Men, too, who till their own—lands 




/ a \ \ lal 
Kivduvev Kav TrepiyevécOat, TO dé ov BEBatov pH 
ov Tpoavadwcev, a\rNws TE Kav Tapa Sokar, 

, € / al 
Omep €ikOs, 0 TOAEMOS AUTOIS pNKUYNTaL. payn 
\ \ an \ ¢ d \ 
pev yap wid tmpos aravtas “EXdnvas dvvarot 
TleXorovynorot Kat ot EVupayor avticyewv, Tode- 
peiv 5é wy pos omolay avTiTapacKeviy advvaTot, 
¢ / , a , 
Stav pnte BovreuTnpio evil Xpwpevor Tapayphua 

b] / b] a 4 > , v 
TL o€€ws €miTeh@or Tavtes Te Laowndor ovTes 

\ > e / x, 5.43) 8 \ ¢ ‘ 
Kal ovxX ouodvro To ep éavtov Exactos omevon, 
€£ wy direl pndev éreteres yiyverOar. Kai yap 

e \ e / és , / 

of wev WS UaLoTA TLLwpHoacOat TLva BovdovTat, 
\ a a 

of 5é ws HKLcTa Ta OiKela POEipat. ypoviol Te 
a , lal fal 

Evviovtes ev Bpayel wév popiw ckoTIOvGL TL TOY 

Kowwa@v, TO S€ TACO TA OiKELA TPaoOVGl, Kal 

¢ > \ \ e a > , v 

ékacTos ov Tapa THY éavTOD apéderav oleTaL 
/ a 

BrawWew, pérewv O€ Tie Kal GAXdX@ UTep EavToOd 

- a 4 an > a e \ e / >O7 
TL Tpoidely, MATE TH AUTO VTO atdvtwv idia 
Sofdcpatt NavOaverw Td Kotvov aOpoov POetpo- 
a4 / a a 

pevov. CXLIT. péyiotov 5é, TH THY YpnuaTov 

, / ef an > \ , 

oTdvel KWAVTOVTAL, OTaV TYONH avTa TropLComevot 
a) / 
StapéAXwow: ToD SE TONEWOU OL KaLpol Ov pE- 
“Kal pny ovo ) émeteiytors obé TO vauTiKoY 


BOOK I. cx. 5—cxiu. 2 

are_more ready. to_ risk their lives in war than gor 
their _property ; for they have confident hope of 
surviving the perils, but no assurance that they will 
not use up their funds before the war ends, espe- 
cially if, as may well happen, the war is protracted 
beyond expectation. Indeed, although in a single 
battle the Peloponnesians and their allies are strong 
enough to withstand all the Hellenes, yet they are 
not strong enough to maintain a war against a 
military organisation which is so different from 
theirs,-seéing that they | have no single general 
assembly, and therefore cannot “promptly put into 
effect any emergency measure; and as they all 
have an equal vote and are of different races they 
each strive to advance their own interests. In suc 
circumstances it usually happens that nothing is 
accomplished, And indeed it could scarcely be 
otherwise, for what some of them want is the 
greatest possible vengeance upon a particular enemy, 
others the least possible damage to their own pro- 
perty. And when after many delays they do meet, 
they give but a scant portion of their time to the 
consideration of any matter of common concern, but 
the larger portion to their own individual interests. 
And each one thinks no harm will come from his 
own negligence, but that it is the business of some- 
body else to be provident on his behalf; and so, 
through all separately cherishing the same fancy, 
universal ruin comes unperceived upon the whole 
body. CXLII. And what is most important, they 
will be hampered by scarcity of money, seeing that 
providing it slowly they are subject to delays; but 
the opportunities of war wait for no man. 

* Moreover, neither the planting of forts in our 



al ” a A, A \ est \ 
avTav aktov poBnOjvar. THv pev yap KaNeTrov 
\ / ae , ‘ ‘ 
kal €v elpynvyn ToL avTLTAdOY katackevackabat, 
9 \ P / 
7) Tov On €v ToAE“ia TE Kal OVX NoToV ExElVvoLs 
na / ft ? > / 
HOV avTeTiTEeTELYLapMevav: hpovptov & et TroL7- 
a an / 

CovTal, THS pev yns BNaTTOLEY AV TL Epos KaTA- 
al / , 
Spomats Kal avtoporiats, ov mévToL tKavoV ye 

/ ba n 7 
€oTat emiteryifey TE KwWAVELY NUaS TAEVTAVTAS 
a / , Ga > , rn 
€v Th exelywY Kal, NTEp LaxVopEV, Tals vavalv 
/ , \ a la n 
auvverOat. mA€ov yap Suws nueis Evouev TOD 
\ a a a / ? a 
KaTa yhv €K TOU VaUTLKOD EpTreplas 1) ‘KELVOL 
a b] \ 4 n 
€k TOD KAT HrrEelpov és TA vauTLKa. TO b€ THS 
, b] / / \ Pee / b] al 
daracons ériatimovas yevéeo Oat ov padtws avTots 
\ \ ad a 
a an / la) 
evOvds amo Tov Mndixar, é€etpyacbé Tw Tas 87 
7 \ \ > / \ / 
avopes yewpyot kal ot Oardaotol, Kal tpocéte 
an / \ > fal 
ovoe pmereTHoal eacomevoe Sia TO VP Hu@V TrOA- 
Aais vavaly aie Epoppetabar, (aEvov av TL Speer; 
s pyeta Bar, ( Spader; 
\ \ \ a af. 2 WE x 
TMpos pev yap odtyas époppovaas Kav Staxw- 
/ / \ b] , / 
duvevoctav TANOE THv apaliav Opacivvortes, 
a \ > / e 7 hd gh a 
TodAais dé eipyouevor naovxdcovel, Kal (ev TO 
pn pedeT@vTs\ akvveT@tepor Ecovtat Kat dv avTo 
> / < \ \ \ / 
Kal OKxVNpoTepol. TO O€ vauTLKoY TéyVNs éoTiD, 
ef \ Ae \ > BJ / (24 / 
/ a \ a 
éx Tapépyou pedeTacbar, ara padAXov pnNdev 
éxelv@ Tapepyov Adro yiyvec Oat. 

* Cf. Ci, CRMs Be 


BOOK I. cx. 2-9 

territory! need cause us to be afraid, nor yet their 
navy. For as regards the first, it is a difficult matter 
even in time of peace to construct here a city that 
will be a match for ours, to say nothing of doing 
this in a hostile country and at a time when we 
have fortifications quite as strong to oppose them. 
But suppose they do establish a fort ; although they 
might injure a part of our territory by making raids 
and receiving our deserters, yet that will not be 
sufficient to prevent us from sailing to their land and 
building forts there, or making reprisals with our. 
fleet, wherein our strength lies. For we have gained 
more experience of operations on land from our 
career on the sea than they of naval operations 
from their career on land. As for their acquiring 
the art of seamanship, that is an advantage they 
will not easily secure;-. for even you, who began 
practising it immediately after the Persian war, 
have not yet brought it to perfection. How 
then could men do anything worth mention who 
are tillers of the soil and not seamen, especially 
since they will not even be permitted to practise, 
because we shall always be lying in wait for them 
with a large fleet? For if they had to cope with 
only a small fleet lying in wait, they might perhaps 
risk an engagement, in ‘their ignoranté” getting 
courage from their mere numbers; but if their way 
is blocked by a large fleet, they will remain inactive, 
their skill will deteriorate through lack of practice, 
and that in itself‘ will make them more timid. 
Seamanship, like any other skill, is a matter of art, 
and practice in it may not be left to odd times, as 
a by-work; on the contrary, no other pursuit may 
be carried on as a by-work to it. 



CXLIII. “EY te nal xkwyoavtes tov ‘Odvp- 
miacw % Aedhois ypnuatev picO@ pelfove tret- 
pevto Huav uToAaBelv Tors Eévous TOV vauTOD, 
un OVT@V meV HuOV avTiTadwD, ésBavT@V avTOV 
Te Kal TOV peToikwv Sewov av hv: viv Sé TOE TE 
imdpyer Kal, Oep Kpatictov, KUBEepyyntas EXoMeEV 
moXitas Kal Ti adAnv UTnpeciav Tretiovs Kal 
Gpeivous 4 &taca » Addn “EXAds. Kal él TO 
KivOvv@ ovoels av déEarto Tov Eévav THv TE avTOU 
devyew Kal peta THS Hocovos awa éerTridos OALywv 
Huepav Evexa peyddov pucbod Socews €xelvots 

“Kal ta pev LleXotovyncioy Eéuorye ToravTa 
kal wapatAnowa Soxet eivar, Ta Sé HuéTEpa 
TOUT@Y TE MUTE éxetvoLs eueurpauny amnrArAdXOat 
Kal a\XNa OK aro TOD loov peyadra Eye. NV TE 
emi tiv yopav huav meh iwow, Huets emt THY 
éxelvov TrEevcovpEOa, Kal OvKETL ex TOU OpotoU 
€xtat IleXotovvijcouv te pwépos Te TUNOAVaL Kat 
tnv “Attikny atacav' of pev yap ovy é€ovcw 
adrAnv avtiraBelv apayel, hpiv & éots yh TOY 
Kal €v vncols Kal KaT irreLpov" pméeya yap TO THS 
Oaracons Kpatos. oKxéyacbe Oé& ef yap mer 
VnoL@TaL, TivEes AV GANTTOTEPOL Hoav; Kab VvoV 
ypn (OTe éyyvtata TovTov SiavonGévtas THY peV 
yi Kal olkias adeivat, Ths b€ Pardoons Kai 

1 The mercenaries drawn from the states of the Athenian 
confederacy ; no one of those who had taken part with the 
Peloponnesians would be allowed to return to his native city. 


BOOK I. cxum. 1-5 

CXLIII. “ Then again, if they should lay hands 
upon the money at Olympia or Delphi and try to 
entice away the mercenaries among our sailors by the 
inducement of higher pay, that indeed might be a 
dangerous matter if we were not a match for them, 
assuming that both citizens and our resident aliens 
have manned our ships. But as a matter of fact we 
are a match for them, and, what is of the highest 
importance, we have citizens for pilots, and our 
crews in general are more numerous and better than 
those of all the rest of Hellas. And no one of our 
mercenaries,! when it came to facing the risk, would 
elect to be exiled from his own land and, with a 
lesser hope of victory at the same time, fight on 
their side because of the offer of a few days’ high 
“Such, as it seems to me at least, or approxi- 
mately such, is the situation as far as the Pelopon- 
nesians are concerned ; as regards our own, I believe 
we are free from the defects I have remarked upon 
in them, and that we have in other respects advan- 
tages which more than counterbalance theirs. If 
they march against our territory, we shall sail 
against theirs; and the devastation of a part of the 
Peloponnesus will be quite a different thing from 
that of the whole of Attica. For they will be 
unable to get other territory in its place without 
fighting, while we have an abundance of territory 
both in the islands and on the mainland. A great 
thing, in truth, is the control of the sea. Just 
consider: if we were islanders, who would be more 
unassailable? So, even now, we must, as near as may 
be, imagine ourselves such and relinquish our land and 
houses, but keep watch over the sea and the city; 



, \ r BS \ 
morews hurakip éyew, kal IeAotovvynciow vrép 
a lal wy \ e 
avtav opytcbévtas TOAAG TAEOGL pun Orapiayed Oat 
/ , \ & > > 4 \Ye% 3 7 
(kpatnoavtés Te yap avOis(ovK éddeooch payov- 
A gk a x. a / ef 
pcOa Kal iv charopuev, TA TOV Evppaxar, dOev 
loxvouev, TpocaToAAUTAL Ov Yap oVvXadooVGL 
n al ? \ 
pn ikavav nu@v dvT@V er avTovs oTpaTeveLy), 
2 \ ? A A VW) oan 
THv Te dNOdhupoLY py OLKLaV Kal YHS TroLEetcOaL, 
> as n / > \ / \ ” 
aNAa TOV TwuaToV: ov yap Tadde TOvS avdpas, 
3 4 Ay a A \ 5) ” 
GXX ot avodpes TavTAa KT@VTaL. Kal EL @pND 
, Cun > \ Xx ? LU aise / eee 
ra \ vad /, ee 43 
dn@oat Kal detEar LleXoTovynciors OTL TOVTMY YE 
éveka ovx UTaKovcedbe. 

CXLIV. “TIloAra 6é Kali ddXra yw és éAtrida 
fal / A > / ’ / \ ’ 
Tov TepiececOat, Hv EOEANTE ApyNV TE wy ETTI- 
KTacbat Gua ToremotvTes Kal Kivduvous avOat- 

/ a \ 
pérous pi) TpocTiGecOat- uwadrrov yap TepoRynuar 
, an , x an 
TAS OLKELAS NU@V Apaptias 7 TAS THY évavTiov 
» | la , 

Siavolas. GAN éxeiva pév Kal ev AXXAW AOYO Gua 
ral 4 / a \ ‘A ? 
Tois épyous SnAwOrjcetat: viv dé TovUTOLS arro- 

b , / \ “4 
Kpivdpevot atroTréewywpev, Meyapéas pev OTe €aco- 
a 4 fal 3 
pev ayopa Kal ALpéot xpHaOar, iv Kai Aaxedatpo- 
, \ rn , a an 
viow Eevnracias fi) TOLWTL MHTE LOY pyTE TOV 
> \ a 
Hpetépov Evppdywv (ovTE yap éxeivo Kw)ver ev} 
a al ” / \ \ / ee > 
> / » 
vouous adyoomev, €6 Kal auvTovosouvs ExoVTES 
é€oTercupmeba Kal OTav KaKeElvotL Tals éavT@V 
1 éy deleted by Hude, after Dion. H. 
y ’ 

BOOK I. ext. 5-cxuiv. 2 

and we must not give way to resentment against the 
Peloponnesians on account of our losses and risk a 
decisive battle with them, far superior in numbers 
as they are. If we win we shall have to fight them 
again in undiminished number, and if we fail, our 
allies, the source of our strength, are lost to us as 
well; for they will not keep quiet when we are no 
longer able to proceed in arms against them. And 
we must not make lament for the loss of houses and 

land, but for men; for these thingsedo t procure Pe 

us men, but men these. Indeed} I thouant 
that I gfould persuade you, I sould hawe urge 
you to go forth and lay them waste yourselves, and 
thus show the Peloponnesians that you will not, for 
the sake of such things, yield them obedience. 
CXLIV. “ Many other considerations also lead me 
to hope that we shall prove superior, if you will 
consent not to attempt to extend your empire while 
you_are at war and not to burden yourselves need- 
lessly with dangers of your own choosing; for I am 
more afraid of our own.mistakes.than of the enemy’s 
plans. But these matters will be explained to you 
on some later occasion! when we are actually at 
war;-at_the present timetlet us send the envoys 
_.back with this answer: As to the Megarians, that 
we will ‘permit thém to use our markets and 
harbours, if the Lacedaemonians on théir part will 
cease*passing laws for the expulsion of aliens so far 
as concerns us or our allies (for nothing in the treaty 
forbids either our action or theirs); as to the states 
in our. confederacy, that we will’ give them their 
independence if they were independent when we 
made the treaty, and as soon as they on their part 
2 2/. is sik 



5 a / \ / ria ip 
anodact TOE 7) ofa Tots NaKedatpoviors * 
/ tal nF > lal 
/ / 4 / nr 
ws Bovrovta Sixas Te 6Te COéNOpeY SodvVal KATA 
\ / / \ > v > 
tas EuvOnKas, jToréuov Sé ovK apEopev, apyo- 
a \ / 
pévous b€ apvvovpeOa. Ttavta yap Sixata Kat 
an a / 
mTpémovTa dua THE TH ToAE aTroxpivacOat. 
2O7 \ \ ce > / lal x NEce / 
eldévar S€ yp STL avayKn TodEpeEtv (Hv € Exov- 
GLoL MGAXOV Seyopcla, Paco éyKEettopévous TOVS 
/ e la / 
évavtious &£ouev), ék Te TOV peyioTaV KdV 
Ott Kal moder Kal (OLloTN pméeylaTaL Tia TrEpt- 
r / la 
ylyvovTat. ol yovv maTépes u@Vv UTOOTAaYTES 
\ r e , 
Myjdous Kal ovK aro TocM@VvSe Opp@pevol, ANrAG 
\ / , f 
A / I / / Xx / , / 
A tUyn Kal TOAuH petCove 7) Ovvdper Tov Te Bap- 
Bapov arewoavto Kal és Tdbe Tponyayov avTa: 
/ + \ 
@v ov xpn RAeltrecPat, GANA TOUS TE exXOpovs 
/ A \ a 
Tavtl TpoT@ auvvecOar Kal Tots eTeyryvopevols 
r \ Qn 
metpacbat avTa pi) EXMacow Tapadodvat.” 
\ la rc 3 
CXLV. ‘O pev Ilepixris toradta eirev. ot 6€ 
n , ” / a 
"AOnvaiot vopicavtes adpiata odior Tapavety 
a a 
avtov éndicarto & éxédeve, Kai Tots Aaxedarpo- 
/ lel , , 
viols atrexpivavTo TH éxeivou yvopun, Kal Exacta 
e ” \ \ / > \ , 

Te ws éppace kal TO Evutrav, ovdév KEdevdpeEvot 
/ / \ \ \ / e a 3 
Tounoety, dikn dé Kata Tas EvvOnKasS ETOtMOL EivaL 

, \ fal > / a. iN ie \ 
SuarvecOar wept TaVv éyxAnuatov emt ion cal 

1 Deleted by Hude, following Schol. 

BOOK I. cxtrv. 2-cxtv. 

grant the states in their alliance the right to exercise 
independence in a manner that conforms, not to the 
interest of the Lacedaemonians, but to the wishes of 
the individual states; and as to arbitration, that we 
are willing to submit to it in accordance with the 
treaty, and will not begin war, but will defend our- 
selves against those who do. This answer is just 
and at the Same time consistent with the dignity of 
the city. But we must réalisé that war is inevitable, 
and that~the-more--willing’we™ show “ourselves to 
- accept it, the less eager “will our enemies be to 
attack us, and also that it is from the greatest 
dangers that the greatest honours accrue to a state 
\ as well as to an individual. Our fathers, at any rate, 
withstood the Persians, although they had no such 
resources as ours, and abandoned even those which 
they possessed, and by their resolution more than by 
good fortune and with a courage greater than their 
strength beat back the Barbarian and advanced our 
fortunes to their present state. And we must not 
fall short of their example, but must defend our- 
selves against our enemies in every way, and must 
endeavour to hand down our empire undiminished 
to posterity.” — 
CXLV. Such were the words of Pericles: and the 
Athenians, thinking that he was advising“them for 
the best, voted as “he directed, and answered the 
Lacedaemonians according to his bidding, both as 
regards the particulars as he set them forth and on 
the whole question, to the effect that they would do 
nothing upon dictation, but were ready in accord- 
ance with the treaty to have all complaints adjusted 
by arbitration on a fair and equal basis. So the 



éuota. Kal of wey amexepnoay én’ oixov Kal 
ovKéTL UaTEpov emped RevovTo. 

CXLVI. Alrias 8¢ attar cal di:ahopat éyévovto 
> , \ aA , ? s 2A. 
dpdborépois mpd TOU TohEép“ov, apEapevar evOus 
iro Tov év Emiddpve cal Kepxvpa. émrept 
amo Tov év Enidapre epKupa. €TrEpiryvuvTo 

ei a ? 

Sé dues ev avtais kal map’ addidous édpoitov 
> 4 f 3 f be o 8a \ 

\ / 9 \ / a 
Ebyyvois Ta yuyvoueva tv Kal Tpopacis TOU 



BOOK I. cxtv.—cx tv. 

Lacedaemonian envoys went back home and there- 
after came on no further missions. 

CXLVI. These were the grounds of complaint 
and the causes of disagreement on both sides before 
the war, and they began to appear immediately 
after the affair of Epidamnus and Corcyra. Never- 
theless the two parties continued to have intercourse 
with one another during these recriminations and 
visited each other without heralds, though not 
without suspicion ; for the events which were taking 
place constituted an actual annulment of the treaty 
and furnished an occasion for war. 

1 ¢.e. without the formalities which are indispensable after 
war is declared. 


#e8 aries PSII, 
sad teks asiahiaeenhciaie HA * 
civcaieatred 2 cae coo oa im 
pane Deena) om B doishir bobtilasien} a0 Seas 



4 / ’ 
I. "Apyertar 5€ 0 TéXEnos EvOevde HOn ’AOPnvaiwy 
A na / 
kal LleXotrorvnciov Kal Tov ExaTtépois Evppayonr, 
> a ” ’ , ” b] \ ’ > / 
SG (OUT E Ee IOUT ae ie ate ea arrn- 
/ Lal > \ 
Novus KaTacTavtTes Te EvvEey@s ETONEpWOUY, Kal 
/ nr / 
yéypattat éENs ws Exacta éylyveto Kata Oépos 
Kal YElLOva. 
/ 4 / 
Il. Téccapa cal déea pev ETN evéwervav ai 
e / Pi 
TplaxovTovTels omrovoal al éyévovto pet EvPoias 
e an \ 
ddkwow TO O€ TéuTT@ Kal Sexdt@ ere, éml 
y , pea ay , 7 a , 
Xpuaidos év "Apyer TOTE TevTHKOVTA Svoty SéovTa 
” e / \ > / b] / > , 
érn lepwuevns kal Aivnoiov édopou év Yrrapty 
Yj / a / 
kal Ilv@o0dépou ett Téccapas pHvas apyovTos 
"AOnvat x tTHv év Lotedat l l 
nvatols, peta THY év LloTeala paynv pnvi 
e \ Py / e/ if = > /, e a 
Ext Kal Sexadt@, dual npr apyouéve OnBaiwr 
, ~ / fal 
avipes oArly@ mTElous TpLakociwv (aAyovvTo Sé 
4 lal / 
avtav BowwtapyovrTes IlvOayyenos Te 0 Dureidov 
\ / © 3 i >? a \ cal 
kat Aréutropos 0 "Ovntopidov) éofAOov trepl Tpa- 
e/ \ e > / a , 
tov uTrvov Evy OTAoaLs €s LlNataiav THs Botwrtias 

1 Hude’s correction for éxtw nal Gua of the MSS. Lipsius 
suggested €xtm <xal Sexdt@> kal. 

1 The mode of reckoning customary in the time of Thucy- 
dides, and continued long afterwards. In such a scheme 
the summer included the spring and the winter the autumn: 



I. Ar this point in my narrative begins the 
account of the actual warfare between the Athenians 
and the Peloponnesians and their respective allies. 
While it continued they ceased having communi- * 
cation with one another except through heralds, and 
when once they were at war they waged it without 
intermission. The events of the war have been 
recorded in the order of their occurrence, summer 
by summer and winter by winter.1 

Ili For fourteen years the thirty years” truce— 

_-—“which had been concluded after the capture of / 
\. Euboea remained ‘omaaakaiena, “but inthe fifteenth~ 
“year, whéiChirysis™ was~in’ the forty-eighth year 
of her priesthood ? at Argos, and Aenesias was ephor 
at Sparta, and Pythodorus .had still four months to 
,serye_as archon at Athens, in the sixteenth month™ 
' after the battle of Potidaea, at the opening of 4312. 
spring, some Thebansy~a~little more than-three_ 
“hundred in numbér; “under the command of the 
Boeotarchs Pythangelus son of Phyleidas and Diem- 
porus son of Onetoridas, about the first watch 
of the night/,entered under arms into Plataea,| a 

the summer period was equal to about eight months, the 
winter to about four. 

2 The commencement of the war is fixed according to the 
forms of reckoning customary in the three most important 
Hellenic states. 



, , 

2 obcav “A@nvaiov Evypayida. émnydyovtu &é 
kal avéwtay tas Tiras I dataidv avdpes, Nav- 
/ \ e ’ > lal “ O77 
KrELoNs TE Kal of peT avTov, BovrAdpmevor tdtas 
&vexa Suvdpews avdpas Te TOV TOALT@Y TOUS 
/ e , a \ \ / 
odicw vmevavtiovs SuapCetpar Kat THY Todw 
3 OnBulots tpoctoajoa. éempakay O€ tavta bv 

fal \ 
Etvpuyayou tod Aecovtiddov, avdpos OnBatwv 
Suvatwtdtov. tpoiddvtes yap ot OnBaior ote 
at / \ 
écoito 6 ToOAELOS, ERovrAovTO THY IIAaTaLav aiel 
, / be 2 ” > bd 4 \ a 
adic. Suahopov ovaav ETL EV ELpNVN TE KAL TOU 
jTor€uov pnt ghavepod KalecTa@T0s TpoKata- 
lal a »- / rn 
NaBeiv. % cal pdov EXafov écedOovtes, Puraxis 
b] / / x > \ > \ 
4 ov mpoxabectyKvias. Oémevor € és THY ayopav 
val / 
Ta 6rda Tols pev eTayayouéevols OvK é7re\OovTO 
4 279. v 4 v OF ae, \ LPT 
aate evOvs épyou Exec Oar Kai lévat ETL TAS OLKLAS 
nr cal 3 ral , 

Tov éxOpav, yoounv 8 éro.odvTo Knpvypact Te 
/ >’ / \ > / lal 
xpnoacbar emiTndelors Kal és EvwRacw padrov 

\ / \ , b) a \ ’ a € 
kal diriav Thy Tow ayayeiy (Kai aveimev oO 
n ” 4 \ \ / a , 
Khpv€, el tis BovdeTaAl KATA Ta TATpLA THY Tav- 

lal 4 / > 
tov Bowwtav Evppayeiv, tiWecPar Tap avtovs 
~ OTAQ) iCovtes ahiat padiws Tov A 
Ta OTAa), vopiovTes pagdiws TOVT@ TO 
\ , 
TpOT@ TpoTKopycel THY TON. 
III. Of 88 IlAararijs Gs YoOovto Evdov Te dvTas 
\ £ \ > / / 
tous OnBaiovs nat éEamiwaiws Katetknupevny 
, \ / an 
\ , a 
mrelous écednrvOévas (ov yap Ewpav év TH VUKTL) 
, \ Ud 
mpos EvpBacw exwpyncav Kal Tovs oyous deFd- 

BOOK, II. nm. 1=1m. 1 

town of Boeotia which was in alliance with Athens, 
They had been invited over by some Plataeans, 
Naucleides and his partisans, who opened the gates 
for them, intending, with a view to getting power 
into their hands/ to destroy the citizens who were 
“OF the Opposite party and make over the city to the 
_ _Thebans.)~And“they~had*conducted»their-intrigte 
“~throwgh“Eurymachus son of Leontiades, a man of 
great influence at Thebes. For, as Plataea was 
_always at variance with them,; the Thebans, fore- of 
' seeing that the war! was coming, wished to get 
possession of it while there was still peace and 
_before the war had yet been openly declared. “And 
so they found it easier to maké theirvéfitry unob- 
served, because no watch had been set to guard the 
city. And when they had grounded their arms in 
the market-place, instead of following the advice of 
those who had invited them over, namely to set to 
work at once and enter the houses of their enemies, 
they determined rather to try conciliatory proclama- 
tions and to bring the city to an amicable agreement. 
The proclamation made by herald was that, if anyone 
wished to be an ally according to the hereditary 
usages of the whole body of the Boeotians, he 
should take his weapons and join them. For they 
thought that in this way the city would easily be 
induced to their side. 

Ill. And.the Plataeans,) when they became aware 
that the Thebans were inside, and that the city 
had been taken by surprise, took fright, and, 
as it was night and they could not see, thinking 
that a far greater number had come in, they con- 
cluded to make terms, and, accepting the proposals 

1 i.e. the war between Athens and Sparta. 



e / C, ” \ DI] &7 DJ bd / 
pevor navyalov, aXAws TE Kal ErreLdy és ovdEéVAa 
‘ / a7 fa 
ovdev evewTépifov.. TpacaovTes O€ TS Ta’TA 
/ > \ \ “4 v \ 
KaTEvONTaY ov TOANOUS TOUS OnBatous ovTas Kal 
5) , , / e , ‘fs fal * 
évopucav ériGkpevot paciws Kpatncew: TO yap 
mrnoer tav Udatardv ot Bovdopévm fy TeV 
’ , 247 207 5 > , 
A@nvaiwv adictacbat. boxer odv emiyerpntéa 
eivat kal Evvedéyovto SLopvacovtes Tovs KOLVOUS 
/ ory : 3 / c/ \ XV Qn ce ral 
Tolyous Tap GAXjAoUS, 6TwS pw La TOV Oda 
, VA f lal 
davepol Bow LovTes, amagas Te avev THY UTO- 
\ c , 
tuyiov és Tas odovs Kabiotacayr, iva avti Teiyous 
> \ Ss > / e a > / \ 
n, Kal TANNA eEnpTUov n ExacTOV efatveTo TpOS 
\ f , 4 DI \ \ ° . 
Ta Tapovta Evudopov écecOar. ere d€ wS EK 
tov SuvaTav éToipa Av, PudrddEavtes Ete viKTA 
\ \ / f “A A 
Kal avTo TO TEptopOpov exwpovy EK TOV OiKiaY 
/ ef \ \ ral 
ér avtous, 67ws a KaTa Pas Oapcarewtépals 
\ / r 
ovat Tpochépowto Kal ohiow €x Tov ioov y¥I- 
> » ee | \ , v fod 
yv@vTal, GAN ev vuKTl Pohepwrepar ovTEs ogous 
rn / , 4 »,” \ / 
@o. THs obeTépas euTrerplas THS KATA TI TONY. 
, b \ pr ohe, tal > \ 
mpocéBarov te evOus Kat &s yYelpas noav KaTa 
, , 
IV. O01 & os éyvacay éEnratrnpuevot, Evvertpe- 
a \ 
dhovto te ev ohicw avtols Kal Tas mpooBodas 
i TpooTintoey arewbodvTo. Kai dis pe 7 TPIS 
& / ” fal @ t ] a 
aTEKpovcavTo, ETELTA TOAX@ GopvB@ avtTav Te 
rc lal \ A“ lal 
rn > al a \ bl] a 
dpa ato TOV OlKLOY Kpavyh Te Kal odOAVYT 
/ , \ , , \ 
vowweveav ALGous TE Kal KEepa@ BaddovTwv, Kai 
e fal \ lal / 
veTod dpa Oia vuKTOS TOANOD Emuyevopevou, Epo- 


BOOK II. ur. 1-1v. 2 

made to them, raised no disturbance, especially as 
the Thebans did no violence to anyone. But, as it 
happened, while they were negotiating the terms 
‘they pérceived that theFhebans~were™ few in” 
_ number, and thought that by an attack _they might 

sily overpower them/ or if was not the wish of 
“the majority of the Platacans to withdraw from the 
' Athenian alliance! “So it’ was detérmined=to~make~/ 
~the-attempt, and! they began to collect together, 
reaching each other's houses by digging through the 
party-walls that they might not be seen going 
through the streets, and they placed wagons 
without the draught-animals in the streets to serve 
as a barricade, and took other measures as each 
appeared likely to be advantageous in the present 
emergency. And when all was ready as far as they ae 
could make it so, waiting for the time of night just 
before dawn, they sallied from their houses against 
the Thebans, not wishing to attack them by day 
when they might be more courageous and would be 
on equal terms with them, but at night when they 
would be more timid and at a disadvantage, in com- 
parison with their own familiarity with the town. 
And so they fell upon them at once, and speedily 
came to close quarters. 

IV. The Thebans, when they found they had 
been deceived, drew themselves up in close ranks 
and sought to repel the assaults of the enemy 
wherever they fell upon them. And twice or three 
times they repulsed them; then when the Plataeans 
charged upon them with a great uproar, and at the 
same time the women and slaves on the house-tops, 
uttering screams and yells, kept pelting them with 
stones and tiles—a heavy rain too had come on 




/ \ F v \ lol 4 
BrnOnoav Kal tpaTropevor Epevyov da THS TOAEWS, 
/ / n 
amre:por mev OVTES Ol TAELOUS Ev TKOT@ Kal TNO 
a , a \ a \ \ la} 
tov d10dav 7 Xp7 TwWOFvaL (Kal yap TehEUT@VTOS 
nr s / 
\ 8 , la) \ > 7 1 & 5 @ / 
Tous SL@KOVTAaS TOD py Exhevyety, Bote SredOei- 
lal \ Lal 
povto ToAAol.; Tov Oe Idkatai@v tis Tas mvAAaS 
rn vA > , 
7 €ondGov Kal aimep oav povar avewypevat, 
” / > / > \ / , 
éxAnoe TTUPAKI@ akovTiov avtTt Baddvou ypnoa- 
’ \ , Ca 5 Y ” y 
pevos és TOV pmoyAoV, BaTE pNnde TavTH EEOOoY ETL 
, \ f 
eivat. OtwKkdpevor O€ KATA THV TOALY OL pév TLYES 
by rn > ES \ a ? Leh, yy > pe 
GaUT@V ETL TO Telyos avaPavTes Eppiapv és TO éEw 

‘ohas avtovs cai duehOapynoay ot mrelovs, ot Sé 

\ 4 +] / \ 8 4 / 
KaTa TvAas épyuous yuvatkos Sovans méXexuY 
/ \ lal 
Aabovtes® duaxoWwavtes Tov poyrov é&AAOov 
> / »” \ an > / 
ov moro (aicOnois yap tayeia éreyéveTo), 
a / 
\ \ a \¢ / 5 = 
TO O€ TAELoTOV Kal OGOV padtota Av Evvertpap- 
/ = , lal 
pévov €omimTovew és oiknma péeya, 0 Hv TOD 
t« ‘4 > / r 
telyous Kal al® Cupar avemypéevar EtuYov avTod, 
\ / a 
olomevoe TUAAS TAS BUpas TOD olKymaTOS Elvat 
\ ” / > \ SYA e a \ > 
Kal avtixpus dtodov és To Ew. opavtes S€ ad- 
a > 
tous of IlXatatjs atretAnpmévovs éBovrevovTo 
\ oT] ” , »” / f \ 

1 rod uh expevyery Hude deletes, after van Herwerden. 

2 xa) of MSS. after Aaédvres deleted by van Herwerden. 

3 So Hude with CG; af rAnoiov @dpa:s ABEFm,. Didot and 
Haase would transpose thus: tod telxovs mAnalov Kal ai Odpas. 


BOOK II. 1v. 2-7 

during the night—they became panic-stricken and 
turned and fled through the city; and since most 
of them were unfamiliar with the thoroughfares by 
which they must save themselves amid the darkness 
and mud—for these things happened at the end of 
the month!—, whereas their pursuers knew full well 
how to prevent their escape, many of them conse- 
quently perished. One of the Plataeans, moreover, 
had closed the gates by which they had entered— 
the only gates which had been opened—using the 
spike of a javelin instead of a pin to fasten the bar, 
so that there was no longer a way out in that direc- 
tion either. And being pursued up and down the 
city, some of them mounted the wall and threw 
themselves over, most of these perishing; others 
succeeded in getting out by an unguarded gate 
without being observed, cutting through the bar 
with an axe which a woman gave them—but not 
many, for they were soon discovered; and others 
got isolated in various parts of the city and were put 
to death. But the greater number, those who had 
kept more together than the others, rushed into a 
large building abutting upon? the wall whose doors 
happened to be open, thinking that the doors of the 
building were city-gates and that there was a pas- 
save right through to the outside. And the 
Plataeans, seeing that they were cut off, began to 
deliberate whether they should set fire to the 
building and burn them up without more ado or 
what other disposition they should make of them. 

1 When there would be no moon. 

? Or, as most MSS. read, ‘‘a large building . . . whose 
doors near by happened to be open”; with Didot and Haase, 
‘a large building near the wall whose doors . . .” 

VOL. I. K 5 


ovTor Te Kat cot Addo TOV OnBaiwv TEpLhoav 
KaTa THY TOALY TAAV@pEVOL, Evve8noar Tots 
T\ataedor mapacodva opis Te avtous Kal Ta 
oTAa xpycacbar 6 6 TL av Bovhovrar. 

WV Oi pev 67 év 7H Natata oUT ws émem parye- 
cav. of © ddrot OnBaior ods eu 2 ere TAS VUKTOS 
TapayeverFar TAVOTPATiA, El TL apa a) 1 po- 
X.@poin TOLS éevednrvboct, THS ayyendtas awa Ka 
oO0v auTots pyQetons mept TOV yeryernuévov €Tré- 
BonBovv. améxes 5€ 4» UdNataa tov OnBav 
oTadlous EPdounKovta, Kal TO Vdwp TO yevopevov 
TIS YUKTOS étoinge Bpadurepov avTous éNO ety: 
0 yap “Acwtros ToTapos eppun peyas Kal ov 
padies dvaBaros nv. Topevopevot TE €V VETO Kal 
Tov TOTaLOV (BONS OvaBavres | UaTEepov Tape- 
yévovTo, 1/0n TOV avdpav Tav pev diehbGappévor, 
Tov o€ Cwvtwv éyopévav. ws 8 ja8ovto ot On- 
Batot TO yeyernpmévor, érreBovXevov Tois Ew THs 
morews TaV IIdatatav (Hoav yap Kal avOpwrrot 
KaTa TOUS aypov’s Kal KaTacKEUy, ola ampocsbo- 
KNTOU Tob * KAKOD €D elem n ryevouevou)* €Bov- 
AovTo yap opiow, el Twa a Borer, UT apxelv 
avrl TOY Evoor, 7] hv dpa TUXwOL TIVES eCoorypnuevot. 
Kal of ev TavTta duevoodvtor ot 6é Wdatacis ere 
TL éceaOar Kal SetoavTes jTept Tots eEco KnpuKa 
efémenrpav Tapa TOUS OnRaiovs, AéyouTes OTe 
oUTe Ta eT OLN Leva. bola Opacevav év omovoats 
ofav Telpacavtes KataaBeiv THY TONY, Ta TE 
éEw EXeyov avTots pn adixety: ef S€ uy, Kal avTol 
epacav avTay Tos avdpas aToKTEVELV ods EXOUGL 

1 Added by Bredow and Baumeister. 


BOOK IL. 1. 7-v. 5 

But finally these and the other Thebans who sur- 
vived and were wandering up and down the city 
came to an agreement with the Plataeans to 
surrender themselves and their arms, to be dealt 
with in any way the Plataeans wished. 

V. The Thebans in Plataea had fared thus; but 
the main body of the Thebans, who were to have 
come in full force while it was still night, on the 
chance that things might not go well with those 
who had entered the city, received while on the way 
news of what had happened and were now hastening 
to the rescue. Now Plataea is about seventy stadia 
distant from Thebes, and the rain that had come 
on during the night delayed their coming; for 
the river Asopus was running high and was not easy 
to cross. And so, marching in the rain and crossing 
the river with difficulty, they arrived too late, some 

of their men having already been slain and others ~ 

taken captive alive. And when the Thebans learned 
what had happened, they began to plot against the 
Plataeans who were outside the city—there were, of 
course, men in the fields and household property, as 
the trouble had come unexpectedly in time of 
peace—for they desired to have such men as they 
could lay hands on as hostages for those within, in 
case any of them had chanced to be taken captive. 
Such then were their plans; but the Plataeans, 
while the Thebans were still deliberating, suspected 
that something of the sort would be done, and 
fearing for those outside sent out a herald to the 
Thebans, saying that they had done an impious 
thing in trying to seize their city in time of peace, 
and they bade them do no injury outside the walls; 
if they did, they on their part would put to death 




a \ ol lol 
tavtass avaywpnodavtav b€ mad éx TAS yAs 
’ , a »” lal 
aToéwcev avtois Tovs avopas. OnBaior pev 
fal \ / 
TaUTa A€yovoL Kal ETOMOTAaL daciv avTovs: 
a >] e a 
IIXatarjs & ovxX opmoroyodat Tovs avdpas evOvs 
e , > , > \ , A 
tTocyécOat atodwcev, GAAA Oyo TpawTov 
yevouevav nv te EvpPatvwot, Kal eTouocar ov 
’ Ss an na > / a 
dacw. éx & ody Tis ys avexopynoav ot OnBato 
e r 
ovoev adixynoavtess ot S€ IXataufs érevdy Ta ex 
rn , \ 7, 
\ , > 5 
Tous avdpas ev0us. Aoav dé oydonKxovTa Kai 
¢ X e / \ 7 2 On > 
Exatov ol AndOévTes, Kal Evpvpayos avtav jy, 
mpos ov érpakav ot mpod.dovTes. 
VI. Todrto 6€ momncavtes és te Tas *AOnvas 
, \ 
> / tal / / > A / 
am3ésocav tois OnBaiows, ta Te ev TH TOdEL 
\ X , e , n 
xkabloTavTo Tpos Ta TapovTa 7 €doKEL avTots. 
cal / \ \ lal 
trois & 7AOnvaiows HyyéXOn evOvs Ta Tepit TaD 
cal / \ lal 
Il\ataav yeyevnuéva, cat Botwtav te mapa- 
rie , ” 5 B) a? 7 x 
yphpa EvvédhaBov ooo noav ev TH ATTLKH Kal 
> \ , ” , , 
és tHv IlXatatav erepryav KknpuKa, KédevovTes 
” / \ BA \ > \ , 
éyovot OnBaiwv, mplvy av Te Kal avtot Bovdev- 
lal \ > / cr 
cwol Tepl avTa@v: ov yap HyyédOn avTois ote 
s c \ a U 
TeOvnKdTes elev. Apa yap TH €oddm yryvopevy 
a 2 lal / , e 
tov OnBaiwy o mpaTos ayyeros €Enet, o dé dev- 
” / 
TEPOS ApTL veviKNmevav TE Kal Evverdnupevwv, Kal 
tav taotepov ovdev Hdecav. oOUTw bn OUK ELdOTES 
ot "A@nvaior éméstedXov: Oo O€ KHpVE adiKopevos 

BOOK II. v. 5-v1. 3 

the men whom they held captive, but if the Thebans 
withdrew from their territory they would restore 
the men to them. Now this is the account which 
the Thebans give, and they allege that the Plataeans 
confirmed their promise with an oath; the Plataeans 
do not admit that they promised to restore the oe 
at once, but only that they would do so in case 
they should come to an agreement after preliminary 
Negotiations, and they deny that they swore to-it-—~_ | 
At any rate, the Thebans withdrew from their terri- 
tory without doing any injury; but the Plataeans, 
as soon as they had hastily fetched in their property 
from the country, straightway slew the men.) And 
~ those who had been taken captive were one hundred 
and eighty in number, one of them being Eury- 
machus, with whom the traitors had negotiated. 

VI. When they had done this, they sent a mes- 
senger to Athens, gave back the dead under a 
truce to the Thebans, and settled the affairs of the 
city as seemed best to them in the emergency. 
The report of what had been done in Plataea was 
made to the Athenians promptly ; and they instantly 
apprehended all the Thebans who were in Attica 
‘and sent a herald to Plataea, bidding him tell 
them to take no extreme measures regarding the 
Thebans whom they held captive until they them- 
selves should have taken counsel about them; for 
the news had not arrived that the men had been 
put to death. For the first messenger had set out at 
the time the Thebans were entering the city, the 
second immediately after their defeat and capture, 
and the Athenians knew nothing of later events. 
Consequently the Athenians sent their orders 
without knowing the facts; and the herald on his 




2 \ v / \ \ A 
4 nvpe Tovs avepas diehPappévous. Kal peta TadTAa 
lal lal , 
ot “A@nvaiow otparevoavtes és UAdtaiav citov 
Te éonyayov Kal dpovpovs éyxaTédiTTOV, TMV TE 
, \ \ 
avOpwrev tovs aypetotdtous Evy yuvarEt Kai 
b / 
Tatolv e€exouicar. 
VIL. Teyevnuévouv dé tod év Wdararais Epyov 
rn cal a > 
kal Nedupévov AaAUTPas TOV aTrovday at “AOn- 
vaio. TapeckevdlovtTo ws ToNELINTOVTES, TApeE- 
4 \ \ f \ e , 
aoKxevalovto 6€ cal Aaxedatpovior Kai ot Evppayot, 
/ / / \ / 
mpecPelas Te péeAXOVTES TreuTTELY Tapa PacthEa 
\ ” x \ / yy / 
kal adXoce pos Tovs PapPadpous, ei wobEv Tiva 
aperiav nrATIov ExaTepot TpogAnWeaOat, TOdELS 
te Evppayidas wolovpevor Goat joav éxTOS THS 
2 é€avt@y duvapews. Kal Aaxedaipoviors péev pos 
rf > nee 7 > > / \ SS / 
Tals avTov UTapyovaars €& “ITadXtias Kal LiKedas 
TOs TaKelvwY EXomEevoLs Vads EvTEeTaYOncav! Trot- 
elc0at Kata péyeOos TOY TodEwV, ws és TOV 
\ fal 
TavTa aptO mov TevTakociwy vedy écopévor, Kal 
apyvptov pytov éToimatew, Ta TE AXA Hovyd- 
> / / cal 
Covras Kat “A@nvatovs dSexopévous mia vyl Ews 
A A A 5) a \ , 
3 dv tavta wapacKkevachy. ‘AOnvaior dé THY TE 
uTdapyovcav Evupayiav éEntafov Kai és Ta Tepl 
/ a 
IleXotovvncov waddov ywpia érped Bevovto, Kép- 
\ r / \ > n \ 
Kupav kat KedaddrAnviav cat Axapvavas kai 
ZaxvvOov, opavtes, e&& ohiaot ditta tabr ein 

1 énxetaxOn diaxoclas Hude, with Herbst (érerdy6n o’). 

1 cf. ch. Ixxviii. 3. 
2 Referring, in the one case, to the unsuccessful embassy 
of the Lacedaemonians to the King mentioned in ch. lxvii.; 


BOOK II. vi. 3-vu. 3 

arrival found the men slain. After this the Athe- 
nians, marching to Plataea, brought in food and left 
a garrison,! taking away the least efficient of the 
men along with the women_and children. 

VIL. . Now that.the affair at Plataea] had. occurred 
“and the treaty had been glaringly violated, the 
Athenians began preparing for war, and the Lace- 

\ daemonians and their allies also begany both sides 

were making téady to send embassies"to the King 
and to the barbarians of any other land,? where 
either of them hoped to secure aid, and they were 
negotiating alliances with such cities as were outside 
of their own sphere of influence. The Lacedae- 
monians, on their part, gave orders to those in Italy 
and Sicily who had chosen their side* to build, in 
proportion to the size of their cities, other ships, in 
addition to those which were already in Pelopon- 
nesian ports, their hope being that their fleet would 
reach a grand total of five hundred ships, and to 
provide a stated sum of money; but as to other 
matters, they were instructed to remain inactive and 
to refuse their ports to Athenians if they came with 
more than a single ship, until these preparations 
had been completed. The Athenians, on the other 
hand, began to examine their existing list of allies 
and also sent embassies more particularly to the 
countries lying about the Peloponnesus—Corcyra, 
Cephallenia, Acarnania, and Zacynthus—perceiving 
that if they were sure of the friendship of these 

in the other, to the connection of the Athenians with the 
Odry sian court mentioned in chs. xxix. and Ixvii. 

3 Referring to the Dorian colonies in Italy and Sicily (cf. 
mt. Ixxxvi. 3), which, however, contributed no ships till 
412 B.c. (cf. VIII. xxvi. 1). 



, / \ , 
BeBaiws, réprE tHv IleXorovyncov Katatrodeun- 
VIII. "OXiyov te éerevoouv ovdév apdorepor, 
> ’ ¥ > \ , > > , 
apyomevot yap Tavtes O€UTEpov avTiMauPavorTat, 
, \ \ Ld \ \ = b a 
ToTe b€ Kal veoTNS TONKA? pev ovaa ev TH LeXo- 
/ \ 7/3 la >] / > > , 
Tovynaw, TOAN? 8 év Tats “APnvats ovK axovotws 
e \ b] / ef fal / e SYA 
¢ . ¢ / > rn nr s 
EAXas adtraca petéwpos Hv Evviovoay TaY TP@- 
\ \ , 
2 Twy morkewy. Kal TOANA prev AOYyLAa EXEYETO, 
\ , ? y lal 
modAa 6€ YPNTMoNOYyoL WOoV Ev TE Tots péANOUVGL 
r / , 
3 ToAEeunoely Kal ev Tais adrNaLs TrOAECLY. ETL OE 
a ? 
Aros éxwvOn odtyov Tpo TovTwY, TpoTEpoV 
BA eS ? ? = 7 , 
ovmwm acecGeica ad ov “EXAnves péuvnytar. 
» / \ \ 297 > \ a , , 
édéyero S€ Kal edoxer emi Tots péAdoUGL yeEv7)- 
r x / / , 
cecbat onunvar el Té Te AAO TOLOVTOTPOTFOY 
EvvéBn yevécOar, Tavta avelntetto. 
¢ \ ” \ \ b] / rn > , 
4 H 6€ evvora Tapa ToND éerTrole TOV avOparav 
na / 
uadrov és todvs Aaxedatpoviovs, addrAwsS TE Kal 
¢ , r 
mpoetovtwy OTe THY “EddXasa €devOepodow. 
cad / 7 
\ /, \ 7 , > a , 
Kal Noyw Kal Epyw EvveTriNapBave avtots: év 
na , , 
ToUT@® TE KeKw@ADTOaL edoKEL ExdoTw TA Tpay- 
os ica A 
5 pata @ fn TIS avTOS TapéoTat. ovTwSs ev} opyA 
* € , \ ; , c \ a 
elyov of mAéelovs tovs “A@nvatous, of pev Tis 
rn a“ ‘ © al 
apyns aTorvOjvar Bovropevot, of S€ pr) apxOaor 
1 Added by Stephanus. 

BOOK II. vu. 3-vu1. 5 

places they would be able to encircle the Pelo- 
ponnesus and subdue it. 

VIII. There was nothing paltry in the designs of 
either side; but both put their whole strength into 
the war, and not without reason, for men always 
lay hold with more spirit at the beginning, and at 
this time, in addition, the young men, who were 
numerous beth in the Peloponnesus and in Athens, 
were unfamiliar enough with war to welcome it. 
All the rest of Hellas was in anxious suspense as its 
foremost cities came into conflict with each other. — 
And many were the prophecies recited and many 
those which oracle-mongers chanted, both among 
the peoples who were about to go to war and in the 
Hellenic cities at large. Moreover, only a short 
time before this, Delos had been shaken, although it 
had not before been visited by an earthquake within 
the memory of the Hellenes.1 This was said and 
believed to be ominous of coming events, and indeed 
every other incident of the sort which chanced to 
occur was carefully looked into. 

The general good-will, however, inclined decidedly 
to the side of the Lacedaemonians, especially since 
they proclaimed that they were liberating Hellas, 
Every person and every state was strongly purposed 
to assist them in every possible way, whether by 
word or by deed, and each man thought that 
wherever he could not himself be present, there the 
cause had suffered a check. To such an extent were 
the majority of the Hellenes enraged against the 
Athenians, some wishing to be delivered from their 
sway, others fearful of falling under it. 

1 Probably an intentional contradiction of Hdt. v1. xeviii., 

where it is stated that an earthquake occurred shortly before 
the battle of Marathon, but none later, 


IX. Ilapaccevf pév odv cal yvopn tovavty 
@punvto. odes O€ Exdtepor Taode EXovTES Evp- 
payous €s Tov TONEpOV KaBicotavTo. Aaxecatpo- 

, \ Oa , 5 , \ e 
viwy pev ode Evppayor’ Lledorrovy7jctor pev ot 
b) \ > a , \ ? , Sa a 
évtos tc Ouov mavtes TANHY Apyelayv Kal “Axaiov 
(rovTous S€ és audhotépous diria Hv: IledAnvijs de 
lal ‘ lal 
"Ayaav povor EvverroNépovy TO TpaTov, Emerta 
be ef a e/ \ ” be Il / 
é votepov Kal arravtes), Ew de LleNomovyyncov 
n / an nn 
Meyapijs, Borwrot, Aoxpot, Paxis, Aumpaxiotat, 
Aevedé.iot, “Avaxtoplot. TovT@y vauTiKov Tapel- 
/ a , fol 
yovto KootvO.0r, Meyapijs, Luxverior, lerArnvijs, 
"Hreior, “Aprpaxiotat, Aeveadzor, imméas 66 
Botwtoi, Pwxis, Aoxpoi, ai & adda Todeus 
metov mapetyov.' aitn pev Aaxedatpoviwr 
Evpuaxta’ “AOnvaiwy S€ Xtor, AéoBior, Una- 
a / e235 T , ? , 
rains, Meconvior ot ev Navraxtw, Axapvavev 
oi maAelous, Kepxupaicr, ZaxvvOior, cal adrar 

/ € ¢ vad Ss ? »” a 
moXELS al UTroTENEis ovcat év EOvEct ToToIase, 
Kapia % éri Gardoon, Awpiijs Kapol rpocoxot, 
7 , c , Ny bathe aah / a x4 
Iwvia, ‘EXAnorrovtos, Ta Ert Opakns, vicot doar 
b] \ / \ f \ 4 
évtos LleXotovyncov Kxat Kpntns mpos Atop 
avicxovta® wAnv Mydov cal Onpas. Tovtwy 
vauTikov Tapelyovto Xior, AéoBror, Kepevpaior, 
oi & a&ddoe Tefov Kal juata. &v ia mev 

e / \ XP \ \ BPAX P 

e/ x = 
aitn éxaTépwv Kal TapacKevn €s TOV TOAEMOV HV. 

yr \ val 

X. Of € Aaxedarpovior peta Ta é€v Idatatais 

b] \ / \ \ , \ 
evOds TepinyyedXov kata Tv IleXoTrovyncov Kai 

1 Herbst deletes, followed by Hude. 
2 Before rahy C gives maoca: af KuxAdbdes, the other MSS. 
wacat af &AAa Kuxdrddes. Deleted by Dobree. 



BOOK: + 11s -ex/ tx. 2 

IX. Such were the preparations and such the 
feelings with which the Hellenes went into the 
conflict. And the states which each side had as its 

_allies when it entered wen war were as follows, 

resé were the-allies-of acedaemonians: all 
the Peloponnesterre=sewth™Of-cite-Fethnmnti!-Wieh the 
exception of the Argives and Achaeans (these latter 
had friendly relations with both sides, and the 
Pellenians were the only Achaeans who at first took 

_ part in the war with the Lacedaemonians, though 

eventually all of them did), and outside of the Pelo- 
ponnesus the Megarians, Boeotians, Locrians, Pho- 
cians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians. 
Of these, the Corinthians, Megarians, Sicyonians, 
Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leucadians 
furnished ships, while cavalry was contributed by 
the Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians, and infantry 
by the other states. —These-were” the allies“of*the 

—acedaeiontanrs—Phose of the Athenians were: 

the Chians, Lesbiaris}Plataeans, the Messénians of 
Naupactus, most of the Acarnanians, the Cor- 
eyraeans, the Zacynthians, and in addition the cities 
which were tributary in the following countries: 
the seaboard of Caria, the Dorians adjacent to the 
Carians, Ionia, the Hellespont, the districts on the 
coast of Thrace, and the islands which lie between 
the Peloponnesus and Crete toward the east, with 
the exception of Melos and Thera. Of these, the 
Chians, Lesbians, and Coreyraeans furnished ships, 

~~.the rest infantry and money. Such were the allies 

of eath~side~and-the—preparations~they-made for 
the war. 

X. Immediately after the affair at Plataea the 
Lacedaemonians sent word around to the various 




\ yy / \ z 
hv &€m Evppayida otpatiav TrapacKkevater Oar 
” Mv e Pd ~ > \ ? / 
Exdnpov Exelv, ws eoRadovvtes es THY ATTLKHD. 
e lal fe 
Uy \ / A / 
Ypovov Tov eipnuévov Evvncav Ta dvo mépn a7ro 
\ > \ r 
TOAEWS EXaaTHS €s TOV icOuov. Kal é7ELdn TAY 
\ / ? s > / € 
TO otpatevpa Evvereypévov Hv, “Apyidamos o 
ral V4 o Lal QY 
Bacirevs tav Aaxedatmoviov, baoTep ayettTo TAS 
/ , \ \ n 
éEodou TavTns, Evykadéoas Tous TTpAaTHYOUS THV 
al / 
aftoNoywTatous Tapynver ToLade.* 
XI. “”Avdpes IleXomovyyjciot cai Evppayot, 
a \ 
Kal of Tatépes Hu@v ToANAaS oTpaTElas Kal év 
avtn TH Uedorovynow Kal Ew éeroujoarto, Kal 
an lal / ” 
o \ a / 
eloiv: duws S€ THOSE OUT pelfCova TAapacKEnY 
\ , 
éxovtes €EnOopev, adda Kai eT TOAW SvVATO- 
TaTnvy vov épxyopeba, Kai avtot mreEloToL Kal 
/ lal , 
dpioToL oTpaTevovTEs. OlKaLov ovv 7Mas pjTE 
lal / , an a 
TOV TATEpwV KElpous haiverOar pjTe NUoV AUT@Y 
a / b] / e \ ¢ \ lal 
THs So—ns évdeectépous. 7 yap EdXas traca 
nr na c ral nan x , \ P 
THOE TH OPN ETHpTal Kal Tpocéyer THY yvopn?, 
yA ” \ Nw 4D oY a 
evvoray éxovoa Sua TO ’AOnvaiwy ExPos mpakar 
Huas & emivoovmEev., OUKOVY XpN, El TM Kal 
Soxovdmev mwAHGEL émiévas Kal aopaddeta TOAAT 
3 a \ : n \ 
eivat pr) av €AOetv Tovs Evavtiovs Huiv dia payns, 
U , 

an / , 
ywpelv, GAAA Kal TOAEWS ExaTTNS HYyE“oVva Kal 

otpatiwTnv TO KaP avTov alei mpoadéyer Oat és 
1 Sintenis’ correction for rapeitva: road? €detev of the MSS. 


BOOK II. x. 1-x1 3 

states in the Peloponnesus and their confederacy 
outside the Peloponnesus to make ready such troops 
and supplies as it was appropriate they should have 
for a foreign expedition, their intention being to 
invade Attica.» When everything was ready in the 
‘several ‘states; two-thirds of the contingent of each 
state assembled at the appointed time at the 
dsthmus...And when the whole army was assembled, 
Archidamus, the king of the Lacedaemonians, ‘w hie 
“was"to be the leader of “this expedition, called 
together the generals of all the states as well as the 
chief officials and the most notable men, and 
exhorted them as follows: 

XI. “ Peloponnesians and allies, our fathers made 
many campaigns both in the Peloponnesus and 
beyond it, and the elder men also amongst us do 
not lack experience in warfare, yet never before 
have we taken the field with a greater armament 
than this; but though we were never more numerous 
and puissant, it is also a very powerful state we 
now_go against. It is but right, therefore, that we 
neither should show ourselves worse men than our 
fathers nor ‘wanting to_ our own fame. For all 
Fellas is stirred by this e enterprise e of ours, and 
fixes her gaze upon it, and being friendly to us on 
account of their hatred of the Athenians hopes 
that we shall succeed in carrying out our designs. 
Therefore, even if some of us may think that we 
are going against them with superior numbers and 
that in all likelihood the enemy will not risk a 
pitched battle with us, we must not on that account 
be a whit less carefully prepared when we advance, 
but rather must officer and soldier of every state for 

his own part be_always expecting. to encounter 



/ f cA A \ j \ A / 
kivduvoy twa HEew. adnra yapta TOV ToAgLOD, 
artes t \ \ \ Be > A ei.3 
Kat €£ oALyoU TA TOAAA Kal OL OPYNS at ETrt- 

4 / \ 
YelpHnoels yiryvovTaty TodAaKis TE TO EXaTCOV 
fal x ” b] , \ / \ 
\ fa / 
TO KatappovovvTas amapacKevous yevéc@ar. xpn 
dé alel ev Tm) Troneuia TH ev youn Papaaréous 
oTparevew, T@ © epy@ Sed267as Tmaperxevdaar. 
oUTw yap mpos TE TO émévat Tos évayTiols 
B) > / \ a 
ev uyoTaToL av elev, TpOS TE TO emLyerpetcOaL 
aco paréotatot. 
““Hyels 6€ od él advvatov apuvecbat odTH 
/ 3 / > \ lal cal ” 
TOA EepxyouEela, AANA TOls TaCW aploTa TAape- 
id \ / 
/ > \ lot 
paxns lévat avTovs, € fut) Kai VvoOV Bpunvtar &v 
Ka bd 4 > 2 > a fal e a 
© oUT@ TdpecpeEv, GAN Stay év TH YH opaow 
an lal /, x > / / r 
Huds OnovvtTds TE Kal TaKelvwyv POEtpovtTas. Tact 
cal > \ n / a 
yap év Tois Oupact Kal év TO Tapavtixa opav 
Yd > \ / t 
madaxyovtas Te anes opyn mpoomimte, Kal oi 
a > / , a cal > 
Noylouwo éAayitTa yYpwpuevor Ove@ TreEicTta és 
4 / >? / \ \ / 
épyov xabiotavtat. *‘AOnvaious O€ Kal mréov TL 
TOV AAXwD ELKOS TOUTO Opacat, of apyew TE TOV 
” > n + ety / \ A / r 
adXov aktovar Kal éTovtTes THY TMV TEXAS SyodY 
fadXov 7) THY AUT@V Opav. ws odv él TOTa’THY 
TOA oTpaTevovTes Kal weyloTny doEav oicopevos 
lad / \ ¢ lal 4 
Tols TE Tpoyovolts Kal Luly auTols er’ auhotepa 
n / e fal 
éx TOV aToBavovTav, EreaVe STN av TLS HYHTAL, 
\ \ 
KOomov Kal duAaKHY EPL TAVTOS ToLovmEVoL Kal 
A , ’ / , / 
Ta Tapayyedropeva of€ws Sexouevor’ KadddNLOTOD 
1 ofrw deleted by Hude, after Madvig. 



BOOK II. x1. 3-9 

some danger. _For the events of war cannot be 

foreseen, and attacks are generally sudden and 
furious; and oftentimes a smaller force, made 
cautious by fear, overmatches a larger number that 
is caught unprepared because it despises the foe. 
One should, however, when campaigning in—an 
enemys-tountry always be bold in spirit, but in 
action cautious and therefore prepared. For thus 
‘men will be most valorous in attacking their oppo- 
nents and most secure against assault. 

«And we are going against a city which is not 
sO powerless to defend itself as some may think, 

but is perfectly prepared in all respects; we a 
therefore every reason to expect eae to risk a 
battle, if they have not already set out before we 
are yet there, at any rate when they see us in 
their territory laying it waste and destroying their 
property. For with all men, when they suffer an 
unwonted calamity, it is the sight set then and 
there before their eyes which makes them angry, 
and when they are angry they do not pause to think 
but rush into action. And the Athenians are even 
more likely than most men to act in this way, since 
they are more disposed to claim the right to rule 
over others and to attack and ravage their neigh- 
bours’ Jand than to see their own ravaged, Real- 
ising, then, how powerful is the city against which 
you are taking the field, and how great is the fame, 
for better or for worse, ‘which you are about to win 
for your ancestors and for yourselves from the out- 
come, follow wherever your officers lead you, 
regarding good order and vigilance as all-important, 
and sharply giving heed to the word of command ; 
for this is the fairest as well as the safest thing—for 



\ , 
yap Tobe Kal aoghadéotatoyv ToAdovs ovTas évi 
/ / / > 
KoTpLw Xpwpmevous paiverBar. 
a \ / \ 
XII. Tocadta eitwv cat d:arvoas tov EvNXO- 
yov 0 Apxtéapos Mernoitrov Tpa@tov arog TENNEL 
/ if 
és tas “AOnvas tov Araxpitov, avdpa Xraptia- 
va) al C719 a ¢e n 
THY, EL TL dpa padXov éevdotev ot “AOnvator opev- 
2 tes ahas HON ev 06@ dvTas. oi Sé ov Tpocede- 
3 N 5) \ , SY SoseeN \ , > 
Eavto avtov és THY TOY Od éTL TO KoOLVOV* TV 
\ veh / / ral 
yap Ilepixréous yv@un mpoTepov vevixnxvia K1)- 
\ , x / , 
puxa Kal mpecBelav pa SéyerGar Aaxedatpoviwr 
/ \ 
éfeotpatevpévav. amoméutouaw obv avtov Tpu 
lal \ / \ 4 3 
axovoat Kal éxéXevov Ex70s Spav eivat avOnpepor, 
TO TE AOLTOY avaywpncavTas eTl Ta ohHéTEpa 
lal 7 
auToav, nv te Bovr\wvTa, mpecBevecOar. Evp- 
, a ° 
méuTovol te TO Medrnointa@ aywyous, OTws 
\ / e >] > \ >? \ la Cie 
3 pndevl Evyyévntat. o 0 érrerdy mi Tots optots 
éyéveTo Kal éuerre dradvcecGar, Tocovee elT@v 
« / a 
é€rropeveto OTe “Hoe 7 nwépa tots “EXAnor peya- 
lal v 39 a \ ’ / > \ , 
4 \wv Kaxov apEe.” as dé adixeTo €s TO oTPATO- 
\ li e > 4 cA > lal 
medov Kal éyvm o ‘Apytdapos OTe ot “A@nvaior 
ovdév TH EvOwMcovaLy, OUTH 617) apas TO oTpPAT@ 
, \ ral nan 
& mpovywpe: és THY yhv avTov. Bowtot d€ pépos 
yey TO odéTepov Kal TOvs imméas TrapeiyovTo 
/ , a 
IleXorovynaios Evatpatevew, Tots S€ NecTropévors 
, / lal 
és LXdtarav éXOovtes tH yy ednour. 
XII. "Ere 6€ trav LedXorovynciwv EvrAreyopé- 


BOOK II. x1. g—xm1. 1 
a great host to show itself subject to_a single dis- 

cipline.”’ - 

XII. With these words Archidamus dismissed the-— 
assembly. He then first sent Melesippus son of 
Diocritus, a Spartan, to Athens, in the hope that 
the Athenians, when they saw that the Lace- 
daemonians were already on the march, might be 
somewhat more inclined to yield. But they did not 
allow him to enter the city, much less to appear 
before the assembly; for a motion of Pericles had 
already been carried not to admit herald or embassy 
after the Lacedaemonians had once taken the field. 
They accordingly dismissed him without hearing 
him, and ordered him to be beyond their borders a 
that same day; and in future, they added, the Lace- 
daemonians must first withdraw to their own terri- 
tory before sending an embassy, if they had any 
communication to make. They also sent an escort 
along with Melesippus, in order to prevent his 
having communication with anyone. And when he 
arrived at the frontier and was about to leave his 
escort, he uttered these words before he went his 
way, “This day will be the beginning of great evils 
for the Hellenes.”. When he came to the army, 
and Archidamus had learned that the Athenians 
would not as yet make any concession, then at 
length they broke camp and advanced into Athenian 
territory. And the Boeotians not only supplied 
their contingent! and the cavalry to serve with the 
Peloponnesians, but also went to Plataea with their 
remaining troops and proceeded to ravage the 

XIII. While the Peloponnesian forces were still 

1 1.e. two-thirds of their full appointment ; cf ch. x. 2. 



pI \ > \ \ ’ 4 A v \ 
vov te és Tov tcOpmov Kal év 06@ dvtTwv, mplv 
ral > ral e , 
éoBareiv és thy “Attixnv, epixr4s 0 Bavéir- 
\ xX °’ / / > , e 
mov, otpatnyos av “A@nvaiwy déKatos avtcs, ws 
bi \ > \ > , € / ef 
éyva thy éaBorrnyv écopévynyv, UToTOTNGAS, OTL 
> / > lal 7 xX ’ 4 \ 4 
Apyidapmos avTe@ Eévos av éTUyXaveE, uw) TOAAG- 
Kis autos idia BovArouevos yapitecOar Tov 
si) pEevos Xap bs 
> A > ra , x \ , a \ 
aypous avTov Tapaditn Kal un dnwon, } Kal 
Aaxedatpoviwy Kedevodvtwy éml dvaBoryn TH 
Qn r ad \ 
EauTovU yévNnTat TOUTO, WaTTEP Kal TA Ayn éXavVELY 
a 4 , fal 
Tpoelrov eveka Exeivou, mponyopeve Tots ’AOnvat- 
> A > x , ef as "A a) O é ec Eé 
ows €v TH EXKANTLA OTe Apyidapos pv ot E€vos 
an a , 
ein, ov pévTor etl KAKO ye THS TOAEWS YyévoLTO, 
ral > 
TOUS O€ GypOvs TOUS EAUTOD KUL OlKias Hv apa p1) 
, € / (4 \ \ a v 
> , > \ / > \ , ¢ 
adinaw avTta Snmooia eivat, Kal pndepiay oi 
c at , U 
UToWiav KaTa TaDTA yiyverPat. Taprver dé Kal 
nr , 
Tépl TOY TapovTwY aTEP KaL TPOTEPOV, Tapa- 
\ / x. na 
oxevalecOai te é> TOY TONEMOY Kal Ta ex TOV 
fal \ , 
aypav écxopiverOar, és Te payny pn éeme€cévar, 
GXXa THY TOALW égeXOovTas durAacoe, Kal TO 
e / n 

Evpuayov dia yerpos Exew, NEywov THY LoxydY 
avTois amo TovUTwY EivaL TOV XpNuaTwV THs 
\ fal 
mpocodou,! Ta O€ TOAAXA TOV TOELOV yop" Kal 
YPN MAT @Vv Teplovata kpatetcbar. Capceiv te 
1 rav xpnuatwv tis mpocddov deleted by Hude, after van 



BOOK II. xi. 1-3 

collecting at the Isthmus and while they were_on the 
march but had not yet invaded Attiéa, Pericles gon 
of Xanthippus, who was one of the ten Athenian 
generals, when he realised that the invasion would be 
made, conceived a suspicion that perhaps Archi- 
damus, who happened to be a guest-friend of his, 
might pass by his fields and not lay them waste, doing 
this either on his own initiative, in the desire to do 
him a personal favour, or at the bidding of the Lace- 
daemonians with a view to creating a prejudice 
against him, just as it was on his account that they 
had called upon the Athenians to drive out the 

pollution.! So he ee Athenians in. 
their assembly that whiléArchidamus was indeed a 

guest-friend of his, this Setattonshtp“had certainly 

ot been entered upon for the detriment of the 

/state; and that in case the enemy might not lay 



waste his fields and houses like the rest, he now gave 
them up to be public property} and asked that no 
suspieron should-ariseagainst himself on that account. 
And he gave them the same advice as before? about 
the present situation: that they should prepare for 
the war, should bring in their property from the 
fields, and should not go out to meet the enemy in 
battle, but should come into the city and there act 
on the defensive ; that they should equip their fleet, 
in which their strength lay, and keep a firm hand 
upon their allies, explaining that the Athenian power 
depended on revenue of money received from the 
allies, and that, as a general rule, victories in war 
were won by abundance of money as well as by wise 
policy. And he bade them be of good courage, as on 

1 ef. 1. exxvii. 1, 
8 fs 1. .exiiii. 




’ / , a J U / 4 
éxédeve Tpoclovt@y pev EEakoclwy TANAVTWY WS 
? \ \ \ U Daw \ > \ lal / 
él TO TOAU Popov KaT eviavTov amo Tov Evupa- 
fal 7 fol li / 
YoOv TH Tore avev THS aAANS TpoTodov, UTap- 
fol U ” / > 
xovtwv b& év TH axpomroder ETL TOTE apyuptov 
,’ / e / / \ \ lad 
émionmou éEakicytNiwy TadadvT@v (Ta yap THeéi- 
= , / , / 
Ta Tplakociwy aTrodéovTa pupia eyéveto, ad 
® / A ) so 
/ > , 
Xa oikodopnuata Kal és Hotedarav atravnrwbn), 
/ / \ 3 / 
yopis 6€ Ypuciov adonpov KIL apyuplou év Te 
\ , \ iA e 
avaOrypaoww idtow Kal Snmociows Kal doa lepa 
/ \ \ \ Qr 
oKEev!) TEPL TE TAS TOMTAS Kal TOUS ay@vas Kal 
r if 
axtDAa Myodixa xat el Te ToLovTOTpoTroV, ovK 
> , 1s , , ” \ 
édtuacovos!  mevtaKociwy TadavT@v. ETL Ee 
lal Vi lal 
Kal Ta €k TOV GAXwY lepav TpoceTiOEr YpnuaTa 
, , 3 , 
ovx Oddtya, ols ypyoecOat autos, Kal HY TavU 
‘d Xx fol fal r ral 
éfelpywytat TavTwv, Kal avtis THs Oeod ois 
, , 2 
TEPLKELMEVOLS Xpuvalos’ amépawe 6 EXOV TO 
dyaXpa tTeccapaKovta TadavTa otabmov ypv- 
/ XV > 
ciov arébOov Kal TeptaipeTov eivat aTav. xpN- 
\ / na \ 
capevous Te €7l cwTNpia Edy YpHvar wn EMacow 

1 Fv of the MSS., after éddocovos, deleted by Abresch. 

1 About £120,000, or $583,200. The original amount at 
the institution of the Confederacy of Delos was 460 talents 
(1. xcvi. 2). The figure here given is an average amount, 
because the assessment was revised every four years at the 

These figures, and all other equivalents of Greek financial 
statements, are purely conventional, inasmuch as the purchas- 
ing power of money was then very much greater than now. 

2 The ordinary revenue, apart from the tribute, consisted 
of customs duties, tax on sales, poll tax on resident aliens, 


BOOK II. xm. 3-5 

an average six hundred talents! of tribute were 
coming in yearly from the allies to the city, not 
counting the other sources? of revenue, and there 
were at this time still on hand in the Acropolis six 
thousand talents? of coined silver (the maximum 
amount had been nine thousand seven hundred 
talents, from which expenditures had been made for 
the construction of the Propylaea* of the Acropolis 
and other buildings,® as well as for the operations at 
Potidaea). Besides, there was uncoined gold and 
silver in public and private dedications, and all the 
sacred vessels used in the processions and games, and 
the Persian spoils and other treasures of like nature, 
worth not less than five hundred talents.6 And he 
estimated, besides, the large amount of treasure to 
be found in the other temples. All this would 
be available for their use, and, if they should be 
absolutely cut off from all other resources, they 
might use even the gold plates with which the 
statue of the goddess herself was overlaid.? The 
statue, as he pointed out to them, contained forty 
talents’ weight of pure gold, and it was all re- 
movable.? ‘his treasure they might use for self- 
preservation, but they must replace as much as they 

rents of state property, especially the silver mines, court 
fees and fines. 

3 About £1,940,000, or $9,428,400. 

4 Completed about 432 B.c. 

> Such as the Parthenon, the Odeum, and the Telesterion 
at Eleusis (see Plut. Per. xiii.). 

§ About £100,000, or $486,000. 

7 The-chryselepliantine statue of Athena by Phidias in the 

8 According to Plut. Per. xxxi., Phidias, by the advice of 
Pericles, laid on the gold in such a way that it could all be 
removed and weighed. 



na / \ S 

6 avTiKaTacThoaL TAAL. YXpHuace pev odV OUTH 
b] 7 > 7 e /  \ / \ 
éOdpauvev avtovs’ omAiTas d€ TpLaXLALOUS Kal 

/ 3 / lal lal / al 
pupious evar avev TV ev TOs Ppovptots Kal TOY 
ty e / \ , a 
7 wap érarkiv é€axicxiNwv Kal puplov. Tocod- 
x \ cal e , (4 
éoBddovev, ad Te TOV TpecRuTdTwY Kal TOV 
, ccd e cad lal 
\ n / 
te yap Padnpixod telyovs otadion Hoav TeEvTeE 
\ \ 4 a 
Kal TplLdKoVvTAa Tpos TOV KUKAOY TOD aadTEwS Kal 
rn fal \ , ral 
avtoD TOU KUKAOUV TO duAaccopEvoY TpEis Kal 
/ ad \ > lal aA \ > / 
Teccapaxovta (€ots S€ avTov 0 Kal apvdaKTov 
Av, 70 peTaev TOU Te waKpov Kal ToD Padypixod), 
x \ al 
Ta 5 paxpa telyn mpos Tov Lletpava teccapa- 
\ o r 
KovTa oTadiwv, av to &wbev ernpeito, Kal TOU 
rn \ ; , ter ‘ , ‘ 
Ilecparas Evv Movvixig e€nKkovTa yey oTadiop 0 
, > r 
amas twepiBoros, TO o ev hudakh ov tyucu Tov- 
e / \ > / /, \ , 
8 Tov. inméas 6€ atrédhatve Stakociovs Kal XUALOUS 
\ te / e / \ \ tA 
Eby immotofotats, éEaxociovs 6€ Kai yedtous 
rofdTas, Kal Tpinpsis Tas TAWLWoUS TpLAKOCias. 
a e a . , \ 

9 Tadta yap UTApyev “AOnvatows Kal ovK éXAdoow 
= / ” € 2 \ \ a ” 
éxacta TOUTwWY, OTE 7) eo BOA TO TPwTOV Ewedre 

\ / 
Ilerotrovvnciwy écecOar Kal és Tov TOEMOV KAabL- 
otavto. édeye 6¢ Kal adda oldTep eiwher Iepi- 
n ’ > / an / lo , 
Kris és aTodeEw TOD TepiécedBat TO TOAELY. 
XIV. Of &8 "A@nvaiot dxovcavtes aveTreiBovto 
te Kal éoexouilovto ex TaY aypa@v Taidas Kai 
al e > 


BOOK II. x11. 5—x1v. 1 

took. As to their resources in money, then, he thus 
sought to encourage them; and as to heavy-armed 
‘infantry, he told them that there were thirteen 
thousand, not counting the sixteen thousand men 
who garrisoned the forts and manned the city walls. 
For this was the number engaged in garrison duty at 
first, when the enemy were invading Attica, and they 
were composed of the oldest and the youngest! 
citizens and of such metics as were heavily armed. 
For the length of the Phalerian wall was thirty-five 
stadia to the circuit-wall of the city, and the portion 
of the circuit-wall itself which was guarded was forty- 
three stadia (a portion being left unguarded, that be- 
tween the Long Wall and the Phalerian); and the 
Long Walls to the Peiraeus were forty stadia in extent, 
of which only the outside one was guarded; and the 
whole circuit of the Peiraeus including Munichia 
~was-sixty stadia, half of it being under guard. The 
cavalry, Pericles pointed out, numbered twelve 

hundred, including mounted-archers, the..bow-men ~ 

sixteen hundred, and the_triremes’ that were sea- 
worthy three hundred. For these were the forces, 
and not less than these in each branch, which the 
Athenians had on hand when the first invasion of the 
Peloponnesians was impending and they found them- 
selves involved in the war. And Pericles used still 
other arguments, as was his wont, to prove that they 
would be victorious in the war. 

XIV. After the Athenians had heard his words 
they were won to his view, and they began to bring 
in from the fields their children and wives, and also 

' The age limits were eighteen to sixty, those from 
eighteen to twenty (ep{roAm) being called on only for gar- 

rison duty within the bounds of Attica. The age of full 
citizenship was twenty. 




7 nw lal ’ cal cal 
éypavTo, Kal avTav TV olKL@Y KaBatpodyTEs THY 
s \ 
EUkwow: mpd8ata 6€ Kal UTotiya és THY Ko- 
/ \ \ / \ 
Boav Sterréuryavto Kal Tas vycovs Tas ETLKEL- 
pévas. xareTa@s be avtois dua TO atel evmlevar 
Tovs mToNAovUs ev TOs aypots SiatTaoOat 2) ava- 
/ / \ a 
otacis éyiyveto. XV. EvveBeByxer bé€ a0 Tod 
/ / e / cal ] , a 
mdvu apyaiov étépwv paddov ‘A@nvaiots TovTO. 
>] \ \ re. \ ae Se , / € 
éml yap Kéxporros kal Tov tTpeTtav Bacihewv 1 
’ \ > / plies, | \ / ’ a 
Artiky és Oncéa aiet Kata TONES WKELTO TPU- 
4 / \ Ul e 
Taveid TE éxovcas Kal apXovTas, Kal OTOTE LUN 
an , 
wi Selcerav, ov Evvnocav BovrEvoopevot ws TOP 
4 > ’ > \ 4 > / ‘ 
Baocirtéa, AX avTol ExagToL eTONLTEVOY Kat 
> , , <7e5 / , ? 
fal av Saae , ’ > / x 
Tav, w@oTEp Kal EXevotvior meT Evyor7rov 7 pos 
"EpeyOéa. émredy 5& Onoeds éBactirevee, ryevo- 
\ fa fa A 
wevos peta Tod Evvetov Kat duvatos Ta Te adda 
, , \ f lal v 
Suexdopnoe THY Yopav Kal KaTaXVTAS THY ah- 
/ / / \ \ > \ >? 
\ a U 5 a 4 > / 
Thy vov ToAW ovcarv, &v BovrevTrpLov amrodetEas 
cal Li 
Kal Tputavelov, EvveKice TAvTas, Kal vEWomevous 
rat / , \ \ Qn 
Ta avTo@Y Exdotous amep Kal TPO TOV nVvayKacE 
al Ul / fo) aA / » 
wid TOE TA’TH XphoOat, t awavtTwv Hon Evv- 
/ \ / / 
redovvT@V és avTHVY peyaddn yevomévn TrapedoOn 
/ r 
ind Oncéws tois éretta: Kal Evvoixia €& Eexeivou 
>] lal ” \ rn fal Q fal id \ a 
A@nvaio. ért Kal viv TH Oe@ Eoptiv dnuoterh 
rm \ \ cal > Ul e lal = , 
To S€ mpo tod 7) axpoTroNts 7) VOY OvTa TOMS 

1 Others render: ‘since all were now counted as belonging 
to it.” 


BOOK II. xiv. 1-xv. 3 

their household furniture, pulling down even the 
woodwork of the houses themselves; but sheep 
and draught-animals they sent over to Euboea and 
the adjacent islands. And the removal was a hard 
thing for them to accept, because most of them 
had always been used to live in the country. 
XV. And this kind of life had been the character- 
istic of the Athenians, more than of any other Hel- 
lenes, from the very earliest times. For in the time 
of Cecrops and the earliest kings down to Theseus, 
Attica had been divided into separate towns, each 
with its town hall and magistrates, and so long as 
they had nothing to fear they did not come together 
to consult with the king, but separately administered 
their own affairs and took counsel for themselves. 
Sometimes they even made war upon the king, as, 
for example, the Eleusinians with Eumolpus did upon 
Erechtheus. But when Theseus became king and 
proved himself a powerful as well as a prudent ruler, 
he not only re-organized the country in other respects, 

but abolished the councils and magistracies of the. 


minor towns and brought all their inhabitants into dé 

union with what is now the city, establishing a single 
council and town hall, and compelled them, while con- 
tinuing to occupy each his own lands as before, to use 
Athens as the sole capital. This became a great city, 
since all were now paying their taxes to it,land was 
such when Theseus handed it down to his successors. 
And from his time even to this day the Athenians 
have celebrated at the public expense a festival 
called the Synoecia,? in honour of the goddess. 

Before this? what is now the Acropolis was the 

2 “Feast of the Union,” celebrated on the sixteenth of the 
month Hecatombaeon. 

8 i.e. before the Synoecismus, or union of Attica under 



5 Ri NS ee ss IN \ , , 
/ \ \ \ a a 
pévov. texunpiov b& Ta yap lepa ev avTh TH 
Ld a 
axpoToder Kal adrdwv Gedy eat, Kat Ta ew 
\ lal \ , a LU lal (cA 
’ a \ an? , / 
76 te ToD Atos Tod "OXvpriov Kal To TlvOiov Kat 
a a \ a / 2 
ro THs Tis kal 7o Tod ev Aipvats Acovicov, © 
7 a a 
Ta apyaotepa Atovicta TH Swdexdtyn” Toretrar 
> na eo pee 
év pnvi "AvOcotnprav, @oTep Kal ot am “AOn- 
/ v y \ r / 7 \ 
valwov "lwves éte Kal viv vomifovow. tdputar de 
\ bd e \ 7 > n \ a / fol 
kal ddra (epa TavTN apyata. Kal TH KpHVH TH 
vov pev Tov TUpdyVwY oUTwS cKevacavToV ‘Ey- 
/ f \ \ 7 a a 
veakpovv@ Kadoupévyn, TO O€ Tahal Pavepov TOV 
a rc / / vad / 
mnyav ovcav Kaddppon @vopacpevy exetvot TE 
\ U lal lal 
éyyds oon Ta TAeiaTOU dia éxXp@vTO, Kal VOY 
la) / , a 
ru amd Tov apyalov Tpo TE yaplKav Kal és ara 
r a / lal > a an 
Tov lepav vomiterar Te VdaTe xpicOa. Kareirar 
\ / , 
Sé Sua THY Tadatay TavTN KATOiKNCW Kal 7) aKpo- 
r lj ae y / 
Tos wexpe TOdSE ETL UT “AOnvaiwy TOXLs. 
“4 on > 
XVI. T7 8 obv emi word cata THY ywpav 
> / 3 Pe! 3 4 -A@ lal \ bd \ 
aUTOVOML® oiKHTEL® ot nvaiolt, Kal é7reLon 
/ yy \ lal cal o 
EvvexicOnoar, 61a Td eos ev Tos aypois Ouws 
¢ , a >? , lal 
oi mAelous TOV TE apyalwy Kal Tov vaoTEpoV 

1 Added by Cobet. 

2 +7 Swoexaty deleted by Hude, after Torstrick. 

’ ueretxov, in the MSS. before of ’A@nvaio, deleted by 

1 It is taken for granted that these temples were ancient 


BOOK II. xv. 3-xvi. 1 

city, together with the region at the foot of the 
Acropolis toward the south. And the proof of 
this is as follows: On the Acropolis itself are the 
sanctuaries? of the other gods as well as of Athena,? 
and the sanctuaries which are outside the Acro- 
polis are situated more in that quarter of the city, 
namely those of Olympian Zeus, of Pythian Apollo, 
of Earth, and of Dionysus in Limnae, in whose 
honour are celebrated the more ancient Dionysia 
the twelfth of the month Anthesterion, just as the 
Ionian descendants of the Athenians also are wont 
even now to celebrate it. In that quarter are also 
situated still other ancient sanctuaries. And the 
fountain now called Enneacrunus,‘ from the fashion 
given it by the tyrants, but which anciently, when 
the springs were uncovered, was named Callirrhoe, was 
used by people of those days, because it was close by, 
for the most important ceremonials; and even now, 
in accordance with the ancient practice, it is still 
customary to use its waters in the rites preliminary 
to marriages and other sacred ceremonies. And, 
finally, the Acropolis, because the Athenians had 
there in early times a place of habitation, is still to 
this day called by them Polis or city. 

XVI. Because, then, of their long-continued life of 
independence in the country districts, most of the 
Athenians of early times and of their descendants 
down to the time of this war, from force of habit, 
even after their political union with the city, continued 

? A lacuna in the text is generally assumed; Classen would 
supply kal ra rijs "A@nvas after beav ear, and I translate this. 

* The Anthesteria, contrasted with the Lenaea, which was 
also an ancient festival, but of less antiquity. The city 

Dionysia was of comparatively recent origin. 
* Enneacrunus, Nine Conduits; Callirrhoe, Fair Stream. 




/ lal a / , , / 
wx pl Tovdse TOU ToAgu“ov Tavorxnoia’ yevoperdt 
Te Kal olxjcavtes, ov padciws Tas avacTacels 
> wn ” \ v ’ / A 
€motouvTo, AN\AWS TE Kal apTL avetdyPoTes TAS 

\ \ \ / > a \ \ 
KatacKkevas peta Ta Mydixa: éBapvvorto dé Kal 

a / , 
yareras épepov oixias Te KaTadelrovtes Kal 
e \ x \ al a 
iepa & S:a wavtos Hw avtois ex THs Kata TO 
’ an / / , / / 
apXaiov TorTElas TaTpLa, OlatTav TE EdoVTES 
peTaBdrrew Kal ovdev adro 7) TOW THY avTOD 
\ , 

XVII. ’Exresdy) 8 ddixovto és TO datu, ddtyors 

, fa ’ / 
pév TLow UTX oiKnoes Kal Tapa diwv TiVas 
Hi > , , e \ \ , ee 

rn / ” \ \ n 
Tis TOEwWS WKnoav Kal TA lepa Kal Ta Hpoa 

/ \ iol > / \ a? / 
TavTa TAY THS akpoTrOAEws Kal TOV EXevorviou 

UA , \ 
xa ef te ado BeBalws KAnoTOV Hv TO TE 
7 \ \ 
Tlevapyixov? kadovpevov TO bo THY axpoTrONu,, 
A Yes , , = \ > A , \ 
6 kal érdpatov Te Hv wy olKely Kat Te Kal Hude- 

be 6 , > , Ul ‘ 
Kod pavtelov aKpoTedevTioy ToLovde Srexwdue, 

Néyou as “To TleAapyxdv apyov apyewov, ones 
ind THs Tapayphya avayens eEpxyOn. Kat pot 
Soxel TO pavtetoy Tovvavtiov EvpLhvar } mpoce- 
SéxovTo, ob yap Sia THY Tapdvomov évoiKnaty ai 
Evpdhopal yevécOar TH TOrEt, GAM Sua TOV TOe- 

1 ravoixnole placed by Hude, following Lipsius, after 

‘2 With C and a popular decree found in 1880 (C.I.A, iv. 
27b); the other MSS. MeAaoyixdv. 


BOOK II. xvi. r1—xvur. 2 

to reside, with their households, in the country where 
they had been born; and so they did not find it casy 
to move away, especially since they had only recently 
finished restoring their establishments after the 
Persian war. They were dejected and aggrieved at 
having to leave their homes and the temples which 
had always been theirs,—relics, inherited from their 
fathers, of their original form of government—and at 
the prospect of changing their mode of life, and 
facing what was nothing less for each of them than 
forsaking his own town. 

XVII. And when they came to the capital, only a 
few of them were provided with dwellings or places 
of refuge with friends or relatives, and most of them 
took up their abode in the vacant places of the city 
and the sanctuaries and the shrines of heroes, all 
except the Acropolis and the Eleusinium and any 
other precinct that could be securely closed. And 
the Pelargicum,! as it was called, at the foot of the 
Acropolis, although it was under a curse that forbade , 
its use for residence, and this was also prohibited by - 
a verse-end of a Pythian oracle to the following 
effect : 

“The Pelargicum unoccupied is better,” 

nevertheless under s'ress of the emergency was com- 
pletely filled with buildings. And the oraclé;asvit 
© seems to-meycanre™ true; \but in a‘ sense quite the 
op of-what-was~expected ;_ forf it was no 
Account of the unlawful occupation of the place that 
\the city was visited by the calamities, but it was on 
1 A fortification built by the ‘Pélasvians”~on~the-west 
side of the Acropolis, the only side accessible to an enemy. 

It was to the space below and above this fortification that 
the curse attached. 




id ’ 4 lol >, / A > > / \ 
pov 9) avaykn THS oiKHnTEwS, dv OVK OVvomafov TO 
A ’ “ \ 
pavrelov mponde: un eT ayab@ TOTE AUTO KaTOL- 

, GC 
KkicOnoouevov. KatecKevacavtTo 5é Kal év Tots 
lal lal , 
> / > \ ’ , / > > \ e 
édvvato* ov yap éywpnoe EvvedOovtas avtTous 1) 
, > ? ef \ / \ , 
mods, GAN Uotepov 67) Tad TE paxpa TELYN 
Oknoav Katavedwevot kai tod Ileparas ta 
/ e \ \ lal \ \ / 
Tord. dpa O€ Kab TOY Tpos TOY TOdEpoV 
ee / > / \ a 
Amtovto, Evppadyous Te wyelpovtes Kal TH LeXo- 
\ n , / 
Tovync@ ExaTov vewy éeTiTAOvY EEapTVOVTES Kal 
€ \ > / lal i 
OL peev Ev TOUTM TApacKEUTs ioav. 
bs ca 
XVIIL. ‘O 6€ otpatos taév HeXotrovynciov 
w\ > / nr ray, a >? 8, lal 
Tpoiwv apixeto THS "AtTiKhs és Oivony rpator, 
mn ral 
niep e€“edrov eoBadrelv. Kat ws éexalélorTo, 
mTpoa Boras twapeckeudlovTo TO TELYEL TOLNTO- 
a Ny jo / ig Xx a oe 
pevot pnyavais Te Kal ANXW TpOT@: 7H yap Oivon 
93 / lal roe a 
ovca ev peOopios THs “Attixns Kat Borwrtias 
> , \ 3 an / e€ > ~ 
éreTetyloTo Kal avT@® gpovpio ot “A@nvaiar 
al e U / > 
mpoaBoras nutpeTifovto Kal adrws evoreTpiav 
\ > 7 \ , 
Ypovov mept avTyv. aitiay S€ ovK €dNayloTHY 
b , 4 - ’ > > an 6 4 > A 
Apyidapos éhaSev am’ avtovd, doxOv Kai év TH 
a “ / r 
Evvaywy Tov ToA€“ou pmadakos Eivat Kat Tols 
/ / a 
"AOnvalows émityndel0s, ov Tapawav mpobvpws 
val , / , : , iA 
ToNeuety* €mreton Te EvvedeyeTO O OTPATOS, 4 TE 

a > A \ / 
év TO loOud erripovn yevonévn Kal Kata THY 

2 of. 1. Ixxx.-Iexxy, 




BOOK II. xvu. 2-xvint. 3 

account of the war that there was the necessity of its 
occupation, and the oracle, although it did not men- 
tion the war, yet foresaw that the place would never 
be occupied for any good. ) Many also established 

\themselvesi in the towers-of the city walls, and where- 

ever each one could find a place; for the city did 
not have room for them when they were all there 
together. But afterwards they distributed into lots 
and occupied the space between the Long Walls and 

the greater part of the Peiraeus. (And while all 

to the war, bringing together allies and fitting out 
an expedition of one hundred ships against the 
Peloponnesus. The Athenians then, were in this 
stage of their preparations, )“~"" 

| this was gone on, the Atheniansapplied themselves 

camp there, they prepared to assault the wall with 
engines wind otherwise ; for Oenoe, which was on the 
border between Attica and Boeotia, was a walled 
town, and was used as a fortress by the Athenians 
whenever war broke out. So the Lacedaemonians 
went on with their preparations to assault the place, 
and in this and other ways wasted time. And it was for 
his conduct here that Archidamus was most severely 
censured, though it was thought that in the levying 
of the war, too, he had been slack and had played 
into the hands of the Athenians when he did not 
advise the Peloponnesians to make war with vigour.} 
Again, when the army was being collected, he was 
criticized for the delay which occurred at the 
Isthmus, and afterwards for the leisurely way in 


"XX VIE Meanwhile the army of the Peloponnesians . 
was neing and the first point it reached in Attica 
wa Oenoe, here they intended to begin the \ 

invasion. Amd while they were establishing their 


/ é / 
aAXnv Topelav % ayoraroTns SiéBarev avTov, 
¢ n ee 
partata 6€ 1) é€v TH Olvon ériaxeois. ot yap 
? a , al / 
A@nvaiot écexoptfovto €v TO Xpov@ TOUT@, Kal 
, ’ \ , 
édoxouv of IleXotrovynotos émerXOovtes av Sta Ta- 
/ 4 ” a > x \ \ 
yous Tavta étt Ew KatadaPetv, & wn dia THY 
, / ' g x ’ ar ic 
éxeivou pédAnow. év TOLAUTN MEV Opn O OTPATOS 
\ "A 1 b] a 6é8 t e &é 
tov Apxidapov év TH Kabédpa eiyev. 0 Cé, Tpoa- 
/ \ , a an 
Seyouevos, ws EyEeTaL, TOUS "A@nvatous THs ys 
, ” , a zi 
al \ lal an 
Tepudety avTnY TunOetoav, avelyev. 
XIX. ’Esrecdn) pévtoe twpocParovtes 7H Oivon 
lal / a 
Kal Tacav déay TetpdcavTes oUK EdvVAaVTO EXEl>P, 
— b] al 2O\ bd , / ‘\ 
of te “AOnvaios ovdév emrexnpuKEevovto, oUTw@ On 
jpunoavtes at avtHs peta ta év Idataia! 
Oppncavtes am avTis peta Thataig’ 
yevomweva nuépa oySonxooTH pdartoTa, Oépous Kat 
a / \ 
Tov citov akpatovtos, écéBarov és THY AtTiKHY: 
e an J / id 
nyetto S€ “Apyidapmos o Zev&tddpov, Aaxedar- 
if, / / a 
poviov Bacirevs. Kat kabeCopwevor ETE“vov Tpa- 
\ 31) a \ \ / ‘4 \ 
tov pev "EXevotva Kal TO Opidowov Tediov kai 
val , ¢ / 
tpoTy tiva Tav “A@nvaiwv imméwy rept Tous 

‘Peitovs KaXovpévous érroljocavto: éTEelTa Tpov- 
/ ] n ” ‘\ A? / v \ 
x@povv ev dekid Eyovtes To Alyadewv dpos dia 
al >? , 
Kpwmtds &ws adixovto és “Ayapvds, ywptov pé- 
nr er a 7 , 
yiotov THS AtTiKAs TOV Ojpwwv KaXovMEVwY, Kat 
’ / / / 
xabefopevor és adTov oTpaToTeEdoy TE eTOLNTAVTO 

, , f 
na / \ > / 
XX. Tveépun 5€ tordse Néyetat Tov “Apyidapov 

l rav écedOdvtwv OnSalwy, in the MSS. after MAaralg, 
deleted by Classen. 


BOOK Il. xvut. 3-xx. 1 

whiel+ the march was made, but most of all for the 

¢ halt at Oenoe> For in the interval the Athenians 

“continued to bring their property into the city and 
the Peloponnesians believed that but for his pro- 
crastination they could have advanced quickly and 
found everything still outside. Such was the re- 
sentment felt by the army toward Archidamus while 
they were sitting still. But the reason, it is said, 
why he kept holding back was that he expected the 
Athenians would make some concession while their 
territory was still unravaged and would be loath to 
see it laid waste. 

XIX. When, however, after assaulting Oenoe _ 
and trying in every way to take it they were not able ~ 
to do so, the Athenians meanwhile making no over- 
tures, then at length they set off from there, about 
eighty days after the events at Plataea, when it was . 
midsummer! and the corn was ripe, and invadéd *\\ 
Attica, under the command of Archidamus son of | 
Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. Making 

“avhalt-they~proceededto~™ravage,.first..of“all, the 
territory of Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, and 
they routed the Athenian cavalry néar thé Streams 
called Rheiti; then they advanced, keeping” Mount 
Aegaleos on their right through Cropia,? until they 
came to Acharnae, the largest of the demes of Attica, 
as they are called! Halting in the town they made 
a camp, where they remained for a long time ravaging 


the country. 
ee. AG it is said that the motive of Archidamus 

1 The reference is to the Attic summer, which included 
spring. The date was about the end of May, the average 
time for cutting grain in Attica. 

2 A deme between Aegaleos and Parnes, 


VOL. I. L 


, \ ’ A e > / f 
Tept te Tas Ayapvas ws és paynv tafdpevov 
petvat Kai és TO TedLov exelvyn TH ea BOAH OU KaTa- 
a \ 4 > / »” > / / 
Bivat tovs yap “A@nvaious HAmivev, axwalovrdas | 
, an / , 
TE VEOTNTL TOAAH Kal TaperKevacpéevous és TOE- 
/ a 
{ov WS oUTw TpoTEpoV, laws av émreFeAOciy Kal 
THY yhv ovK adv wepudety tunOfRvar. érrerdy ovv 
bd a 2 >] a \ \ / / > 
avT®@ és “EXevciva cal TO Opidovov rediov ovK 
tal an x 
aTHVTNTAV, Teipay éTroletTo Tept Tas “Ayapvas 
Ka@nuevos eb émeElacw Gua pev yap avT@ o 
Yapos émiTHOELOS EhaiveTo évaTpaToTEdedaal, dpa 
a / 5) fol , 
dé kal of “Ayapviis péya pépos dvtes THS TONES 
A \ e tal > / > | , 
(Tptayidtol yap omrAiTat €yévovTo) ov Treptovrec Oat 
990 / \ / / > p oe. / 
édoxouv Ta odétepa dtadVapévta, aAX opuncev 
Kal Tovs TdavTas és paynv. el Te Kal pn ére€- 
A fal e ’ al 
éEXOorev exeivn TH é€cBorAH ot “AOnvaio, abe- 
/ 7 a 
éotepov 70n és TO YaoTEpov TO TE TEdiov TEpeEty 
\ \ / / \ \ 
Kal €> avTnY THY TOAW KXwpHcEcOaL> TOUS yap 
a / e 4 
"Ayapvéas éotepnpévous TOY odeTépwv OvY opmoiws 
a nr / 
mpoOvmous éEcec0ar UTrép THS TOV ANAwWY KLVdU- 
, a 
vevew, atdow © eévécecOat TH yvopn. ToLravTyn 
\ , a / \ \ > \ > 
ev OLavola o Apxicapos mept Tas Axapvas VY. 
XXI. A Onvaior dé EXPL bev ov epi "EXevotva 
Kal TO Opraciov Tedlov oO oTparos ip Kab TiVva 
érTrida elyou és TO éyyutépw avTovs mr) Tpoiévat, 
peuvnuéevor Kal IlXevotodvaxta tov Lavoaviou 
/ / . na 
Aaxedatpoviov Bactiéa, 6Te EoBarwov tis 7Atti- 
Kns és “EXevatva cal Opi@fe otpat@ WeXozrov- 
\ a lal / 
vnoiwy Tpo TovdSe Tod TrOAgwouv Técoapar Kal déxa 
, , \ 
ETeoly aveywpnoe Tadiv és TO TA€OV OUKETL 


BOOK UH. (xx) y-—xx1.. 1 

in waiting about Acharnae with his troops ready for 
battle, instead of descending into the plain during 
this invasion, was as follows: He cherished the 
hope that the Athenians, who were at their very best 
as regards the multitude of their youth and prepared 
for war as never before, would perhaps come out 
against him and not look on and see their land 
ravaged. So when they did not come to meet him 
at Eleusis and in the Thriasian plain, he settled 
down in the neighbourhood of Acharnae, to make a 
test whether they would come out; for not only did 
that seem to him a suitable place for his camp, but 
also the Acharnians were an important part of the 
state, their hoplites numbering three thousand, and 
he thought that they would not look on and see their 
fields ravaged, but would urge the whole people 
also to fight. And even if the Athenians should not 
come out against him during this invasion, he would 
thenceforward proceed with less apprehension to 
ravage the plain and even advance to the very walls 
of the city; for the Acharnians, once stripped of 
their own possessions, would not be as eager to incur 
danger as before in behalf of the lands of the rest, 
and so a division would arise in the counsels of the 
Athenians. It was with this design that Archidamus 
stayed at Acharnae. 

XXI. Now so long as the Peloponnesian army 
remained in the neighbourhood of Eleusis and the 
Thriasian plain, the Athenians retained hope that they 
would not advance nearer; for they remembered that 
Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedae- 
monians, when fourteen years before this war he had 
invaded Attica with an army of Peloponnesians and 
proceeded as far as Eleusis and Thria, had advanced 




’ \ \ \ a / 
mpoeOav (60 6 67 Kal 7 huyn avT@ éeyéveto éx 
a \ 
Vrdprns SoEavte ypypace wercOjvar THY avayo- 
b] dt be \ oe. \ i \ ® 
pnaww)* erredy O€ wept Axapvas eldov Tov oTpaTov 
, lod , / 
éEjxovta oTadlous Tis Toews ATEXOVTA, OVKETL 
\ lal > 3 > A e fal 
n nial Ul 
TEeuvouevns ev TO Euavel, 0 oVTM EopaKEecay ot 
, 7o) e , \ \ 
ye vewtepot, ovd ot mpeaRuTepor TAY Ta Mn- 
/ \ > , \ ’ , 4 v 
Sued, Servov edaiveto kai édoKet Tots Te aAXoLS 
ol , , \ 
Kal wadicTa TH veoTnte émeEvéevar Kal pn TrEpt- 
cal \ / fo 
opav. KaTa Evotdacers TE yryvomevot Ev TOArXH 
> , e 
Eptde toay, ol puev KeNEVOVTES erreELévat, ol O€ TLVES 
cr / Ss \ 
OUK E@VTES. XpNTMorOyOL TE HOov YpHnopovs 
TavtTolous, @Y axpoacBat ws ExacTos wpunto. 
an \ / ral 
of te Ayxapvis oldpevor Tapa odio avtois ovK« 
tal > / lal e 
ehayiotny potpay eivar “A@nvatwr, ws avtov 7 
r fal \ / 
YF ETEMVETO, evhyyov Thy é€odov padsora. Tavtt 
TE TpOT® aumpedigTo.. %) WONLS Kal TOV Hepuecrca 
év opyn €ixov, Kal ov Trarpyvere ™poTEpov cue 
pvnvto oveEev, AAW éexadxilov OTL oTpaTHYyOS Gv ovK 
“i / / 
éreEayol, altuov Te odtow évouilov TavtTwv wv 
r an \ e a 
XXII. Ilepixr7js 8€ copay pev adtovs mpos 
, \ x 
TO Tapov YareTTAivovTas Kal ov Ta apltoTa po- 
lal 4 ‘ ’ r rn 
voovtas, Tiatevav S€ OpOGs yryvecKe TeEpi TOD 
/ / a 
pn eretvévat, ExKANolay TE OVK ETTOLEL AUTA@V OSE 
/ > / lal \ ’ a rat x , 
EvAXoyor ovdéva, TOD wn OPyH TL “aAXOV 7H YV@p"N 
/ > a / / > / 
EvveNOovtas eEapaptety, THvy Te TodkW epvracce 
1 With CEG; &pyntro ABM. 

BOGE“L1! v31.30-xxit.. i 

no farther but had gone back again. (And indeed this 
was the cause of his banishment from Sparta, since 
lie was thought to have been bribed to retreat.) But 
when they saw the army in the neighbourhood of 
Acharnae, only sixty stadia from the city, they thought 
the situation no longer tolerable; on the contrary, it 
naturally appeared to them a terrible thing when their 
land was being ravaged before their eyes, a sight 
which the younger men had never seen, or even the 
older men except in the Persian war ; and the general 
opinion, especially on the part of the younger men, 
was that they ought to go forth and puta stop to it. 
They gathered in knots and engaged in hot disputes, 
some urging that they should go out, others opposing 
this course. Oracle-mongers were chanting oracles 
of every import, according as each man was disposed 
to hear them. And the Acharnians, thinking that 
no insignificant portion of the Athenian people lived 
at Acharnae, insisted most of all upon going out, as 
it was their land that was being devastated. Thus 
in every way the city was in astate of irritation; and 
they were indignant against Pericles, and remember- 
ing none of his earlier warnings they abused him 
because, though their general, he would not lead 
them out, and considered him responsible for all 
their sufferings. 

XXII. Pericles, however, seeing them exasperated 
at the present moment and that their intentions 
were not for the best, and convinced that his 
judgment was right about refusing to go out, would 
‘not convoke a meeting of the assembly or any 
gathering whatever, for fear that if they got to- 
gether there would be an outbreak of passion 
without judgment that would end in some serious 




\ r e , / e/ > , s 
Kal Oe hovxias padtcTa Ocov édvvaTO ElxXeD. 
e / f Pe lal \ ‘ 
imméas péevtoe e&érreutrev altel TOU ju) TPOdpomous 

a cal / 
ato Ths oTpaTiads éotimtovtas és Tovs aypous 
an / la 
ToUs eyyUs THS TOAEwS KaKOUpyely: Kal imTO- 
, / a Lg lal 
paxyla tis éyéveTo Bpayeta ev Ppvytots THY TE 
’ / / CON a e f \ r 
A@nvaiwy térer évl TOV imTéwY Kai Deccanrois 
an \ \ a / 
pet avTav mpos Tovs Bowwtav imméas, ev mp 
cal , 
ovx édaccov écxov ot “AOnvaior Kai Oeccarot 
7 Lal n la) 
péxpt ov tpoc8onOncavrev tots Bowwtots Tav 
e lal \ , lal r 
lal , , 
Qcocarav cat “AOnvaiwy ov trodXol, aveiiovTo 
\ XN 
pwévtoL avTovs avO@nuepov aomovdovs. Kal ol 
IleXcrrovvxjovot TpoTaiov TH votepata éotynoav. 
% 66 Bonfera attn Tav Oeccara@v Kata TO 
\ \ 3 7 a 9 , \ 
Tmaralov Evppaxixov éyéveto Tots "A@nvators, Kat 
b] , >] > \ A lal / 1 
adixovto map avtous Aapicatot, Papoddzo., 
4 / / 6 
Kpavveviot, Ilvpacio, Luptevior, Pepaior. 
rn \ nA > \ / 
fryovvto 6€ avTav ex pev Aapions Tlodvpndns 
, \ fel 
kal “Aptorovous, 470 THS TTATEWS EKATEPOS, EK 
, — a 
S& Papoddrov Mévav joav 6é€ Kai Tov addov 
/ Ui 
XXIII. Of 6é Tledorovvicior, érerdy ovdK 
an a“ cs cal 
éreEnoay avtots ot ‘A@nvaior és waynv, apavtes 
’ rn ’ - 25 / an / A y 
éx Tav Axapvav édjouv Tay Ornpwv Tas addovsS 
nr \ II / Q \ B a ” 
tov petaed Ildpvnfos xai Bpitdknocod spovs. 
v \ > lal ’ fol fal ep al > , 
dvtwv b€ avTav év TH yH ot A@nvaioe aréctevnav 
\ nm \ / 
Tas éxatov vais mept Ledotovvncov aotep 
\ / e > rn 
mapeckevalovTo Kat xXtdLoUS om iTas ér avTaY 

1 Tlapdéoio, in MSS. after Gaprddso, deleted by Heringa. 

BOOK II. xxn. 1—xxi. 2 

mistake; moreover he guarded the city, and as far 
as he could kept it free from disturbances. He 
did, however, constantly send out detachments of 
cavalry to prevent flying parties from the main army 
from raiding the fields near the city and ravaging 
them; and there was a cavalry skirmish at Phrygia 
between a company of Athenian horsemen, assisted 
by some Thessalians, and the Boeotian cavalry, in 
which the Athenians and Thessalians fully held their 
own, until their heavy infantry came to the support 
of the Boeotians, when they were routed. <A few of 
the Thessalians and the Athenians were killed, but 
their bodies were recovered the same day without a 
truce; and on the next day the Peloponnesians set up 
atrophy. This auxiliary force of the Thessalians was 
sent to the Athenians in accordance with an ancient 
alliance,! and those who came were Larisaeans, 
Pharsalians, Crannonians, Pyrasians, Gyrtonians, and 
Pheraeans. And their leaders were, from Larissa, 
Polymedes and Aristonous, each representing his own 
faction, and from Pharsalus Menon; and the others 
had their own commander city by city. 

XXIII. The Peloponesians, on the other hand, 
when the Athenians did not come out to do battle 
with them broke up their camp at Acharnae and 
ravaged some of the demes which lie between Mt. 

Parnes and Mt. Brilessus.?. But while they _ ere). 

still in their territory the Athenians sent out on 
an e hich round the Peloponnesus the hundred 
ships * ‘which™they “had been equipping, and on 

: ‘f I. cil. 4. 

2 More generally known as Pentelicus, so called from the 
deme Pentele on its southern slope, 

3 of. ch. xvii. 4. 



\ ’ / > / \ 

kal to£otas Tetpaxocious: éatpatyye: dé Kap- 
, C(— / \ / © % f 

Kivos Te © Bevotivov Kat IIpwréas o Emxdeous 

/ / | / e 

cal SwKxpdatns 6 Avtuyévous. Kal of pev apavtes 
fal A / / e \ 

Th TapacKkevn TAVTN TEpLeTTAEOV, OL dé Ieno- 

/ / A A ei 

Tovyyiclot Xpovov eupetvavtes ev TH ATTLKH OooV 

elyov Ta émiTySera avexopnoar dia Bowwrav, ovx 

4 > / , es \ \ ~ 

Amep écéBadov: tmapioytes 6€ Opwrrov thy yhv 
\ - a! / A / ’ , 

thy Tpaixny Kxadoupévny, iv vémovtat OQpwrvot 

’ , e / > / > / \ ? 

AOnvaiwv tryjKoo, édjywcav. adixopuevor € €s 

/ \ 

Ilerorévvncov duedvOnoav Kata TONES ExacTOL. 
XXIV. ’Avaywpyncavtwy d€ ai’tav ot ’A@n- 
rn \ A 4 

vaio. durakds KaTETTIHTAYTO KATA Yi Kal KATA 

od \ 5) \ a 

Oddaccav, @otep 5 Euedrov Sia TavTos TOU 

\ , lal 
modéuov dura Kal xia TddavTa ato TOV 

b] a > / / BA > a b / 

év Th axpoToNee XpnuaTov edokev avtois eEaipeta 

/ \ / \ \ b] al > ) 

Tomoapéevols yopls GécOat Kat wn avandodv, arr 

b) \ las yA Las x / 5 x » 

ano Tav adAXwv Toremetv: nv O€ Tis Ely 7 ETL- 

, a \ s lal > wv 
wndbicn Kiwelv TA KpHw“aTa TavTa es aXXo TL, 
/ a a 

Ay ph of Todeuon vyitTy oTpaT@ émiméwot TH 
, \ / > md , , 3 , 

more Kat dén aptvacbat, Oavatov Enuav érre- 

’ a / 
Oevro. Tpinpes Te pet avtTav eEarpétous €7r0L7- 
\ \ \ 

cavTo KaTa& Tov éviauTov ExaTov Tas BedTioTAS 

/ b) ce e \ n a 

Kal Tpinpapxous avtais, ov wn xXpHoOar wndewd 

\ cr , 7 rn 


4 > / 


1 Named after the ancient town of [pata (Hom. B 498). 

BOOK II. xxur. 2—xx1v. 2 

them a thousand hoplites and four hundred archers; 
and the generals in command were Carcinus son of 
Xenotimus, Proteas son of Epicles, and Socrates son 
of Antigenes. So they set sail with this force and 
began their cruise ; the Peloponnesians, on the other 
hand, remained in Attica for as long a time as they 
were provisioned and then withdrew through Boeotia, 
taking a different route from that by which they had 
entered Attica. They passed by Oropus and laid 
waste the district called Graice,! which the Oropians 
occupy as subjects of the Athenians.?, Then on their 
return to the Peloponnesus they were dismissed to 
their several cities. 

XXIV. After the retreat of the Lacedaemonians, 
the Athenians set guards to keep watch both by land 
and sea, their purpose being to maintain a like guard 
‘throughout the war. They decided also to set apart 
one thousand talents? of the money stored on the 
Acropolis as a special reserve fund, and not to 
spend it, but to use the rest to carry on the war; 
and if anyone should make or put to vote a _pro- 
posal to touch this money except in the one case 
that the enemy should attack the city with a fleet 
and they should have to defend it, death was to be 
the penalty. And along with this sum of money 
they set apart for special service each year one 
hundred of the very best triremes, appointing 
trierarchs to command them, and no one of these 
ships was to be used in any other way than in connec- 
tion with this particular fund in dealing with the 
same danger should the emergency arise. 

2 This was written before 412/11, when Oropus was cap- 
tured by the Boeotians. 

3 About £200,000, or $972,000. This was part of the 
6,100 talents stored on the Acropolis (ch. xiii. 3). 



XXV. Of & év tais éxatov vavot Twept TeXo- 
movunaov “AOnvaior nal Kepxupaio: pet avTov 
TEVTHKOVTA vavot m poo BeBonOnxores Kal adXot 
TIWes TOV exet Evpuaxov aNXXa TE EXAKOUVY Tet 
mAéovTes Kal és MeGavnv tijs Aakovnis aTro- 
Bavtes TO TELX EL TpoaeBanror, ¢ OvTt da Bevet Kal 
dv poorer ouK €vovTwv. eTUXE 6€ Tept TOUS 
Y@pous TOUVTOUS Bpactoas o TérXL60s, aviip 
LTaptiaTns, ppoupar ¢ exor, kal aia Gopevos €Bo1- 
Sadpapav € TO TOY "AOnvaioy otpatonedor, 
éoxedac Levov Kara THY X@pav kal Tpos TO TELXOS 
TET Pappevov, EoTLTTEL ES THY Meany Kal oX- 
yous Twas év TH éo dpouy amoneoas TOV pe? 
avutTov THY Te TOLD TrEpLeTroinae Kal amo TOUTOU 
émnvédn év Lrdpry. ot Oe “AOnvaior apayres 
TapeTeov, Kal oxovTes THIS "Hyelas és Derav 
édnouv THY viv él dvo Tmepas Kal ™poa BonO- 
cavTas TOV éK THS KOLANS “HAc6os Tplakog ious 
Aoyacas Kal Tov avTodev ex THS TEPLOLKLOOS 
"Hreiwv paxn expdTna av. avewou &é KATLOVTOS 
peyarou Xetpalopevor év adipevep xo pio, OL pev 
Tool éwéBnoav emt Tas vaus Kab Te pte N€ov 
TOV 1yOov KadoUmEVOY TH axpav és TOV €v TH 
Peva Aupeva., ot 6€ Meoonnot €v TOUT® Kal adou 
TLVES, OL ov uvdpevor éerreBivar, KaTa Yyhv xepn- 
cavtes Tv Peray aipodow. Kai UoTEpov ai TE 
VIVES TepiT Evo aTaL avahapBavovew avrovs Kal 
eEavayourar exetTovTes Derav, cai Tov ’HreElwv 
%) TOA On oTpaTLa TpoceBEeBonOynKke, Tapa- 


BOOK II. xxv. 1-5 

XXV. Meanwhile the Athenians who had been 
despatched in the hundred ships around the Pelopon- 
nesus, together with the Corcyraeans, who had rein- 

gs ema, 

Methone in Laconia and assaulted its walls, which / 
were weakeand without adequate defenders. But / 
Brasidas, son’of Tellis, a Spartan, happened to be in 
that’ neighbourhood with a guarding party, and 
seeing the situation he set out with one hundred hop- 
lites to relieve the garrison. Dashing through the 
army of the Atlenians, which was scattered over the 
country and was oecupied solely with the fortress, he 
threw his force into Methone, losing a 
in_the rush, and thussaved the city. “This daring. 
exploit, the first of the fener ene 4 war, was acknow- * 
ledged at Sparta by a vote of thanks, “The Athenians 
then weighed-anchorand-eontinued.their cruise along Y 
the coast, and putting in‘at-Pheia in Elis ravaged the ~ 
land for two days, defeating in battle-a-réscue-party 

of three hundred picked men gathered from the low- 
lands of Elis and from the immediate neighbourhood 
of Pheia. But a heavy gale of wind arose, and since 
they were exposed to the storm in a harbourless 
region, most of them embarked on their ships and 
sailed round the promontory called Ichthys into the 
harbour at Pheia. Meanwhile the Messenians and 
some others, who could not get on board, marched 
overland and took Pheia. Afterwards, when the 
fleet had rounded the promontory, it took up thesé 
men, abandoned Pheia, and put out to sea, for mean- 
while the main body of the Eleans had come to the 
rescue. The Athenians now resumed their voyage 



. /, \ e SAY a A 
mrevoavtes 5€ of “AOnvaio. él adda yYopia 
édSnouv. | 
73 ¢ N \ \ lal 
XXVI. ‘Tro 6€ tov avtov ypédvov todTov 
’ lal 4 fal b] , \ \ 
A@nvatot tpidxovta vavs éfemenwav tepl tiv 
Aoxpioa cat} EvPotas ipa durXakny: éotpatiyyer 
\ > a / € ra \ > 
d€ avt@v Kvreoroutos o KrXewiov. Kat azo- 
Baces Tomodmevos THs TE TaPAPaXacciou EcTLY 
a 26 / \ / a e / y 
& €dnwoe Kat Opovioy eirev, ounpovs te EXaPev 
> lal \ > ’ , ‘\ / nr 
avTa@v, Kal é€v “AXown Tovs BonOyncavtas Aoxpav 
ayn éxpatnaev. 
/ \ \ >? A a 
XXVIII. ’Avéotyncav &€ cai Aiywytas TO atta 
Oépe. tovT@ €& Alyivns “A@nvator, abtovs Te Kal 
Pp , yevn y) S 
a a > / 

Taidas Kal yuvatcas, émikadéoavTes ovY HKLoTA 
a / , BP 3 \ \ A» 
TOU ToNé“ov odio aitious eivary Kal THY Aiy- 

> , ; > , a / 
vav acdharéotepov édaiveto tH LleXotrovyjnce@ 
/ a / Us 
\ > / ef > al > Sa \ \ 
kal €&érreurpay totepov ov TOA Es avTIY Tovs 
cr O\ a >] 
oikyntopas.  éxTecovat O€ Tots Alywntats ot 
/ / a a 
Aaxedaipovor Edocav Oupéav oikety Kal THY yh 
l / VIB 4 , , \ 
véwetOat, Kata te TO AOnvaiwrv dtddopov Kal 
ral / \ \ 
é6Tt od@y evepyéTar Hoav UT TOV cEetopov Kal 
lal ¢. / \ b] / € \ an 
tov Eikotov thy émavactacw. 1 d€ Ovpedtis 
a / na > , \ an 
yn peOopia tHs Apyetas cat Aakwvixns éotu, 
él OdXaccav Ka0ryKovoca. Kal ol pev avTav 
evtad0a w@knoav, oi b€ é€oTapnoavy Kata THY 
a@ddqv “EdAdSa. 
- an ? > “ , , \ 
XXVIII. Tod & avtovd Gépovs vousnvia cata 
id \ / tal > , 
ceArvnv, @oTEp Kal movoyv SoKel elvar yiyvecOat 

1 kar’ read by Hude, after Madvig. 

BOOK II. xxv. 5-xxvin. 
along the coast, and visiting other place te 

XXVI. About this same time the Athenians sent 
out thirty ships to operate around Locris and at the 
same time to serve as a guard for Euboea, These 
were under the command of Cleopompus son of 
Clinias, who made descents upon various places along 
the seaboard and ravaged them, captured Thronium, 
some of whose inhabitants he took as _ hostages, 
and at Alope defeated in battle the Locrians who 
came to the defence of the town, 

Xxvik 1 In the course of this summer the Athen- 

—jans_ also expelled the Aeginetans from Aegina} to- 
gether with their wives and childr ren, making it their 
main charge against them that they were responsible 
for the war in which they were involved; besides 
Aegina lay close to the Peloponnesus, and it was 
clearly a safer policy to send colonists of their own 
to occupy it. And indeed-they_soon afterwards sent 
_thitherthe settlers.-As for the Aeginetan refugees, © 
the Lacedaemonians gave them Thyrea’ ‘to dwell in 
“and its territory~to cultivate, moved™to do this not 
only by the hostility of the Aeginetans towards the ® 
Athenians but also because the Aeginetans had done * 
them a service at the time of the earthquake and 
the revolt of the Helots.1 Nowthe district of Thyrea ~ 
is the border country between Argolis and Laconia, 
extending down to the sea. There some of the 
Aeginetans settled, while some were scattered over 
the rest of Hellas. 

XXVIII. During the same summer at the beginning 
of a lunar month? (the only time, it seems, when 

lof. 1. ci. 2, NI 
~ * August 3rd, 431 B.c. 



Suvatov, 0 Atos €€éNuTTE peTa preaonuBpiav Kai 
Tar aveTANPwOON, yevomevos pynvoedns Kal ao- 
Tépwv Tivav expavevTov. 

XXIX. Kal év 76 atte Oéper Nupdodwpov tov 
Ilvdew, avdpa “ABSdnpitny, ob ceive tiv aderXdyy 
LutadrKns, duvdpevoyv Tap av7@ péya ot ’“AOnvaior 
TpoTEpov Tonréemtov vowiCovtes mpokevoy ezroin- 

\ / rs 4 

gavtTo Kal petevréurpavto, Bovomevor LuTadrKHv 

/ \ / lal / 4 
adict tov Tipew, Opaxav Baoiréa, Evppayov 

/ € \ / f = e “ / 
yevesbatr. o 6€ Trpns ovtos 0 Tod XuTAddxKov 

\ A Nes \ 7 , 
Tatnp TpaTtos Odpvaais THv peyardnv Racirerav 
oo / a ” , b , \ 
eri mwréov THS adAAns Opaxns Eerroinoev’ TOU 
yap mépos Kal avTovomov éott Opaxav. Tnpet dé 

an / \ , > ’ ; cal , 
to Ipoxvnv tHv Uavdioves am "A@nvav cyovrtt 
yuvaixa tpoanxe. o Trpns ovtos ovdév, ovdé 

qn 3 lal ‘ > / > : ih \ > ’ 
THs avTHns Opakns eyevovto, adr o pev ev Aavda 
THs Paxidos viv Karovupévns ys 0 Typevs! oxet, 
rOTE vo Opaxayv otkovpévyns, Kal TO Epyov TO 

v e lal b fol a 

mep. tov “Ituy ai yuvaixes ev TH yn TavTn 
»” as \ \ “ nA >? > s 
érpakav (moNAols O€ Kal TOY TOLNTa@Y Ev anddovos 
pvnun Aavrtas 9 Opvis éETwVOpaTTat), EiKOS TE 
Kal TO KHOos Llavdtova EvvdyracOar tis Ouyartpos 
Sia tocovTov ém wperta TH TMpos adXAHAOUS 
parrov 7 bia TOAXoY Hpepav és “OSptcas odor. 
Trpns 6€ odd€ TO adTo dvopa éywv Bacireds? 

1 Deleted by Hude, after van Herwerden, as not read by 

the Scholiast. 
2 re, in the MSS. after Bas:Aebs, deleted by Classen. 

1 7.e. their representative to look after Athenian interests 
in the country of Sitalees and Tereus. The latter had violated 


BOOK II. xxvut.—-xx1x. 3 ~~ 


such an occurrence is possible) the was eclipsed ; 
after midday ; it assumed the shape of a crescent an 
became full again, and during the eclipse some stars 
became visible. 

XXIX. In this summer, too, Nymphodorus son of 
Pythes, a man of Abdera, whose sister Sitalces had 
to wife, and possessing great influence with Sitalces, 
the Athenians made their proxenus! with that king, 
although they had hitherto regarded him as an 
enemy ; and they summoned him to Athens, wishing 
to gain Sitaleces, son of Teres and king of the 
Thracians, as their ally. Now this Teres, the father 
of Sitalces, was the first to found the great kingdom 
of the Odrysians, which extended over the larger 
part of Thrace; for a considerable portion of the 
Thracians are independent. This Teres is not in 
any way connected with Tereus who took from Athens 
to be his wife Procne the daughter of Pandion, nor 
indeed did they come from the same Thrace. Tereus 
dwelt at Daulia in the land now called Phocis, which 
was then occupied by Thracians, and it was in that 
land that the women? perpetrated their deed upon 
Itys. In fact many of the poets, when they refer to « 
the nightingale, call it the bird of Daulia. Besides. 
it was natural for Pandion to contract the marriage 
alliance for his daughter at so short a distance as 
Daulia with a view to mutual protection, rather than 
among the Odrysians, who are many days’ journey 
distant. ‘Teres, however, whose name was not the 
same as the other's, was the first king to attain 
Philomela, sister of Procne, and cut out her tongue to prevent 
her telling of it; but she revealed it by weaving the story 
into a piece of tapestry. 

2 The women, 7.e. Procne and Philomela, who murdered 
Itys, son of Procne, 






a b ‘ "08 cal a! 2 }7 v 
TPWTOS ev KPaTEL puc@y éyéveto. ov bn dvTa 
\ , e 2? ~ , > ~ 
tov Lutarknv ot “AOnvaior Evpmaxov érrovovyto, 
a pe r Set 2 yy / \ 
Lovropevoe odhict ta él Opaxns xXwpia Kat 
Ilepdicxcav EvveEeXeiv avrov. €dOwv Te és Tas 
"AOnvas o Nupdodwpos tHv te Tov YetddKov 
Evupaylav évoince Kal Ladoxov Tov viov avtod 
, a / 3 \ / , e , 
A@nvaiov, Tov Te él Opaxns TWoEwov vTrEedéxeTo 
\ 7 ; , € , \ 
trav Opaxiav A@nvatots imméewv TE Kal Tred- 
al \ , ral 
tactav. EvvePiSace 5é€ cai Tov Lepdtexav Tois 
3 , \ / >? A 64 > fal 
A@nvaios Kal Pépunyv avt@ évrevcev atrodovvar: 
/ z > \ / / 
Evveotpatevaé te evOds Hepdixcas ert Xadkidéas 
\ 3 , \ / cf \ , 
peta “AOnvaiwv cal Poppiwvos. ottTw pév LiTad- 
e / lal , , 
kns te 0 Typew, Opaxav Bacirevs, Evupayos 
; , 
éyéveto “A@nvaiors cat Ilepdixxas 0 “AXeEdvépou, 
Makxedovwv Bacirevs. 
XXX. Of & & tais Exatov vavoly ’AOnvaior 
Sy , 
ére dvtes mrept IleNXomrévynoov Lordov te Kopuwv- 
Giwy moAtcpa aipovot Kal tapadidoact Uandar- 
n > \ fo) 
pevow “Axapvdvev povors THY yhv Kal mwodw 
/ 0 ied , e v > / 
véwerOar: kal “Actaxov, is Evapyos érupavver, 
AaBovtes KaTa Kpatos Kal éEeXacavtes avTov TO 
xwplov és tTHv Evppaxiav mpoceroincavto. ért 
te Kedadrdnviay tv vijcov mpoomdevoavtes 
/ v / lal \ e 
Tpoonyayovto ave paxns’ Keita O€ 7) Kedad- 
, a 9 / \ , a 
Anvia kata’ Axapvaviav cat Aevxada TeTpaTroNLs 
ovaa, Iladis, Kpavior, Lapaior, pavvor. tore- 
pov & ov TOAA® advexywpnoav at vies es Tas 


BOOK II. xxix. 3-xxx. 3 

great power among the Odrysians. And it was his 
son, Sitalees, whom the Athenians wanted to make 
their ally, wishing him to help in subduing the 
places on the coast of Thrace and Perdiccas. So 
Nymphodorus came to Athens, brought about the 
alliance with Sitalces,and got Sadocus son of Sitalces 
made an Athenian citizen; and he promised also 
to bring the war in Thrace to an end, saying that he 
would persuade Sitalces to send the Athenians a 
Thracian force of cavalry and targeteers. Moreover, 
he brought about a reconciliation between Perdiccas 
and the Athenians, whom he persuaded to restore 
Therme! to him. Perdiccas immediately joined 
forces with the Athenians under, Phormio ? and took 
_the field against the Chalcidians. It was in this way 
that Sitalces son-of "feres;*king of the Thracians, 
became an ally of the Athenians, and also Perdiccas 
son.of. Alexander, king of the Macedonians. © 

XXX. Meanwhile the Athenians in the hundred 
ships, who were still opérating on the Peloponnesian 
coast, took Sollium, a town belonging to the Corin- 
thians, which they then handed over, the territory 
as well as the city, to the people of Palaerus in 
Acarnania, for their exclusive occupation. They also 
stormed Astacus, which Euarchus ruled as tyrant, 
drove hinf6Uf""and incorporated the place in their 
confederacy. Sailing then to the island of Cephal- 
lenia, they brought it over to their side without a 
battle. Now Cephallenia lies over against Acar- 
nania and Leucas and is a union of four communities, 
the Palians, Cranians, Samaeans, and Pronnians. 
And not long afterwards the ships withdrew to 

beef Wi Be Pei au leive 2s leve3, 



XXXI. Ilepi d6€ to POivoTrwpov tod Oépous 
toutov "A@nvaiot wavédnuet, avtol Kat ot pét- 
orxot, oéBarov és tHv Meyapiéa Iepixréous Tod 
Eav0irmov otpatnyovvtos. Kal ot wepi IenXo- 
movynoov "A@nvaio. év tais éxaTov vavaiv 
(éruyov yap dn év Aiytvn dvtes em olKov ava- 
coprlomevor) os 70 QovTo Tous éx THS TONEDS 
TavoT pated év Meydpous Gvtas, émXevcav Tap 
avtous Kat EvveuetyOnoay. oT paTomebov TE 
péytctov 67 TovTO aOpoov *AOnvaiwy éyéveTo, 
axwalovons eTL THS TOAEWS Kal OUTH VevoonKviAs: 
unter yap oTALT@V OvK eXdacous Hoav avTol 

i “A@nvaior (yopis & avtots ot év Toredaig 
rpuryiduo Hoav), méeTotKoe O€ EvvecéBarov OUK 
€AXaoaous TPLOXLALOY OTALT OV, Yopis dé 0 aXXos 
6utros WidOv ovK oArLyos. Snwcavtes S€ TA 
TOAAA THS Ys avexwpnoav. éyévovto O€ Kal 
éo Boral ‘AOnvateov és tyv Meyapisa kal imréwv 
Kal TavoTpatia, péypt ov Nicata éddw Or’ 

XXXII. ‘ErerxioOn dé Kal ‘“Atahavtn UO 
"AOnvatov @povptov Tov Oépovs TOUTOU TeAEUTOU 
TPOTEpoOv oOvGAa, TOD pn AnaTas éexTAEovtas é& 
"Orotvtos Kal TIS arys Aoxpisos KaKoupyelv 
THY EvBotav. tav7a ev év T@ Oéper TOUT@ peTa 
Thy IleXotrovyyciov éx THs ATTIKIS avaxopnow 
ery éveTO. 

XXXII. Tod & ériyiyvopévov yeuadvos Ki- 
apyos 0 "Axapvav, BovXopevos és Thy “Aotaxov 


BOOK II. xxxi. r-xxxu. 1 — a 

I. Toward autumn fof this pean tlie athe! 

nians with all their military forces, drawn both from cal 

the citizens and the resident aliens, invaded Megaris | 
under the command of Pericles son of Xanthippus;” 

who was general.!. The Athenians of the fleet of 
one hundred ships operating around Peloponnesus, 
who happened to be at Aegina on their way home, 
when they heard that the whole military force of the 
city was at Megara, sailed over and joined them. 
This was the largest army of Athenians that had 
ever béén-assémbled in one body; for the city was 
still at the height of its strength and not as yet 
stricken by the plague; the Athenians themselves 
numbered not less than ten thousand heavy in- 
fantry, not including the three thousand at Potidaea,? 
and there were three thousand heavy-armed aliens: 
who took part in the invasion, and, besides, a con- 
siderable body of light-armed troops. After they 
had ravaged most of the Megarian country they 
retired. Later on in the course of the war still 
other invasions were made by the Athenians into 
Megaris every year, both with the cavalry and with 
the whole army, until Nisaea was captured.3 



XXXII. Towards the end of thig~summerjthe (1 » 

Athenians also fortified and _garrisone | Atalante,/the 
island which lies off Opuntian Locris and had hitherto 
been unoccupied. ‘Their object was to prevent 
pirates sailing from Opus and the other ports of 
Locris and ravaging Euboea. These were the events 
which took place during this summer after the 

withdrawal of the.Peloponnesians from Attica. | 
XXXIII. But in the ensuing winter} Euarchus the - 
Acarnanian, wishing to 1 ' us, persuaded 

1 i.e, one of the ten generals elected annually. 
2 of. 1. lxi. 4 3 Iv. lxvi.-lxix, 




tad / 
xaterbeiv, reiPe. KopivOiovs teaoapaxovta vaval 
/ e / x 
Kal TevTaxoclos Kal yirtiows omALTals EauTOV 
TpoceuicOwcato: Apyov b6€ THS otpatias Kv- 
, eens”) s \ / t 
dauiias te o ’Aptotwvupov cal Tipokevos o 
mn / \ A e , \ 
Tuuoxpatouvs Kxal Etpayos o Xpvoidos. «kal 
a ” 
TrevoavTes KaTHyayov: Kal THS AadAns ’AKap- 
/ an \ / v a / / 
vavias Ths Tept Odrdaccav Ectiv & ywpia BovXdo- 
pevol TpootroincacGa Kai Tetpadévtes, ws OvK 
édvvavto, amémAeov é€m” olxov. ayovtes 0 év TO 
TapaTrw és KedadrdAnviav cat atoBaocw Trotn- 
, a) , 
capevot €s THY Kpaviwv yiv, aratnbévtes tr 
: Ey a > € , \ BY ’ / 
avTav €& oporoyias Tivos avdpas Te aTToRBAdXOVGL 
a a / , la 
chav avTov, éemilenévavy ampocdoxntas Tav 
Kpavioy, cai Biarotepov avayayomevor exopicOn- 
cav €T OiKov. 
XXXIV. "Ev 6€ 76 atte yempau ’APnvaio 
A / 
TO TATPLO VO“Lw Xpw@pevor Snuocia Tapas érrotn- 
a e an ~L , 
, n \ ra 
TwY TpoT@ ToOL@de. TA pev OoTA TpoTiPevTaL 
Kal émipépet TH AUTOV ExacTos HY Tt BovANTAL 
> \ \ e b \ 3 , ’ 
everday O€ 7) Eexhopa 7, Ndpvakas KUTTAapLocivas 
” oe 1 n Cx 7 ” ‘ 
ayovow apakar, dvans éxaotyns piav: éverte bé 
\ > aorle ev = a , \ , 
T2 OoTa 1S Exactos Hv dvdAns. pia O€ KrlVy 
\ n a n 
Kevyn hépetat éctpwpevn TOV adavav, of av pi 
e lal I > / / \ ¢ / 
evpeOa@aw és avaipecw. Evvexdéper 5€ o Bovro- 
Mevos Kai doT@y Kai Eévwv, Kal yuvaixes Tapecow 
al tTpocijkovaat éml tov tadpov orodvpopevat. 
1 Hude inserts déxa, following Gertz. 


BOOK II. xxx. 1-xxxiv. 4 

the Corinthians to sail with forty ships and fifteen 
hundred heavy infantry and restore him to power, 
and for this purpose he himself hired some mer- 
cenaries. The commanders of the expedition were 
Euphamidas son of Aristonymus, Timoxenus son of 
Timocrates, and Eumachus son of Chrysis. They 
did in fact sail over and restore him; and wishing 
to acquire some other places along the seaboard of 
Acarnania they made the attempt but failed, and 
thereupon sailed for home. As they skirted the 
coast they touched at Cephallenia, where they 
made a descent upon the territory of the Cranians ; 
here deceived by the inhabitants through some sort 
of agreement they lost a few of their men by an un- 
expected attack of the Cranians, and finally, after 
they had got out to sea with considerable difficulty, 

managed to get back home. pps occu. 
XXXIV. In the course ofthe same phe 
Athenians, following the custom™6f their fathers, 
celebrated at the public expense the/ funeral. rites bf 
the first who had fallen in this war. The ceremony 
is as follows. ‘The bones of the departed lie in state 
for the space of three days in a tent erected for that 
purpose, and each one brings to his own dead any 
offering he desires. On the day of the funeral 
coffins of cypress wood are borne on wagons, one 
for each tribe, and the bones of each are in the 
coffin of his tribe. One empty bier, covered with a 
pall, is carried in the procession for the missing 
whose bodies could not be found for burial. Any 
one who wishes, whether citizen or stranger, may 
take part in the funeral procession, and the women 
who are related to the deceased are present at the 



bg 5 . X 5 , A 9 fae ¥ 
5 TWWéacw ovv és TO Snmoctoy ona, 6 éotiw él 
nr / / an , 
Tov KaNXiotTov TpoacTeEiov THs Toews Kal alet 
lal \ A 
év avT@ OdtTovet TOUS eK THY TOKLwY TARY YE 
\ > a > z \ a \ 
tors év Mapadaw: éxeivav 6€ duatrperh tHv 
A , la) \ , 
apeThny KpivavTes avTov Kal TOV Tadov éToLnoaD. 
/ a 2 eee ec , a 
6 érevday bé Kptiywot Yq, aVYNnP HpNpEEévos VITO THS 
3 , a \ / 
Toews OS av youn Te SdoKH pn akvveTOS eivat 
/ / ; a 
Kal afi@oer mponkn, Neyer € avTois Erratvov 
\ \ a 
7 Tov mpémovta: peta b€ TOTO aTépyovTal. wbe 
\ \ 35 \ a 
pev Oartovew: Kal dia TavTos Tod TroAémou, 
/ a a n / 
8 omote EvpSain avtois, ExpovTO TH vouw. emt 
ral , a fal (— , 
§ obdv tois mpw@tots Toiade LlepixrHs 0 ZavOimmov 
e / / \ > \ \ / 
npeOn Réyew. Kal e€rretdn Karpos édapBave, 
2 \ > \ n , a3 y nA ¢ \ 
mpoeAO@v aro Tov onuatos él Piya wYyydov 
/ e v4 X a a 
abt of / 
Outrou, édreye TOLACE. 
e \ Ss A 
XXXV. ‘Of pév ody Todd) Tov évOade %}6n 
a \ a / 
ELpNKOT@Y érraLvovaL TOY TpocBévTAa T@ VO“@ TOV 
, / € \ I] \ cr . Qn , 
4 / fal 
Oarrropmévors ayopever Oar avTov. épmol dé apKovy 
7 lal J a ” 
dv édoxer elvar avdpav ayabav Epyw yevouévav 
n 3s! a 
Epyo kal SnrotcPar Tas Timds, ola Kat viv sept 
/ / 
Tov tahov Tovde Snuocia mapacKevacbévta 
€ an \ \ > eX > \ ” > \ 
Opate, Kal pn év Evi avdpl TOAX@Y apeTas KiVdv- 
9 \ lal J / A 
vevecOar ed TE Kal Yelpov elTOVTL TLTTEVOHVAL. 
\ / > r ? 
2 yaderov yap TO peTplws eiTety Ev @ pods Kal 7 

1 The Outer Cerameicus, just outside the Dipylon gate. 
This street was to Athens what the Appian Way was to 


BOOK II. xxxiv. 5-xxxv. 2 

burial and make lamentation. The coffins are laid 
in the public sepulchre, which is situated in the most 
beautiful suburb! of the city; there they always bury 
those fallen in war, except indeed those who fell at 
Marathon ; for their valour the Athenians judged to 
be preéminent and they buried them on the spot 
where they fell. But when the remains have been 
laid away in the earth, a man chosen by the state, 
who is regarded as best endowed with wisdom and is 
foremost in public esteem, delivers over them an 
appropriate eulogy. After this the people depart. In 
this manner they bury; and throughout the war, 
whenever occasion arose, they observed this custom. 
Now over these, the first victims of the wat, Pericles 
son of Xanthippus was chosen to speak. And when™ 
tle proper time came, he advanced from the ile 
and took his stand upon a platform which had been 
built high in order that his voice might reach as far 
as possible in the throng, and spoke as follows: en 
XXXV. “Most of those who have spoken here in 
the past have commended the law-giver who added 
this oration to our ceremony, feeling that it is meet 
and right that it should be spoken at their burial 
over those who have fallen in war. To me, however, 
it would have seemed sufficient, when men have 
proved themselves -brave by valiant acts, by act 
only to make manifest the honours we render them 
—such honours as to-day you have witnessed in 
connection with these funeral ceremonics solemnized 
by the state—and not that the valour of many men 
should be hazarded on one man to be believed or not 
according as he spoke well or ill. For it is a hard 
matter to speak in just measure on an _ occasion 
where it is with difficulty that belief in the speaker’s 




Soxnois THs adnOcias BeBaovtar. 6 TE yap 
Evvetd@s Kal evvous axpoaTns Tax av TL évoe- 
extépws pos & BovreTal Te Kal eTiocTaTaL vopt- 
gece OndovcOat, 6 Te Ameipos éotw A Kal 
mrceovatecbat, da hOovov, ei Te vTép THY avTOD 
duc akovor. méxpl yap Tovoe avexTol ot érratvol 
cio TrEpl ETEPWV Reyomevot, &s Ooov av Kal AUTOS 
T@ O€ UTepBadrovTt avT@v POovodvtes On Kal 
amtioTovcl. émrEeldn O€ TOs TaAaL OVTwWS €d0- 
KiuLadoOn TavTa Kaas EXEL, ¥p7) Kal eye Er OpmEvor 
TO vouw Tepacbar Luav THs ExaoTOV BovrAnTEws 
te Kal OoEns TUyxEly ws el TrELOTOD. 

XXXVI. “"Apfouat b€ ato THY Tpoyoverv 
mTpa@tov: Oixatoy yap avtots Kat mpéTov 6& dpa 
didocBar. THY yap Ywpav ol avTol aiel oixodyTES 
Suadoyn ToY eruyryvouévwv péxpt Tovbde édev- 
Gépav 60 apetnyv Tapédocayv. Kal éxetvot Te aELoL 
ématvou Kal @Tt aAXov of TaTépes Huav: KTHCG- 
pevor yap Tpos ols edéEavto Gonv Exouev apynv 
Sé mreiw avThs avTol Huets olde of viv Ett dvTES 
uddiota ev TH KabeoTynKvLla HriKia érnuEjnoaper, 
Kal THY TOAW TOiS TaOL TAapEeTKEVadcapeDY Kal es 
ToAewov Kal és ElpnvnY av’TapKEecTaTHY. BV eyw 

1 Those enumerated by Pericles in ch. xii .—money, army 
and navy. 


BOOK II. xxxv. 2-xxxvi. 4 

accuracy. is established. For the hearer who is 
cognizant _of the facts and partial to the dead will 
pertiaps think that scant justice has been done 
in comparison{ with his own~wishes )jand his own 
knowledge, while he who is not so informed, when- 
ever he hears of an exploit which goes beyond> 
his own capacity, will be led_by envy. tothink 
there is some exaggeration. And indeed eulogies 
of.other_men are tolerable only in so far as each 
héarer thinks that he too has the ability to perforni: | 
any of the exploits of which hé héars ; but whatever 
goes beyond that~at- once excites envy and unbelief.” 
However, since our forefathers approved of this- 
practice as right and proper, I also, rendering obedi- 
ence to the law, must endeavour to the best of my 
ability to satisfy the wishes and beliefs of each of 
ou. Ae 
XXXVI. “I shall speak first of our ancestors, for 
itis right and at the same time fitting, on an occasion 
like this, to give them this place of honour, in re- 
ealling what they did. For this land of ours, in 
which the same people have never ceased to dwell in 
an unbroken line of successive generations, they by 
their valour’ transmitted to our times a free state. 
And not only are they worthy of our praise, but our 
fathers still more ; for they, adding to the inheritance 
which they received, acquired the empire we now 
possess and bequeathed it, not without-toil, to us who 
are alive to-day. And we ourselves here assembled, 
who are now for the most part still in the prime of 
life, have further strengthened the empire in most 
respects, and have provided our city with all re- 
sources,! so that it is sufficient for itself® both” in 
peace and in war. The military exploits whereby 



Ta wey KaTa Tronewous. Epyas ols éxacTa eer iOn, 
4} et TL avTol 4 ob TATEPES nuav BapBapov 7 
“EAAnva todepov! ériovta TpoOvpas nuvvapueba, 
paxpnyopeiv év eiddcww ov Bovdomevos, édow: 
> \ \ / bp] / ” me > \ 
amo 6€ olas Te émiTNdevoews HAOOMEY Em aUTA 
\ . / \ ’ 5 ” 
kal peO olas TodTEias Kal TpoTwv éF oiwv 
/ Lal lal 
peydra éyéveto, Tadta Syrl@cas TPATOV Elws Kal 
r , r 
él TOV TOVOE Erra.vov, vouifwy él TE TH TApPOVTL 
ovK ay ampeTh AeXOhvat av’Ta Kal TOV TavTa 
ef \ > fal \ / 4 3 
Guirov Kal adotav kat Eévav Evydopov eivar 
Soc , \ , > / 
XXXVII. “ Xpw@puela yap wodteLa ov Enrov- 
\ a / , / \ ca 
on Tovs TY TéhaS VOmouS, Tapdderypa Sé wadrov 
avutol OvTes Ticly % pulpovpmevor ETEépouS. — Kal 
” X\ \ % \ bd P| / ? > > " 
dvoma pwev O14 TO fH ES CALYOUS AAN €s TAELOVAS 
rc / 
oixeiy Snwoxpatia KéxAnTat, méTEoTL O€ KATA meV 
\ \ a 
Tovs vom“ous Tpos Ta idva Sidhopa aot TO icor, 
Kata dé THY akiwow, @s ExacTos Ev TM EvdOKLMEL, 
x z \ 
apeThS TPOTMaTAL, ovd av Kata Teviay, éyav bé 
Ti ayad0ov Spacar THhv TOMY, aE vo patos apavera 
/ A > \ \ > / ar ’ 
/ > el 
Huepav eTiTNOevLaTaV UTo lay, ov dt Opyis Tov 
, ’ SLA / rn » +ON > 
méras, ef Kal ndovny te dpa, EyovTes, ovde afn- 

1 zédeuov, Hude adopts Haase’s conjecture oA émiov. 

1 Alluding to the Spartans, whose institutions were said 
to have been borrowed from Crete ; in fact, throughout the 
whole speech the contrast is with Spartan conditions. 


BOOK II. xxxvi. 4-xxxvit.-2 

our several possessions were acquired, whether 
in any casé it” were we ourselves..or—our. fathers. 
that valiantly repelled the onset of war, Bar- 
barian or Hellenic, I will not recall, for I have no 
desire to speak at length among those who know. 
But I shall first set forth by what sort of training;we 
have come to our present position, and with’ what.. 
“political institutions and as the result of what manner 
of life our empire became great, and afterwards pro- 
ceed to the praise of these men; for I think that on 
the present occasion such a recital will be not in- 
appropriate and that the whole throng, both of citizens 
and of strangers, may with advantage listen to it. 
XXXVIT. ** We live under a form of government 
which does not emulate thé institutions of our neigh- 
bours!; on the contrary, we are ourselves a/ model 
which some? follow, rather than the imitators” of 
other peoples. “It is true that our_government- is 
called a democracy, because its adininistration is in the 
hands, not of the few, but of the many; yet while 
as regards the law all’men are on an equality for. 
the settlement of their private disputes, as regards 
the value set on them it is as each man is in any way 
distinguished that he is preferred to public honours, 

Sree sae 

not because he belongs to a particular class, but be- 
cause of personal merits ; nor, again, on the ground of 
poverty is a man barred from a public career by 
obscurity of rank if he but has it in him to do the 
state a«service. And not only in our public life are 
we liberal, but also as regards our freedom from 
suspicion of one another in the pursuits of every-day 
life ; for we do not feel resentment at our neighbour 

2 Possible allusion to the embassy sent from Rome in 
454 B.c. to examine the laws of Solon (Livy, iii. 31). 



lous pév, NUTNpaS O€ TH Orer AYOnSovas TpoaTt- 

3 Oéuevor. aveTayOas O€ Ta idla TpOTomiNodYTES 


\ , \ / / > al 
Ta Onuocla dia d€0s paddicTa ov Tapavopovper, 
Tov te alel év apyn OvTwY axkpodce Kal TOY 
/ \ / > a a >’ > ’ 4 
VOM@Y, Kal padicTa avT@Y OooL TE ET wWHEdLA 
A / a \ a 
€ / 
aicyuUVnVY omoroyouperny Pépovarv. 
ca , 
XXXVIII. “Kail pnv cai tev rover Treiotas 
avaTavras TH yvoun eropicducla, ayaa pév 
\ / / / 32¢ 7 \ 
ye Kat Ovolais dreTnoiors voutfovtes, tdiars dé 
ral / e / 
KaTacKevals evTpEeTecw, @V Kal Huepay H TEpYris 
a \ b] / > / \ \ 
fal n \ 
péyeOos THs TONEwS eK TaONS YRS TA TavTa, Kal 
/ CY a \ > iA a > / 
Ev Baiver mute pendey OlKELOTEPa TH drodavoet 
\ b) re MBE a A \ 
Ta aUTOD ayaba yryvopeva Kaptrovabat 7) Kai Ta 
lal ” ? , 
TOY AdrAwV avOpaTrwV. 
XXXIX. “Avagépopev 5€ Kav tats THY TOXeE- 
a “ , lal 
[LK@V LEAETALS TOV evavTiwy Tolade. THY TE yap 
/ \ 4 
TOALY KOLWIY Tapéxouev Kal ovK éoTLY OTE Eevn- 
/ x / / 
Aacias ateipyouev Twa 7) palrmatos 7) Peapa- 
a \ \ v lal / 2O\ 
Tos, 5 pn Kpudlev av tis TOV TOdEWioV Lowy 
w@pernOein,) TictevovTes ov Tals TapacKevats TO 

1 Referring especially to the contests at the chief festivals, 
like the Panathenaea and Dionysia, which by their artistic 
setting and performance were recreations of mind and spirit 
quite as much as physical exercises. 

2 Thucydides refers to the spiritual no less than to the 
physical products which the greatness of Athens attracts to 
her, to the poetry, music, and art which find there & con- 


BOOK II. xxxvir. 2—xxx1x. 1 

if he does as he likes, nor yet do we put on sour 
looks which, though harmless, are painful to behold. 

But while we thus avoid giving offence in our private 
intercourse, in our public. life we are restrained from 
lawlessness chiefly through reverent.fear, for wé 
render obedience to those in authority and to the 
laws, and especially to those laws which are ordained 
for the succour of the oppressed and those which, 
though unwritten;—bring upon the transgressor a. 
disgrace which all men recognize. 

XXXVIII. “ Moreover, we have provided for the 
spirit many relaxations from toil: we have games} 
~and sacrifices regularly throughout the year and 

homes fitted out with _ good taste and elegance ; and 
the delight we each day find in these things drives 
away sadness. And our city is so great that all the 
products of all the earth flow in upon us, and ours is 
the happy lot to gather in the good fruits of our 
own soil with no more home-felt ry of enjoy- 
ment than we do those of other lands.? 

XXXIX. “We are also superior to our opponents 

in our system of training for warfare, and this in-the 
following respects. In the first place, we throw our 
city open to all the world and we never by exclusion 
acts debar any one from learning or seeing anything 
which an enemy might profit by observing if it were 
not kept from his sight; for we placeeur depend- 
ence, not so much upon prearranged devices to 

genial home as well as to articles of commerce. On these 
latter compare a passage in the»pséido-Xenophontie Con- 
stitution of Athens (ii. 7), written somewhat earlier than this 
portion of ipiaeevdates’ history : ‘‘ Whatever desirable thing 
is found in Sicily, Italy, Cyprus, Egypt, Lydia, the Pontus, the 
Peloponnesus, or anywhere else, all these things are brought 
together at Athens on account of her mastery of the sea. * 



, X ’ , aA a bp , € lal > ial > \ 
/ ‘ lal ’ e 
Epya evruy@* Kal €vy Tais TatdElats ol peév éTTL- 
Ul / / » lal 
Tovm aoKknoe evOvs veo. dvTes TO avdpetov 

a , 
peTéepyovTat, nels Sé avetpévws SiarT@pevor ovdEV 
\ a 7 rn 
Hooov éml TOUS igoTaNEls KLVOVVOUS YwpoupeEr. 
/ ” \ A > ¢ 
texpunptov é& ovTe yap AaKedatpoviot Kal’ éav- 
’ \ a n 
tovs, weO atdavrwv bé és THY YY Huov oTpaTeEv- 
lal / , 
ovol, THY TE TOV TéANAS aUToL émwedOovTES Ov 
al a , \ \ na 
\ , fal 
e U a / e a > , / 
aOpoa Te TH Suvdper Huey ovdELs TH TOhEmULOS 
/ \ \ a a ev ’ , 
evérvye Ola THY TOU vaUTLKOD TE Gyo errtméerav 
fal la \ la fal 
Kal THY év TH YH éwl TOAAA Huav avToV éTt- 
/ \ , 
Temi: vy O€ Tov popim Tiwi mpocpelEwor, 
n / > tal 
KpaTynocavtTés TE TWAS UBY TavTas auvyovow 
n , > e / fal 
avnewooOat kal wxnlévtes UP aTavTwv noonabat. 
f } babupia padXov 7) ToveV pEré L pr 
Kattot et pabvpig adrdov 7 Tovev weheTn Kal pH 
/ \ / xX ls > > / 
an lad / 
a ‘ \ > \ a 
adyewvols pn TpoKduvew, Kat €> avTa €dOovdar 
a > / / 
pn) ATOAMOTEpOUS TOV alei woxGovvTar PaivecOat, 
, i 
Kal €y Te TOVTOLS THY TOAW akiay eivat Oavpa- 
5 Wd > ” 
CecOar Kat ETL ev addats. 
a / \ 
XL. “ Piroxadodpév Te yap pet’ evTeretas Kal 
fal / / 4 ” 
dirvcododmev avev padakias: TAOVT@ TE Epyou 
rn A A / a , 
padrXov Katp@ 7 Aoyou KouT@ xpwpela, Kal TO 

1 Pericles here hints at his policy, outlined in ch. xiii. 2, 
of always acting on the defensive when the enemy forces are 
distinctly superior. 


BOOK II. xxxix. 1-xL. 1 

deceive, as upon the courage which springs from our 
own souls when we are called taaction, ~ -And-again, 
in-the-matter of education, whereas they from early 
childhood by a laborious discipline make pursuit of 
manly courage, we with our unrestricted mode of life | 
are none the less ready to~meet-any equality of 
hazard.t) And here is the proof» When the Lace- 
daemonians invade our territory they do not come 
alone but bring all their confederates with them, 
whereas we, going by ourselves against our neigh- 
bours’ territory, generally have no difficulty, though 
fighting on foreign soil against men who are defend- 
ing their own homes, in “overcoming them in battle. 
And in fact our united forces no enemy has ever yet 
met, not only because we are constantly attending to 
the needs of our navy, but also because on land we 
send our troops on many enterprises; but if they by 
chance engage with a division of our forces and defeat 
a few of us, they boast that they have repulsed us all, 
and if the victory is ours, they claim that they have 
been beaten by us all. If, then, by taking our ease 
rather than by laborious training and depending on a 
courage which springs more from manner of life than 
com ulsion of laws, we are ready to meet dangers, the 
gain is all ours, in that we do not borrow trouble by 
anticipating miseries which are not yet at hand, and 
when we come £0 the test we show ourselves fully 
aS pale as those who are always toiling ; and so our 

y is worthy of admiration in these respects, as well 
as in others. 

XL. “For we are lovers of beauty yet with no 
extravagance and lovers of wisdom yet without 
weakness. Wealth we employ rather as an oppor- 

\ tantty~fer action than as a subject fur boasting; 
‘stout ‘uaadl MU 327 


, > e lal 5] 4 > A \ 
méverOat ovy opodoyely TLVL aLoXpoVv, aAXrAa py 
Siadhevyerv épyw aloyiov. eve te Tois avTois 

’ / ev \ Lad b / xr / i} 

\ \ \ a 
mpos épya TeTpappevors Ta TOALTLKA pn EevdEeds 

a / \ / \ lal / 
yVOval* OVvOL yap TOV TE wndEeV TOVOE peTeXoVTA 

> > / ’ > > r , \ 
oUK amTpaypwova, aAXN aypetov vouiopev, Kal 

’ \o »” , / X319 é , Q 3 o8 \ 
auto.” HToL Kpivomev ye 7) EvOvpovmEOa opOas Ta 

/ > \ U al by4 / 
mpayyata, ov Tovs AOyous Tots Epyots BraBnv 
Fryovpevol, GAAA pn TpPodLdayOHvat wadrov oyw 

/ Adi Vie 6 ale b] Q a 8 , 
MpoTepov % emt a det Epyw EAGEivy OLadEepovTws 

\ xy \ / v 4 lal 3 > \ 

A \ \ @ > / > / 
padiota Kal Tepl ov errxerpnaopen Exroyiler Gar: 

lad Yi , \ 
& Tots adrows auabia pev Opdaos, Aoyropos Sé 
v / / > xX \ / 
dxvov héper. Kpatiator 8 av rwuynv dixatws 
ca ¢ / \ \ e / "4 
xpidetev of Tad Te Seva Kat 0éa capéotata 
\ a \ , 
yiyv@oKovtes Kal Sta TAaUTA p17) aTOTpPETTOMEVOL 
a \ 
ék Tov KIWdUVOV. Kal Ta és apeTHy evynvTi@pea 
: sa<-. 

a lal \ lal 

Tols TOANOIS: OV yap TacyXoOVTES Ev, GAAS OpwHvTes 


Kktwuela Tors dirous. PBeBaroTepos dé 0 dpacas 
\ / ee > fi ’ > f e / 

Ti Yap Bote whetrouerny Ou’ evvotas @ Sédwxe 
owlew 0 6é avtopethay auBdUTEpos, Eld@s OK 
és yap, GAN ws ohethnua THY apeTiVy atrodw- 

1 érépois <€repa> , Hude. 2 Hunde reads of adrol. 

1 As contrasted with the Spartans, whose officials made the 
most important decisions. 


BOOK II. xu. 1-4 

and with us it is not a shame for a man to ac- 
knowledge poverty, but the greater shame is for 
him ‘not to do his best to avoid it..- And 

will find united in the same persons an interest at 
once in_pri affairs, and in others 

of us w i ntion chi to business 

will find. no lack of insight into_political — ore 

For we alone regard the man who takes no part in 
public affairs, not as one who minds his own business, 
but as good for nothing; and we Athenians decide 
~ public questions for ourselves! or at least endeavour 
to arrive at a sound understanding of them, in the 
belief that itis not debate that is a hindrance to action, 
but rather not to be instructed by debate before the 
time comes for action. For in truth we have this point 
also of superiority over other men, to be most daring 
in action and yet at the same timé most given to re- 
flection upon the ventures we méan to” undertake ; : 
“with other” men; on the~contrary;~-boldness...means 
ignorance and reflection brings hesitation. And they 
would rightly be adjudged most courageous who, 
(realizing most clearly the pains no less than the 
pleasures involved, do not on that account turn away 
from danger. Again, in nobility of spirit, we stand 
in sharp contrast to most men; for it is not by 
receiving kindness, but by conferring it, that we 
acquire our friends~ Now he who confers the 
favour is a firmer friend, in that he is disposed, 
by continued goodwill toward the recipient, to 
keep the feeling of obligation alive in him?; but 
he who owes it is more listless in his friendship, 
knowing that when he repays the kindness it will 
count, not as a favour bestowed, but as a debt 
2 This must be the meaning of the Sate clause, but some- 
thing is perhaps wrong with the text. 

VOL. L. M 329 


A / aA 
5 gwv. Kal povor ov tov Evudépovtos pmadXov 
A aA fal b] , a a > a 
Aoyic ue 7) THS EAXevOepias TO TLIoT@ abdeas Tia 
XLI. “ Buvedov te Néy@ THY TE Tacay TOAW 
THs ‘EXXabcs taidevow eivat Kal Kal’ éxactov 
a \ BA > a 
Soxely ay pot Tov avTov avdpa map nuav ért 
al ’ x ” \ \ , / > xn 
TrElot av elon Kal peTa yapitoyv pdadior ap 
2 evTpaTéAws TO THpua avTapKes TapéxecOar. Kal 
e > f > a , / / a 
@s$ ov AOywv év TO TapovTs Ko“TOS TAabE PaO 
x »” > \ > A c ? \ e bu fol 
h épywov éotivy arnOca, aitn 4 Svvapis THs 
3 onpaiver. povn yap T@Y VV aKons Kpelocor 
al / A 
és Telpav Epxetat, Kal povyn OUTE TH TOAEMIO 
3 , > , ” e,;? o& aa 
érenOovte ayavaxtnow exer Up olwv Kaxotrabel, 
” re eee r , 4 > pit, tense Ds, 6 
ovTE TO UTNKO@ KaTadmE“WLY @S OvY LTO akiov 
” \ 4 \ / \ > “4 
4 dpyeTar. peTa peydrwy O€ onuetwy Kal ov Oy 
TOL apaptupov ye THY Svvayity Tapacyopevot 
Tois Te vov Kal Tois émerta OavpacOnoopeba,} 
¢ 7 t 
ovdev Tpocdeouevot ovTe Opnpou érratvétou ovTe 
\ / a ? 
OaoTls Erect pev TO aitixa Téprrer, TOV O Epyav 
Tv UTovotay 7» adnOca BrdWet, dAAA Tacav 
\ / \ a > \ ied / , 
bev OdrXaccav Kal yhv €o Batov TH nmeTEepa TOMY 
KaTavayKacavtes yevécOat, TavtTayxod Sé uyynpeta 
5 kakav Te Kaya0av aidta Evyxatoixicaytes. mtept 
, a 
1 xal, before ovdéy in the MSS., deleted by Kriiger. 

1 The reference is to Athenian colonies and cleruchies, 
which, according to the bearing of the natives, had been 


BOOK II. xu. 4—xur. 5 

repaid. And, finally, we alone confer our benefits 
without fear of consequences; not upon a calculation 
of the advantage we shall gain, but with confidence 
in the spirit of. liberality which.actuates us. 

XLI. “In a word, then, I say that our city as a 
whole is the school of Hellas, and that, as it seems to 
me, each individual amongst us could in his own per- 
son, with the utmost grace and -versatility, prove 
himself self-sufficient in the-most varied forms of 
activity. And that this is no mere boast inspired by 
the occasion, but actual truth, is attested by the very 
power of our city, a power which we have acquired in 
consequence of these qualities. For Athens alone 
among her contemporaries, when put to the test, is 
superior to the report of her, and she alone neither 
affords to the enemy who comes against her cause 
for irritation at the character of the foe by whom 
he is defeated, nor to her subject cause for com- 
plaint that his masters are unworthy. Many are 
the proofs which we have given of our power and 
assuredly it does not lack witnesses, and there- 
fore we shall be the wonder not only of the 
men of to-day but of after times; we shall need 
no Homer to sing our praise nor any other poet 
whose verses may perhaps delight for the moment 
but whose presentation of the facts will be dis- 
credited by the truth. Nay, we have compelled 
every sea and every land to grant access to~our 
daring, and have everywhere planted! Saceatas 
memorials both of evil to foes and of good to friends 
Such, then, is the city for which these men nobTy 
fought and ‘died, deeming it their duty not to let her 

attended with ill consequences for these (e.g. Oreos, and later 
Aegina) or good (e.g. on the Thracian coast). 



\ 2. nr > \ / > £ 
Ln adarpeOHvat avTnvy payomuevor éTeMeEVTHCAY, 
\ lal / / X ’ \ 3 / 
XLII. “ Av’ 6 67 Kai éunxvuva ta rept THs To- 
/ a 
News, SidacKarlav TE TOLOVMEVOS Ly TEPL Laou Ht 
s \ > A \ e a \ € / 
eivat TOV ayava Kal ols Tavde pndev tTrapyer 
e , \ \ by , ee PBS = A / 
\ / / \ yy b) lel 
2 davepav onpeious Kabiotds. Kai elpntar avThs 
\ , a \ A ’ ve e = 
Ta peyloTa’ a yap THY TON Duvynoa, ai TaVdE 
Kal T@V ToL@VoE apeTal exoTpNnoaV, Kal ovK aD 
Qn lal / > , ee r 
ToAXots TOV “EXAnVwV tcoppoTOs MaTEp TwVOE 
, lal / / la fi a 
0 Aoyos TaV Epywv davein. Soxet Sé por dnrOd 
\ 7 
3 BeBaotca 7 viv tavde KaTacTpody. Kal yap 
al ss J , / \ ’ \ / 
e€ a a /> > / , 
tmép Ths Tatpioos avépayabiav mpotibec bar: 
iya0@ yap Kakov adavicaytes KoWwas padXro 
ayavu@ yap $ S$ pa Vv 
lal / lal 
4 wbérnoav 7 é€k Tov idiwy EBraWav. Tavde dé 
> > / 
/ ‘ 
éuarakicOn ote Tevias €ATLOL, ws Kav ETL d1a- 
\ fal a 
duyav avtnyv+ trovtycELev, avaBodnv Tov Sewvod 
a / 
€Toinjaato: THY dé TOV évayTioy Tiuwpiayv TOBE- 
/ > lal , \ 4 ¢ /, 
votépav avTav rAaBovtes Kal xivdvvav aya Tovde 
/ ? > a 
KaAXNLTTOV VvopicavtTes EBovrAnOncav peT AUTOD 
1 gutiv: Hude brackets, 


BOOK II. xt. 5—xuu. 4 

be taken from them; and it is fitting that every man 
who is left behind should suffer willingly for her 

XLII. “It is for this reason that I have dwelt 
upon the greatness of our city; for I have desired to 
show you that we are contending for a higher prize 
than those who do not enjoy such privileges irr tike 
degree, and at the same time to let the praise of these 
men in whose honour [I am now speaking be made 
manifest by proofs. Indeed, the greatest part of 
their praise has already been spoken ; for when —I 
lauded the city, that was but the praise wherewith 
the brave deeds of these men and men like them 
have already adorned her; and there are not many 
Hellenes whose fame would be found, like theirs, 
evenly balanced with their deeds. And it seems to 
me that such a death as these men died gives proof 
enough of manly courage, whether as first revealing 
it or as affording its final confirmation. Aye, even in 
the case of those who in other ways fell short of 
goodness, it is but right that the valour with which 
they fought for their country should be set before all 
else ; for they have blotted out evil with good and 
have bestowed a greater benefht by their service to 
the state than they have done harm by their private 
lives. And no one of these men either so set his 
heart upon the continued enjoyment of wealth as to 
become a coward, or put off the dreadful day, yield- 
ing to the hope which poverty inspires, that if he 
could but escape it he might yet become rich; but, 
deeming the punishment of the foe to be more de- 
sirable than these things, and at the same time 
regarding such a hazard as the most glorious of all, 
they chose, accepting the hazard, to be avenged 



‘ a n , 
Tovs pev Tiwpetcbat, Tav S€ adiecOar, éEXmids 
pev TO adaves Tov KaTopOwcew éemitpévartes, 
la) 5) e r 
Epy@ € Tepl TOD 76n Opwpévov ahicw adtois 
akwobvtes TeTroevas Kal év avT@ TO! apu- 
veoBar kal” tradety KaddLov? Hynoduevot 7} TO* 
b] Qf f @ \ \ > \ A “ 
évoovtes ow@becOat, To pév aiaxpov Tov Royou 
épuyov, To & épyov T@ cwpate UTrépevay, Kal bv 
a / a fol 
éXayloTov Katpov TUYNS dpa axun THs SoEns 
pad Xov 7) TOD déous aTnAAaYyNCaD. 
XLII. “ Kai otde pév tpoonkovtws TH ToXeL 
/ > / \ \ \ \ > 
ToLoloe €yévovTO’ TOUS O€ AoLTOUS Xp? acda- 
AecTépay pev evyecPal, aTodmoTtépayv Sé pndéev 
akiobv tiv €s Tovs modeutovs dtdvoray yep, 
A n , , \ > , & ” 
oKOTOUVTAS Ln AOYO LoVe THY @deriav, HY ap 
5G \ ¢ , 
TLS TpOs OvdEevY YEtpov avTOUs Umas® eldoTas pN- 
/ / iA i a \ / 9 7 
\ cal a r 
ayaba &vertw, adda padrov THY THs ToAEWS 
, , / 
Sivauw Kal? huépay Epyw Gewpévous Kal épactas 
fol e lal s 
yeyvouévous auTns, Kal OTav byiv peyarn S0€n 
elvat, évOvpoupévous OTL TONWa@VTES Kal yLyVO- 
¢ / 
avdpes avTa EKTHTAaYTO, Kal OTOTE Kal TELpa TOU 
rad > i \ \ / fal / 
odaneiev, ovK ody Kal THY TOAW YE THS opeTépas 
apeths aftodvTes oTEpioKew, KaANLoTOY Oé Epavov 
El ir 

1 So most MSS. Hude reads 7g with CG. 

2 «al: Hude brackets. 

3 Dobree’s correction for uaAAorv of the MSS. Haude inserts 
det and retains uaddAov. * Deleted by Hude. 

5 Suas: Hude brackets. 


BOOK II. xin. 4—xuimt. 1 

upon the enemy and to relinquish these other things, 
trusting to hope the still obscure possibilities of 
success, but in action, as to the issue that was before 
their eyes, confidently relying upon themselves. And 
then when the moment of combat came, thinking it 
better to defend themselves and suffer death rather 
than to yield and save their lives, they fled, indeed, 
from the shameful word of dishonour, but with life 
and limb stood stoutly to their task, and in the brief 
instant ordained by fate, at the crowning moment 
not of fear but of glory, they passed away. 

XLIII. “ And so these men then bore themselves 
after a manner that befits our city; but you who 
survive, though you may pray that it be with less 
hazard, should resolve that you will have a spirit to 
meet the foe which is no whit less courageous; and 
you must estimate the advantage of of such 2 a_spirit_ not 
alone_by a speaker's words, fo for he could make a 
long story in telling gs you—what you yourselves know 
as well as he—all the advantages that are to be gained 
by warding off the foe. Nay rather you must ae 
_fix_your_gaze-upon-the-power.of Athens_and becom 
lovers of her, and when the vision of her satholb 
has inspired y “you, | reflect that all this has been ac- 
quired by men of courage who knew their duty and 
in the hour of conflict were moved by: a high-sense 
of honour, who, if ever they failed in any enter- 
prise, were resolved that at least their country 
should not find herself deserted by their valour, but 
freely sacrificed to her the fairest offering! it was in 

1 %pavos, a joint contribution, the regular term for a con- 
tribution made for mutual benefit, eg. to a common meal, 
to a benevolent society, etc. Demosthenes (cont. Mid. 27) 

represents the state as a sort of benefit society to which 
every citizen owes a contribution, 




lal o/s lel * \ 
avuTH Tpoiguevol. KOLWWH yap Ta TouaTa SidoVTES 
idta TOV ayipwv érawov éhauBavov Kal Tov 
Taghov €TlianmoTatov, OUK ev ® KElVTAL paXo?, 
> 2 gel | er < / > a \ a > / om 2% 
arr’ év 6 } Sofa aiTav Tapa TO évTvyovTs alEi 
\ / \ »” lol a 
kal Royou Kai Epyou Kaip@ aleimunaTos KaTa- 
/ al 3 an Las a 4 
NeitreTAL. avdpav yap éripavav Tada yh Tados, 
\ > a > a >? , , > 
Kal OV OTNAM@V movoy Ev TH OLKELA OHmaiveL eTTL- 
/ ’ \ Vj. 5 a \ / ” 
ypapn, adrAa Kal EV TH LN TpoanKovon aypados 
> lal , nr la) 
LVN Tap ExdoT@ THS yvouns Maddov 7% TOD 
Epyou évolaiTatas. ods vov vpeis EnrwoarTes 
\ x BA \ > x \ ’ fi \ 
Kal TO evdatpmov TO é€XEVGEpoy, TO dD EdEVOEpoY TO 
» / \ a 
evuxov KplvavTes, un TeplopacGe Tovs TONEmt- 
KovS KiVOUVOUS. Ov yap ol KaKoTpayodrTes btKAaLO- 
> a x a 4 © b \ > ” 
Tepov apedoiev av tov Biov, ois édris ovK Ext 
a / a fol 
ayabod, adr’ ols 4 évavtia petaBorn év TO Shp 
€TL KivOuVEvETAL Kal ev ols paddioTa peydra Ta 
, \ 
Siadépovta, Hv TL TTaL\owow. adyELvoTépa yap 
/ / lj a" lal 
avépt ye dpovnua Eyovte 7 meta Tov! pada- 
= KR e \ cr a 
/ ¢ / /, 
érrridos dua yryvopevos avaicOntos Oavatos. 
XLIV. “Av érep Kai tovs Ta@VvdE ViV ToKéas, 
cd / > > / nr x 
, ’ \ na / 
pvOncopat. é€v ToAUTpOTras yap Evudopats émi- 
/ \ ’ / « a 
oTavta, Tpadévtes: TO S& evtuyxés,” of av TIS 
icf cal 
evTpeTTegTaTNS Adywow, wWoTEp olde pEV VDD, 
na lal / \ a , 
TEAEUTHS, pets 6€ AVTINS, Kal ols évevdatmovAcat 
te 0 Bios opoiws Kal évtedevthoa EvvepeTpryOn. 
1 gy r@, in some MSS. before, in others after, wera rod, 

deleted by Bredow. 
2 Hude reads réde edtuxés, following Abresch. 


BOOK II. xu. 1-xtuiv. 1 

their power to give. For they gave their lives for 
the common weal, and inso doing won for themselves 
the praise which grows not old and the most dis- 
tinguished of all sepulechres—not that in which they 
lie buried, but that in which their glory survives in 
everlasting remembranee, celebrated on every occa- 
sion which gives rise to word of eulogy or deed of 
emulation. For the whole world is the sepulchre of 
famous men, and it is not the epitaph upon monuments 
set up in their own land that alone commemorates 
them, but also in lands not their own there abides in 
each breast an unwritten memorial of them, planted 
in the heart rather than graven on stone.. Do you 
therefore, now make these men your examples, and 
“freedom, be not too anxious about the dangers of 
war. For it is not those that are in evil plight who 
have. the best excuse for being unsparing of their 
lives, for they have no hope of better days, but 
rather those who run the risk, if they continue to 
live, of the opposite reversal of fortune, and those to 
whom it makes the greatest difference if they suffer 
a disaster. For to a manly spirit more bitter is 
humiliation associated with cowardice than death 
when it comes unperceived in close company with 
stalwart deeds and public hopes. 

XLIV. “Wherefore, I do not commiserate the 
parents of these men, as many of you as are present 
here, but will rather try to comfort them. For they 
know that their lives have been passed amid manifold 
vicissitudes ; and it is to be accounted good fortune 
when men win, even as these now, a most glorious 
death—and you a like grief—and when life has been 
meted out to them to be happy in no less than to 



2 yanetrov pev ovv oida Tree Gv, OY Kal TOAAAaKIS 
vr e , > v > / ? 
é£ere vTouvynuwata év addwv evtTvytats, als ToTE 
A 3 he] / \ , > a v \ 
Kal avTol nyadrEcOe* Kal AUT OVY WY AV TLS MN 
a - 
Telpacduevos ayabav otepicKyntat, adr ov av 
b] \ , > A a“ \ \ \ 
3 éGas yevouevos adatpeOn. Kaptepety dé ypy Kai 
a\Xov twaidmyv édmids ols Ett WALKia TéxVwWoLW 
A +Q7 \ lal bd ” , e 
Toutalar' idia Te yap TOV OVK dvTwY ANON ot 
5) a / 
eT UyiyVOmevol TLoLY EcoVvTaL, Kal TH TONE StxOOeED, 
” las \ > nn \ > / 7 
€x TE TOV LN Epnuwovabal Kat acdarela, Evvoic et: 
> x er ” aA OF , a 
ov yap olov te icov te} dixarov BovreverOar ot 
x \ \ “ b] Lal e / , 
adv pu) Kal Tatdas éx TOD Omoiov TapaSarropmevor 
° 3 
4 xivduvevmolv. dco. 6 av TwapnRynKaTe, Tov TE 
/ / aA b] n /, e lal A 
Tréova Képdos Ov HUTUXEtTe Biov yyeiaOe Kai 
/ \ 4 \ A a > , 
tovde Bpayiv écecOar, cat 7H ToHvde evKrELA 
/ x \ / > / / 
KkougitecGe. TO yap gdiroTiwov aynpwy povor, 
rn / an / \ 
@oTrep Tivés act, madrov TépTEl, AXA TO 
Tiyac Oat. 
3 r 
XLV. ‘“Ilact & ad dco. tHvde wapeote 7 
> A c rad , \ ’ fal \ \ > 
adedgois op® peyav Tov ayava (Tov yap ovK 
bd ef y > “a \ 4 x ] 
ovta atas elmfev éetrawvety), Kai pordtts av Kal 
e \ > A b e “ > ied , , 
UTEepBodnv apEeTHS OVX Omotot, GAN’ orALY@ YELpous 

1 No one could be a member of the Boule or Senate till he 
was thirty, when he was almost certain to be married ; and, 
according to Deinarchus ($71), no man was allowed to speak in 
the Assembly until he had legitimate male issue (Zimmern). 

2 e.g Simonides. ¢f. Plut. Moral. 786 b: Suwvidns rcye 
mpos Tous éykadovvtTas aiT@ piAapyupiavy, bt: Tay KAAwY ameE- 


BOOK II. xturv. 2-xtv. 1 

die in. It will be difficult, I know, to persuade 
you of the truth of this, when you will constantly be 
reminded of your loss by seeing others in the enjoy- 
ment of blessings in which you too once took de- 
light ; and grief, I know, is felt, not for the want of 
the good things which a man has never known, but 
for what is taken away from him after he has once 
become accustomed to it. But those of you who are 
still of an age to have offspring should bear up in 
the hope of other children; for not only to many of 
you individually will the children that are born here- 
after be a cause of forgetfulness of those who are gone, 
but the state also will reap a double advantage—it 
will not be left desolate and it will be secure. For 
they cannot possibly offer fair and impartial counsel 
who, having no children to hazard,! do not have an 
equal part in the risk. But as for you who have 
passed your prime, count as gain the greater portion 
of your life during which you were fortunate and re- 
member that the remainder will be short; and be 
comforted by the fair fame of these your sons. For 
the love of honour alone is untouched by age, and 
when one comes to the ineffectual period of life it is 
not ‘gain’ as some say,“ that gives the greater 
satisfaction, but honour. 

XLV. “But for such of you here present as are 
sons and brothers of these men, I see the greatness of 
the conflict that awaits you—for the dead are always 
praised—and even were you to attain to surpassing 
virtue, hardly would you be judged, I will not say 

orepnucvos 81a Td yipas Noovav bwrd wits Ett ynpoBookeitat, THs 
and Tov Kepdalvery, Simonides replied to those who charged him 
with love of money, that, deprived by old age of other pleasures, 
he is still comforted by one, that of gain. 



a , \ a a \ \ > / 
xpiletre. pOovos yap Tots [aot mpos TO avTt- 
1 \ be Si. oe ba > , > / 
maXov,: TO 5é 4) €uTrOOWY avaYTAYywVicTw EvVOLa 
ce > / a \ y > fol ef 
2 Ei dé pe def Kal yuvaixeias TL apeTihs, 0oat 
lal “i a / 
vov év xnpeia Ecovtar, pvnoOjvat, Bpayeta 
Tapaweoel ATav onMava. THs TE yap vTapxov- 
, / a 
ons hvcews pi) XElpoor yevecOar vpiv peyary 7 
/ I A 3.53) TNF ? a f a 
S0fa Kat Hs av ém éXdytoTOv apeThs Tépt Ff 
a =. 3 
aroyou év Tois dpoect KEOS 7. 
XLVI. “Eipyntar «al éwol AOy@ KaTa Tov 
f \ 
yomov boa elyov Tpocdopa, Kal Epyw ot PatTo- 
\ , \ a * 
16 \ b] 0 DOE } / e a / no 
matdas TO a0 TOvSE Onpocia 7 TONS MEXpL HENS 
> / / lal / Ta 
Opérer, @hédipov otépavov toiadé TE Kai Tois 
AevTroméevols TV ToL@vde aywvwY TpoTLOEica: 
nr a / lal 
GOda yap ols Keirar apeTis péyrota, Tols b€ Kal 
” ” / a \ > 
2 dvdpes Apiotot moduTevovowv. viv 6€ aTodo- 
dhupapevos Ov TpoTHKEL EXATT@ ATLTE.) 
/ bg lel 
XLVII. Totdcde pév o Tados éyéveTo ev TO 
Yyeuave TovT@* Kal OveNMMovTos avTov TpwToV 
” lal / / I] / a \ / 
2 ros TOU ToAéuou ToOUTOU éTEAXEUTA. TOU bé GE- 
b] \ > / : / \ e / 
pous evdus apyouevou IleXorrovynoror Kai ot Evp- 
/ / \ lal 
payor Ta Ovo pépn WoTEp Kal TO TPwTOV éce- 
\ / a \ 
Banov és thy ’Artixny (jryeito b€ “Apyidapos o 
Zevéidapov, Aaxedatpoviwv Bactrevs), kal xaGe- 
\ n v fal 
3 Cowevoe eOnovy THY yhv. Kal GyTwY avT@V Ov 

1 mpds +d avtimadov, the reading of ABFM[G]; rdv ayri- 
madkov CE. Hude reads ray avrimadwy, after Croiset, 


BOOK II. xiv. 1-xivu. 3 a. 

their equals, but even a little inferior. For there is 
envy of the living on account of rivalry, but that 
which has been removed from our path is honoured 
with a good-will that knows no antagonism. -—-—-p 
“Tf I am to speak also of womanly virtues, re- 
ferring to those of you who will henceforth be in 
widowhood, I will sum up all in a brief admonition: 
Great is your glory if you fall not below the standard 
which nature has set for your sex, and great also is 
hers of whom there is least talk among men whether 
in praise or in blame. 
XLVI. “I have now spoken, in obedience to the 
law, such words as I had that were fitting, and those 
whom we are burying have already in part also 
received their tribute in our deeds;! besides, the 
state will henceforth maintain their children at the 
public expense until they. grow to manhood, thus 
offering both to the dead and to their survivors a 
crown of substantial worth as their prize in such con- P 
tests. For where the prizes offered for virtue are 
greatest, there are found the best citizens. And 
now, when you have made due lament, each for his Fatid 
own ‘dead, depart.” an ee 
XLVII. Such were the funeral ceremonies that took 
place during this winter, the close of which brought 
the first year of this war to an end. At the very _ 
beginning of summer the Peloponnesians and their(420 ne 
allies, with two-thirds of their forces as before,? in- — 
vaded Attica, under the command of Archida son 
of Zeuxidamus, king of, the he Lacedaemonians, , and 
establishing themselves p pr roceeded to TAVERE- the _ 
_country... And before they had been many “days in — in 
1 4.e. the honours shown them throughout the rest of the 
ceremony, described in ch. xxxiv, as contrasted with the 
words of the eulogist. * Gg. en. x & 



npEato yevéoOar tots “AOnvaious, Aeyouevov péev 
Kal TpoTepov ToAAaYocE eycaTacKH Yas Kal Tepl 
Ajyvov cal év &dXots Xwptors, OU MEVTOL TOTOUTOS 
ye NoLuos OVSE HOopa oUTHsS avOpar av ovdapod 
ELT LOvEVETO yevéo Oat. ove yap t tatpol ipkovv 
TO Tp@Tov Geparrevovtes ayvoia, aX» avtol pa- 
Mota EOvncKkov bo@ Kal padioTa Tpooncar, 
ovTe addy v0 pwreia TEXYT ovdepia: dca 7é 
Tpos lepots ikéTevoay 7) wavTelots Kal Tots ToOLOV- 
> n > / € \ a a , 
XLVIII. "HpEato 65é 76 pév mp@tov, ws Xé- 
yetat, €& AiOromias THs UTép Aiydrtou, émeta 
be Kal és AiyuTrov kat AtBinv KxatéBn Kal és 
THY Bactréos yy THV TORAH. és dé Ty. ’A@n- 
varay modw é€arivaiws éverrese, Kal TO 7 pa- 
Tov év TO Tlecpacet ippato TOV avbporror, WOTE 
Kab érdyOn UT avTaV ws ot Iedomovynavoe 
pappaxa eo BeBArjovev és Ta ppéata: Kpyva 
yap ove joav avTot. DoTepov dé Kal és 
THY GVW OAL adbixero cal eOvnoKoV TONKX@ 
Haddov On. AEyeT@ pev OvV Teph QUTOU @S 
ExaoTos yeyvodker Kal iat pos Kal iSvarns ag’ 
OTov eixos Hv} yeves Oar aUTO, Kal Tas aitias 
aoTivas vopiter Too auTns peTaBorrs ikavas 
elvae:” éy@ 6€ olov TE eyiryvero réEw Kal ad 
@v av TIS CKOTOY, El ToTEe Kal avOis émumécot, 

1 jv: Hude deletes. 

2 Sivauw és Td petaotioa oxeiv, in the MSS. after efva, 
deleted by Gesner; Hude deletes ixavas efva: and és 7d 
peraotioa, with F. Mueller. 


BOOK II. xvi. 3—xtviu. 3 

Attica the plague 4 began for the first time to show 
itself dmong the Athenians. It is said, indeed, to 
have broken out before in many places, both in Lemnos 
and elsewhere, though no pestilence of such extent 
nor any scourge so destructive of human lives is on 
record anywhere. For neither were physicians able 
to cope with the disease, since they at first had to treat 
it without knowing its nature, the mortality among 
them being greatest because they were most exposed 
to it, nor did any other human art avail. And 
the supplications made at sanctuaries, or appeals to 
oracles and the like, were all futile, and at last men 
desisted from them, overcome by the calamity. 
XLVIII. The) disease began, it is said,in Ethiopia | 
beyond. Egypt, aiid then descended into Egypt and 
Libya and spread over the greater part of the 
King’s territory. Then it suddenly fell upon the 
city of Athens, and attacked first the inhabitants ot 
the Peiraeus, so that the people there even said that 
the Peloponnesians had put poison in their cisterns ; 
for there were as yet no public fountains there. But 
afterwards it reached the upper city also, and from 
that time the mortality became much greater. Now 
any one, whether physician or layman, may, each 
according to his personal opinion, speak about its 
probable origin and state the causes which, in his 
view, were sufficient to have produced so great a 
departure from normal conditions; but I shall de- 
scribe its actual course, explaining the symptoms, 
from the study of which a person should be best able, 

1 It is perhaps impossible to identify the plague of Athens 
with any known disease. Grote describes it as an eruptive 
typhoid fever. It has perhaps more symptoms in common 
with typhus than with any other disease, 



pariot av EXO TL T poelo@s pi aryvoeiv, TavUTa 
énioce avTos TE VoonaAas Kal avTOS (b@Y adXOUS 

XLIX. To pev yap eros, @S @pororyetTo éx 
TAVTOD, padiota 67) € exelvo avooov és Tas addas 
acGeveias eT UY XavEeV ov: et € Tes Kal T pouKape 
Tl, €S TOUTO TaVTA amex pin. TOUS O€ addous an’ 
ovdemlas Tpopacews, arr’ éEaidvys vrytets ovTas 
Tp@Tov pev THS KEPAarS Oéppat ioxyupal Kal TOV 
oplarpav épuOjpara Kal proyoous éXduBave, 
Kal Ta evTOS, q Te papvé Kal 7 yrocoa, evOus 
ai maroon nv Kal mvedua atom ov Kal dug woes 
noier eTrelTa & aUT@V TTAppos Kab Bpayxos 
ereyiyvero, Kal év ov TOAN@ xX povep KaTtéBawev € és 
Ta arn 0 Tovos meTa Bnyos t loxupov- Kal o7roTe 
eS TH Kapovay ornpigerev, avéaT pepe TE QUTNDY, 
Kal anoxabapaets Xorms Tao aL Grau vo vee 
avowac weve elaly émncav, Kal avTal pera Tahat- 
Toplas peyarys, AVE Te ToL Teloow evéim Te 
Kev omacpov evdiootca ia Xupor, TOUS pev peTa 
TavTa Awgycavra, Tous bé Kal TOAA@ _botepov. 
kal T@ pev eEwOev aT TOMEVD Tol capa ovuT 
ayav Deppov jy ovTe xXdwpov, aX’ wmrépvOpor, 

TENUTVOV, prvuKtaivass puKpats Kal EdXKeow e&nu- 
Onkos" Ta O€ € évTos ovTas EKALETO Gate NTE TOV 
Tavu AETTOV iuatiov Kal oLvdSovY TAS emuBoras 

pnd adXo TL % yupvol avéxer Gat, Hoiota Te av és 

Bop ux pov aopas avtovs pimtew (xal TONXOL 

TOUTO TOV TEA LEVOV avOpwrev Kat edpacay é és 

ppeara) TH divrn aTavere@ Evvexopevoe Kal €v TO 

omol@ KaberoT KEL TO TE mréov kab €accov To- 
1 Added by Hude, 


BOOK II. xivmt. 3-xurx. 5 

having knowledge of it beforehand, to recognize it 
if it should ever break out again. For I had the 
disease myself and saw others sick of it. 

XLIX. That year, as was agreed by all, happened 
to be unusually free from disease so far as regards the 
other maladies; but if anyone was already ill of any 
disease all terminated in this. In other cases from 
no obvious cause, but suddenly and while in good 
health, men were seized first with intense heat of the 
head, and redness and inflammation of the eyes, and 
the parts inside the mouth, both the throat and the 
tongue, immediately became blood-red and exhaled 
an unnatural and fetid breath. In the next stage 
sneezing and hoarseness came on, and in a short 
time the disorder descended to the chest, attended 
by severe coughing. And when it settled in the 
stomach, that was upset, and vomits of bile of every 
kind named by physicians ensued, these also attended 
by great distress; and in most cases ineffectual 
retching followed producing violent convulsions, 
which sometimes abated directly, sometimes not 
until long afterwards. Externally, the body was not 
so very warm to the touch; it was not pale, but 
reddish, livid, and breaking out in small blisters and 
ulcers. But internally it was consumed by such a 
heat that the patients could not bear to have on 
them the lightest coverings or linen sheets, but 
wanted to be quite uncovered and would have liked 
best to throw themselves into cold water—indeed 
many of those who were not looked after did throw 
themselves into cisterns—so tormented were they 
by thirst which could not be quenched; and it was 
all the same whether they drank much or little. 



Ud ea a , la) v € / ey ae 
6 Tov. Kal 7 aropia Tov pn Novxalely Kal 7 aypuU- 
, lal 
mvia éréxeito 61a TaVToOS. Kal TO THpma, boovTrep 
? \ id / > na > > , > > 
xpovov Kal 7 vocos akudfoL, OVK EuapalveTo, arr 
> nr \ & / fol / © aA 
avreiye Tapa Sofav 7H TadatTwpia, Wate 7 die- 
bOeipovto of TrcioToL évatator Kal EBSopaior iro 
a “ v / 
rod évtos Kavpatos)érs Eyovtés Te Suvdpews, 7 ef 
ra lal / 
Siadvyouev, emiKaTLovTOs TOD voonpaTtos és THY 
, 4 4, mp lal 
KOLMav Kal EAKWOEWS TE AUTH LayUpas éeyyLyvo- 
/ cc A / 
pens Kat Siappotas Gua axpatov énimimtovens 
e \ A / 
of moAXol VaoTEpor dia THY acHéveray died bei porto. 
/ \ \ \ ial , BA > / 
SveEner yap S1a TavtTos TOD cwpaTos avwbev ap—a- 
\ A a fal e \ U 
pevov TO év TH KEPAAH TP@Tov LOpvOev Kaxov, Kal 
x “~ / / al 
> la] / 
Typlwv avTirnw is avTov emEecnpawev" KATETKNTTE 
la vy a 
yap Kal és aidoia Kal és.dxpas xetpas Kat Todas, 
\ 5 \ / 4 / 3) ot 
Kal ToANOL oTEplaKopevor TOVTaV dLépevyor, eicl 
© la ’ lal \ 
8 of cal Trav 6b0aryav. Tovds dé Kai AHOn EXaBe 
TO TapauTixa avacTdvTas TavT@Y Opmolws Kal 
Ul al \ \ 
hyvoncay odds Te aUTOVS Kal TOUS ErriTNSELoUS. 
\ “ , a 
L. Tevouevov yap xpetocov Xoyou TO Eidos TIS 
U /, w / x \ \ > 
/ / / lol 
Opwrelay vow TpocémimTEv EXATTH Kal ev THEE 
Ud x x a / 
édnAwoe “adtoTAa aXXo TL OV H TOV EvyTpopav TL 
Ta yap Opvea kal TeTpdTroba boa avOpwrwv ante- 
a > / / xX > U a 
Tal TOAA@Y aTadwy YyEvo“EevwY 7) OU TpOTHEL 1 
, , / A lal 
yevodpueva SvepOeipero. Texunpiov O€& TeV meV 


BOOK II. xuix. 5-1. 2 

They were also beset by restlessness and sleeplessness 
which never abated. And the body was not wasted 
while the disease was at its height, but resisted sur- 
prisingly the ravages of the disease, so that when the 
patients died, as most of them did on the seventh or 
ninth day from the internal heat, they still had some 
strength left; or, if they passed the crisis, the 
disease went down into the bowels, producing there 
a violent ulceration, and at the same time an acute 
diarrhoea set in, so that in this later stage most of 
them perished through weakness caused by it. For 
the malady, starting from the head where it was first 
seated, passed down until it spread through the 
whole body, and if one got over the worst, it seized 
upon the extremities at least and left its marks 
there ; for it attacked the privates and fingers and 
toes, and many escaped with the loss of these, though 
some lost their eyes also.!. In some cases the sufferer 
was attacked immediately after recovery by loss of 
memory, which extended to every object alike, so 
that they failed to recognize either themselves or 
their friends. 

L. Indeed the character of the disease proved such 
that it bates description, the violence of the attack 
being in each case too great for human nature to 
endure, while in one way in particular it showed 
plainly that it was different from any of the familiar 
diseases: the birds, namely, and the fourfooted 
animals, which usually feed upon human bodies, 
either would not now come near them, though many 
lay unburied, or died if they tasted of them. The 
evidence for this is that birds of this kind became 

1 Evidently as the result of gangrene, due to stoppage of 
circulation. This after-effect of typhus was of common oc- 

currence in the outbreak in the Balkans in 1915. 


/ ’ / > / \ 2 / \ 
TOLOUT@Y opVvidwy éemireris TaPNs eyEVETO, KAL 
> e a ” ¥ 7 \ la OE . 
al ta lal > 
of Se KUVES paddov aicOnow Tapetyov TOU aTro- 
/ \ \ a 
Baivovtos da 70 Evvdiartac Oat. 
U \ A 
LI. To pév ody voonpa, ToANa Kai ada Tapa- 
/ / 
/ \ 7 , al 
povtws éTépw Tpos ETEpov yLyvomeEvov, TOLOUTOV Hv 
ee * n \ 3Q/ \ yy / , 
éml wav Thy idéav. Kal adAO TapeXvTEL KAT 
>’ val \ / b] \ lal b / a \ \ 
éxelvov Tov Ypovov ovdev TOV EiwOdTwv: O Sé Kal 
/ ’ rn b] / v \ € \ 
yévoito, és TovTO éTehevTa. EOvycKov dé of peEV 
> / e \ \ / f. A 
apereia, ot 5é Kai wavy Oepatrevopevot. Ev TE 
/ ’ a io! 
ovdev KatéoTn lama ws eitreiv 6 TL YpHVY TpocdgéE- 
- lal \ \ 
ovtas @derety (To yap tw Evveveyxov adXov 
ra ” an Vs 7 a > \ 
TovTO Brat TE), THUd Te aUTAapKEs Ov OvdEV SuE- 
/ \ > XN > / / x > , > \ 
avn mpos avTo iaxyvos Tépt 7) acGeveias, adda 
/ \ , , 
mavta Evynper Kal TA Tadoy OLaitn Oeparrevopeva, 
, . \ fa) a 
Secvotatov 5é TavtTos hv Tov KaKod 7} Te aOvpia, 
¢ U ” / \ \ \ 9. pf 
oToTe Tis alcOotTo Kapvev (Tpos yap 70 avén- 
‘ fal lal lal 
/ lal nm 
Rov mpolevto ohas avTovs Kal ovK avTeixoy), Kal 
Sti Erepos ad éEtépov Oepareia avarriprdapevot 
p pov Gepameta pda 
oe \ / BA \ \ an 
@oTep Ta TpoBata EOvncKoy: Kal TOV TELTTOV 
U fal b] / v \ War Fc TL : 
Odpov TodTo éverroier. elte yap pn “Bédorev Se- 
SuoTes GAANHAOLS Tpoclévat, UTwNAUYTO EphjLol, 
\ a of ocs , > , a 
Kal oixiat ToAAaL éexevwOnoav azropia Tov Gepa- 
/ » / 
mevcovtos: eite Tpociorev, SuepOeipovto, Kal pa- 


BOOK (IL) ni 2411. 5 

noticeably scarce, and they were no longer to be 
seen either about the bodies or anywhere else; 
while the dogs gave a still better opportunity to 
observe what happened, because they live with 

LI. Such, then, was the general nature of the 
disease ; for I pass over many of the unusual symp- 
toms, since it chanced to affect one man differently as 
compared with another. And while the plague lasted 
there were none of the usual complaints, though if 
any did occur it ended in this. Sometimes death 
was due to neglect, but sometimes it occurred in spite 
of careful nursing. And no one remedy was found, 
I may say, which was sure to bring relief to those 
applying it--for what helped one man hurt another 
—and no constitution, as it proved, was of itself 
sufficient against it, whether as regards physical 
strength or weakness,! but it carried off all without 
distinction, even those tended with all medical 
care. And the most dreadful thing about the 
whole malady was not only the despondency of 
the victims, when they once became aware that 
they were sick, for their minds straightway yielded 
to despair and they gave themselves up for lost 
instead of resisting, but also the fact that they 
became infected by nursing one another and died 
like sheep. And this caused the heaviest mor- 
tality ; for if, on the one hand, they were restrained 
by fear from visiting one another, the sick perished 
uncared for, so that many houses were left empty 
through lack of anyone to do the nursing; or if, on 
the other hand, they visited the sick, they perished, 

1 z.e. ‘‘no constitution was of itself strong enough to 
resist or weak enough to escape the attacks” (Jowett). 



e > A 4 > / \ 
Mata oi dpeTis TL peTAaTroLOvpevoL” aLoXYYD Yap 
5 I , a > la > \ \ f- 
nbeldovv ch@v avTav éalovtes Tapa Tous Pidous, 
3 lal 
érel kal tas ddodvpces TOV aTroyLyvopévwv Te- 
lal \ e la / fa lo) 
fal \ / > 
KaKkod viKkwpevol. él mAégov & Gpuws ot diaTre- 
/ / / \ 
devydtes Tov Te OvyocKovta Kal Tov TovoUpeEVvoD 
’ / \ \ dé \ > \ ” > 
@xtitovto Sia TO mpoedévatr Te Kal avTol HON eV 
= ‘al / 3 él \ \ > / if \ 
7@ Oapcaréw eivat’ dis yap TOV avTOV, WaTE Kal 
KTEelvelY, ovK ereAduBavev. Kal éwaxapifovTo TE 
e \ la BA \ > \ a a 
- \ Uj U / 
yapel Kal és Tov ererta xpovoy EATLOos TL Eixor 
/ >] x e- 7 ” , / »” 
Kovoys pnd av vr addov voonuatos ToTE ETL 
/ al \ A 
LII. ’Eriece & avtovs wadXov pos TO UIrdp- 
, \ A Qn = A 
YOVTL TOVM Kal 1) Evyxouid) éx TOV aypav és TO 
\ / a 
Gotu, Kal ovx Hocov Tovs émehOovTas. oLKL@D 
\ b) ¢e ca) b te | / a 
yap ovxX UTapXovTar, GAN év KadvPaLs Treynpals 
, e / / 
@pa eTous StarT@pEvwv 0 hOopos éyiyveto ovdevi 
Koop, GAda Kal vexpol éx’ arXAndoIs aTroOvy- 
oKovTes éxewvto Kal év Tais obots éxadivdodvTo Kai 
mept Tas Kpyvas amacas nuLOvires Tod bdatos 
ériOupia. tad Te iepa év ois eoxnvnvTo vexpav 
, 5 > Onc <9 Q : . 
Trea HV, avToD evaTroCvnTKLVT@DV" uTepBialo- 
lal a a b4 
yévov yap TOU KaKod ol dvOpwrot, ovK ExovTes 6 
/ / lal 
TL YEVOVTAL, €S Odtywpiav éTpadTrovTo Kal Lepa@v 
td / 
cal dclwv opoiws. vopor Te TdvTes Evvetapa- 
r / \ \ / 
yOncav ols éxpa@vTo MpoTepoy TEpt Tas Tapas, 


BOOK II. ur. 5-11. 4 

especially those who made any pretensions to good- 
ness. For these made it a point of honour to visit 
their friends without sparing themselves at a time 
when the very relatives of the dying, overwhelmed 
by the magnitude of the calamity, were growing 
weary even of making their lamentations. But still 
it was more often those who had recovered who had 
pity for the dying and the sick, because they had 
learnt what it meant and were themselves by this 
time confident of immunity; for the disease never 
attacked the same man a second time, at least not 
with fatal results. And they were not only con- 
gratulated by everybody else, but themselves, in the 
excess of their joy at the moment, cherished also a 
fond fancy with regard to the rest of their lives that 
they would never be carried off by any other disease. 

LII. But in addition to the trouble under which 
they already laboured, the Athenians suffered further 
hardship owing to the crowding into the city of the 
people from the country districts; and this affected 
the new arrivals especially. For since no houses 
were available for them and they had to live in huts 
that were stifling in the hot season, they perished in 
wild disorder. Bodies of dying men lay one upon 
another, and half-dead people rolled about in the 
streets and, in their longing for water, near all the 
fountains. The temples, too, in which they had 
quartered themselves were full of the corpses of those 
who had died in them; for the calamity which 
weighed upon them was so overpowering that men, 
not knowing what was to become of them, became 
careless of all law, sacred as well as profane. And 
the customs which they had hitherto observed re- 
garding burial were all thrown into confusion, and 



éVattov 5€ ws Exactos edvvaTo. Kal ToAXOl és 
avatayvvtous Onkas éTpadTovTo oTdve. TOV éT- 
/ \ \ \ ” / , 
Tnoelwy Oia TO GUXVOS On TpoTeOVavaL odhicw* 
» aes. \ \ b } / \ / 
éml Tupas yap adroTpias POdcavtes TOvs vyncav- 
/ La nr 
Tas ol pev erriOevtes TOV EaUT@Y VvEexpoyv UdHATTor, 
of 6€ Kalopévov aAXov érLiBadovtes avwOev dv 
héporey atrncav. 
lal \ s ~ 
LIII. Ilp@tov re jpEe Kai és TAXA TH Tore 
ee rE > / \ , a 5a \ ’ or 
él TA€OV avouias TO VOoNMAa. pdov yap éToApa 
a , 5 , \ > 
Tis & TpoTepov amexpUTTeTO pn Kal Hdovny 
lal \ e lal al 
Tove, ayxliaTtpopov THY meTaBorAnY opayTes TOV 
/ Ld lal 
Te evoarmoveyv Kal aipvidiws OvncKortay Kal TOV 
oveevy mpoTepov KexTnpévwv, evOrs 5é TaKeivwr 
/ \ / 
\ / a / 
TO TepTvoyv nElovy TroetcOaL, Ednuepa Ta TE TO- 
\ \ lA e / / 
Hata Kal Ta YpHU“ATA oOMoiws HYyoUpevoL. Kal TO 
pev Tpotadaitwpeiv! To SoEavTt KAX@ OvSels TpO- 
> + / > \ a... aN Ss val 
Oupos nv, Adnrov vouifwv et mplv ém’ avTo €dOeiv 
/ ef \ e \ / 
SitapOapycetat, 6 Te dé On Te 750 TavTaydbev TE 
a \ \ 
és avTO KEepdaXd€ov, TOTO Kal KadOV Kal YpHoLpov 
, A \ , a“ , , ’ 
KkatéoTn. Oeav dé poBos 7} avOpw@rwv vomos ov- 
ral \ / e / 
dels aTreipye, TO meV KpLvOVTES Ev Opotw Kal oéBeww 
fa) e lal 
Kal fn €K TOU TavTas opav ev iow aTrOAAUpEVOUS, 
n \ e / > \ > / / fal 
Ta@v O€ auapTnudTwv ovdels EATriSMY pEexXpL TOU 

1 With CE, the other MSS. mrpoorada:rwpeir. 

1 ¢.e, they concealed the fact that they were acting after 
their own pleasure (the uh being induced by the negative 
idea in awexpUmrero). 


BOOK II. in. 4—-Lm1. 4 

they buried their dead each one as he could. And 
many resorted to shameless modes of burial because 
so many members of their households had already 
died that they lacked the proper funeral materials. 
Resorting to other people’s pyres, some, anticipating 
those who had raised them, would put on their own 
dead and kindle the fire; others would throw the 
body they were carrying upon one which was already 
burning and go away. 

LIII. In other respects also the plague first in- 
troduced into the city a greater lawlessness. For 
where men hitherto practised concealment, that 
they were not acting purely after their pleasure,! 
they now showed a more careless daring. They 
saw how sudden was the change of fortune in the 
case both of those who were prosperous and _ sud- 
denly died, and of those who before had nothing 
but in a moment were in possession of the pro- 
perty of the others. And so they resolved to get 
out of life the pleasures which could be had 
speedily and would satisfy their lusts, regarding their 
bodies and their wealth alike as transitory. And 
no one was eager to practise self-denial in prospect 
of what was esteemed honour,? because everyone 
thought that it was doubtful whether he would live 
to attain it, but the pleasure of the moment and 
whatever was in any way conducive to it came to be 
regarded as at once honourable and expedient. No 
fear of gods or law of men restrained; for, on the 
one hand, seeing that all men were perishing alike, 
they judged that piety and impiety came to the same 
thing, and, on the other, no one expected that he 

2 Or, reading rpocrada:twpeiv, ‘to take trouble about what 
was esteemed honour.” 



, , \ A \ / > a 
dixny yevecOar Biovs av THY Tiwwpiay avTidodvat, 
/ / lal 
morv O€ pelfm THY 76n KaTeWndioperny opav 
nr a \ 3 fal 
eTriKpewacOnvat, Vv Tpiv eumecelty eLKos Elvat TOU 
Biov Tt avroXadoat. 
\ e al 
LIV. Torovtm pév aber ot “AOnvaio. trepitre- 
, ] / ’ 4 D4 9 / 
coves émélovto, avOpwTwv Tt évdov OvncKovtwv 
\ a ” / ’ = lal al e rd \ 
Kal ys &Ew Snovpévns. év 58 TO KaK@ ola eiKos 
al na e 
aveuwncOncav Kai Tovde Tod érous, HdoKovTEs ot 
/ 7 v , 
mpeaBvtepot Tadat adecbat ” HEer Awpiaxos 10- 
Py \ * x re > oO ” b i \ > 4 
ELLOS KAL AOLWOS Gp avT@. éyévEeTO meV Od EpLs 
an , \ \ , is la 
Tots avOpwrros pt) Aotwov @vouacOat ev TO Erret 
e \ a la) > \ , > -F Nip oDLLA rn 
, su y \ I A € \ ” 
TAPOVTOS ELKOTWS oLpov ELpHabat ot yap avOpo- 
/ ral 
ep Q 
5€ ye olwat Tote aXXos TOAEMOS KaTAaNaBn Aow- 
\ a ef \ a / , 
plixos tovde tatepos Kal EvpBH yevécOar Armor, 
KATA TO €LKOS OUTWS dooVTaL. pun Oe éyévETO 
n /, / a 
kai Tov Aakedaipoviwy xpnotnpiou Tots eidocuyr, 
4 al \ a 
OTe ETEpwTHoW avTois Tov Oeov Eb YpH TONEMELY 
rn n ‘4 
aVetNe KATA KPaTOS TOAELOVGL ViKkny écecOat, Kar 
\ Ss a 
autos épn EvdAXrppecOat. TreEpl wév odv Tod ypn- 
/ \ b) e al 
oTNplLov TA yuyvoueva tKalov omota elvat: éoBe- 
\ lal 4 € 4 ” 
PrnxoTwv bé Tov IleXoTovynTiwv 7 vocos %}pEaTO 
evOus. Kal és wev IleXotrovynoov ovK éanrOev, 6 
\ ” > nr > / ee. / \ 
TL Kat afvov eitretv, émreveiwato de "AOnvas pev 

1 of. I. cxviii. 3. 


BOOK II. uit. 4-tiv. 5 

would live to be called to account and pay the penalty 
of his misdeeds. On the contrary, they believed that 
the penalty already decreed against them, and now 
hanging over their heads, was a far heavier one, and 
that before this fell it was only reasonable to get 
some enjoyment out of life. 

LIV. Such then was the calamity that had befallen 
them by which the Athenians were sore pressed, 
their people dying within the walls and their land 
being ravaged without. And in their distress they 
recalled, as was natural, the following verse which 
their older men said had long ago been uttered : 

* A Dorian war shall come and pestilence with it.” 

A dispute arose, however, among the people, some 
contending that the word used in the verse by the 
ancients was not XAomds, “pestilence,” but Arpds, 
‘famine,’ and the view prevailed at the time that 
“pestilence’”” was the original word; and quite 
naturally, for men’s recollections conformed to their 
sufferings. But if ever another Dorian war should 
visit them after the present war and a famine 
happen to come with it, they would probably, I fancy, 
recite the verse in that way. Those, too, who were 
familiar with it, recalled that other oracle given to the 
Lacedaemonians, when, in answer to their inquiry 
whether they should go to war, the god responded 
that if they “warred with all their might victory 
would be theirs,” adding that he himself would 
assist them.! Now so far as the oracle is concerned, 
they surmised that what was then happening was 
its fulfilment, for the plague broke out immediately 
after the Peloponnesians had invaded Attica; and 
though it did not enter the Peloponnesus to any 
extent, it devastated Athens most of all, and next 



udduoTa, émetta 5€ Kal TOY AAV YopioY Ta 
To\vavOpwToTaTa. TavTa wey TA KATA THY VOTO 

LV. Of 6é Tlerorovynacor émrel6n eTeEHLOV TO 
Tmedlon, Tapi Gor € és THY Udpanov yi Kadoupevny 
HEX pL Aavpetov, ob Ta apyvpeva péTar|a coTW 
"AOnvaiors. Kal Tp@TOv pev ETE{LOV TAUTNY D 
qT pos Tlehorrovunaov opa, émerta dé THY pos 
EvBorav te ral “Avs pov TET pampwevny. Tlepuxdfjs 
6e oTpatnyos @v Kal TOTE mepl pev TOD 7) émeEt- 
éva TOUS “AOnvatous THY AUTHVY yv@punv Elyev 
MoTrEp Kal év TH TpoTepa éo Bon}. 

LVI. "Ett 3 avtav év TO wedi OvT@V, T pW 
és TV Tapariav édOeiv, ExaTov veov émim)houv 
TH IleXotovyntm tapeoKevateto, Kal érrerdy 
"AOnvatwy Tetpakicyirious Kal imméas TpLako- 
cious €v vavolv intaywyols Tpa@Tov TOTE ek TOV 
TARALOY veo mounbeia ats: Evvertparevovto dé 
Kat Xiou Kal Aéo Bro TEVTHKOVTA vavoiv. OTe oe 
aVIYETO 1) OTpAaTLA AUTH "AOnvaior, IleXozrop- 
vnotouvs KatédLTOY THS “ATTLKIS Ovtas év TH 
Tapania. ap Lk owEvoL d€ és ‘Emridaupov TAS TleXo- 
THY TONW 7 poo Banovtes és éhmida pev mprOov 
“TOD éheiv, ou pévToL Tpouxwpnaé ye. avayayo- 
pevor O€ €K TAS. ‘Exridavpou € eTe MOV THY TE Tpobn- 
vida yy kat “Adiada Kal ‘Epmwovida: éote O€ 
tavta mavta émiBardocta THs Ledotovyncov. 
dpavtes 6€ am’ avTav adixovto és IIpacids, Tis 


BOOK II. tiv. 5-tv1. 6 ‘ 


to Athens the places which had the densest popula- | 

tion. So much for-the. history of the plague. ) 

LV. The Peloponnesians, after ravaging tleplain, 

advanced into the district called Paralus} as far as . 

Laurium, m, where are the silver mines of the Athe- X 
nians. And first they ravaged that part of this 
district which looked towards the Peloponnesus, and 
afterwards the part facing Euboea and Andros. But 
Pericles, who was general, still held to the same 
policy as during the earlier invasion, insisting that 
the Athenians should not take the field against 


LVI. InbPerces y had left the plain and entered 
the Paralus,-Pericles liad begun to equip a fleet of a 
hundred ships to sai against the-Peloponnésus, ‘and 
when all was ready he put to sea. He took with 
him on the ships four thousand Athenian hoplites 
and three hundred cavalry in horse-transports, then 
employed for the first time, which had been made 
out of the old galleys. The Chians and Lesbians 
also took part in the expedition with fifty ships. 
And when this armament of the Athenians put to 
sea, the Peloponnesians whom they left in Attica 
were-alt ady in the Paralian district. On reaching 
Epidaurus jn the Peloponnesus the Athenians ra- 
Soin most of that land; they also attacked the city, 
but, though they at first had hopes of taking it, they 
did not succeed. Then, leaving Epidaurus, they went 
to sea again, and ravaged the territory of Troezeny 
~Halieis, and_Hermione, which are all on the Pélo- 
ponnésian coast. ~ “Siting next from this region they 
1 The plain referred to was that about Athens, while the 

Paralian district was the sea-coast, or south-eastern part, 
terminating in the promontory of Sunium, 



Aakwvinns trordtcpa émiOardootov, Kal THs TE 
ys Etewov Kal avTO TO TOALTMA EiNOV Kal eTOp- 
Oncav. tadta dé Toucavtes é€7 vixov avexo- 
pncay. Tous 6€ Terorovyncious OUKETL KatéhaPov 
€v TH ‘Arrixh 6 OVTAS, aXn’ avaxexopnKoras. 

LVIL. “Ocov &é _Xpévov ot TE TeXomovynccoe 
Hoav év TH oH TH ‘AOnvatov Kal OL "AOnvaior 
eo TpaTevov érl TOY VEwY, 1) yoo os év Te 7H oTpa- 
TUG TOUS ‘A@nvaious EbOerpe Kal év TH TOXEL, dare 
Kal er€xOn TOUS Iedorovynaious deicavras TO 
yoonpa, @s éemuvOavovro TOV aUTOMONY 6Te év 
TH) TONEL ein kat Qantovtas dpa no Oavovro, 
Oaacov €x TIS vis efedGeiv. ™] be ea Bony TaUTy 
TAEeio TOV Te x povoy évéwetvav Kal THY YiVv TWacay 
ETEMOV* Huepas yap TEToapaKoVTA adioTa ev TH 
yn tH Attixn éyévovto. 

LVIIL. Tod & atdtod Oépous”Ayvev o Nixiov 
kai KXedroutos 0 KnXewiov, Evatpatnyor ovtes 
Ilepixdé€ovs, AaBovtes THD oTpaTiapv HITEp €KELVOS 
eXpncaro éoTpatevoay evOvs emt Xark«idéas Tous 
eri Opakns Kal Tloretéavay ¢ eTL TON OPKOUMEVNY, 
ah ixopevor dé pnxavas Té 7H Llotedaia mpoce- 
pepov Kai Tavrl TpoTre eT ELPOVTO édelv. ™ pou- 
ywpe. 5€ avtois ovTEe 7 alpeois THS TONES OUTE 
TaAXNa THS TapagKevys akiws: emiyevoméevn yap 
¢€ / > rn \ / >’ / \ ] 

7) voros évtavla on mavu émlece TOUS A@n- 
vaious, b0eipovea THY oT parlay, @OTE KAL TOUS 
T poTepous oT paTLoTas vooncar TAV ‘AGnvaiwy 
amo THs Ew “Ayvovt otpatias év T@ TPO TOD 

1 On the expedition against the Peloponnesian coasts, cy. 
ch. lvi. 8 of, ie bales 


BOOK II. tv. 6-tvut. 2 

came ito Prasiae,/a town on the coast of Laconia, \_ 
where they not-only_ravaged parts of the country, ~* 
f but also captured the town itself™and’ pillaged ite. 
After they had completed these operations they went / 
_ back home, where they found that the Peloponne- 
._Sians were no longer in Attica but had retired. _ 
~ LVII. During this entire period, While the Pelo- 
ponnesians were in Attica and the fleet of the Athe- 
nians was on the expedition, the plague was making 
havoc among the Athenians, both in their fleet and 
in the city. The statement was therefore made that 
the Peloponnesians left Attica in haste because they 
were afraid of the disease, since they not only heard 
from deserters that it was in the city, but also could 
see them burning their dead. In this invasion, how- 
ever, they remained in Attica longer than at any 
other time, and also ravaged the entire country ; 
indeed they.were in Attica almost forty days. 
~~LEVITI. In the.same summer Hagnon son ot 
Nicias and Cleopompus son of Clinias; Colleagues 
of Pericles, taking the armament which he had 
employed,! at once set out on an expedition 
against the Chalcidians in Thrace and against Poti- 
festa wae ga under siegé;?” Sha OH their 
arrival..they brought siege-engines to bear upon 
Potidaea, and tried in every way to take it. But no 
success commensurate with the appointments of the 
expedition attended their efforts, either in their at- 
_ tempt to capture the city or otherwise; for the 
' plague broke out and sorely distressed the Athenians 
“there, playing such havoc in the army that even the 
Athenian soldiers of the first expedition, who had 
hitherto been in good health, caught the infection 

* The 3,000 soldiers of the first expedition ; cf. ch. xxxi. 2 
and 1. lxi. 4. 



, e / / \ \ e-ie¢ , 
Ypove Uytaivovtas. Dopptwv dé Kat o1 eEaxdovor 
| / > / = \ / ec A 
Kal xidton ovKéTL Hoav Tepi Xadxioéas. oO pev 
= ad > 4 la \ > \ > , 
otv “Ayvav aveywpnoe Tats vavolv és Tas A@n- 
, e lal 
na / / 
/ fal 
parloTa Npépais' ob S€ TpoTEpoL oTpaTLM@TaL 
/ A 
KaTa Yopav jévovTes erodLopKovy THY Ilotet- 
/ a 
LIX. Mera 6€ tiv devtépay écBornv Ttav 
/ ’ lal fal a 
IleXorrovynciwyv ot “A@nvaior, as } Te yh avTov 
érétunto To SevTEepov Kal 7) vooos eTéxetTO awa 
\ e / > / 4.4 , \ \ 
\ / > > / > e / al 
pev Tlepixréa év aitia eixov ws Telcavta odds 
moNeuety Kat OL éxetvov tais Evydopats trepr- 
memTwKOTES, mpos O€ Tovs Aaxedatpoviovs wp- 
a \ / \ 
unvto Evyywpeiv: Kal mpéoBes Tivas TréwWavTes 
@s auToUs ampaxtor éyévovto. Tavtaxobev Te 
a ’ / a 
Th yvoun aropo. KabeotnKoTes evéxetvTO TO 
lal e r 
Tlepixre?. 0 O€ op@y avTov’s Tpds Ta TapovTa 
yakeTalvovtas Kal TavTa ToLodYTAS aTrEp AUTOS 
Hrmite, EVANoyov moijcas (éte 8 e€atpaTnyet) 
bp] 4 a / \ > \ ‘ >? / 
€BovreTo Oapcivai Te Kal aTayayav TO 
a , \ \ 
pevov THS yvouNsS Tpos TO HrLw@TEpov Kai ade- 
/ a \ a / 
éotepov kataothoar trapedOwv dé EdeEe Tordoe. 
LX. “Kal mpocdeyopév@ por Ta THs opyhs 
cal \ 
tev & we yeyévntat (aicOdvopat yap Tas aitias) 
Kal é€xxAnoiav tovtov évexa Evvynyayov, Sas 
e / \ / y re, a a ? \ 
UTopvijcw Kal péurpopar el Te py oplas 7 epol 

BOOK II. tvin. 2- Lx. 1 

from Hagnon’s troops. Phormio, however, and his 
sixteen hundred men, were no longer in Chalcidice.} 
Accordingly Hagnon took his fleet back to Athens, 
having lost by the plague in about forty days one 
thousand and fifty out of a total of four thousand 
hoplites ; but the soldiers of the former expedition 
remained where they were and Es the or 
of Potidaea.- ' 
LIX. After the second invasion of ct a a 
_sians.the.Athenians underwent_a change of feeling, 

now that their land had been ravaged a a second time _ 

while the plague and the war combined lay heavily 
upon them. They blamed. Pericles for having per- 
suaded them to go to war and held him responsible 
for the misfortunes which had befallen them, and 
were eager to come to an agreement with the Lace- 
daemonians. They even sent envoys to them, but 
accomplished nothing... And now, being altogether 
at their wits’ end, they assailed Pericl And when——\ 
he saw that they were exasperated eth: si ca 
situation and were acting exactly as he had himself 
expected, he called a meeting of the assembly—for 
he was still general—wishing to reassure them, and 
by ridding their minds of resentment to bring them 
to a milder and less timorous mood. So he came 
forward and spoke as follows: 

LX. “I have been expecting these manifestations 
of your wrath against me, knowing as I do the causes 
of your anger, and my purpose in calling an assembly 
was that I might address to you certain reminders, 
and remonstrate if in any case you are either angry 

1 of. 1. lxiv. 2. Phormio’s departure must have occurred 
before the events described in ch, xxxi.2, but is nowhere 

VOL. I. n 36% 


2 yareraivete H Tails Evpdopais elxete. eyw yap 
3 n / / , ’ , b] 
Hyobpar TOALY TAELw EVuTTacay opfovpévynv we- 
ety Tous idtoTas 7 Kal” ExacToVv TOY TONTAV 

3 evrpayodoay, aOpoav 5é cdhadropévnv. Karas 
pev yap hepopevos avnp To Kal” éavtov diadGerpo- 

, a , OA e 
pévns THS matpidoos ovdév Haocov EvvaTroddvTat, 
Kaxotuxav 6€ éy evTUXovan TOAX@ paddov 
e / ‘ 
4 diacwbetat. omdTe ovv ods pev Tas tdtas 
\ / / Ka \ @ \ b] / 
Evudopas ola Te héperv, els b€ Exactos Tas éxeivns 
advvatos, TAS ov Xpn TaVTAS apvvEe AUTH, Kab 
un 0 vov tues Opate, Tals Kat olKov Kaxo- 
b] / \ b] / \ / 6 
adiecOe, kal éué TE TOV TapalvécavTa TroNEpEtY 

/ 4 

\ e a > \ \ / > ’ 
Kal vas avTtovs of Evvéyvwte Ov aitias éyere. 
5 / b] \ / > 5 \ > he Q 0 i) ¥ 
Kaitot éuol TowovT@ avdpt opyiferbe Os ovdevos 
a / \ 
oocwv olouar eivat yvavat te Ta Séovta Kai 
e lal ca / / \ / 
épunvedoat Tavta, pidoTroNls Te Kal YpnuaTov 
, ec \ \ \ \ a 8 é / 
6 Kpeicowv. 6 TE Yap YvouS Kai wn caps didakas 
> ” \ > A» @ 10 + ce ” > Ul 
év iow Kal ef pur) eveOusnOn 0 Te Exwv apdorepa, 
rf \ / , > xX e i > / 
TH 5€ modes SvavOUS, OVK AY OMolwS TL OlKELwS 
/ , de \ DO 4 de 
dpalor' mpocovtos o€ Kat Tovde, Ypnpmact de 
7 \ lal 
vikwpevov, TA EVYTavta TovTOU Eves av TwRoOtTO. 
vf ’ v \ / e / an € / 
ral al / 
mpoceivat avTa Trodemety emelcOnTe, ovK ay 
a lo) a 2 i? / 
ELKOTWS VoV TOU ye abdLKElV aitiay hepoiuny. 

BOOK II. ux. 1-7 

with me or are giving way to your misfortunes with- 
out reason. For in my judgment a state confers a 

eater benefit upon its private citizens when as 
a whole commonwealth it is successful, than when 
it prospers as regards the individual but fails as a 
community. For even though a man flourishes in 
his own private affairs, yet if his country goes to 
ruin he perishes with her all the same; but if he is 
in evil fortune and his country in good fortune, he is 
far more likely to come through safely. Since, then, 
the state may bear the misfortunes of her private 
citizens but the individual cannot bear hers, surely 
all men ought to defend her, and not to do as you 
are now doing—proposing to sacrifice the safety of 
the commonwealth because you are dismayed by the 
hardships you suffer at home, and are blaming both 
me who advised you to make war and yourselves who 
voted with me for it. And yet I, with whom you 
are angry, am as competent as any man, I think, 
both to determine upon the right measures and to 
expound them, and as good a patriot and superior to 
the influence of money. For he who determines 
upon a policy, and fails to lay it clearly before others, 
is in the same case as if he never had a conception 
of it; and he who has both gifts, but is disloyal to 
his country, cannot speak with the same unselfish 
devotion ; and if he have loyalty also, but a loyalty 
that cannot resist money, then for that alone every- 
thing will be on sale. If, therefore, when you al- 
lowed me to persuade you to go to war, you believed 
that I possessed these qualities even in a moderate 
degree more than other men, it is unreasonable that 
I should now bear the blame, at any rate, of wrong- 




LXI. “Kai yap ois pev aipeois yeyévnrat 
> ral a A y > \ lal / e 
avayKatov mv % elEavtas evOus Tols TéXAS UTTa- 

a / e 
Kovcal 1) KIvOuvEevoaYTas TepLyevéc Gal, 0 puyav 
>. \ \ e I , > \ ’ ’ , e ~ \ 
éya@ pev 0 autos eis Kal ovK éFiotapat: vpets O€ 
peTaParreTe, every EvvéByn vpiv wercOjvar pev 

aKepaiows, metauédew S€ KaKovpévols, Kal TOV 
é“ov AOyo ev TO UpeTepw acUevet THs yvouns by 
= \ , , \ \ ~ Mv A 
opOov daiverGat, dudte TO pwev AVTTODY EXEL 7d 

\ v ce y a \ > / bd 
tThv aicOnow éxdoto, THs S€ @deNAS aTrEeoTLV 
y € / ‘ae \ cal / 
éte 7) OnX\wols Aract, Kal weTaBorANs peyarys, 

, \ n 
Kal TavTns €E& driyou, éuTrecovaons TaTrELYN ULaV 
9) Olavola éeyKapTepely & Eyvwte. SovAol yap 
dpovnua TO aidvidiov Kat aTpocddoKntov Kat TO 

+ / X06 nr J aA r * rd 
TrELTT@ Taparoywo EvuPaivov: 0 amiv mpos Tots 

addols ovY HKLgTAa Kal KATA THY VOTOV yeyEvNnTaL. 
fod \ / / > fal \ > Bl 
Guws 6€ TOAW peydAnV oixoUYTas Kal év 7OecLV 
avTiTadols avThH TeOpampévous ypewv kal Evp- 
r rn , by / e / \ 
ghopais tais peylotais eOédhew wdiotacOar Kai 

\ > , \ > / pI » \ 

Thy akiwow pn apavitery (ev iow yap ot avOpwrot 
rn nr e | lal 
dixalovar THS Te vTapyovons SoEns aitiacOat 

yu 2 iS Ba) Tpoonkovon 
Qr \ / >) , / 
pucety Tov OpacvTyTL Opeyouevoy), aTaNynoavTas 

1 Described by Pericles in the Funeral Oration, chs. 


BOOK II. tx1. 1-4 

LXI. “For though I admit that going to war is 
always sheer folly for men who are free to choose, 
and in general are enjoying good fortune, yet if the 
necessary choice was either to yield and forthwith 
submit to their neighbours’ dictation, or by accepting 
the hazard of war to preserve their independence, 
then those who shrink from the hazard are more 
blameworthy than those who face it. For my part, 
I stand where I stood before, and do not recede from 
my position; but it is you who have changed. For 
it has happened, now that you are suffering, that you 
repent of the consent you gave me when you were 
still unscathed, and in your infirmity of purpose my 
advice now appears to you wrong.’ The reason is 
that each one of, you is already sensible of his 
hardships, whereas the proof of the advantages is 
still lacking to all, and now that a great reverse has 
come upon you without any warning, you are too 
dejected in mind to persevere in your former re- 
solutions. For the spirit is cowed by that which 
is sudden and unexpected and happens contrary 
to all calculation ; and this is precisely the experi- 
ence you have had, not only in other matters, but 
especially as regards the plague. Nevertheless, see- 
ing that you are citizens of a great city and have 
been reared amid customs which correspond to her 
greatness, you should willingly endure even the 
greatest calamities and not mar your good fame. 
For as all men claim the right to detest him who 
through presumption tries to grasp a reputation to 
which he has no title, so they equally claim a right 
to censure him who through faintheartedness fails to 
live up to the reputation he already enjoys. You 
should, rather, put away your grief for private ills 



\ \ a fa n 
5€ Ta ida TOU KoWOD THS CwTHpias avTiAapBa- 
LXII. “Tov 5€ rovov tov cata Tov Todepor, 
: / / \ \ > \ lat s 
Hn YevnTal TE TOADS Kal Ovdev MaAXOV TreEpLyEeva- 
sea, apKeLTo ev Vuiv Kal éxeiva év ols aNXOTE 
/ \ > / > > la} - ee. e 
ToAAaKLS ye 61 aTréderEa OvK OPO@S avTOV UTO- 
, / \ x 7©e fod an 
TTEvopevov, Onrwow Sé Kal TOde, 6 pot SoKEiTE 
ouT avtol mwrote évOvunOnvar trapxov bpiv 
x a 
peyeOous mépt és THY apXnY OUT éyw év Tots pW 
Noyoss ovd av viv éypnoduny KxouTwbdectépav 
2 Uuas Tapa TO elKos EWpwv. olecbe ev yap TOV 
4 / 54 DJ \ \ >? / 7 
Evpudywv povev adpyew, éy@ dé arodaivw dvo 
Mep@v TOV és Yphow havepav, ys Kal Oardoons, 
TOD éTépov vUuas TavTOS KUpLwTaTOUS dVTas, ed’ 
¢ fal , \ A rPyas. / a 
dcov Te viv véyerOe Kat Hv él TrEéov BovAnOATe: 
kal ovx éotiv Gots TH UTAapYOVeH TapacKevT 
bY 2Q\ 4 n > A / , 
@AXo ovdev EOvos TaV év T@ TApovTt K@AVCEL, 
@y peydrwv vouibete eotepnabat, attn 7 Svvapis 
daivetar' ovd eixds yareTas hépery aVT@Y par- 
x > , \ > , , 
? a a 
Tpos TavTNV vouicavTas OALYwpHoaL Kal yvavaL 
> / / A > / >? nr 
éLevOepiay pév, Hv avTiNapBavopuevor avThs S1a- 
, € , an b / A \ 
cocwLEV, padiws TAVTA avadnWouerny, adrwv dé 

1 cf. ch. xiii and I. exl-cxliv. 

366 \ x oe 

BOOK II. vx1. 4-Lx. 3 

and devote yourselves to the safety of the common- 

LXII. “ As to the hardships involved in this war, 
and your misgivings lest they prove very great and 
we succumb after all, let those arguments suffice 
which I have advanced on many other occasions! in 
order to convince you that your fears are groundless. 
But there is one point I propose to lay before you 
on which, 1 think, you have never yourselves as yet 
reflected, in spite of the advantage it gives you as 
regards your empire and its greatness, and which I 
have never previously dealt with in my speeches, 
and should not have done so now—for it makes a ~ 
somewhat boastful claim—had I not seen that you 
are unreasonably dejected. You think that it is only 
over your allies that your empire extends, but I 
declare that of two divisions of the world which lie 
open to man’s use, the land and the sea, you hold 
the absolute mastery over the whole of one, not 
only to the extent to which you now exercise it, 
but also to whatever fuller extent you may choose; 
and there is no one, either the Great King or 
any nation of those now on the earth, who will 
block your path as you sail the seas with such a 
naval armament as you now possess. This power, 
therefore, is clearly not to be compared with the 
mere use of your houses and fields, things which you 
_ value highly because you have been dispossessed of 
them; nor is it reasonable that you should fret about 
them, but you should make light of them, regarding 
them in comparison with this power as a mere flower- 
garden or ornament of a wealthy estate, and should 
recognize that freedom, if we hold fast to it and 
preserve it, will easily restore these losses, but let 



\ a 
UTakovoact Kal Ta TpoKexTnueval direiv édac- 
lal “ \ 
covcGal, TOY TE TATEPWY p47) YElLpovs KaT apdo- 
a "\ \ 4 \ > , v 
Tepa havijvat, ol peta TOVMY Kal Ov Tap adwY 
deEdwevo, Katéoyov Te Kal TpoTéeTL SiacwoaytTes 
£5 Ci ee > / y be 4 > 
Tapedocay vyuiv avTa (aicxtoy O€ ExovTas adat- 
rn xX ra na 
peOnvat  KTwpévous atuxjaat), lévar bé Tols 
a e / 
€xPpots omoce pn dpovnpwate povov, adda Kal 
KaTappovnuatis avynua pev yap Kal aro aua- 
/ > lal \ fal >’ / 
Gias evtvyovs Kal Sere tive eyyiyveta, KaTa- 
/ rn 
Ppovnas de Os av Kal yy@pun TLoTEVH T@V évavTiov 
/ aA e an e / a’ \ / > \ 
fal e / / 4 lal P 
THS omotas TUyNns 7 Evveris Ex TOV vTépppovos 
éxupwtépav Tapéyetat, eXmid. TE HoTOV TLaTEvVEL, 
hs €v TO aTOpwn iaxvs, yuoOun O€ ATO TOY UTAp- 
4 2 / € j 
YovTav, ns BeBaoTépa n Tpovora. 
fol / lal A 
LXIII. “Tis te rodkews buds eixos TO TLMO- 
/ > \ la) v e iA >? / 
HEV@ aTrO TOU apxXeEL, OTEP ATaVTES ayadreaOe, 
i \ \ , \ / a \ \ 
Bonbetv, cat pr pevyerv Tovs Trovous 7 pndé Tas 
\ / é 
Tyas Si@Kerv’ unde vopicar Trept évos povov, Sov- 
, / 
elas avT édevOepias, aywviferPar, adra Kal 
Q » 1o. b] . »” e cal 5A 4 
yOGecbe. 1s ovd éxorihvat Ett bpiv Eotwy, et Tus 
\ , ) nw ‘ \ > , 
kal Tobe €v T@ Tapovte Sedi@s atpaypoovvyn 

1 So most editors with Gmc; all other MSS. mpocexrn- 
péva except M mpookexrnu€va. 


BOOK II. vxu. 3-Lx111. 2 

men once submit to others and even what has been 
won in the past! has a way of being lessened. 
You must therefore show yourselves not inferior 
in either of these two respects to your fathers, who 
by their own labours, and not by inheritance, not 
only acquired but also preserved this empire and 
bequeathed it to you (and it is a greater disgrace 
to let a possession you have be taken away than 
it is to attempt to gain one and fail); and you 
must go to meet your enemies not only with con- 
fidence in yourselves, but with contempt for them. 
For even a coward, if his folly is attended with good 
luck, may boast, but contempt belongs only to the 
man who is convinced by his reason that he is superior 
to his opponents, as is the case with us. And, where 
fortune is impartial, the result of this feeling of con- 
tempt is to render courage more effective through 
intelligence, that—puts its trust not so much in 
hepe,-which-is strongest in perplexity, as in reason 
supported by the facts, which gives a surer insight 
into the future. 

LXIIT. “You may reasonably be expected, more- . 
over, to support the dignity which the state has at- 
tained through empire—a dignity in which you all 
take pride—and_not to avoid its burdens, unless you 
resign its honours also. Nor must you think that 
you are fighting for the simple issue of slavery or 
freedom; on the contrary, loss of empire is also in- 
volved danger from the hatred incurred in your 
sway. | From this empire, however, it is too late for 
you even to withdraw, if any one at the present crisis, 
through fear and shrinking from action does indeed 

1 Or, reading ra mpocextnuéva, ‘‘freedom and all that 
freedom gives” (= mpds tH @AcvOepla Kextnuéva, as Poppo 



/ \ ¥ 
avipayabiferary ws tupavvida yap dn eyete 
> / aA a \ a é art? >? al 
avTnyv, hv AaBety pev adixov Soxel eivat, adetvat 

/ ° fal 
dé émixivduvoy. TadyioT av TE TOXLVY OL TOLODTOL 
> / , 
a rn / > s \ \ ” 
\ \ a , 
pov ov ao@leTar pn peta Tov dSpactnpiov teTay- 
7 U , 
pévov, ovdé év apxovon mrorer Evydéper, adr’ év 
lal / 
tmnkow, aoparas dSovrevewy. 
e o \ lal lal 
LXIV. “‘Twuets 5€ wnte vTd TOV ToL@vde TrONL- 
a / b] A ] ’ a lj 
Tov TapayerOe pute ewe du’ opyns EyeTe, @ Kal 
> \ f - > A 42 fe ¢€ 
auto Evydséyvwte Trodepety, et Kal erred Oovtes ot 
9 , ” ef 5 aN 3 Ve, 3 , 
évavtiot épacav atrep eixos Hv pty €OeXynoavTov 
“ , , , 2 
tpav UTaKovelv, eTlyeyevNTAL TE TEPAa WY TpOG- 
/ r / \ cal 
edeyouc0a 1 vooos de, Tpaypa jpovoy 5) TeV 
mTavtTwy é€ATiOos Kpelacov yeyevnuevov. Kal Sv 
Bus 9% sM , a ” rn > 
\ . 4 
Sixaiws, eb un Kal OTaY Tapa Noyov TL Ev TpaENTE 
b] \ > Q / / be \ / Py / 
euot avalnoete. epe O€ ven Ta TE OaLmovla 
\ a / 
avaykaiws Tad TE aTO TOV TodELioV avdpEiws: 
al \ > »” lal a / ‘ ‘ @ 
taita yap év Ge: tHOE TH TOAEL TPOTEPOY TE HY 
Lal al nw Lal \ 
vov Te 7 €v Luly KwWAVOH. vate O€ Gvoma péeyt- 
oTov auTiv éxovoay év dtacw av petro. 81a TO 
tais Evudhopais un elke, TrEtoTAa b€ cwOpuaTa Kal 
Tovous avnrwxévat TOAEL, Kal SUVapLY pEeyioTNY 
a / a 
57) pméxpt TODSE KEKTNMEVHY, HS €s aldLov ToIs éTTL- 

1 Dobree deletes, followed by Hude, 

BOOK II, txt. 2-Lxiv. 3 

seek thus to play the honest man; for by this time 
the empire you hold is a tyranny, which it may seem 
wrong to have assumed, but which certainly it is 
dangerous to let go. \Men like these would soon 
ruin a state, either here, if they should win others to 
their views, or if they should settle in some other 
land and have an independent state all to themselves ; 
for men of peace are not safe unless flanked by men 
of action; nor is it expedient in an imperial state, 
but only in a vassal state, to ions ameioty by. 
submission. 7 ph ee 
LXIV. “Do not be led astray by Aas citizens as 
these, nor persist in your anger with me,—for you 
yourselves voted for the war the same as I—just be- 
cause the enemy has come and done exactly what he 
was certain todo the moment you refused to hearken 
to his demands, even though, beyond all our expec- 
tations, this plague has fallen upon us—the only thing: 
which has happened that has transcended our fore- 
sight. I am well aware that your displeasure with 
me has been aggravated by the plague; but there 
is no justice in that, unless you mean to give me also 
the credit whenever any unexpected good fortune. 
falls to your lot. But the right course is to bear with 
resignation the afflictions sent by heaven and with™ 
fortitude the hardships that come from the enemy; 
for such has been the practice of this city in the past, 
and let it find no impediment in yourselves. And 
realize that Athens has amighty name among all 
mankind because she has never yielded to mis- 
fortunes, but more freely than any other city has 
lavished lives and labours upon war, and that she 
possesses to-day a power which is the greatest that 
ever existed down to our time. The memory of 



a \ n r 
ylyvomevols, HY Kal voV UTEvd@pév Tote (1dvTAa 
\ ¥ A #2 ca) / , 
yap Tépuke Kal €Xaccovcbat), uynun KaTareNrel- 
wetat, ‘EXXjvav te Ste “EXAnves TrELTT@V 67 
> / / 
> s lal 
te Evyravtas Kal Kal’ Exdotovs, TOoAW TE Tots 
~ / 
lal ¢e \ > / I Se e \ A 
TOL TAaUTa O fev aTpPayLoV péuratt’ av, o 6é Spay 
\ > \ / 7 > / \ 
TL Kal autos Bovrdpevos Enrwoer ef O€ TLS pH 
/ / \ \ al \ 
KéexTnTAal, POovnce. TO dé pioetcGar Kal AUTN- 
lal / n \ a \ 
pous elvat ev TH TapovtTe Tao pev vaHpte 61) 
id e? e / ’ / A 4 Ac 2 \ 
Soot Etrepor Etépwy jEiwoav ape Satis 6é érl 
\ , 3 lal 
peyiotos TO émidPovoy AapPaver, opOas Sov- 
lal / 
AeveTalL. juloos pev yap OUK ET TOAD aVTEYEL, 1 
5€ mapautixa Te NapTrpoTNs Kal és TO érretta So~a 
aleiuvnotos KaTaXELTETAL. pets OE Es TE TO MEA- 
/ lj \ / \ > \ 
an af) Q + 2 . , 0 l A - 
TO 76n TpodUpwM audotepa KTHcacGe, Kai Nake 
Satpoviors ponte emixnpvKevedbe prte EvdnroL EaTeE 
ad A / A iA \ 
Tols Tapovet Trovols BapuVvopeEvol, ws OlTLVES TPOS 
Tas Evpdopas yvoun mév HKioTa AVTODYTAL, Epyo 
es , 
S€ pwddtoTa avtéxyovowy, ovTOL Kal TOhEWY Kai 
a %” 
iOvwT@v KpaTLoTOL Eiowv. 
a e fol / a 
LXV. Toratta o Uepixr7s rAeywr érrerpato 
\ b] / fol ] > \ ’ n / 
tous “AOnvaious THs TE és AUTOY Opyis Tapadveww 
r , fal A , 
Kal a0 TOV TapovTay SeVvav atTayew THY yve- 
unv. ot dé dnuoota pev Tois Noyos averreGovTo 
/ v v 
kal ovTe mpos Tos Aaxedatmovious Ett Emreutrov 
al 4 297 
és Te Tov Todeuov wadrAov Wpunvto, idia 4é 


BOOK II. wxiv. 3—Lxv. 2 

this greatness, even should we now at last give 
way a little—for it is the nature of all things to 
decay as well as to grow—will be left to posterity 
forever, how that we of all Hellenes held sway over 
the greatest number of Hellenes, in the greatest 
wars held out against our foes whether united or 
single, and inhabited a city that was the richest 
in all things and the greatest. These things the 
man who shrinks from action may indeed dis- 
parage, but he who, like ourselves, wishes to accom- 
plish something will make them the goal of his 
endeavour, while every man who does not possess 
them will be envious. Tobe hated and obnoxious for 

the moment_has s always been the ‘lot of those who 


have aspired to rule over - others; but he who, aim- 
ing at the highest ends, | ‘accepts the odium, is well 
advised. For hatred does not last long, but the 
splendour of the moment and the after- “glory are 
left in everlasting remembrance. Do you, then, 
providently resolving that yours shall be honour in 
ages to come and no dishonour in the present, 
achieve both by prompt and zealous effort. Make 
no overtures to the Lacedaemonians and do not let 
them know that you are burdened by your present 
afflictions ; for those who in the face of calamities 
show least distress of spirit and in action make most 
vigorous resistance, these are the strongest, whether 
they be states or individuals.” 

LXV. By such words Pericles endeavoured to cure 
the Athenians of their anger toward him, and to di- 
vert their minds from their present ills. And as 
regards public affairs they were won over by his 
arguments, sending no further envoys to the Lace- 
daemonians, and were more zealous for the war; but 





a / lal e \ na e > > 
tols TwaOnuacw é€dXvTovVTO, Oo pev SHhuos OTL atr 
éXNaccovayv opympevos éaTépnTo Kal TOUTWY, OL 

\ \ 
Sé duvatol Kaka xTypata Kata Thy xopav} 
olkodomlats Te Kal ToAUTEAECL KATAGKEVATS aTrO- 
, \ \ / , 2 “2 > , 
éyovtes. ov pévTos mpoTepov ye ot EvpTravTes 
A / 
éravcavTo év opyn ExovTes avTov piv e>nuimoav 

, ef 2 5 > a 
ypjpaciw. wUaotepov & avOis ov TOAAG, OrreEp Gi- 
Nel Gutdos Tovety, oTpaTHYyOV etAovTO Kal TavTAa 

\ > rn 

Ta TpaymaTa éTéTpEWay, @V MeV TrEpl TA OLKELA 
oe yA ? , ” v 2 \ e 
Exactos HAyel auSAUTepor On dvTes, @v O€ 7 

, al 

Evutaca wos TpocedeiTo TWAELTTOU AELOV VoOpt- 
e 4 a 

Covtes elvat. Ocov TE yap Ypovov TpovaTN THs 

Uy a > lad 

lal 4 > / \ b] 7 229 > / 
ras StedvrAakev avtyv, Kat éyéveto em €xelvov 

, 3 , e , / e be / 
peyloTn, émerdy TE O TONEMOS KaTéTTH, O SE Hai- 
\ \ / 
VETAL Kal €v TOUT@ TpOYyvouUs THY duvamLy. 
> / \ / 4 is es a ‘ > \ 
EqeBio dé dvo érn cal && phvas: kai érretdy 
3 , > \ / 4 3 , e Ud > fol 
améOavev, él Tréov Ett Eyv@TON 7) Tpovota avTOD 
5 , € \ 
n €> TOV ToOAECu“OY. O pev yap novyalovTds TE 
Kal TO vautixov OepatrevovTas Kal apyny py 
a f \ a / 
vevovtas ébyn treptécecOar: of O€ Ta’Ta Te TaVTA 
> b] , ” \. bY4 fal / 
és Touvavtiov érpatav Kal adda éEw Tov TroAEMoU 
* \ \ 2Q7 
Soxodvta elvat Kata Tas idias PiroTipias Kal 
a cal \ 
idia Képdn Kakas és Te ohas avTovs Kal TovsS 

1 Hude inserts év with Madvig. 

1 Righty talents, according to Diod. x1. xlv.; but accord- 
ing to Plut. Per. xxxv. estimates varied from fifteen to dtty 




‘maintain a defensive policy, attend to their navy, and | 

BOOK II. txv. 2-7 

in private they were distressed by their sufferings ; 
for the commons, having less to start with, had been 
deprived even of this, while the upper classes had 
lost their beautiful estates in the country, both 
buildings and costly furniture, and above all they 
had war instead of peace. Indeed one and all they 
did not give over ai ir ent against him until 
they had imposed a fine! upon hit, But not long 
afterwards, as is the way with the multitude, they 
chose him again as general and entrusted him with 
the whole conduct Ofatars ; for they were now be- 
coming individually less keenly sensible of their 
private griefs, and as to the needs of the state as a 
whole they esteemed him invaluable. For so long 
as he presided over the-affairs of the state in time of 
peace he pursued a moderate policyand kept the 
city in safety, and it was under him that Athens 
reached the height of her greatness; and, after the 
war began, here too he appears to have made a far- 
sighted estimate of her strength. ee 
Pericles lived two years and six months beyond the 
beginning of the war; and after his death his fore- 

sight as tothe war was still m6réTullyTecognized. | 

For he had told the Athenians’ that if they would” 



eo P ae elle A 
not seek to extend their sway during the war, or do \~ 

anything to imperil the existence of the state, they 

trary to his advice™in all these things, but also“in 
matters that apparently had no connection with the 
war they were led by private ambition and_private 
greed to adopt policies which proved injurious both 
talents. The charge was embezzlement, according to Plato, 
Gorg. 576 A. 


\ would prove superior.| But they not only acted-con= 





Evppuayous étroditevoar, & KaTopOovpeva pev Tots 
/ Qn 
idvoTats TYLn Kal wheria padrov Hv, cparévta 
dé TH Tove és TOV TOAELOV BAGBn KafiotaTo. 
aittov & mv ote éxetvos pev Suvatos Oy TO Te 
a4 , lal 
ati@uate Kal TH yvoun Xpnuatav Te diadavas 
> , / An N 7 > tA 
\ > »” cal e > > Lal a > \ 
/ \ 2 / / > > 4 , ’ 
Sivapiy mpos noovnv TL Eye, GAN Eyov er 
akiwioer Kal Tpos Opynv TL avTELTEty. OmdTE youu 
\ \ fn 
aicOoito TL avTOvs Tapa Katpov UBper Papaoty- 
Tas, Néywv KaTéTAnocey etl TO hoPeiacGar, Kal 
’ O..- Sait 5) , s Fe 8 \ 
ded.oTas av anroyos avtixkabiatn TAaAW €TL TO 
An , , / A 
Oapceiv. éyiyveTo TE Aoyw per dnuoxpatia, 
5M \ e \ cal , > \ J 7 e \ 
Eépyw d5€ vmTo0 Tov TpwToU avdpos apyn. ot dé 
A \ 
totepov icor wadXov avtot Tpos GAANHAOUS GYTES 
Kal dpeyouevot tod mpatos ExacTos yiyverOar 
érpatrovto Kal’ noovas T@ SHuw Kal Ta TPaypaTa 
, / 
évdioovar. €& @Y aXa TE TOAAG, wS ev pEeyary 
U \ >] \ ’ 4 e / \ 2 > 
moder Kal apynv éxovon, nuapTnOn Kai o és 
Lixediav Trovs, 65 Ov TocodTOY yvouNs apdap- 
~ ¢ 
THUA HV Tpos ods ETHATAV, OooV ol ExTrEewraVTES 
ov Ta Tpoachopa Tots oixXomevols ETLYLYVMoKOVTES, 
adra Kata tas idias dsaBoras repli THs Tod 

1 The reference is especially to the Sicilian expedition ; 
the pernicious results were seen in the Decelean war. 


BOOK II, txv. 7-11 

as to themselves and their allies ; for these policies, so 
long as they were successful, merely brought honour 
or profit to individual citizens, but when they failed 
proved detrimental to the state in the candiuct of 
the war.! And the reason for this was th Pericles, / 
WHO'OWER His Tifliience to his récsnized Standing and 
ability, and had proved himself clearly incorruptible. 

inthe highest degree, restrained the multitude while | 

respecting their liberties, and led them rather than 
wwas led by themf{bécause he did not résort to flattery, 
“seeking power=by dishonest means, but was able 
on the strength of his high reputation to oppose 
them and even provoke their wrath. At any rate, 
whenever he saw them unwarrantably confident and 
arrogant, his words would cow them into fear; and, 
on the other hand, when he saw them unreasonably 
afraid, he would restore them to confidence again. 
AAnd so \Athens, though in name a democracy,}«_ 
gradually became in fact a government ruled by its) ~ 
|foremost citizen./ But the successors of Periclés; 
being moré~on-an equality with one another and yet 
striving each to be first, were ready to surrender 
to the people even the conduct of public affairs 
to suit their whims. And from this, since it hap- 
pened in a great and imperial state, there resulted 
many blunders, especially the Sicilian expedition,? 
wh ich was not so much an error Of judgment, when 
we consider the enemy they went against, as of 
management; for those who were responsible for it, 
instead of taking additional measures for the proper 
support of the first troops which were sent out, gave 
themselves over to personal intrigues for the sake of 

2 For the history of this expedition, see Books vi and vir. 



57} ov Tporracias Ta Te év To oTpatoTrédp ap 
Brorepa € évrolovv Kal Ta TEpl THY TOAD 7 pe@Tov 

12 e€v adj rOLS érapdxOnoav. oparertes éé€ &p 


DiKxedta adr TE Tapa Key, Kal TOU vauTLKod TO 
méove popiw Kal Kata THY Tod On év oTdoel 
OVTES Guws déxal pev ern avTeixov Tous TE TTpo- 
Tepov UTapXovct Toneutous Kab Tots amo YtKedas 
aderTnKoot, Kuvpe TE DoTepov Bacvrréws Tarot 
T POT YEVOLEVO, Os Tapeixe Xpnpara IleXoz7rov- 
vnotous és TO VaUTLKOV, KAL OU 7 poTepov évédocay 
) auTol év? odiow avtois Kata Tas tdtas bra- 
gdopas TEplLTrET OVTES eo padycav. Too oUTOV TO 
Tlepukret emeplaceuce ToTe ah wv auTos Tpoeyven 
Kal Tavu ap padios Tmepuyever Bar THY TOLD 
IleXorrovynciwy aitTav TO TOMELO. 

LXVI. Of 88 AaxeSaipdvioe kab of Evupayor 
Tov avtov Gépous éotpatevoay vavoly ExaTov €5 
ZaxvvOov TV vo ov, ) KelTaL avTLTépas “HAc6os" 
etal de “Ax arov TOV €K IeAorovyncou ATTOLKOL 
Kal "AOnvators Evvewaxouy. érrémAeov 5é€ Aaxe- 
Satpovtov yidwoe oTATAL Kal Kyfjwos Lraptiarns 
vavapxos. arroBavtes dé és THY yHRY eOnwcay Ta 
Todd. Kai éredn ov Evveyw@povy, amémrevoav 
ém’ olkov. 

LXVII. Kat rod avtod Gépovs teXevTavTos 
"Apiotevs Kopiv@:os cat Aaxedaipovior mpéc Reus 
"Avipiotos kat Nexodaos cat Iparodapos Kai 

1 MSS. read rpla, but Hude follows Haacke in reading 
3éxa. So also van H., Cl., Stahl, F. Mueller, Croiset, 
Marchant. oxro is preferred by Shilleto, Aem. Mueller. 

2 Deleted by van Herwerden, followed ‘by Hude, 



BOOK II. wtxv. 11-Lxvu. 1 

gaining tie. popu yilar leadsiship and cansequently pot 
only conducted the military operations with less 

( rigout, but also brought about, for the first time, civil 

\discord at home. And yet, after they had-met. with... 
disaster-in Sicily, where they lost not only their army _ 

but also the greater part of their fleet, and by this 
time Ral come tO DE in @ State oF 8€dition at home, 
they neverthless held out ten years not only against 
the enemies they had before, but also against the 
Sicilians, who were now combined with them, and, 
besides, against most of their allies, who were now 
in revolt, and later on, against Cyrus son of the 
King, who joined the Peloponnesians and furnished 
them with money for their fleet; and they did not 
finally succumb until they had in their private 
quarrels fallen upon one another and been brought 
to ruin. Such abundant grounds had Pericles at that 
time for his own forecast that Athens might quite 
easily have triumphed in this war over the Pelopon- 
nesians alone. 
LXVI. During the same summer the Lacedae- 
monians and their allies made an expedition with a 
hundred ships to the island of Zacynthus, which lies 
over against Elis. The Za¢ynthians are colonists 
of the Achaeans in the Peloponnesus and were in 
alliance with the Athenians, On board the ships 
were one thousand Lacedaemonian hoplites, and 
Cnemus a Spartan was admiral. And making a 
descent upon the land they ravaged most of it; but 
as the inhabitants would not come to terms they 

sailed back home. . 

“LXVII. And at the end of the same summer 
Aristeus a Corinthian, three Lacedaemonian envoys, 
Aneristus, Nicolaus, and Pratodamus, also Timagoras 


4380 Bc. 


Teyedtns Teparyopas Kal ’Apyetos Lota ITorXus, 
70 pevopevot és THY ’Aciav OS Baciréa, ¢ et TOS 
TELTELAV AUTOV Xpnpare Te Tapacyely Kal Evp- 
Tone peiy, adixvoovTat ws Duran ™p@tov TOV 
Trpew és Opaxny, Bovdopevor Telcal TE AUTOV, eb 
dvvalyTo, peTagTayra THS ‘AOnvateov Evppaxias 
oTpatedoas él THY Totetéacay, ov 7D: oTpaTeupa 
tov “A@nvat@v TodopKovy, Kal, HEP WpuNnvTo, OL 
éxelvou TopevOnvat tépav tov ‘EXXnotovtTou ws 
Dapvaxny tov PapvaBafov, ds avtovs Ewedrev 
as PBaciréa avamepayety. TapaTuxovtTes O€ 
"A@nvatwv mpéc Pets A€apxos Kahvipaxou Ka 
“A petviddys Pedsjpovos Tapa TO LuTarey Teéi- 
overt Tov Zi8oxov TOV ‘yeyevnjéevov A Onvaior, 
LiTahkov VLOV, TOUS avdpas eyxerpioar opiow, 
oreo pn) OraBavTes ws Baothéa THY €KELVOU TONY 
70 ju pos Brayoou. 0 Oe Teva Oels Topevopuevous 
avTous dua THS Opaxns ert 70 TRotovy @ Ewedov 
TOV “EX Ago TovT ov TEPALWoELV, TpIV ‘éoBaivew 
EvArXauBaver, adrovs 67 Evytréuras peta tov 
Aedpyov cat “Apewiddov, cat éxédevoev éxeivors 
mapadovvar: ot 6€ AaBovTes Exomcav és Tas 
"AOnvas. adixopévov 5é€ adtav Seicavtes ot 
"AOnvatot tov “Apirotéa pn avdois odas ett TrELw 
Kakoupyn Siadvywv, OTL Kal TPO TOVT@V Ta TIS 
Ilotedaias cai Tov eri Opaxns wavta édaiveto 
mpakas, aKpitous Kal BovAopévous éotiv a eitrety 
avOnwepov améxteivay tTavTas Kal és ddpayya 

1 Because Argos was a neutral state ; cf ch. ix. 2, 
2 Then satrap of Dascylium ; ¢f. I. cxxix. 1. 
e Ta On. -Xkix. G, 


BOOK II. uxvir. 1-4 

of Tegea and Pollis of Argos, the last acting in a 
private capacity,! set out for Asia to the King’s court 
to see if they might persuade him to furnish money 
and join in the war. On their way they came first 
to Sitalces son of Teres in Thrace, their desire being 
to persuade him, if possible, to forsake the Athenian 
alliance and send a force to relieve Potidaea, where 
an Athenian army was conducting the siege; and 
also, in pursuance of their object, with his help to 
cross the Hellespont to Pharnaces? son of Pharna- 
bazus, who was to escort them up the country to the 
King. But two Athenian envoys, Learchus son of 
Callimachus and Ameiniades son of Philemon, who 
chanced to be visiting Sitalces, urged Sadocus son of 
Sitalees, who had been made an Athenian citizen,? 
to deliver the men into their hands, that they might 
not cross over to the King and do such injury as 
might be to his adopted city.4 To this Sadocus 
agreed, and sending some troops to accompany 
Learchus and Ameiniades, seized them as _ they 
journeyed through Thrace before they embarked on 
the boat by which they were to cross the Hellespont. 
They were then, in accordance with his orders, 
delivered to the Athenian envoys, who took them 
and brought them to Athens. When they arrived, 
the Athenians, in fear that Aristeus might escape 
and do them still more harm, because he had evi- 
dently been the prime mover in all the earlier 
intrigues at Potidaea and along the coast of 
Thrace, put them all to death on that very day 
without a trial, though they wished to say something 
in their own defence, and threw their bodies into a 

‘ Possibly thy éxeivoy wéAw 7d wépos means ‘‘a city in a 
measure his own,” 



>] / PS) a, al > fal > 4 
écéBarov, Stxaodvtes Tols avtois apiverbar 
olomep kal ot Aaxedaipomor trinpEav, Tovs éep- 

7 A y- > / \ a , 
mopous ods éXaBov AOnvaior cai Tov Evppaxov 
b] e / \ / / > , 
év oAKaot Tept IleXoTrovynoov TEOVTAS ATTOKTEL- 
vavtes Kal és hapayyas éoBaXrovtes. mavtas 
yap 8 Kat’ apxas Tod Trodepouv Aaxedatpoviot 
Saous NaBovev év TH Oaddoon ws TrodEpious Sié- 
bOepov, kal Tovs peta AOnvaiwv Evyrrod\epuobvTas 
Kal Tous pnoé ped EtEpav. 

LXVIII. Kara 6€ tods attots ypovous, Tod 
Oépous TEAEVTHVTOS, kal “Aptrpaxi@tat avtoi Te 
Kal tov BapBdpev TodXovs avactyoavtTes EoTpa- 

“ee eee \ > \ \ \ 
tevoav ém Apyos to ApodidoxiKov Kat THY 
addrnv "Apdiroxiav. EyOpa Sé mpos tovs "Ap- 
yelous aro TOVdE avTois HpEaTO TPwTOV yevéo Oat. 
"Apyos To "Apudiroxexoy kat “Apdiroyiay thy 
” »” \ \ \ Ss bd > 
Gddnv éxtice pev peta Ta Tpwika oixade ava- 
Yopicas Kal ovK aperKopevos TH év "Apryet KaTa- 
otace. Audiroyxos 0 "Audidpew év TO ‘“Aprrpa- 
KLK@ KOATO, OMwOVUpOY TH avTOV maTptio. “Apyos 
dvoudcas (Kal hv  TOALS aUTN peEyioTN THS 
° , 4 \ Py / s i > / 
Audiroyias kal tovs duvvatwtdtous eixev oiKy- 

e \ lal \ Qn re ev 
Topas), uTo Evpopav dé 1roddais yeveais batepov 
mucCopevor Apmpakiwotas opopous évtas TH “Ap- 
diroyixh Evvoixovs érnydyovto, Kai nAXnvia On- 
cay THY vov yA@ooay TpaTOY aTO THY ’AuTpa- 

1 Alcmaeon, the elder brother of Amphilochus, had slain 
their mother Eriphyle (¢f. ch. cii. 5). The foundation of 


BOOK II. txvn. 4-Lxvirt. 5 

pit, thinking it justifiable to employ for their own 
protection the same measures as had in the first 
instance been used by the Lacedaemonians when 
they killed and cast into pits the traders of the 
Athenians and their allies whom they caught on 
board merchantmen on the coast of the Pelopon- 
nesus. For at the beginning of the war all persons 
whom the Lacedaemonians captured at sea they 
destroyed as enemies, whether they were fighting \ 
on the side of the Athenians or not even taking 
part on either side. J 
LXVIII. About the same time, as the summer 
was ending, the Ambraciots themselves, with many 
of the barbarians whom they had summoned to their 
standard, made an expedition against the Amphi- 
lochian Argos and the rest of Amphilochia. And 
enmity between them and the Argives first began 
from the following circumstance. Amphilochus son 
of Amphiaraus, when he returned home after the 
Trojan war, was dissatisfied with the state of affairs 
at Argos,! and therefore founded Amphilochian 
Argos on the Ambracian gulf, and occupied the 
country of Amphilochia, calling the town Argos 
after the name of his own fatherland. And this 
city was the largest in Amphilochia and had the 
wealthiest inhabitants. But many generations later 
the Amphilochians, under the stress of misfor- 
tunes, invited in the Ambraciots, who bordered 
on Amphilochia, to share the place with them, 
and these first became Hellenes and adopted their 
present dialect in consequence of their union with 

Amphilochian Argos is ascribed by other authors (Strabo, 
vii. 326c; Apollod. 11. 7) to Alemaeon or to his son 



kiotav Evvoixnodvtav: oi 68 dAroe "Appiroxot 
/ , ? >) / Ss \ , 
BdpBapot eiow. éx8dddovowv odv Tovs Apryetous 
of “Aumpaxi@tar ypove Kat adtol taxovar THv 
/ e ae? / U 4 / 
rorw. of & Apdiroyor yevouevou tovtou 6.60- 
>] n 
acw éavtois ’Axapvact, kal TpocTapaKkanéoar- 
> / > , \ > lal f / 
res duddtepor "AOnvatovs, of avtois Poppiwva 
Te otpatnyov érepav Kal vats tpldKovta, 
\ lal e a 
adixopévou 89 ToD Popyiwvos aipovar KaTa Kpa- 
\ , 
tos "Apyos Kal Tous Aumpaxiotas nvdparrodicay, 
A \ r >, A 
Koh Te @KLoaY a’TO Apudiroyot kat Axapvares. 
fal / al 
wea Sé TOOTO 7) Evppaylia mpwtov éyéveto AOn- 
> cr id > a 
vaio kat’ Axapvaow. ot d¢ Apmpaxi@tar THv 
, lal 
uev &yOpav és tovs "Apyelous amo Tov avopa- 
Trosicwod chav avTav TpaTov éroujcavto, VarTe- 
a Ny 
pov S& év TO Toreum THvdE THY oTpatelav 
motobvrat éauvT@v te Kal Xaovev Kal adrov 
nr na , f. / \ 
TIWOV TOV TAncLoYapwov BapBapwr: édOovTes de 
a % , / 
mpos TO” Apyos THS bev XYwpas éxpatouy, THY O€ 
TodY Os ovK edUvavTO édelv TmpoaBaxdovTes, 
dmeyapnaav er olkou Kal dvehvOnoav Kata €Ovn. 
TocavTa pev ev TH Oéper éyéveTo. 
a f lal > 
LXIX. Tod & émiysyvopévov yeypa@vos “A@n- 
vad la) , 
vaio. vads éoTetNav elkoct pev Tmepi LleXotrovynaov 
/ e e f 
kat Popuiova atpatnyov, 05 opwmpevos ex Nav- 
, \ 5 ja ee A > , 
maxtou purakny eixe pnt éxTrreiv éx Kopiviouv 
nw / / / ’ rad 
kai Tod Kpicaiov xodrouv pndéva prt éeameiv, 
d / , 
érépas 88 && émi Kapias wal Avxias cat Med»- 
/ e/ a / a 
cavdpov otpaTnyov, OTws TATA Te Apyupodoyace 
Kal TO AnoTiKOv TaV LleXorovyyciov wn edowv 
\ a fal 
aitobev oppm@pmevov BraTTew Tov TAOVY TOY 
c / lal > \ / \ , \ 
6dxddav tov ato PacnrLb0s Kal Powiens Kat 


BOOK II. ctxvin. 5-Lx1x. 1 

the Ambraciots; but the rest of the Amphilochians 
are still barbarians. Now in course of time the 
Ambraciots expelled the Argivés’ and themselves 
seized the city. But the Amphilochians, when this 
happened, placed themselves under the protection of 
the Acarnanians, and together they called in the 
Athenians, who sent to them Phormio as general 
with thirty ships. On the arrival of Phormio they 
took Argos by storm and reduced the Ambraciots to 
slavery, and Amphilochians and Acarnanians settled 
there together. It was after this that the alliance 
between the Athenians and the Acarnanians was 
first established. The Ambraciots first conceived 
their enmity toward the Argives from this enslave- 
ment of their own countrymen; and afterwards in 
the course of the war they made this expedition, 
which consisted, besides themselves, of Chaonians 
and some of the other barbarian tribes of the neigh- 
bourhood. And when they came to Argos, although 
they dominated the country, they were unable to 
take the city by assault; they therefore went home 
and the several tribes disbanded. Such were the 
events of the summer. __, a 

LXIX. During the ensuing winter the Athenians 
sent twenty ships round the Peloponnesus under the 
command of Phormio, who, making Naupactus his 
base, kept watch there, so that no one might sail 
either out of Corinth and the Crisaean Gulf or in; 
and six other ships were sent to Caria and Lycia, 
under Melesander as general, to collect arrears of 
tribute in these places and to prevent the Pelopon- 
nesian privateers from establishing a base in these 
regions and molesting the merchantmen sailing from 
Phaselis and Phoenicia and the mainland in that 



A 3 lal > , > XN a 3 
2 THs éxeiOev nr etpou. dvapas 5é otpatia *AOn- 
’ lal > lal lal lal if > 
valwv TE TOV ATO TOV VeoV Kal TOV Evppayer és 
tv Avxiav 6 Mernjcavépos amoOvncKe Kat THs 
oTpatias pépos Te dvepOerpe vixnGeis wayn. 
LXX. Tod & aitod yewpovos ot Llotedeatar 
arn ai te ec Boral és thy “Attixny IeXotrovyn- 
/ >O\ val > / \ > ld 
ciwy ovdév padrov aravicotacay tovs "A@nvai- 
ral , 
érreyeyévnto avtobs H6n Bpwcews Tept avayKaias 
/ \ > / > / ef \ / 
/ a a 
mpocdépovar mept EvuRacews Tots otpatnyots 
lal lal , 
tav “A@nvaiwvy tois éml aodhict tetaypévots, 
= cal , a ? / . .€ , a 
Eevodarti te TO Evpimioov cai “Eotidaipo To 
"ApiotoxAreloov cal Pavopdyw TO Kaddtpayov. 
€ lal fol a 
20. 6&€ mpocedé~avTo, opavTEes pev THS oTpaTLas 
, a 
Thy TaraiTwplay év Ywpi@ YELmEpLVe, avynro- 
/ , eer 4 n , } 4 > \ 
kulas 6€ 76n THs TOAEws OicXiNa TaXavTa és THY 
3 TodopKiav. éml Tolade ovv EvvéBnoav, éEeOeiv 
avtous Kal Taiédas Kal yuvaixas Kal Tovs émiKov- 
\ ShiWerwe / an \ ‘ al QA 
pous Ebv évl (patio, yuvaixas bé€ Evy dvoiv, Kai 
4 apyvplov TL pytov eéxovTas épcdiov. Kal ot pev 
umocmovéot €EAAOov és TE THY Xadkidienyv Kal 
4 > / 3 lal \ A 
éxaatos édvvato: ’A@nvaio: Sé Tovs Te otTpaTn- 
yous émrntidcavto é6te dvev avtav EvvéBnoav 
Sti # \ A nr nr , eo 5] / 
(€voutlovy yap av Kpathncat THs Twodews 7 ERov- 
oe 7 nr 
AovToO), Kal aTEpov EeTroiKous Evreurav éEavTav és 
5 tHv Iloteioarav Kal KaTt@Kicay. TadTa pev ev TO 

BOOK II. wxix. 1-Lxx. 5 

quarter. But Melesander, going inland into Lycia 
with a force of Athenians from the ships and of 
allied troops, was defeated in battle and slain, losing 
a number of his troops... 

LXX. During the same winter/ the Potidaeans 
found themselves Me rserG to endure the 
siege; and the raids which the Peloponnesians made 
into Attica did not cause the Athenians to raise the 
siege any more than before.! Their grain had given 
out, and in addition to many other things which by 
this time had befallen them in their efforts to 
get bare subsistence some had even eaten their 
fellows. In this extremity they made proposals for a 
capitulation to the Athenian generals who were in 
charge of the operations against them, namely 
Xenophon son of Euripides, Hestiodorus son of Aris- 
tocleides, and Phanomachus son of Callimachus. And 
the generals accepted their proposals, seeing the 
distress which the army was suffering in an exposed 
place, and taking into consideration that Athens had 
already spent two thousand talents? on the siege. 
So..acapitulation was made on the following terms, 
thatthe Potidaeans, with their children and wives 
and the mercenary troops,’ were to leave the city 
with one garment apiece—the women, however, with 
two—retaining a fixed sum of money for the journey. 
So they left Potidaea under a truce and went into 
Chalcidice or wherever each was able to go. ‘The 
Athenians, however, blamed the generals for granting 
terms without consulting them—for they thought 
they could have become masters of the place on their 
own terms; and afterwards sent settlers of their 
own into Potidaea and colonized it. These things 

1 of. 1. lviii. 1, 2 £400,000, $1,944,000. 4 cfix Ix. 1. 


XELOvE eyevero, kal devtepov! Eros TO TrOAELO 
ETENEUTA THE OV Sovevo.dys Evvéyparber. 
LXXI. Tod 8 emuytyvouevou Pépous ot LeXo- 
movynotoe Kab ot EVpwpaxor és pev THY “ATTLKHY 
ovx éa€Carov, éoTpatevoay dé éml Wndtaav: 
HyetTo é “Apxtoapos 0 Zev&ivapov, Aaxedat- 
provl@v Bacinrevs: Kal Kkabicas TOV oTpAaTOV EwEedrE 
Snw@cew TV yay: ol 6¢ Tarachs evOus mpéa Reus 
Téuraytes Tap aurov éXeyov ToLdde 
‘“Apxioape Kal Aaxedarpovior, ov diKkata 
ToveiTe ove aga oUTE UUaY OUTE TaTépov Ov 
éate, és yqv tiv IdXatav@v otpatevovtes. av- 
cavias yap 0 KXeouSpotov, Aaxedaipovios, édev- 
Oepwoas tiv “EXAdda até Tov Mydav peta 
‘ErAjvev tov eernoavtov Evydpacbat Tov Kiv- 
Suvov THs maxns 1) Tap hiv éyéveto, Ovoas ev 
tT IWnraraov ayope lepa Au édXevPepioa Kai 
EvyKanréoas mavTas TOUS Evppaxous aTrecioou 
Matacedor yi Kal TOALY THY odeTépav éyovtas 
avTOvOLOUS oixely, oTparevoat Te pndéva TOTE 
aSiKos em avTOUS und emt dovreta: el O€ 117, 
a LUveLy Tous TApovTas Evppaxous KaTa Ovva wy. 
TAGE MEV api TAaTépEs Ob UMETEPOL €docav apeThs 
évexa Kal tpoOvpias THs ev éxelvols Tois KLVOU- 
vous ryevOpevns, tpsis. dé TavavTia Spare pera 
yap On Bator TOV jpiy ex Ola rev éml dovheig TH 
7 LeTEPA TKETE. pdpTupas de Geos TOUS TE 
opkiovs TOTE yevouevous TOLOUMEVOL Kal TOUS Due- 
Tépous TaTpwous Kal HueTépous eyywplous, rE- 
youev vpiv yhv thy IIdataitda pr) adixeiv nde 

2 +d Sedrepoy in the MSS.; 7d deleted by Poppo. 

BOOK II. uxx. 5—-Lxx1. 4 

happened in the winter, and so ended the second 4303.4 
year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the 
history. : a | 

LXXI. In the ensuing summer the Peloponnesians ~~~ 
and their allies did not invade Attica, but made an ~ 
expedition against Plataea. Their leader was Archi- 
damus son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedae- 
monians, and when he had encamped his army he 
was about to ravage the land; but the Plataeans 
straightway sent envoys to him, who spoke as 
follows : 

“ Archidamus and Lacedaemonians, you are acting 
unjustly, and in a manner unworthy either of your- 
selves or of the fathers from whom you are sprung, 
when you invade the territory of the Plataeans. 
For Pausanias son of Cleombrotus, the Lacedae- 

~monian, when he had freed Hellas from the Persians, 
together with such of the Hellenes as chose to share 
the danger of the battle! that took place in our 
territory, offered sacrifice in the market-place of the 
Plataeans to Zeus Eleutherius, and calling together 
all the allies restored to the Plataeans their land and 
city to hold and inhabit in independence, and no 
one was ever to march against them unjustly or for 
their enslavement; but in that case the allies then 
present were to defend them with all their might. 
These privileges your fathers granted to us on 
account of the valour and zeal we displayed amid 
those dangers, but you do the very contrary; for 
with the Thebans, our bitterest enemies, you are 
come to enslave us. But calling to witness the gods 
in whose names we then swore and the gods of your 
fathers and of our country, we say to you, wrong not 
the land of Plataea nor violate your oaths, but suffer 

1 The battle of Plataea, 479 B.c. 


mapaBaive tovs SpKous, éav 8é oixeiv avtovo- 
fous KaOatep Ilavoavias édixaiwoev.” 

LXXII. Tocatta eitovtay tov Lndatacov 
"Apyidapos troNaBwv eltrev: 

“* Aixata NéyeTe, @ avdpes LAataris, Hv Toute 
omota Tots Aovyous. Kabarep yap Uaveavias tiv 
TApEOWKEV, AUTOL TE avTovopetae Kal TOUS an- 
ous EvvehevOepodte 6 ocoL HETATXOVTES TOV TOTE 
KLVOUV@Y Upiv TE Evvepocay Kal etal vov oT 
’AOnvatois, TapacKkevn S€ Toonde Kal TrOAELOS 
ryeyevnTau auTav évexa eal TOV addov ehevdepa- 
EWS. nS padiara ev pETaaXovTES Kal aural 
éupelvate Tols dpxois* et 5é mn, amep Kal ™ po- 
TEpoOV 707 T povkaher ducla, novxiav GyeTe VELO- 
[EVOL Ta vpéTepa avTav, Kal éoTe poe pel 
éTépav, déverOe Oé aporepous pirous, emt TONE- 
ho dé poeTepous. Kal TASE 7) jpiv dpKécet.” 

bev ‘Apxisapos Toc atta eimrev' ot O€ 
TAatarov m peo Bers axovoavTes tadta éo7ndOov 
€s THY TOMY, Kal TO THO EL Ta pnOévta Kowo- 
TAVTES amex pivavTo avT@ 6TL advvata opiouw 
ein Trotety a Tpoxaneirat avev "AO nvatov (wraides 
yap opav Kal yuvaixes Tap exelvous elev), dedrévae 
6€ Kal wepl TH TWaon TodEL py KElVOV aTox@pn- 
cdvtav “AOnvaios édOdvtes odiow ovdx émutpé- 
Twa, % OnBaior, ws EvopKot ovTes Kara TO 
apudorépous déxe Oat, aves odhav THY TOMY 
Telpag wor kataraBeiv. o 5€ Oapovvwv adtods 
7 pos TavTa en’ 
““Yueis 6€ mod pev Kal oikias Hutv Tapaoote 

1 Omitted by Hunde, with Lex. Vindob. 

BOOK II. vxxi. 4-.xxu. 3 

us to live independent, according as Pausanias granted 
that to us as our right.” 

LXXII. When the Plataeans had so spoken, Archi- 
damus answered and said: 

«What you say is just, men of Plataea, if what 
you do is consistent with your words. For according 
as Pausanias bestowed that privilege upon you, so 
do you assert your own independence and help us to 
set free the others also who, having shared in the 
dangers of that time, swore the same oaths with you, 
and are now in subjection to the Athenians; for it is 
to recover their freedom and that of the rest that 
these great preparations for war have been made. 
Therein you should take part, if possible, and your- 
selves abide by the oaths; otherwise keep quiet, as 
we have already proposed, continuing to enjoy your 
own possessions ; take part with neither side, receive 
both sides as friends but for hostile purposes neither. 
And this will be satisfactory to us.” 

Thus spoke Archidamus ; and the Plataean envoys, 
on hearing him, went into the city, and after reporting 
to the people what had been said, answered him, that 
it was impossible for them to do what he proposed 
without the consent of the Athenians—for their 
children and wives were in Athens'—adding that 
they feared for the very existence of the state; for 
after the departure of the Lacedaemonians the 
Athenians would come and veto the plan, or else 
the Thebans, claiming that they were included in 
the stipulations about receiving both sides, would try 
again to seize their city. But he, endeavouring to 
reassure them with regard to these matters, said : 

“You need only consign the city and your houses 

tof. ch. vi. 4. 


a / \ a i > 7 
tois Aaxedatmoviots Kat ys Gpous atrodeiEaTte 
\ w SIN > n \ e / \ ~ ” 
kal dévdpa apiou@ Ta vuéTEpa Kal aro el TI 

\ vad 
Suvatov és aptOuov édOeiv: avtoi b€ petTaywpn- 
7 4 xX c f zon BES \ 
cate drat BovreoOe, Ews Av o TOAEMOS G* eTTELOaY 
\ / > / e lad A x /, 
dé mapédOn, amrodacopev vulv & av Tapada- 
Bopev. péxpe d€ Tovde EEopev TapakatabyKnpy, 
> \ \ / aA x e tal / 
epyalomevor Kal Popay hepovtes 7) av vuty pwedArH 
ixavn écecOa. 
> nm 
LXXIII. Of & axotvcavtes éoArOov adOis és 
\ / \ / ay ca / 
. a ’ 
éreEav 6Tt BovrAovTat a TpoKarettat AOnvaiors 
A lal / rad 
a 9 
Tabta* péxpe € TovTOV oTelcacBar odiow éxé- 
lot \ n ¢ \ f. 
Nevov Kal TV Yyhv py Snovv. oO 5€ Huépas TE 
éomelcato év ais eiKos HV KouLoOhvat Kal THY yHV 
e a 
ovK éteuvev. édOovtes 5é ot Xataijs mpéo Res 
Af \ b ug \ / b bf 
a@s tovs “A@nvaiovs cal BovrAevoedpevot peT av- 
an / ° Ar 
Tov Tad HAOov aTrayyéAXovTES TOs EV TH TOAEL 
/ ‘ce A) b] A A tal sf = ” 5 
rovaoe: *‘ OUT év TO TPO TOV Ypov@, w avdpes 
fol / >? a 
IlXataris, ad’ ob Evppayor éyevomeBa, “APnvaiot 
dacw év ovdevi twas Tpoécbas adixovpévous ovTE 
ra , / A \ 4 
vov meptowecOat, BonOnceav Sé Kata duvapy. 
émicknm@tTovel Te vulvy mpos TOV GpKwY ods ot 
\ / 
TAaTepes wWpocav pndev vewteplfery epi THY 
LXXIV. Toraidta tév rpécBewyv atayyerav- 
tov of IIXataiAs éBovrXevoavto “A@nvaiovs pH 
r > ] > / \ fol / 
Tpoo.ooval, GAN avéxecOar Kai yHv TE“vomerny, 
lal c a 
ei Sef, op@vTas Kal aXXo TaoxovTas 6 TL av 


BOOK II. vxxu. 3-Lxxiv. 1 

to us, the Lacedaemonians, pointing out to us the 
boundaries of your land and telling us the number 
of your trees and whatever else can be numbered; 
then as for yourselves migrate to whatever place you 
please, remaining there while the war lasts; but as 
soon as the war is over we will give back to you 
whatever we have received ; until then we will hold 
it all in trust, working the land and paying you 
whatever rent will satisfy you.” 

LXXIII. With this answer the Plataean envoys 
went again into the city, and after they had conferred 
with the people replied that they wished first to 
communicate his proposals to the Athenians, and if 
they could gain their consent would do what he 
proposed; but meanwhile they requested him to 
grant them a truce and not to ravage the land. And 
so he made a truce for the number of days within 
which their representatives could be expected to go 
and return, and did not lay waste their land. But 
the Plataean envoys went to the Athenians and after 
consulting with them returned with the following 
message to the people at home: “ The Athenians as- 
sure you, Plataeans, that as in times past, since you 
became their allies,! they have never on any occasion 
deserted you when you were being wronged, so now 
they will not suffer you to be wronged, but will assist 
you with all their might. They therefore adjure 
you, by the oaths which your fathers swore, not to 
break off the alliance.” 

LXXIV. When the envoys reported this answer, 
the Plataeans determined not to betray the Athenians, 
but to endure even to see their lands laid waste, if 
need be, and to suffer whatever else might happen ; 

2 About 520 B.c, cf. m1. lxviii. 5. 
VOL. I. O 393 


EvpBaivn é&eXOciv te pwndéva Ett, AAN aro TOU 
Teiyous atoxpivacbat 6tTt advvata ohict Toteiv 
b a / A e \ 
éotwy & Aaxedatudviot tmpokadovvtTar. ws 6€ 
aTrexpivavto, évtev0ev 89 Tp@Tov ev és émripap- 
fal fal > / 
tuplay Kal Oedv Kal jpowv TaV éyywpiov 'Apyi- 
dauos 0 Bacirteds Katéctn Aéyov be3 “ Deol 
6cot ynv thy Idataida eyete Kal Hpwes, Evv- 
UA / bd e/ A \ b \ 29/7 > / 
totopés éote OTL OUTE THY apynY adixws, éKdLTIOV- 
tov 6€ Tavde Tpotépwy TO EvywpoTtov, él yhv 
/ EA b a ¢ F e la > / 
THvde HAGopEV, ev H OL TaTépes Nua@y evEduEVoL 
tpiv Midov éxpatncav Kal rapéoxete avTiy 
? a > , eae LA a 
evuevhe evaywvicacOat Tois “EXXnow, ovTe vod», 
a \ 
TOANG Kal elKOTa Ov TUyYdvomer. EvyyvapoveEs 
\ wv a \ > / / a e 7 
dé ote THs mev abdixias KoradlecOar Tots vTap- 
Youvct TpoTépols, THS S€ Tywwplas TUyXdvelv Tots 
/ ” 
émipépovor vopipas. 
lo) , 
LXXV. Tocatta ériferdcas xabiotn és TOXe- 
/ lal / 
pov TOV OTPATOV. Kal TP®TOV pméeyv TEpLecTaUpw- 
> \ a / A ” r a7 
cuv avtous Tois Sévdpecty & Exoray, Tod wndéva 
la \ 
émeEvéval, ETELTA Y@ma EXovv Tpos TiV OAL, 
> , , \ 1 ¢/ ” Q 3 
érrifovtes tayiotny Hv} aipecw écecOat ad- 
TOV oTpaTEvpATOS TocoUTOU épyalopévov. Evra 
pev odv Téuvovtes ex TOD KiOaip@vos TapewKosdo- 
pouy éxatépwber, hopundov avtl toiywv tiWévtes, 
OTs un Siayéorto etl TOAD TO YONA. Eepopovy 
1 Added by Classen. 

BOOK II. vxxiv. 1-Lxxv. 2 

further, that no one should thereafter leave the city, 
but that the answer should be given from the walls 
that they found it impossible to do what the Lace- 
daemonians proposed. And when they had made 
answer, thereupon king Archidamus first stood forth 
calling the gods and heroes of the country to witness 
in the following words: “Ye gods and heroes who 
protect the land of Plataea, be our witnesses that 
we did no wrong in the beginning, but only after the 
Plataeans first abandoned the oath we all swore did 
we come against this land, where our fathers, in- 
voking you in their prayers, conquered the Persians, 
and which you made auspicious for the Hellenes 
to fight in, and that now also, if we take any 
measures, we shall be guilty of no wrong; for though 
we have made them many reasonable proposals we 
have failed. Grant therefore your consent, that 
those be punished for the wrong who first began it, 
and that those obtain their revenge who are seeking 
to exact it lawfully.” 

LXXV. After this appeal to the gods he began 
hostilities. In the first place the Lacedaemonians, 
using the trees which they had cut down, built a 
stockade round Plataea, that in future no one might 
leave the place; then they began raising a mound 
against the town, hoping that with so large an army 
at work this would be the speediest way of taking it. 
So they cut timber on Cithaeron and built a structure 
alongside the mound on either side of it, laying the 
logs like lattice-work! to form a sort of wall, that 
the mound might not spread too much. Then they 

1 A frame was made like lattice-work or mat-work, the 
timbers crossing each other at right angles (+£). 



5é BAnv és avo Kal ALGous Kal yhv Kab ef Te ddXrO 
avutew pérroe erriBardropevov. nHuépas 5é Eyour 
éBdounkovta Kat vuxtas Euvexds, Sinpnpévos 
KaT avatravras, Bate Tors pev Pépew, Tovs Oe 
imvov te Kab citov aipeicOar. Aaxedatpovior 
re of Eevayol éxdotyns wodews Evvehertartes' 
nvaykatov és TO épyov. of dé IINatasis opa@vtes 
TO YOpa alpopevov, EvdAwov teiyos EvvOévtes Kat 
€sw@Kodomouy €s avTo TALvOous ex TOY eyyuUS ob- 
kiav Kabatpoovtes. Evvderpos 8 Hv avtois Ta 
Evra, Tod wn Unrov yeyvopevoy acOeves Eivat TO 
oixodopnua, Kal Tpokarvppata eixe Sépoes Kal 
SiupOépas, wate Tors épyalopuévous Kai Ta Evra 
unte muppopos oiatots BadrecOar ev acdhareia 
Te €lval. mpeTo O€ TO trvos TOD TEivous péeya, Kal 
TO YOpua ov cxoraitepoy avtavye aVT@. Kab ot 
Il\ataijs torovde te érwoovow: Sd1edXovTEs TOD 
Teixous 7 TMpooénmiTTEe TO XOua écedopouvy THY 

LXXVI. Of 6€ TleXorovyncioe aicopevor év 
Tapaots KaNdwov mnrov éviddovTes EoéBadXovr &s 
To Sinpnpevov, Straws wn SiaxXeomevoy WaTEP 1) Yi) 
dopotto. of d€ TavTn amToKANOpEvOL TOUTO peEP 
éréayov, UTovomov Sé ex THs TOAEwS OpveavTes 
kai EvyTexuNpapmevol VTO TO YOua UpetrAKov avOts 
mapa opas Tov xovv' Kat éXavOavoy emi TodV 

1 With ABEFM and Suid. MHude reads, with CG, of 

tevayol xal éxaoTns woAews <ol> épecTares, 


BOOK II. txxv. 2—-Lxxvi. 2 

brought and threw into the space wood and stones 
and earth and anything else which when thrown on 
would serve to build up the mound. And for seventy 
days and nights continuously they kept on raising 
the mound, divided into relays, so that while some 
were carrying others might take sleep and food ; and 
the Lacedaemonian commanders of auxiliaries to- 
gether with the officers in charge of the contingents 
from the several cities kept them at their task. But 
the Plataeans, seeing the mound rising, put together 
a framework of wood which they set on top of their 
own wall at the point’ where the mound was being 
constructed, and inside this frame they put bricks 
which they took from the neighbouring houses. The 
timbers served to hold the bricks together, pre- 
venting the structure from becoming weak as it 
attained height, and they were protected by coverings 
of skins and hides, so that the workmen and wood- 
work might be safe and shielded from incendiary 
arrows. The wall was mounting to a great height, 
and the opposing mound was rising with equal speed, 
when the Plataeans thought of a new expedient. 
They made an opening in that part of the city wall 
where the mound came into contact with it, and 
began to draw the earth in. 

LXXVI. But the Peloponnesians became aware of 
this, and threw into the breach clay packed in reed- 
mats that it might not filter through like the loose 
earth and be carried away. But the _ besieged, 
thwarted in this direction, gave up that plan and 
dug a mine from the town, and, guessing when they 
had got beneath the mound, once more began to 
draw away the earth to their side, this time from 
underneath; and for a long time they worked 



Tovs €£w, Mote émiPadrovtas Hooov avuTew bTra- 
youévou avtois KaTwOev TOD YouaTos Kai |Cdvov- 
Tos alel éml TO Kevoupevov. SedoTes Sé p27) OVS 
mpoceteEnvpoy Tdde* TO wey péya olKOoounma 
érravoavto épyatouevo, TO KaTa TO Yopa, evOev 
Sé kal évOev adtod apEdpuevor avd Tod Bpayéos 
Telyous €x TOD evTOS pnvoErdes és THY TOALY Eo@- 
Kooopour, SWS, EL TO pPéya TElYos aXLoKOLTO, 
TOUT avTéxot, Kal déot Tovs évavTious avis Tpos 
auto your, Kal mpoxwpotvtas éow Siumddotov TE 
Tovov éxew Kat ev audtBor@ wadXov yiyvecOat. 
dpa 58TH XOoEL Kal unYavas Tpociyyov ot IeXo- 
TOVVNGLOL TH TOAEL, lav pmev *) TOU pEyaXov oLKo- 
SounuaToS KATA TO YOua TpocaxOeica ert péya 
Te Katécetce Kal Tors IlAataads EpoRycev, adXras 
dé GAA TOU TElyous, Us Bpoxous Te TEptBddrov- 
tes avéxrwv ot IlXatarqs, cab doxods peyddas 
aptycavtTes advceot paxpais aidynpais amo THs 
Touns exaTépwbev ato Kepai@y Svo émiKEeKALLEevOV 
Kal UTEpTELVoUTaY UTép TOD TElyous avEAKVaaD- 
Tes éyxapalas, oTOTE TpooTecciaOal Tn médXrOL 1) 
unyavy, apiecav tiv dSoxov yarapais tais adv- 
gear Kal ov Sia yerpos Exovtes,  S€ PUN éuTri- 
TTovea aTreKavrite TO Tpovdyov THs éuBorj7s. 
LXXVII. Mera 6€ rodrto of HeXorovyyccos, 
@s al Te unxyaval ovdev @pédovy Kal TO YOuaTL 


BOOK LI. -txxvi. 2—-Lxxvu. 1 

unnoticed by those outside, so that in spite of what 
they heaped on these made less progress, because 
their mound, as it was sapped from below, constantly 
kept settling down into the hollow space. But fear- 
ing that even so they would not be able to hold out, 
few as they were against a multitude, they devised 
this further expedient: they stopped working on the 
high structure opposite the mound, and starting at 
the low part of the wall on either side of it they 
began building a crescent-shaped rampart on the 
inward or city side of it, in order that, if the high 
wall should be taken, this might offer resistance ; the 
enemy would thus have to raise a second mound to 
oppose the new rampart, and as they advanced and 
came inside the crescent they would not only have 
their labour twice over, but would also be more 
exposed to attack on both sides. But the Pelopon- 
nesians, while going on with their mound, also brought 
up engines against the city: one was moved forward 
over the mound, and shook down a great part of 
the high structure, terrifying the Plataeans, while 
others were brought to bear at different parts of 
the wall. But the Plataeans threw nooses over these 
and pulled them up. They also suspended great 
beams by long iron chains attached at either end to 
two poles which rested on the wall and extended 
over it; then they hauled up the beams at right 
angles! to the battering-ram and when it was about 
to strike anywhere let go the beam by allowing the 
chains to run slack and not keeping hold of them; 
whereupon the beam would fall with a rush and 
break off the head of the battering-ram. 

LXXVII. After this, the Peloponnesians, seeing 
that their engines were doing no good and that the 

1 4.e. parallel to the wall 399 


TO GVTITELYLOMAa eyiyvETO, VouicayTes ATrOpoY Ei- 
> \ cal / lal € a \ / 
vat ato TOV TapovT@y dewav éEdely THY OAL 
2 Tpos THY TepiTelytoW TapecKkevalovToO. TpoTeE- 
\ \ 7 > al an ’ 7 
pov O€ Tupt édofev avtots mevpacat et Svvawto 
, / b] / \ 4 = 
TVEVMATOS yEevopmevou eTipréEat THY TOALY OVaAD 
> / rn \ A 9 / 3 , y 
ov weyarnv: Tacav yap 51 idéav étevoour, El TAS 
/ v / \ / , 
cdhiow avev darravys Kat ToMopKias TpocaxOein. 
a A 
3 dopovvtes Sé€ tAns axkédous tapéBadov aro 
TOU yopaTtos és TO petakd TPaTOV TOD TELyous 
\ / > / \ ipl ” / 
dia ToAvYELplay éTLTApevnoAaY Kal THS aAANS TO- 
an lal ¥ 
emiayelv, éuBardvtes dé wip Evy Oeiw nal ticon 
4 trav tTHv DAnv. Kal éyéveto PrOE TocavTn bonv 
lal , 
ovdels Tw &S ye ExXEivoy TOV YpoVvoOY YELpoTrOiNToY 
< 7 \ > v e/ a C..3.  Puwk 
eldev" 70n yap év Gpecw DAN TprdGeica br avé- 
\ \ a 
5 aT avuTOvD avhKev. TOUTO O€ péya TE HY Kal TOUS 
IIdatavas tadra Suaduyovtas éXayiotou édénoe 
SiadGeipar: evTos yap TOAAOD Ywpiou THs TOAEwS 
> , ¢ \ y e > , > x 
érigopov, OTep Kal HAmMLov of évavTiot, ovK av 
fal / fol 
6 dudpuyov. viv b€ Kal Tode Aéyetar EvuBFvat, 
CAN \ \ \ / / \ 
tédwp tjorAv Kal Bpovtas yevouévas cBéoar THv 
droya kal otTws TavoOivat Tov Kivdvvov. 

BOOK II. vxxvir. 1-6 

counter-wall was keeping pace with the mound, 
and concluding that it was impracticable without 
more formidable means of attack to take the city, 
began to make preparations for throwing a wall 
about it. But before doing that they decided to 
try fire, in the hope that, if a wind should spring 
up, they might be able to set the city on fire, as 
it was not large; indeed, there was no expedient 
they did not consider, that they might if possible 
reduce the city without the expense of a siege. 
Accordingly they brought faggots of brushwood and 
threw them down from the mound, first into the 
space between the wall and the mound; and then, 
since the space was soon filled up by the multi- 
tude of workers, they heaped faggots also as far 
into the city as they could reach from the height, 
and finally threw fire together with sulphur and 
pitch upon the wood and set it afire. And a 
conflagration arose greater than any one had ever 
seen up to that time, kindled, I mean, by the 
hand of man; for in times past in the moun- 
tains when dry branches have been rubbed against 
each other a forest has caught fire spontaneously 
therefrom and produced a conflagration. And this 
fire was not only a great one, but also very nearly 
destroyed the Plataeans after they had escaped all 
earlier perils; for in a large part of the city it was 
not possible to get near the fire, and if on top of 
that a breeze had sprung up blowing toward the city, 
which was precisely what the enemy were hoping 
for, the Plataeans would not have escaped. But as 
it was, this also is said to have happened—a heavy 
thunder-shower came on and quenched the flames, 
and so the danger was checked. 



LXXVIII. Of 6€ LeXorovvnctoe erred) Kat 
/ n 
ca / / \ 
gTpaTov, TO O€ TAE€OV adévTes TEpLeTELyLfoV THY 
/ y Ul \ , \ 
s > 
tapos 5€ évTds te HY Kal EEwOev €& Ho errdivOed- 
\ rn / \ 
gavTo. Kal éedn av éeEelpyacto Tepl apKTov- 
, A - 
/ \ oe \ > LA > , 
TeLyous (TO de Hutov Botwrtot epvXacaov) avexo- 
pnoav TO oTpaT@ Kai duedvOncav Kata TOES. 
IIkataijs 6€ maidas péev Kai yuvatcas Kai Tovds 
nr \ a lal 
mpeaButatous Te Kai TANGos TO ayYpeiov Tav 
f / Ss 
"AOnvas, avtol dé étoXLopKovvTO éyKaTadereELL- 
, > \ >’ 
pévot TeTpaxoctol, AOnvaiwv b€ oydonxovta, yu- 
vaixes 6€ Séxa Kal ExaTOov GiTOTFOLOL. TocovTOL 
* e , ¢ > \ , , 
Hoav ot EvuTavTes OTE €s THY ToNOPKiav Kabi- 
\ A 7) \ 3 > lol / Mv 
GTAVTO, Kal ANdOS OvdEls Hv ev TO TEelyer ovTE 
a ee) n 
SodAos oT edXeVOEpos. ToLravTn pev 1) IlXatardv 
TONLOpPKia KaTEcKEevacOn. 
na >] a , A 
LXXIX. Tod & avtod Cépovs Kxal aya TH 
lal lal > / ? a , » 
tav Idataayv ériatpateia AOnvaior dicyirious 
e / Lal lal 
oTALTALs EAUTMY Kal imTEVOL OtaKkoctols éTrecTpa- 
- eee Ld \ 5, ditt! / \ 
Tevoav éml Xadkidéas tovs émt Opdxns xal 
a / \ 
Bottialovs axuafovtos Tod citou: éstpatHyer Sé 
Eevohbav o Evpitidov tpitos aitds. édOovtes b€ 
A \ A 
to Xadptwrov THY Bottexny Tov citov dédOe- 
Ud \ 
pav. édoxer d€ Kal Tpocywpncew » Tors UTE 


BOOK [I]. uxxvin. 1-Lxxrx. 2 

LXXVII1. When the Peloponnesians had failed in 
this attempt also, they dismissed the larger part of 
their army, leaving only a portion of it, and proceeded 
to throw a wall around the city, apportioning the 
space to the several cities; and there were ditches 
both inside and outside the wall, out of which they 
had taken the clay for the bricks. And when the 
wall was entirely finished about the time of the 
rising of Arcturus,! they left a guard to watch one 
half of the wall (the Thebans guarded the other 
half), and withdrew the main army, the troops dis- 
persing to their several cities. But the Plataeans 
had previously had their children and wives, as well 
as the oldest men and the unserviceable part of the 
population, removed to Athens, and the men left be- 
hind to undergo the siege were only four hundred of 
their own number and eighty Athenians, besides one 
hundred and ten women to prepare the food. This 
was the number all told when the siege began, and 
there was no one else within the walls, slave or free- 
man. Such were the conditions under which the 
siege of the Plataeans was established. 

LXXIX. During the same summer, when the corn 
was in full ear,? while the expedition against Plataea 
was in progress, the Athenians with two thousand 
hoplites of their own and two hundred cavalry 
marched against the Chalcidians in Thrace and the 
Bottiaeans, under the command of Xenophon son of 
Euripides and two others. And coming to Spartolus 
in Bottice they destroyed the grain. It was be- 
lieved, moreover, that the city would be delivered 
over to them by a party inside the town which was 

1 About the middle of September. 
* In the month of May. 



y ' , —— 
tivev évdobev TpaccovT@y: mpoTremrpavTav O€ és 
nr a / 
“OnrvuvOov tav ov Tav’Ta BovrAopLEéevwv oTXiTal TE 
ArOov Kal otpatia és dvrakyy Hs éreEeNGovons 
> an / b] / , ae 
éx THS Xmaptwrov és waynv KabictavtTat ot AOn- 
al a fl , ¢ a 
vaio. UT avThH TH TONE. Kal ob wéev oTAiTAL TOV 
, a fa) 
Xarkidéwv kal érixovpot tives wet avT@V ViKaDv- 
tat Td Tov AOnvaiwv Kal avaywpodow és TIV 
a nr / 
Srdptoroy, of dé ints Tav Xarkidéwv Kab Worot 
r \ n i / e / \ W 
vikK@ot Tors TOV "AOnvaiwy imméas Kal >ridovs. 
> / > \ \ > na 
eiyov 5€ Twas ov ToAACUS TEATATTAS EK TIS 
a a , 
Kpovoidos yijs cadoupévns. apts dé THs paxyns 
/ ’ la vy \ 3 
yeyernuéevns émiBonPovtow adXor TEATATTAL ex 
ths ‘OdwvOov. «Kal oi ék THs Yrapt@dov Widrot 
al , 
w@s eloov, Japanacavtes Tols TE TpocyLyvopeEvols 
Kal OTL TpOTEpOV OvY Hoonvto, émiTiPevTar avis 
\ a / e / \ cal 
peTa TOV Xadrkidéwyv imméwv Kal THY Tpoc Bon- 
lal Lal \ 
Oncavtwv toils “A@nvators: Kat avaywpovdet TpOs 
Tas Ovo Takes as KaTéALTOY Tapa Tots oKEVO- 
, Ka a8: / \ > 4 e.3 a > 
opos. Kal omdte pev érriovey ot A@nvaior, éve- 
didocav, dvaywpodar Oé évéxewvto Kal érnxovTiCov. 
of te immns Tov Xadrxidéwv mpooimmevovtes 7 
Soxoin écéBarAov, Kal ovy Hatota hoBycavtes 
étpevrav tovs “AOnvaious kal érediwEav én) tronv. 
\ e \ ’ a b] \ / 4 
kai of ev “AOnvator és tHv Llotetdarav natadgev- 
youval, Kal votepov Tovs vexpors wvroamTovdous 
Kopicdpevot es Tas AOnvas avaywpodat TO TreEpt- 
ovTL TOU oTpaTov amréGavoy S€ av’TaV TpLaKoVvTA 


BOOK II. uxxix. 2-7 

negotiating with them; but the opposite faction 
forestalled this by sending word to Olynthus, and 
some hoplites and other troops arrived to garrison the 
place. Now when these made a sally from Spartolus, 
the Athenians were drawn into a battle with them 
under the very walls of the city, and although the 
hoplites of the Chalcidians and some mercenaries 
with them were defeated by the Athenians and re- 
treated into Spartolus, the cavalry of the Chalcidians 
and the light-armed troops defeated the Athenian 
cavalry and light-troops; for the Athenians had a few 
targeteers from the land called Crousis,! and just after 
the battle was over another force of targeteers came 
from Olynthus to the help of the garrison. And when 
the light-armed troops in Spartolus saw them, em- 
boldened by these accessions and because they had 
not been worsted before, they again, assisted by the 
Chalcidian cavalry and those who had newly come to 
their support, attacked the Athenians, who now fell 
back upon the two companies which they had left 
with their baggage. And whenever the Athenians 
advanced, they gave way, but when the Athenians 
retreated they kept close at their heels, hurling 
javelins at them. Then the Chalcidian cavalry, riding 
up, kept charging the Athenians wherever opportu- 
nity offered, and throwing them into utter panic 
routed them and pursued them to a great distance. 
The Athenians took refuge in Potidaea, and after- 
wards, having recovered their dead under a truce, 
returned to Athens with what remained of their 
army; and they had lost three hundred and thirty 

1 This is evidently a remark in explanation of the presence 
of light-troops with the Athenians, for there had come from 
Athens only heavy-armed infantry and cavalry ; ¢f. § 1 above. 



f e 
Kal TeTpaKoolo, Kal ol oTpaTnyol TavTes. ol bé 
Fe (ol nm al 
Xark«idns Kal Bottiatos tpotraiov te Eotncav Kai 
lal / 
LXXX. Tod & aitod Gépous, od TOAD BoTe- 
/ >’ a \ / / 
pov tovtayv, Apumpaxiatar Kat Xaoves, Bovdo- 
pevo. Axapvaviay thy Tacav Kataotpévacbat 
\ 2 , > a / 
kat ‘“A@nvaiwy amocthcat, teiBovat Aaxedat- 
/ a 
fLovious vauTLKOV TE TapacKevacar éx THS Evp- 
, AS / / / eae 
paxidos Kal omXitTas yidtous Téurar er >Axap- 
vaviav, A€yovTes OTL, WV vaval Kat meld aya 
al > 4 al 
peta chav EXOwour, advvatov dvtwv EvyBonOety 
r > \ / ’ /, € / 3 
Tov amo Oardcons "Akapvavov padios *Axap- 
f ) L tHs ZakxvvO tap 8 
vaviavy axovtes xal THs ZaxvyOov Kai Kedar- 
4 ’ , € / \ , 
écoito “A@nvaiors opotws rept IeXorrovyncor: 
/ a 
éxmioas 8 elvar kat Navwaxktov raBeiv. of bé 
/ a \ 
Aaxedarpoviot TeroGévtes Kvtjov pev vavapyov 
ry 4 / b ’ , 
> \ / A \ a / 
evOls méutovcl, TH O€ vaUTLK@® TrEpLnyyelNav 
/ ¢ 7 lal > / 
TAapacKevacapevo ws TUXLOTA TreEtv és AEevKdoa. 
> \ oes , A / 
jaoav 6é€ KopivOro. Evytpolvpovpevoe pddtoTa 
trois "Aumpaxiwtais atroixols oval. Kal TO peD 
vavtikov &€k Te KopivOov nai Suxva@vos kal tov 
fal ] 
TavTn xwplov év TapacKkevh tv, To 6 é« Aeved- 
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Sos kat "Avaxtopiov kai ’Aurpaxias mportepov 
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adixopevov ev Aevxdds trepréwevev. Kytyos 6é 
Kal of eT avTOD yirLot OT AiTAaL ETELO) errEpalo- 
/ lal 
Oncav raGovtes Voppiwva, os Hpye ToV elkoct 


BOOK II. txxrx. 7-Lxxx. 4 

men and all their generals. The Chalcidians and 
Bottiaeans set up a trophy, and then, after they had 
taken up their own dead, dispersed to their several 
Part: awe 

LXXX. During the same summer, not long after 
these events, the Ambraciots and Chaonians, wishing 
to subdue the whole of Acarnania and detach it 
from Athens, persuaded the Lacedaemonians to fit 
out a fleet from the countries of the Doric alliance 
and to send a thousand hoplites against Acarnania, 
saying that, if they joined forces with them, bringing 
ships and infantry, it would be an easy matter first 
to occupy Acarnania since the Acarnanians on! the 
seacoast would be unable to aid those inland, and 
then to make themselves masters of Zacynthus and 
Cephallenia also: after that the Athenians would no 
longer be able to sail round the Peloponnesus in the 
same way as before ; and there was a chance of taking 
Naupactus also. The Lacedaemonians agreed and at 
once despatched Cnemus, who was still admiral,? and 
the hoplites on a few ships, and sent round orders to 
the allied fleet to make their preparations and sail as 
soon as possible to Leucas. And the Corinthians were 
especially eager to support the enterprise of the 
Ambraciots, who were colonists of theirs. The con- 
tingent of the fleet to come from Corinth and Sicyon 
and the places in that quarter was still under pre- 
paration, but that from Leucas and Anactorium and 
Ambracia, arriving first, waited at Leucas. As for 
Cnemus and the thousand hoplites, as soon as they 
had succeeded in crossing over without being de- 
tected by Phormio, who was in command of the 

1 ¢.e. because of the presence of the Peloponnesian fleet 
along their coast. = of. ch. lxvi. 2. 



veav tov Atrtixav al mept Navraxtov éppou- 
povv, ev0v’s tmaperxevafovto THY KaTa viv 
orpareiay. Kal avT@ Tapio av “EXMjvev ev 
“Apt pacar ar Kal "Avacrdpuou Kat Aevxdd.or 
Kal ods auTos eX@v mrAGE xiMor Tleorrovynator, 
BapBapor dé Xaoves XiAvou aBacinevtol, Ov 
Hyobvto éTeTNTLO mpoorareig €x TOD apxLKov 
ryévous Portis Kat Nexavep. Evvertpatevovto 
dé peta Xadvov cat @ecrpwtol aBacirevtor. 
Modocaovs 6é Hye kal “Ativtavas LaBvrwGos 
éritpotos av OdpuTos Tov Bacidéws Ett traidos 
OvTOS, Kal Tlapavatous “Opotdos Baotrevor. 
‘Opéarac dé xi Avot, av é€Bacinevev ‘Avtioyos, 
pera Tapavaioy EvveotpatevovTo Opoide "Av- 
TLOXOU eet perav Tos. emeurve dé Kal Tlepdixras 
pupa TOV “AOnvatov XALouS Maxedover, ot 
UoTEpoV mrOov. TOUT 78 oTpaT@ emropeveTo 
Kyijpos ov Tepiuetvas TO amo KopivOou VaUTLKOD, 
Kal dua THS “Apyetas iovtes Acuvaiav, K@unv 
ATELY LOTOD, em opOnoar. agixvovyTat Te €TL 
2Tpatov, TOMY peyloTny THs “Axapvavias, vo- 
pitovtes, el TavTnvy mpeTnv AdPotev, padiws 
odiot TAAXA TpoTYwpHcev. 

LXXXI. ’Axapvaves 6€ aicOopuevot Kata Te 
yv mwoAAnY aotpatiav éoBeBXyKviav ex Te 
Oardoons vavoly dua TOUS ToNElous Taper o- 
pévous, ouTE EvveBorovv epuracaov TE TA AUTOV 
éxaoTo, mapa TE Popyiova em euTov KENEVOVTES 
auvve' o d€ advvatos én Eivat vavTiKoD éK 
Kopiv@ov pédXovtos éextXetvy Navrraxtov épnunv 
atvroAiTetv. of 5€ IleXotrovynaion Kal ot Evppa- 


BOOK II. uxxx. 4-Lxxx1. 2 

twenty Athenian ships that were on guard off Nau- 
pactus,! they began at once to prepare for the ex- 
pedition by land. He had with him, of Hellenic 
troops, some Ambraciots, Anactorians and Leuca- 
dians, and the thousand Peloponnesians whom he 
himself brought; of barbarians, a thousand Chao- 
nians, who, having no king, were led by Photius and 
Nicanor of the ruling clan who had the annual presi- 
dency. With the Chaonian contingent were also some 
Thesprotians, who likewise have no king. A force 
of Molossians and Atintanians were led by Saby- 
linthus, the guardian of king Tharyps, who was still 
a boy, and of Paravaeans by their king, Oroedus. 
With the Paravaeans were a thousand Orestians 
whose king, Antiochus, had entrusted them to 
Oroedus. And Perdiccas also sent, without the 
knowledge of the Athenians, a thousand Macedo- 
nians, who arrived too late. With this army Cnemus 
set out, not waiting for the fleet from Corinth; and 
as they passed through the territory of Argos? they 
sacked Limnaea, an unwalled village. Finally they 
arrived at Stratus, the largest city of Acarnania, 
thinking that if they could take this first, the other 
places would readily come over to them. 

LXXXI. Now when the Acarnanians perceived 
that a large army had invaded them by land and 
that the enemy would soon be at hand with a fleet 
by sea as well, they did not attempt combined re- 
sistance, but guarding severally their own possessions 
they sent to Phormio urging him to aid them. But 
he said that he could not leave Naupactus unpro- 
tected, as a hostile fleet was about to sail from 
Corinth. Meanwhile the Peloponnesians and their 

1 of. ch. lxix. 1. # Amphilochian Argos; cf. ch. Ixviii. 1. 


yor Tpla TédXyn TrorncavTes chav avTav eEywpovy 
\ a / , ei 
Tpos THY TOV YTPATiwy TOW, OTwS eyyUs oTpa- 
/ > x / / 
An rn / \ \ / \ 
p@VTO TOU TELYOUS. Kal TO pécov eV ExovTES 
al / \ 4 A / b] 
mpocnaav Xaoves Kat of adrot BdpBapo, éx 
5 cal 8 > lal A 1 b 4 s \ 
efias 8 attav Aeveddiot cat “Avaxtoptoe Kal 
\ ca \ a 
oi peta TovTwV, év apiotepa 5é Kyvjuos kai ot 
\ > fal rt 
IleXotmrovynciot Kat Apmrpaxiotar: dietyov dé 
\ > >. / \ yy ¢ 2O\ € A 
7 / ~ 
Kal of pev” EXXnves TeTAypEeVOL TE TPOTHTAV Kal 
dua hurakhs eyovtes, ws éotpatoTedevcavto év 
/ / lal £ 
émritnoei@’ ot 6€ Xaoves opiat TE avTois TLoTEV- 
/ \ a 2} cal 
ovtes Kal akiovpevor UTO TaV exEivn NTELPwWTaV 
/ a 
a / f / \ a 
KaTaraPety, YwpnoavTées TE PUN META TOV Ad- 
ov BapBdpov evopigav avToBoel av thy Tory 
éXely Kal aAUT@V TO Epryov yevérOar., ‘yvoures é 
QUTOUS Ob >Tparvor ete mpoovovras Kat nyne a 
‘ ec / a 
odict tos “EXAnvas omotws mpocedOeiv, mpodo- 
/ \ \ \ \ / > / \ > \ 
yifovet 67 TA Tepl THY TOL evédpats, Kal éTrELOH 
r , € / 
éyyus Roav, ék TE THS TOAMEWS OMOTE YwpHcavTES 
Kal 逫 TOV évedp@v TpoomimTovaw. Kal és 
/ lal 
dhofov catactavtwv StapGetpovtat Te ToAXO! TAY 
Xaovwv, cai of dAdo BadpBapot a@s eidov avdtouvs 
> ’ oi > sty > 2 3 \ , 
évdovtas, ovKEeTL UTEéwEeWaV, AAX €s huynyv KaTé- 
lal \ ¢m a / 2Q7 
otncav. Ttav dé ‘EXAnuKav otpatorédwy ovdé- 
v fol / Ps \ \ \ al 
Tepov nabeTo THS maxXNS, La TO TOV TpoEdOeEtW 
auTovs Kal oTpatoTedoy oinPjvat KaTadnwope- 


BOOK II. txxxi. 2-7 

allies, dividing their troops into three divisions, 
advanced towards the city of the Stratians, their 
purpose being to encamp near by, and then, if they 
could not prevail upon them by parleying, to assault 
the wall. As they advanced, the centre was held by 
the Chaonians and the other barbarians, while on 
their right were the Leucadians and Anactorians 
and those who accompanied them, and on the left 
Cnemus with his Peloponnesians and the Ambraciots ; 
and the divisions were far apart from each other, 
sometimes, not even in sight. And the Hellenic 
troops as they advanced maintained their ranks and 
were on their guard until they encamped in a suit- 
able place; but the Chaonians, who were not only 
confident of themselves but were also recognised as 
very excellent fighting men by the inhabitants of 
that part of the mainland, did not halt to make 
camp, but advanced with a rush along with the other 
barbarians, thinking that they could take the town 
at the first assault, and thus gain the glory for them- 
selves. But the Stratians noticed that they were 
still advancing, and thinking that, if they could 
overcome them while isolated, the Hellenes would 
no longer be as ready to attack them, set ambushes 
in the outskirts of the town, and as soon as the 
barbarians were close at hand, closed in upon them 
from the city and from the ambushes and fell upon 
them. Thrown into a panic, many of the Chaonians 
were slain, and the other barbarians, seeing them 
give way, no longer held their ground, but took to 
flight. But neither of the Hellenic divisions was 
aware of the battle, because their allies had gone far 
ahead of them, and they thought that they were 



8 vous étreiyerOar. érrel & evéxewTo pevdyovres ot 
BapBapou, averduBavov Te avTous Kal Euvaya- 
youres Ta otparomeba novxatov avTov THV HUE- 
pay, és xEtpas pev ovK tovt@v odpiot TOV LtTpaTtiwv 
61a TO pnTrw@ TOVS adXovUS ‘Axapvavas EupSeBon- 
Onxéva, aTwbev 5é opevdovevTov Kal és atropiay 
KabioTavTov ov yap Hv dvev oT A@V xan Ofvar. 
Soxover 5€ ot "Axapvaves KpaTLaToL elvan TOUTO 
Tovetv. LXXXIl. emeLon dé vv§& eyevero, ava- 
Xopngas 0 Kviyos TH oTparea KaTa TAaXOS én 
tov "Avatrov TOTA}LOV, Os aT@éxet oT adious o7/80%- 
KovTa 2Tpatov, TOUS TE vexpous Kopivetar TH 
baTepata vmoamovdous Kal Oiviadav Evpmapa- 
Yevowevov KaTa pirtay avayopel Tap avTovs 
mp THY EvpBonbevav érOeiv. KaKelOev err’ 
oikov anipOov € ExaoTol. ot dé 2TpaTvou TpoTraiov 

LXXXIII. To 8 é« ris Kopiv@ov Kal TOV 
adXov  Suppaxov TOY €x TOD Kpicaiou KONTrOU 
VaUTLKOD, O &deu maparyevér at TO Kone, 6 OTWS 
[1) EvpBonbdow oi amo Bardcons a avo ‘Axapva- 
VES; ov TapaylyveTar, ann’ jvaykacOnoav mepl 
TAs auras Tepas ™ €v 2Tpar@ HaXn VAVLAXT- 
cat pos Poppiova Kal Tas elKOCL vads TOY 

2 “A@nvaiwy al éppovpovy év Navraxro. 0 yap 
Dopytov TapaTA€ovTas avTovs é&eo Tov KOXTFOU 
eT pel, Bovdopevos ev TH evpuxopia émiBeo Bau. 

3 ot O€ Kopiv@vor Kal ol Evupaxor émheov bev ovy 
@S ETL vavpaxia, avnra OT PATLOTLKOTEPOV mape- 
TKEVAT HEVOL és THY ‘Axapvaviay Kal ovK av ol0- 
pevo. mpos émTa Kal TET TApaKovTa vavs Tas 
ofetépas ToAuHoaL Tos "AOnvaious eixoat Tais 


BOOK II. txxxi. 7-Lxxxi1. 3 

pressing on in order to find a camp. But when the 
barbarians in their flight broke in upon them, they 
took them in and uniting their two divisions kept 
quiet there during the day, the Stratians not coming 
to close quarters with them, because the rest of the 
Acarnanians had not yet come to their support, but 
using their slings against them from a distance and 
distressing them ; for it was not possible for them to 
stir without armour; and indeed the Acarnanians are 
famous for their excellence in the use of the sling. 
LXXXII. But when night came on, Cnemus hastily 
retreated with his army to the river Anapus, which 
is eighty stadia distant from Stratus, and on the 
following day took up his dead under a truce; and 
since the Oeniadae had joined his expedition in token 
of their friendly feelings, he withdrew to their 
country before the combined forces of the Acar- 
nanians had arrived, and from there they returned 
severally to their homes. As for the Stratians, they 
set up a trophy of their battle with the barbarians. 
LXXXIII. Meanwhile the fleet from Corinth and 
from the other allies on the Crisaean Gulf, which 
was to have joined Cnemus in order to prevent the 
Acarnanians on the sea-coast from aiding those in the 
interior, did not arrive, but was obliged, about the 
day of the battle at Stratus, to fight with Phormio 
and the twenty Athenian ships which were on guard 
at Naupactus. For Phormio was watching them as 
they sailed along the coast out of the gulf, pre- 
ferring to attack them in the open water. Now the 
Corinthians and their allies on their way to Acarnania 
were not equipped for fighting at sea, but rather for 
operations on land, and they had no idea that the 
Athenians with their twenty ships would dare to 



a \ / 
éavT@v vavpaylay toijcacOar: émrerdn pévTor 
¢ 7 / \ a 
lal / » ioe a a > A 
chav Koutfouevarv, cat ex Llatpa@yv ths “Ayaias 
\ \ > / a / Re 
mpos THY avtitépas Hmetpov StaBadrrovtes et 
> , a \ > / > \ fal 
Axapvavias kateidov tovs "A@nvaious ato Tis 
a a / 
Xadkidos cal tod Ev7jvou rotayov mpoomXéovtas 
/ \ > + @ \ > /, 1 
opigt Kal ove eXalov vuKTOS adoppicodpevot, 
al / \ 
ovTw 6 avayxafovTat vavpaxety KaTa écoVv TOV 
, \ \ od \ \ \ 
4 mwopOuov. otpatnyol S€ joav pev Kal Kata 
/ c vA \ / / 
Toes ExdoTwV Of TapecKeudlovTo, KopivOiwr 
\ / \ ’ / A 2 / 
5€ Maydov kai ‘Iooxpatns kai “Ayabapytéas. 
\ e \ / b] “A / lal 
5 kai of pev IleXotovvnoios éraEavto KUKXOV TeV 
n , > 6 \ / 
VE@V MS péyloToV olol T Hoav pn SLdovTeEs dLéK- 
\ / \ v »” \ \ / 
TXovy, Tas Tpdpas pev &Ew, Ecw Se TAS TpU- 
\ / \ Lal a / b] \ 
pvas, Kal Ta Te AETTTA TrOLa A EvvEeTrrEL EVTOS 
lal r ¥ / 
To.ovuvTar Kal TévTE VAS Tas AploTa TEOVGAS, 
, » 
Stas éxtréorev d1a Bpayéos Tapayryvopevat, et 
, / 
Tn TpooTimTToLev Ol €vavTioL. 
al / lal 
LXXXIV. Oi & ’A@nvaio. cata piav vady 
/ ‘ a 
a / 
yov €$ OXlyov, ev xp@ alel TapamrheovTes Kai 
/ o / 
Soxnow TapéxyovTes avtixa éuParelv: mpoeipynto 
8 avtots uo Poppiwvos pr émixerpety mpiv av 
lal “ \ 
2 avtos onpunvyn. HAmioe yap avT@v ov pevety THY 

1 Bloomfield’s correction for ipopuioauevar of the MSS. 

1 Or, retaining bpopuioaduevor, ‘‘they had tried to anchor 
under cover of night, but had been detected.” 


BOOK II. txxxim. 3-Lxxxiv. 2 

bring on an engagement with their own forty-seven. 
When, however, they saw that the Athenians kept 
sailing along the opposite coast as long as they them- 
selves continued to skirt the southern shore, and 
when, as they attempted to cross from Patrae in 
Achaia to the mainland opposite, making for Acar- 
nania, they observed that the Athenians were bearing 
down upon them from Chalcis and the river Evenus, 
and finally when, during the night, they had tried to 
slip their moorings! and get away but had been 
detected, under these circumstances they were forced 
to fight in the middle of the channel.? Their fleet 
was commanded by generals from the several states 
which contributed contingents, the Corinthian squad- 
ron by Machaon, Isocrates, and Agatharchidas. The 
Peloponnesians drew up their ships in as large a 
circle as they could without allowing the enemy an 
opportunity to break through,’ prows outward, sterns 
inward ; and inside the circle they placed the light 
boats which accompanied them, and also five of their 
swiftest ships, in order that they might have only a 
short distance to sail out and bring support at any 
point where the enemy attacked. 

LXXXIV. As for the Athenians, drawn up in 
single column they kept sailing round the Pelopon- 
nesian fleet in a circle, hemming it into a narrower 
and narrower space, always just grazing by and 
giving the impression that they would charge at any 
moment. But orders had been given by Phormio 
not to attack until he should give the signal; for he 
hoped that the enemy’s ships would not keep in line, 

2 7.e. in the open water between Patrae and the mouth of 
the Evenus, as opposed to the regions along the shore of the 

Gulf, where their fleet might run into a harbour. 
3 See note ont. xlix. 3. 



taki, woTep ev yn wetnv, adda Evpreceiabat 
mpos adXAnAaS Tas vats Kal Ta TAOCIa Tapayny 
3 n \ 
Tapékew, el T éxTVvEevoeev EX TOD KOATTIOV TO 
Tvevpa, OTEp Avapevwv Te TepléTTAEL Kal eiw@Oet 
, \ / 
ylyvecOar érri tiv &w, ovdéva ypovoy navxKacew 
> Me \ \ > / 3 52 e n b] / 
avrous: Kal Thy emixeipnow éd aiT@ Te évopt ev 
elval, oTrOTaV BovANnTaL, TOV VEewV GApLeLVOV TEOU- 
r / , 
oav, Kal TOTE KaANoTHY yiyverOa. ws 5é TO TE 
fa) e a / 
? an / lal 
tm’ apuhotépwy, TOU Te avé“ov T@Y TE Tolar, 
dua tTpockepevav étapacaovto, Kal vads TE vl 
mpooémimte Kal Tots KovTois OvewOodvTo, Bon Te 
, \ X 3 / 3 A \ 
AoLdopia ovdév KaTHKOVOY OTE THY TapayyedAo- 
Tot ovTes ev KAVOMVL avadépety aVOpwTrOL aTeELpoL 
r A a oF 
tois KuBepvyntais amreectépas Tas vads Tapel- 
\ rn 
xov, TOTE O12) KATA TOY KaLpOVY TOUTOV onpaivel, 
a , lal 
kal of A@Onratot mpoomEecovTEes TRWTOV meV KaTa- 
SvoveL TOV CTpaTHnylOwy vedv piav, erretta O€ Kai 
\ yA - / 5 / \ / 
Tas ddXas 7 Ywpyoeav OvepOerpov, Kal KaTEéEoTN- 
nr X\ 
cay é> adxKiy pev pndéva TpétrecOat adta@v v7r0 
an al / \ b] / \ / 
Ths Tapayns, pevyew Oe és Ilatpas Kai Avpny 
a b ce e be > lal 5 , \ 
ths Axaias. ot d€ A@nvaio: catadim€aytes Kat 
rn , 4 4 ” > > a 
vats d@dexa AaBovTes TOUS TE avdpas éF avTaV 
\ F > , > * / > / 
Tous mA€laTous avedopevor €s MorXuvxperov arré- 
\ al \ a 
TEV, Kal TpoTaloy oTHaarTEs Evi TO ‘Pim Kal 
vabv avabévtes TO Llocerdau avexwopnoav és 
Navraktov. wapémdevoav 5€ cai oi Iledotrov- 


BOOK II. txxxiv. 2-5 

like infantry on land, but would fall foul of one 
another, and also be thrown into confusion by the 
small boats, and then if the breeze for which he was 
waiting while he sailed round, which usually blew 
from the gulf towards dawn, should spring up, they 
would not remain steady for any length of time. As 
for the attack, he thought that was in his power 
whenever he chose, since his ships were better 
sailers, and that then was the most favourable 
moment for it. So when the wind began to come 
up, and the ships, already hemmed in a narrow 
space, were being thrown into confusion both by the 
violence of the wind and the pressure of the small 
boats, when ship was dashing against ship and the 
crews were trying to push them apart with poles, all 
the while keeping up such shouts and warning 
cries and abuse of one another that they could not 
hear either the word of command or the coxswains’ 
calls, and, finally, when the inexperienced rowers, 
unable to get their oars clear of the water in a heavy 
sea, were rendering the ships less obedient to the 
helmsmen, then at this critical moment Phormio 
gave the signal. Thereupon the Athenians fell upon 
them; first they sank one of the admirals’ ships, 
and then destroyed the rest as well wherever they 
came upon them, reducing them to such straits that 
in their confusion no one turned for defence, but 
all fled to Patrae and Dyme in Achaia. But the 
Athenians gave chase, and after they had captured 
twelve ships and had taken on board most of their 
crews sailed away to Molycreum; then they set up a 
trophy on Rhium, dedicated a ship to Poseidon, and 
returned to Naupactus. The Peloponnesians also 



/ > \ val , lal A > ol 
vnoot evOds tails TeptNolToLs TAY VvEe@V EK TIS 
rn , I 
Avpns cai Ilatpav és Kuddjvny to Hero émt- 
nr e / 
vetov' Kat amo Aeveddos Kvijyos cal at éxevov 
An a cal \ 
ves, as eer TavTais EvppetEar, apixvodvTar peta 
THV ev LTpaT@ wayyy és THY KvrAdyvyD. 
LXXXV. I[léurover 8€ rai of Aaxedatpovior 
n / / > \ \ na / 
TO Kvjuw EvpBovrous eri tas vads Tipoxpaty 
/ / 7 
kal Bpaciéav cat Avucodpova, Kedevovtes aXANV 
/ \ » Cee. ’ 
vavpayiav BéXtiov TapacKevadlecOar Kal wn UT 
b] , lal ” 6 na - / 280 \ 
drAiyov vewv elpyecOar THS Padacons. edoKer yap 
auTois G\XwS TE Kal TP@TOV vavpaylas TeLpaca- 
s \ t 
pévols TOAUS O TapaXoyos elvat Kal OV TOTOUT@ 
@ovTo chav TO vauTLKOY eiTrecOaL, yeyevnT Iau 
/ / b] > / A > , 
dé Twa paraxtap, ovK avtiTiOévtes THY AOnvatwy 
> a > / a / b] 3. 7 
ék ToAAOD éurretpiay THs aodetépas 62’ oréiyou 
peréTns. Opym ovv améotedXov. ot 5é adixo- 
pevot peta ToU Kynuov vads Te mpoomepinyyethav 
@s él vavpaxyiav. téutrer 6€ Kal 0 Doppiwr és 
tas “AOnvas thy Te TapacKeuny avTaY ayyEedouv- 
Tas Kal Tepl THs vavpayxlas Hv éviknoav Ppacov- 
Tas Kal KeXevwv avT@® vads OTL Treiotas Sea 
/ b] a e ? e / e / > 
moos ovons aiel vavpayryoev. of dé atroTép- 
TpooevéaTerav és Kpytynvy mpatov adixécOat. 
, \ > le | / / 
Nixias yap Kpys Toptuvios wpokevos av reid 


BOOK II. exxxiv. 5-Lxxxv. 5 

sailed away immediately with the ships that were 
left, proceeding from Dyme and Patrae along the 
coast to Cyllene, the shipyard of the Eleans; and 
Cnemus likewise, coming from Leucas together with 
the ships from that quarter! which were to have 
joined the Corinthian fleet, came to Cyllene after the 
battle at Stratus, 

LXXXV. The Lacedaemonians now sent to the 
fleet Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron as ad- 
visers to Cnemus, directing them to make better 
preparation for another sea-fight, and not to be 
driven off the sea by a few ships. For the issue of 
the recent battle seemed to them utterly incompre- 
hensible, especially since this was their first attempt 
at a sea-fight, and they could not believe that their 
fleet was so greatly inferior, but thought that there 
had been cowardice somewhere, failing to take into 
account the long experience of the Athenians as 
compared with their own brief practice. In a rage, 
then, they dispatched the advisers. And these on 
their arrival, acting in conjunction with Cnemus, 
sent round a call to the allied cities for additional 
ships, and set about equipping those already at hand, 
with a view to a sea-fight. And Phormio on his 
part sent messengers to Athens to give information 
of the enemy’s preparations and to tell about the 
battle which they had won, urging them also to send 
to him speedily as many ships as possible, since 
there was always a prospect that a battle might be 
fought any day. So they sent him twenty ships, 
but gave the commander in charge of them special 
orders to sail first to Crete. For Nicias, a Cretan of 
Gortys, who was a proxenus? of theirs, persuaded 

1 The contingents from Leucas, Anactorium, and Am- 
bracia, ch. lxxx. 2, 3. 2 See ch. xxix. 1, note. 419 


avtovs émi Kudwviay mredoat, dacxwv mpoc- 
TOLnoELV AUTHVY ovoav Torepiav: ériye Sé Ilo- 
Auxvirass xapilomevos omopous TOV Kudovarav. 
Kal ° jev AaBov TAS vavs @ByETO €s K pyrny Kal 
pera | TOV Torryver av edrov THD yay TOV Kvdo- 
viaTaVv, Kal UT avéwov Kal aolas évdréTpiver 
oUK OYOV YXpovoV. 

LXXXVI. O: & &v tH Kurrjvn Tedorrovyncros 
év TovTo, é€v © ot “A@nvaior wept Kpytny Kxatet- 
YOVTO, TapeTKEevacMEeVvoL WS éTl VaVpAaXiaV TaApe- 
mrevoav és dvoppov tov ’Ayaixov, ovrep avtois 
0 KaTa yhv TT patos TOV Tledorrovynatay T poo - 
eBeBonOnxee. TapeTrEVTE dé Kal 0 Poppion ¢ etl 
TO ‘Piov TO Monduxpixov Kal @ppicato éEw avrod 
vavaly elKOoL, alonep Kab evavpLaXnoeD. Dy b€ 
TOUTO pev TO “Piov pidtov Tots ‘AGnvaiors, TOO 
érepov ‘Piov éotlyv avtimépas TO év TH IeXoTov- 
vno@" OvexXeTOV éé ar add ov oTAOLOUS pddiora 
era TAS Oaracons, TOD dé _Kpioaiou KOANTTOU 
oT Opa TOUTO éoTLD. ent ovv TO ‘Pio TO "Axaixd 
OL eorrovynovoe am eXOVTL ov Trond TOU Tavop- 
Lov, ev @ avTots o Telos HV, @ppicavto Kal avTol 
vavoly érta Kal EBdounKovra,! erred) ral TOUS 
"AOnvaious eidov. Kal éml pev && 4 éxta tpépas 
av wpyouv GXA1 OLS HeAETOVTES Te Kal Tapa- 
oKxevalopevor THY vaupaxian, yepny EYOVTES OL 
bev pL) ex ely &&o tov “Piwv és THY evpuxepiar, 
poBovpevor TO ™poTepov dB 0s, ol dé pa éomAety 
és Ta oTeVa, voutSovres T pos exelvov elvan THY ev 
oALy@ vaupaxiar. erecta 0 Kytuos cat o Bpact- 
das Kal ot aot TOV Tlerorovynaiwy oTparnyol, 
Bovdopevor ev TaYE THY Vavpayiay TovhoaL Tpiv 

420 1 Hude reads revthxovra, with C 

BOOK II. ixxxy. 5—Lxxxvi. 6 

them to sail against Cydonia, a hostile town, promis- 
ing to bring it over to the Athenians; but he was 
really asking them to intervene to gratify the people 
of Polichne, who are neighbours of the Cydonians. 
So the officer in charge took the ships, went to 
Crete, and helped the Polichnitans to ravage the 
lands of the Cydonians, and by reason of winds and 
stress of weather wasted not a little time. 
LXXXVI. Meantime, while the Athenians were 
detained in Crete, the Peloponnesians at Cyllene, 
equipped and ready for a battle, sailed along the 
coast to Panormus in Achaia, where the land-forces 
of the Peloponnesians had come to their support. 
And Phormio also sailed along the coast to the 
Molycrian Rhium and anchored outside with the 
twenty ships with which he had fought before. 
This Rhium was friendly to the Athenians, and 
opposite is the other Rhium, that in the Pelopon- 
nesus; and the distance between them is about 
seven stadia by sea, constituting the mouth of the 
Crisaean Gulf. Accordingly the Peloponnesians, 
when they saw the Athenians come to anchor, like- 
wise anchored with seventy-seven ships at the Achaian 
Rhium, which is not far from Panormus, where their 
land-forces were. And for six or seven days they 
lay at anchor opposite one another, practising and 
preparing for battle, the one side resolved not to 
sail outside the two Rhia into the open water, fear- 
ing a recurrence of their disaster, the other not to 
sail into the straits, thinking that fighting in a 
narrow space was in the enemy’s favour. At last 
Cnemus and Brasidas and the other Peloponnesian 
commanders, wishing to bring on the engagement 



Te kal amo Tov “A@nvalwv ériBonOjaoat, Evvera- 
avT@v Tovs Todos bia THY TpoTépay ocav 
foBovpévous xal od tpofvpovs dvtas Tapexedev- 
cavto Kal éreEav Torabe. 
LXXXVII. “‘H peév yevouévn vavpayia, @ 
A / ” BA =] > \ e lal 
dvdpes HeXorrovynorot, et Tis dpa Ov avtTny Uuav 
a \ lé > \ / yy / 
hofeitas THv pédAdovaar, ovyt Sixaiav Eyer TEK- 
a a \ A 
papow TO éexpoBhjoar. TH TE yap TapacKev7 
/ o 
évdens éyéveto, waTrep late, Kal ovxl és vavpa- 
, a xX > \ / 4 / / 
xiav padrov 7 él otpateiay émreopev EvvEe8y 
, / a a 
Kat Tov TL Kal 1) aTELpla TP@TOV vavpayodvvTas 
todyrev. @oTe ov KaTa THY hweTépav KaKiay TO 
ca) , a 
hoocdobar Tpoceyéveto, ovde Sikaoy THs yvoOuns 
TO pi) KATA KpaTos wKNOEr, yor 5é Twa ev av’T@ 
avtinoyiav, THS ye Evydhopas TO aTroBavTt ap- 
Brvvecbat, vowicar Sé tats pév TUYaLs Evdéyer Pat 
/ \ > , A \ , 
cpharrecbat tovs avOpwrovus, Tais dé yvopats 
Tovs auTovs alel dp0as! avdpetous eivat, Kal p71) 
ametplav Tod avdpetov Tapovtos mpoBaddopévous 
eixoT@s av év Tit KaKoUs yevécOa. tpav dé ovd 
cr am 
) ameipla ToooUTOV AElTETAL SoOV TOAMYy TpOv- 
yeTe: Tavde O€ 7) ErloTHUN, hv waddoTa go- 
Beicbe, avipeiav pev éxovoa xal priunv e€eu ev 
a ro , 7 A »” v \ > , 
To Sew@ émiterelvy & Ewalev, avev O€ evyvyias 
> /, / \ \ /, > / / 
ovdeuia TéyVN TpPOS TOUS KLVdUVOUS LaxvEL. hoBos 
yap uvnunv exTrAHToEL, TEXYN OE AVEV ANKIIS Ov- 
1 Hude writes épovs and deletes avdpelous (with Badham). 

BOOK II. txxxvi. 6-Lxxxvil. 4 

soon, before reinforcements came from Athens, first 
called their soldiers together, and seeing that most 
of them were frightened on account of their previous 
defeat and not eager for battle, encouraged them 
and spoke as follows : 

LXXXVII. “The recent sea-fight, Peloponne- 
sians, if possibly it has caused any man among 
you to be afraid of the one before us, affords no 
just grounds for your alarm. For our preparation 
was deficient, as you know, and the object of our 
voyage was not so much to fight at sea as operations 
on land; and it happened, furthermore, that not a 
few of the chances of war were against us, and 
doubtless also our inexperience had something to do 
with our failure in the first sea-fight. It was not 
then our cowardice that brought about defeat, nor 
is it right that the spirit, which force cannot con- 
quer, but which has in it something defiant, should 
be dulled and blunted by the outcome of mere 
chance ; rather you ought to reflect that although 
men may suffer reverse in their fortunes, yet in 
their spirit brave men are rightly considered always 
brave, and when courage is present no inexperience 
can properly be urged as an excuse for being cowards 
under any circumstances. And, after all, your inex- 
perience is more than counterbalanced by your 
superiority in daring; and though the enemy’s skill, 
which you particularly dread, will indeed, so long as 
bravery goes with it, have the presence of mind. in 
the moment of danger to put into effect the lessons 
it has learned, yet without valour no amount of 
proficiency avails against such dangers. For fear 
drives presence of mind away, and skill without 



5 dév @herel. pos pev ody TO éumrerpoTepov aUTaV 
TO ToApnpoTepov avtTitaEacGe, mpds S€ TO Sia 

6 Tepiyiyvetas 5é nuivy wAHOs Te vVedv Kal Tpos TH 
Y oixeia oven OTITOV TapovT@Y vavuayeElV’ TA 
d€ TOAAa TOV TAEOVoY Kal duEeLVOY TapecKevac- 

7 pévav TO Kpatos éotiv. @aote ovdé Kal’ Ev evpi- 
oKOMEV ELKOTMS AV Has oharropmévoUS Kal boa 
HuapTOMEV TpOTEpoV, VOV ad’Ta TadTAa Tpocyevo- 

8 peva StOackariav TwapéEet. Oapcodvtes obv Kai 
kuBepyyntat Kal vadtas TO Kal’ éavTov ExacTos 
érecOe, Y@pav fn TporEiToVTES 7 AV TLS Tpoc- 

9 TayOR. Tov dé TpOTEpOVY HryE“oveY Ov YElpov THY 
eTLyeElpnolw HuEels TapacKevacopey Kal ovK Evew- 
couev tpohaciw ovdevl Kax@ yevéoOar: hv Sé Tis 
dpa kat BovrnOh, KodkacOjceTat TH TpeTTOVTN 
Enuia, ot de ayalol tiuncovta: Tois mpoonKkovow 
aOXoLs THS apEeTAs.” 

LXXXVIII. Tovadta pév tots eXotrovynciots 
of apxovTes Tapexedetcavto. o 5é€ Poppiov 
Sedv@s Kal avtTos THY TOV oTpaTLWTaY Oppwdiav 
Kat aiaOopevos Ott TO TAOS THY Vvedv KaTA 
adas avtous Evyictapevor efhoSovvto, éBovreTo 
Evycarécas Oapcivat te nal rapaiveow év TO 

2 TapovTe moinocaclat. mpoTepov pev yap aiel 
avtois éXeye Kal TpoTrapecKkevate Tas yvopas ws 
ovdev avTtots mAnGos vedv ToToUTOV, HY éTiTAEN, 
6 TL ovN Umopevetéov éoti, Kal of oTpaTi@Tat x 
TohkXNov €v odhicw avtois tiv akiwoww tavTny 


BOOK II. vxxxvi. 4—-Lxxxvul. 2 

intrepidity is of no avail. Therefore, against their 
greater experience set your greater daring, and 
against the fear caused by your defeat set the 
accident of your being at the moment unprepared. 
You have the advantage, both in number of ships 
and in fighting close to the land, which is friendly 
to us, and you are supported by hoplites; and victory 
is generally on the side of those who are the more 
numerous and better prepared. There is accordingly 
not a single reason that we can find why we should 
fail; and as to our earlier mistakes, the very fact 
that they were made will teach us a lesson. Be of 
good courage, then, and let each man, both helms- 
man and sailor, follow our lead as best he can, not 
leaving the post to which he may be assigned. We 
shall prepare for the attack at least as well as your 
former commanders, and shall give no one an excuse 
to act like a coward; but if anyone should be in- 
clined that way, he shall be punished with the pen- 
alty he deserves, while the brave shall be honoured 
with rewards such as befit their valour.” 

LXXXVIJI. With such words the Peloponnesian 
commanders encouraged their men. But Phormio, 
being himself also uneasy about the apprehension 
felt by his troops, and observing that they were 
gathering in knots amongst themselves in alarm at 
the superior number of the enemy’s ships, wished 
to call them together in order to hearten them and 
make an exhortation to suit the present emergency. 
For in the past he had always told them, by way of 
bracing their minds, that there was no number of 
ships, however great, whose attack men such as they 
could not withstand ; and his sailors had long since 
held among themselves the conviction that they, 

VOL. I. p 475 


/ A 
ei\Andecav pndéva oxrov "AOnvaior dvtes TeXo- 
/ a a / 
Tovvnci@y veav vToxXwpely' ToTEe O€ Tpos THY 
a ” Chore > \ > fo) ] 7 
Tapovacay ori opa@v avtovs aOupuodvtas éBov- 
/ nw Lal 
AeTO UTOMYnoW Tolncacbat Tov OBapceiv, Kal 
Evyxadécas Tovs "AOnvaious édeye Tordbe. 
¢€ a lal = 
LXXXIX. “‘Opav ipas, @ avdpes oTpatTioTat, 
\ fel ca) , 
mepoBnuevous TO TANGos THY EevavTiov EvvEKa- 
Neca, ovx akiav Ta pn Sewa év oppwdia exe 
ca, ya) pposia éyew. 
nr ¥ fo) 
ovTOL yap TpaTov pev Sia TO TpovertKHaOaL Kai 
2 bg \ ” e tad — >. X a 
pnd avtol olecPat opotor nuiv elvar TO TAROOS 
TOV VeOV Kal OVK ATO TOD loov TapecKevdcarTo: 
iN / 
mpoonKov adicw avopelots eivat, ov dc ado Tt 
a a 5 a A > A Ph, ot / \ 
Gapcodow 4 dia tHv ev TO elo eurrerpiav Ta 
‘4 A \ ” , aed a 
mrelw KaTopOodvtes Kal olovtat odicr Kai év TO 
lal \ a 
VAUTLK@ Tolnoew TO avTO. TOO éK TOD StKaiov 
Hptv wadXov viv reptéatat, elmep Kal ToUTOLS év 
\ A 
éxeiv@, émel evrpuxia ye ovdev mpopépovat, TO Sé 
ExaTepot Te evar €utrerpotepot Opacvtepoi eopev. 
, , e of > lal \ A 
Aaxedatpoviot te Hryovpevor attav da thy ode- 
/ sf 7 / \ \ 
tépav ddfav akovtas Tpocdyovct Tovs TOAXOUS 
és Tov xivduvov, érel ovK ay rote évexeipnoay 
a \ \ 
joonGéevtes Tapa TOAD avis vavpaxeivy. pn dn 
by a A / / ‘\ \ ¢e a b] , 
avuT@v THY TOAMaV Seionte. Toru Oé vpels Exel- 
4 / / \ , / 
vous TAeiw hoBov Tapéxete Kal TicTOTEpoV KaTa 

BOOK II. txxxvitt. 2-Lxxxix. 5 

being Athenians, must never give ground before any 
number of Peloponnesian ships. But at this time, 
seeing that they were dispirited by what they saw 
before their eyes, and wishing to remind them of 
their old-time confidence, he called them together 
and spoke as follows: 

LXXXIX. “Observing that you have become 
alarmed, soldiers, at the numbers of the enemy, I 
have called you together, because I do not want you 
to be in dread of imaginary dangers. For, in the 
first place, it is just because these men have been 
beaten before, and do not even themselves believe 
that they are a match for us, that they have provided 
themselves with this large and disproportionate num- 
ber of ships; then, too, as regards their courage,— 
the thing on which they chiefly rely when they 
come against us, as if it were their peculiar pro- 
vince to be brave,—the only reasonable ground 
they have for confidence is that their experience in 
fighting on land has generally brought them success, 
and so they think this will achieve the same result 
for them at sea as well. But in all reason the ad- 
vantage to-day will rather be ours, if they on their 
side have it on land; for in valour assuredly they 
are nowise superior, but we are both more confident 
just as in any way we have more experience. 
Besides, since the Lacedaemonians lead their allies 
for their own glory, the majority of them have to 
be dragged into battle against their will, for other- 
wise they would never, after their decisive defeat, 
have attempted to fight a second time at sea. 
Hence you need not fear their daring. On the 
contrary, you inspire in them a dread far greater 
and better justified, both because you have already 

‘ 427 


Te TO TMpovevixnkévat Kab StL ovK av HyodvTar wn 
pédrovtas Te aktov TOU Mapa TOAD Tpakew avOt- 
e a BJ / \ \ $e F / 
otacbat Upas. avTit@anot pev yap ol” TAELOUS, 
e ze A 5 / \ / , a a 
@omep ovTol, TH Suvawer TO TAEOV TLoVVOL fH TH 
, SaaS. a be 2 fre lh , 
yvopun emépyovtat of O€ Ex TOAN@ VTodecc TEpwV 
/ an 
Kal Gua ove avayxalopevot, péya Te THS Stavotas 
To BéBatov Exyovtes avTiToApaawv. & Noyrfouevos 
e a > ee, ’ ’ Caton tek ~ 
KaTa AOYOY TapacKeuy. TOANG O€ Kal oTpaTo- 
BA ” ¢e 2. > / A > , v 
Teda Hon erecev UT EMaToOVaY TH aTrELpLa, EoTL 
be a \ A b a fae 2 ") f e a aA 
é & kal TH GToApia’ wv ovdeTepou els vov 
/ \ Nei 3 a > > a Ld ie 9 
peTéyomev. Tov O€ ay@va OVK EV TO KOATO EXOD 
3 / SQW id / > > , e A 
\ isd \ \ A > “3 b] 7 
vavow éutretpors Kal Apewvov TAEoVTAaLsS 4 TTEVO- 
, > / ” \ A > A , 
yopia ov Evudéper. ovTe yap av emimdAEevoese 
\ \ . 2 \ / 
Tis @s xp és euBorrnv pH EXoV THY TpoTorpLy 
A / 3 rn P97 KR b] / 
év Séovts mieCopevos: SuéxTAor Te ovK eiciv ovd’ 
> , e a bla a 54 
dvactpodal, atep vey apevov mEoVTHY Epya 
> , > X\ > ‘dé x yy \ / 
éotiv, GAXa avayKn av ein THY vavpaxtay Trefo- 
a / @ \ > / e , 
payiav nabiotacOa, Kal év TovT@ ai TdreLouS 
a / \ 
pies Kpelacous yiyvovtal. TovT@Y meV ov eyw 
1 Hude adopts Madvig’s conjecture # for oi. 


BOOK II. ixxxix. 5-9 

defeated them and because they think that you 
would not be facing them at all unless you ex- 
pected to achieve a result commensurate with the 
very great odds. For most men, when, like our 
present opponents, they are equal to their foes, rely 
more upon their strength when they advance to the 
attack than upon their resolution; whereas those 
who dare oppose them with greatly inferior num- 
bers, and at the same time without being compelled 
to do so, must possess in a high degree the quality 
of unwavering resolution. Taking all these things 
into consideration, our enemies have come to fear 
us more on account of what is amazing in our con- 
duct than they would if our preparations were less 
out of proportion to their own. Furthermore many 
an army has before now been overthrown by smaler 
numbers through its own want of experience, and 
some too through a deficiency of daring, and at this 
moment we can be charged with neither. As for 
the contest, I will not risk it in the gulf if I can 
help it, nor will I sail into the gulf. For I am 
aware that a confined space is not an advantage to a 
fleet of a few ships which are better sailers and 
have experienced crews, when it is opposed to a 
large number of ships which are badly managed. 
For one cannot charge properly upon an enemy ship 
to ram her side, through not having a clear view of 
her a long way off, nor can one retire at need when 
hard pressed; and there is no chance for such 
manoeuvres as breaking through the line or whirl- 
ing around to ram, though these are precisely the 
proper tactics of fast sailing ships, but the sea-fight 
would have to be turned into a land-battle, and in 
that case it is the larger fleet that wins. For these 





é&w tHv mpovotavy Kata TO Svvatov' bpels Fé 
EUTAKTOL Tapa Tats vaval pEvovTes Ta Te mapay- 
yeddopeva o&€ws dexerbe, & addws TE Kal by odiyou 
Tis epopunrens ovens, Kal év TO EPpy? KOo LOV 
Kal ouyiy Tepl WAEloTOU jyetobe, 6 O é$ TE 7a. 
ovy KL Ta, apuverbé Te Tovabe akios rev T po- 
e_pyacuevav. o € ayov péyas vpiv, i) Katano- 
oat Tlehomovynatay THY EAXTLOG TOD vauTtKob q 
eyyuTéepo KaTaCTH OAL "AOnvators TOV poBov 
mept TAS Garacons. ava pine Keo & av buds 
OTL VEVLK KATE avuT@Y TOUS Todovs* oonpwevov 
dé avdpav OUK eGehovew ai yv@muat pos TovS 
AUTOUS KLVOUVOUS O omotas eval. 
XC. Toradta 8 Kai o Popptov TapeKereVTATO. 
ol dé Tlehorrovyjo vor, émrel0n avtois ol ‘AOnvaior 
OvK é7rémrA€OV €S TOV KOATIOV Kal Ta oTEVa, BovXdO- 
pevol AkoVTAaS ~ow Tpoayayely avTOUS, avayayo- 
pevot awa Ew em eor, em Teco dpov Tabapevot 
Tas vaus, mapa? THY EauT@v yi éow ents TOU 
KONTOU beEv@ KEpa HYOULEVO, OoTEp Kal @ppyouv" 
emt é auT@ cixoot ératav Tas apiora Teovoas, 
Omws, Eb dpa vopioas él THY Navraxtov avtous 
mreiv 0 Dopuiwv Kal avtos émiBonOav tavTn 
1 Hude reads roAenlwy, with C. 

2 With CG; the other MSS. and the Schol. ézi, 
8 Hude deletes evi, after Kriiger. 

1 In the first sea-fight the Peloponnesians had forty- 
seven ships (ch. lxxxill. 3) against Phormio’s twenty (ch. 
lxxxiii. 1); in the second battle the Peloponnesians had 
seventy-seven ships (ch. lxxxvi. 4). Since the Pelopon- 
nesians lost twelve ships in the first battle (ch. lxxxiv, 4), 
the expression ‘‘ most of them” is not quite exact here, 


BOOK II. txxxix. 9-xc. 2 

matters, however, I shall make provision to the best 
of my ability. As for you, keep good order, stay 
near your ships, give heed sharply to the word of 
command, especially since the two fleets are at 
watch so near one another; and when it comes to 
action, regard discipline and silence, which are 
generally advantageous in warfare, but especially 
so at sea, as all important, and ward off the enemy 
yonder in a manner worthy of your past exploits. 
The contest is a momentous one for you—whether 
you are to shatter the hopes which the Peloponnesians 
have in their fleet, or to bring closer home to the 
Athenians their fear about the sea. Once more I 
remind you that you have beaten most of them? 
already ; and when men have once suffered defeat, 
their spirit is never the same as before if they are 
called upon to face the same dangers.” 

XC. Such were the words with which Phormio 
also encouraged his men. And the Peloponnesians, 
when the Athenians did not sail into the gulf and 
the narrows to meet them, wished to draw them 
in against their will; so they put out to sea at 
dawn, and, after lining up their ships four deep,? 
sailed along their own shore towards the inner part 
of the gulf, in the same order as they had lain at 
anchor,’ their right wing leading the way.4 Upon 
their right wing they had placed their twenty 
best sailing ships, in order that, if Phormio got 
the impression that their objective was Naupactus 

2 Or, as some take it, ‘‘ in a column four abreast.” 

$ Only now the four ships which had lain at anchor one 
behind the other sailed, after the turn to the right, abreast. 

* Or, retaining én) instead of rapa, ‘‘ after lining up their 

ships four deep against their own shore (t.e. with it at their 
backs), sailed toward the inner part of the gulf.. ..” 



/ / 
cdav of "A@nvaio Ew tod éavt@v Képws, GAN 
a / € a 
avTat ai vies TepixAnoerav. oO 6, Strep exeivor 
\ lal , 
mpocedéxovto, poBynGeis Epi TO Ywpio épnuw 
OVTL, WS EWPA avayouévoUS aUTOUS, akwv Kal KaTa 
\ > / »” \ \ a 4 ve 
oTovdny éuBibdoas emer Tapa THY YhV* Kal oO 
melos dua tov Meconviwy mapeBonGer. idovtes 
Sé of HeXotrovvncios Kata piav éri Képws trapa- 
mA€ovtas Kal On OvTas évTOS TOU KOATOU TE 

\ \ A r ° ’ / / > \ 
Kal Tpos TH YH, Strep EBovAOVTO paddLoTA, a7ro 
onpelou évos Apyw éemioTpéWavTes TAS vads peET- 
womnoov éTAEOV WS Elye TAYOUS ExaaTos él TOS 
3 / » ee / \ a > / 
A@nvatous, Kai nATLEOV Tagas Tas Vas aTrONN- 
WecGat. tev dé Evdexa pév TiVEs aittep HYyodVTO 

\ a 
umexpevyouct TO Képas Tov IleXoTOvynciwy Kal 

\ F | \ > \ > / \ > AS 
ériuxataraBovtes ¢éwody Te Tpos THY yh U1o- 

/ \ / BA A 3 
devyovoas Kal drépVerpav, dvdpas te tav *AOn- 
/ na 
vaiwy amréxtevav boot pn eFévevoay avtav. Kat 
lal la) 1A 
TOV veav TiVas avadovpevot elXxov KEevas (piaV 

\ b] lal > / F A \ , e 
5€ avtols avdpaow eixyov 76n), tas Sé Tivas ot 
Meconviot tapaRonOnoartes Kai eres Baivovtes 

\ lal e b] \ / 3 / 
Evy Tots 6mAols és THY POdrXaccav Kal émiBavtes 
ato TOV KATATTPOLATOV paYomevol adeidovToO 
éAKOMEeVvas 707. 

XCI. Tavtn pév odv ot HWeXorovvnoiot éxpa- 
touv te Kal duédOeipav tas “Artixas vads: ai bé 
ElKOoL VES AVT@V al amo TOU SekLod Képws EdI- 
w@xov tas évoexa vats tov ’AOnvaiwy aimep 


BOOK II. xe. 2-xc1. 1 

and should, following the coast, sail in that direc- 
tion to its aid, the Athenians might not be able 
to escape their attack by sailing outside their wing, 
but might be enveloped by these ships. Now he 
did just what they expected him to do; when he 
saw them put to sea, fearing for the safety of the 
place, which was unprotected, he reluctantly and 
in haste embarked his crews and sailed along the 
coast, the Messenian army moving along the shore 
to support him. And when the Peloponnesians 
saw that they were skirting the coast in single 
file and were already inside the gulf and close to 
shore, which was just what they most desired, at 
one signal they suddenly veered about, bore down 
with ships in line as fast as each could upon the 
Athenians, hoping to cut off all their ships. But 
eleven of these, which were in the lead, got past the 
Peloponnesian wing, as it swung round, and escaped 
into the open water; but the rest were overtaken, 
driven ashore as they attempted to escape, and dis- 
abled, and all the Athenians on them who did not 
succeed in swimming ashore were slain. Some of 
the ships they made fast to their own and proceeded to 
tow away empty—though they had already captured 
one with its crew—but some others, which were 
already in tow, were taken from them by the Mes- 
senians, who came to the rescue, rushed armed as 
they were into the sea, boarded the ships, and fought 
from their decks. 

XCI. In this quarter, then, the Peloponnesians 
were victorious and had disabled the Athenian ships ; 
but the twenty ships covering their right wing were 
pursuing the eleven Athenian ships which had got 



e / A > \ > \ > , 
imekéhuyov tHv émiatpodny és THY evpuxwpiav. 
\ \ a 
kat bOdvovo adtovs TANVY plas vews TpoKaTa- 
a \ , a 
guyotcat tpos THY Navmaxtov, kal cxovoar 
“wae: X . 9 , - 
avtimpwpor Kata TO “AmoAN@YLOY TapecKeud- 
4 xX > \ an a 
Covto apuvvovpevol, nv és tiv yhv él odds 
/ e 
mréwow. of Sé Tapayevouevor VaoTEpov éTraid- 
vitov Te Gua TEoVTES ws vEviKNKOTES, Kal THY 
, a a > / \ e / 207 
uiav vadv tov ’AOnvaiay thy bTrodoToy édiwxe 
Aevxabia vads pia TOAD Tpd TOV GrAX@v. ETUXE 
e nq / 

S& éAKds Oppodca peTéwpos, Tepl Hv H ’ArTiKN 
a / \ / A ? 
vads dOdcoaca Kal TepitrEVcaca TH Aeveadia 
Su@xovon éuBdrrE pécn Kal Katadvel. Tots ev 

otv IleXorovvynctos yevouévov tovTov ampocdo- 
/ \ \ / / > / \ 
Kytov te Kal Tapa royov PoBos euTimte, Kat 
dma atdxtos Si@xovtes Sia TO Kpateiv ai pev 
lal al a \ , 

TIves TOV vew@v Kabeical Tas KoTTAaS éTécTNCOAV 
lal la) > ¥ a \ \ ? bd / 
ToD TAOV, a€vpdopov Spavtes pos THY EE OdLYOU 

/ \ / an 
dvteEopunoty, BovdAdpevor Tas TAELOUS TepLpetvaL, 
ai 5¢ Kal és Bpdxea atreipia xwpiov oxKelrav. 

XCII. Tots & "AOnvaious idovtas tadta yuyvo- 
, ”- \ > \ EN A 
peva Odpaos Te éraBe Kal amo Evos KEedeVTpATOS 
5 / > > 3 \ 4 € \ \ X 
éuBoncavres em avtovs Mpunoav. ot O€ dia Ta 
SmapYovTa apapTHwata Kal THY Tapodcay ata- 
Flav édlyov pev xpdvov iméuewav, émerta e 
érpdmovto és Tov [dvoppov, 60evmep avnyayovto. 
- , ra ag a , 3 \ ” 
émudsw@xovtes 5é€ of “AOnvaior tds TE éyyus ovcas 
/ lo) A é \ \ e a 2 / 
udrdiota vads éXaBov && Kai Tas eavToV aget- 
a > a \ lol A / \ 
RAovto as éxeivor mpos TH yH StapGeipavtes TO 

BOOK II. xcr. 1—xcr. 2 

past them as they swung round and had escaped 
into the open water. And all the eleven except one 
reached Naupactus ahead of them, and riding at 
anchor off the Temple of Apollo, prows outward, 
made ready to defend themselves if the enemy put 
in toward the shore to attack them. When the 
Peloponnesians came up they were singing the paean 
as they rowed as if they were victorious already, and 
one Leucadian ship, far ahead of the rest, was chasing 
the single Athenian ship which lagged behind. But, 
as it chanced, a merchantman was lying at anchor in 
deep water and this the Athenian ship succeeded in 
reaching first and, sailing round it, rammed the 
pursuing Leucadian vessel amidships and sank her. 
At this unexpected and amazing feat consternation 
fell upon the Peloponnesians, who were, moreover, 
pursuing in disorder because they had the upper 
hand ; on some of their ships the rowers sank their 
oars into the water and checked the headway of 
their vessels, intending to await the main body of 
their fleet—a serious mistake to make in the face of 
an enemy lying near and ready for the charge— 
while others, unfamiliar with the waters there, ran 
aground in the shallows. 

XCII. As for the Athenians, when they saw what 
was happening, they took courage, and at a single 
word of command gave a shout and dashed at them. 
But the Peloponnesians had made so many mistakes 
and were at present in such disorder, that, although 
they resisted a little while, they soon turned and 
fled to Panormus, whence they had put to sea. The 
Athenians gave chase, and not only captured the six 
ships that were nearest, but also recovered their own 
ships which the enemy had disabled in the beginning 



mpatov avedicavto: avépas Te TOUS mév aTéKTEL- 
\ \ \ 347 : et \ a 
vav, Twas 5é Kal éS@ypynoav. émt dé THs AevKa- 
bt , a \ \ ¢ / / / 
tas vews, 1) Tepl THY OAKdoa KaTébu, TipoKpaTns 
¢ U 4 e e a , 
6 AaxeSatpovios TAéwV, WS 7 Vads SLEepOetpeTo, 
+ e a , / > \ , 
és hakev éautov, cai e€érrecev és Tov Navtaxtiov 
Nipéva. avaywpynoartes 5é of “AOnvator tpoTatov 
értncav d0ev avayayouevot éxpatnoay, Kal Tous 
\ a a 
vexpovs Kal TA vavayla boa TpOs TH EavToV Hv 
dveiNovto, Kal Tolls évaytiows Ta éxeivwv bTO- 
bd Ui BA \ \ 
otrovea amédocav. éotncav 6é Kai IleXomov- 
violoL Tpotratov ws vEeviKNKOTES TIS TpoTHS, as 
\ a A / n Wes: 4 »- 
mpos TH yn SvépOerpay vais’ Kal HvTEep EXaBov 
~ 3 ‘ > \ pees , X +9 line. \ \ 
vaov, avébecav él To ‘Piov To Axaixov Tapa TO 
tTpotaiov. peta dé tavTa PoBovpevor Ty ame 
r > / / e \ p. Db] / 
tav A@nvaiwy Bonferavy uo vuKTa éoeTTAEVCAaV 
> \ ’ \ a \ , ¢ 
és Tov KOATrOY TOV Kpioaiov Kat KopivOov aravtes 
mrAnv Aeveadiov. Kali ot €x ths Kpntns ‘“A@n- 
vatot Tals elxoot vavaiv, als &der TPO THS vav- 
A , a 
paxlas TO Dopuiwv tapayevéoGar, ov TOrArA@ 
nr / nr lal nw 
ictepov THS avaywpncews THV vey adixvodyvTat 
9 \ , ACTOR , 3 , 
és thy Navraxtov. Kat To Gépos éTedevTA. 
XCIII. IIpiv 6€ duadicas 76 és KopivOov te 
kal tov Kpicaiov xoATov avaywpicav vavttKor, 
ec a \- = / \ cs ” 
6 Kvfjpos nal 0 Bpacidas kal of &ddXow apyovTes 
tov LleXotovynciwy apxouévov Tov YELmavos 
éBovrAovto Sidakavtwvy tov Meyapéwv azrotet- 
pacar Tov Ile:paras tod Auwévos Tov ‘APnvatwr: 
4 LA 
Fv dé advAantos Kal axkAnoTos eiKoTws Sia TO 

BOOK II. xc. 2-xcm. 1 

of the fight near the shore and taken in tow; and 
of the men they killed some and took others alive. 
But Timocrates the Lacedaemonian, who was on 
board the Leucadian ship which was sunk near the 
merchantmen, slew himself when he saw that his 
ship was lost, and his body was washed up in the 
harbour of Naupactus. The Athenians now withdrew 
and set up a trophy at the place? from which they 
had set out and won the victory; and they took up 
their dead and such of the wrecked ships as were 
close to their own shore, giving back to the enemy 
under a truce those which belonged to them. But 
the Peloponnesians also set up, in token of victory, a 
trophy for the defeat of the ships which had been 
disabled near the shore. And the ships which they 
had taken they dedicated on the Achaean Rhium by 
the side of the trophy. And after this, fearing the 
reinforcements expected from Athens,” they sailed 
under cover of night into the Crisaean Gulf and 
to Corinth, all except the Leucadians. And not long 
after their retreat the twenty Athenian ships from 
Crete,* which were to have joined Phormio in time 
for the battle, arrived at Naupactus. And so the 
summer ended. 

XCIII. However, before dispersing the fleet which 
had retired to Corinth and the Crisaean Gulf, at the 
beginning of the winter Cnemus and Brasidas and 
the other Peloponnesian commanders, instigated by 
the Megarians, wished to make an attempt upon the 
Peiraeus, the port of Athens; for it was unguarded 
and unclosed, and quite naturally, since the Athen- 

1 The point is not certain; either near the Molycrian 
Rhium (ch. lxxxvi. 2), or off the Apollonium (ch. xci. 1). 
2 of. ch. Ixxxvi. 6, 3 of. ch. Ixxxv. 5. 



2 érixpateiy TOAU TO vavTLK@. €ddKer O¢ AaBovta 
Tov vauT@v &xacTov THY KoTny Kal TO UmNpéatov 
Kal TOV _TpOTeTHpA meth tévar €x KopivOov émrl 
THD T pos "AOnvas Odraccav, Kal ad ikopevous 
Kara TAX OS és Méyapa cabehxvoartas ex Nu- 
gaias TOU vewpiov av’T@Y TeccapaxorTa vads, al 
éTUYov avrob oveas, TAedo at evOvs éml Tov Tlev- 

3 para ouUTE yap VaUTLKOY HY mpopuhaocov év 
aut ovdev ovTE mpoa Soxia ovdepia BI) av TOTE 
of Trodépwor eLarrivaiws obtws érimdedoevay, ered 
ovT amo Tod Tpodavods ToAUHoaL av, KAO’ Hav- 

iav 6} é& Siavooivto, a) ouK av TpoatabecGar. 

4 ws d€ cdokev autos, Kal €Xx@pouv evO vs" Kab agi 
KOMEVOL VUKTOS Kal Kabeduvoartes € €x THS Nicaias 
Tas vavs émdeov éml péev tov Llecpard ovxétu, 
dorep SievoobvTo, KaTadelo aves TOV xivduvov 
(kai Tis Kal dvepos avTous AeyeTaL Korea), ert 
d€ THs Larapivos TO aK pwn pLov TO ™ pos Méyapa 
opav: Kal ppovptov ® ét avtTov jv Kal veadv 
TpL@v PvrAaKn TOD pn éomAciv Meyapedor pode 
éxTAely pundév. TO Te hpoupiw mpocéBarov Kat 
Tas Tplnpes adeihxucav Kevas, THY Te ANAHV 

arapiva am poo SoKntous ETLT ET OVTES erropGouv. 

XCIV. "Es dé Tas “AOnvas PpvKToL TE HpovTo 
TONEMLOL Kal éxmrAnkis é eyeveTo ovdeueas TOV Kara 
TOV TONE Lov éXdoowv. ol bev yap év TO AoTeL 
és TOV Hecpard govto TOUS Tohepious éorremev- 
Kévat ON, ol & ev TO Tlerparet THY TE Lahapiva 
jphobat kal mapa opas bcov odx éaTelv avtous: 

1 So Hude, adopting Madvig’s conjecture & (for ov3’) and 
punctuating after roAujoa ay. 

2? Hude inserts ydp after gpovpiov, with van Herwerden, 
and includes in parentheses poovoiov. . . undév. 


BOOK II, xcuu. 1-xciv. 1 

ians were decidedly superior at sea. And it was 
determined that each sailor, taking his oar and 
cushion and oar-loop, should go on foot from Corinth 
to the sea on the Athenian side and hastening to 
Megara should launch from the docks at Nisaea forty 
ships of theirs which chanced to be there, and then 
sail straight for the Peiraeus. For there was no 
fleet on guard in the harbour, nor was there any ex- 
pectation that the enemy would ever suddenly attack 
it in this way, since they would not dare such a 
thing openly, and if they should plan it secretly 
they would not fail to be detected in time. But 
once they had determined upon the scheme they set 
to work immediately. Reaching Nisaea at night 
they launched the ships and sailed, not now to the 
Peiraeus as they had intended, since they were ap- 
palled by the risk—and a wind, too, is said to have 
prevented them—but to the promontory of Salamis 
that looks towards Megara. ‘There was a fort here 
and a guard of three ships to prevent anything from 
entering or leaving the harbour of the Megarians. 
This fort they assaulted, towed away the triremes 
without their crews, and ravaged the rest of Salamis, 
falling on the inhabitants unawares. 

XCIV. Meanwhile fire-signals indicating a hostile 
attack were flashed to Athens, where a panic was 
caused as great as any in this war.! For the 
inhabitants of the city thought that the enemy 
had already entered the Peiraeus, and those of 
the Peiraeus that they had taken Salamis and 
were all but sailing into their own harbour—as 

1 This must refer to the so-called Decelean War (or last ten 
years of the Peloponnesian War), for in vil. xcvi. 1 we 

read that a panic occurred greater than any before (rots 
*AOnvalois .. . ExmAntis peylatn 5) Tay mpivy wapéorn). 




érep av, et €BovrAnOnoay i) KaTOKVACAL, padlws 
p av, nOnoar pi) float, po 
> / \ > bat ” > , / 
éyéveto* Kal ovK av dvewos éexddAvoev. BonOn- 
ef = 3 ‘te / \ e 9 A \ 
cavtes 6€ dw nuépa Ttavonpel ot "A@nvaior és Tov 
Tlecpard vads te Kabetdxov kai éoBavtes Kata 
\ A an / a \ \ > \ 
cmovdiy Kab TOAX@ OopuvBw tats pev vavoiv Er 
THv Larapiva érreov, TO Telo 5€ Gurakas Tod 
Iletparas xabioravto. ot b€ IleXorovynoiot as 
>’ / \ A / n 
noOavovto tiv Bonbeav, katadpapovtes THs La- 
Aapivos Ta Toa Kal avOpwTovs Kal relay 
AaBovtes Kal Tas TpEls vads éx TOD Bovddpou Tod 
, \ , $1:V>Aanliine , 9 try 
dpoupiov Kata Tayos émt THS Nucaias amém)eov 
€oTs yap & TL Kal ai vies avtovs bia ypovov 
kaGerxucbeicat Kal ovdév atéyoucar époBeour. 
/ a 
adixopevor O€ és Méyapa traruv éml THs KopivOov 
a > a 
ameyopnaoav teln of & “AOnvatos ovKéte Kata- 
AaBovtes mpos TH Larapive améwrevcay kat 
> 4 \ \ a \ 4 a fal 
avtol’ Kal peta TodTO dvrAakny dyn Tod Tepards 
al QA \ 3 lal / td 
\ yt 8 b] / 
XCV. ‘Td 5é rods adTovs ypovous, Tod yer- 
cal € 
B@vos TovToU apyopuévov, YTddrAKns Oo Typew 
"05 4 e a / > 4 > \ 
pvons, Opaxdv Bacirevs, éotpdtevoev ert 
Tlepdixcav tov ’AdeEdvdpov, Maxedovias Bact- 
Aéa, Kal ert Karxidéas tovs él Opaxns, dvo 
itocxérers THY ev Bovropevos avarrpaEat, THY 
5é avtos amododvar. & Te yap Llepdixxas atdTo 
g U _ = 4 / e x 
itor Komevos, et "APnvaios Te dvaddakerev EavTov 
2o's \ A / s \ f 
KAT apXas TO TOAEU@ TLEfopEevoy Kal Didirrov 


BOOK II. xctv. 1—xcv. 2 

indeed might easily have happened if the enemy 
had resolved that there should be no flinching; 
and no mere wind would have prevented them. 
But at dawn the Athenians hastened down to 
the Peiraeus with all their forces, launched ships, 
and embarking in haste and with much confusion 
sailed with the fleet to Salamis, setting their land- 
forces to guard the Peiraeus. The Peloponnesians 
had already overrun most of Salamis and had taken 
prisoners and booty and the three ships at the fort 
of Budorum, when they saw the relief expedition 
coming, whereupon they sailed in haste toward 
Nisaea; to some extent too there was apprehension 
about their own ships, which had not been drawn 
down into the sea for a long time and were anything 
but water-tight. On reaching Megara they with- 
drew on foot to Corinth, and the Athenians, finding 
them no longer at Salamis, likewise sailed back. 
After this they kept stricter guard over the Peiraeus, 
closing up the harbour! as well as taking other 

XCV. About the same time, at the beginning of 
this winter, Sitalces the Odrysian, a son of Teres, king 
of the Thracians, made an expedition against Perdiccas 
son of Alexander, king of Macedonia, and against the 
Chalcidians of Thrace, wishing to exact fulfilment of 
one promise and to make good another. For when 
Perdiccas was being hard pressed at the beginning 
of the war he had made Sitalces a promise on condition 
that he should reconcile him to the Athenians and 
should not bring back his brother Philip, who was 

1 i.e. by prolonging the walls at the entrance so as to leave 
only a narrow passage in the centre, which could be closed 
by a chain. 

Vou. IL. Q 44! 


\ b] \ > ~ / ov \ 4 
TOV abeXdhov avTOD ToAguLoy dvTa py KaTayayo. 
> \ / aA e / > > / a 
él Bactrela, & uTedéEato ovK éreTEeEL* TOIs TE 
’ r > \ e S, a \ / 
AOnvaios avTos wporoynKer OTE THY Evppaytav 
’ rn \ > » 4 ‘ \ / 
€moveito Tov él Opaxns Xarkidseov Todenov 

, 5 / 9 ¢ ‘ y 
KaTadvoew. appotépwv ody évexa tHv Epodov 
> a \ , / e\ b] / e 
émovetto Kal Tov te Diditrov viov ’Apvyrav ws 
/ nr i aA 
évt Baciheia Tov Maxedover ire cal Tov ’AOn- 
valov Tpéa Pets, ob ETUXOV TapoVTEs TOUTMY EveKa, 
\ure f d ” x \ a > 
Kal nyewova “Ayvwva: éer yap Kal. tovs °AOn- 
/ / fal 
Xarkidéas Tapayevéc Oa. 
> / lal > lal e 
XCVI. “Aviotnaw obv éx Tav ‘Odpuvcadv oppo- 
lal \ \ lal 
HEevos TP@TOV pev TOUS évTOs TOD Aiwou TE GpousS 

L THs “Poderns Opa 5 ji typ. Oa- 
kat ths Podorns Opdxas bcwv hpxe wéxpt Oa 

/ > \ U / / \ \ 
Aadoons és Tov EKveewov te movtov Kat Tov 
¢ \ 

EnXrnjorovtov,: erecta tovs vmepSavtt Atpov 

/ \ a Mw 
Tétas kai 6ca adda pépn evtos Tov “Iatpou To- 
Qn al + a 
Tauov Tpos OaXacoay madrov THv Tov Evéeivou 
movtov Kat@Knto: eat O ot état nai ot Tavtn 
¢ la € 
6uopot te Tols LKevOats Kal opocKevor, Tavtes 
\ lal a 
immotogotat.  mapexdder O€ Kal THY opetvav 
rat \ lal > / \ 
Opaxav Tohovs TOV avTOVOMwY Kal pwayYaLpo- 

’ ° a a \ € , e a 
hopwv, ot Aior carodvtat, THv “Podomny ot Trei- 

a an ? 

OTOL olKOUVTES* Kal TOUS meV pLcO® ErrecBev, oi 6 
2 > a 

éGerovtal EvvnkorovOovv. aviortn dé Kat Aypia- 

1 és... ‘EAAnhomovtov deleted by Hude and others as not 
read by the Schol. (uéxp: @ardoons, ws tov Evfeivou mévtov 
kal tov ‘EAAnondvtov). Classen understands the Schol. to 
support the text reading. 


BOOK II. xcv. 2—xev1. 3 

hostile, to make him king; but Perdiccas would not 
fulfil his promise. On the other hand, Sitalces had 
made an agreement with the Athenians,! at the 
time he entered into the alliance with them, to bring 
to an end their war with the Chalcidians in Thrace. 
For both these reasons, then, he now began the in- 
vasion, and he took with him Philip’s son, Amyntas,? 
with a view to making him king of the Macedonians, 
as well as some Athenian envoys who had come to 
see him on this business, and Hagnon as com- 
mander?; for the Athenians were to furnish a fleet 
and as large an army as possible‘ for the war against 
the Chalcidians. 

XCVI. Sitalces, accordingly, beginning with the 
Odrysians, summoned to his standard, first the 
Thracians under his sway between the mountains 
Haemus® and Rhodope® and the sea,—as far as 
the shores of the Euxine and the Hellespont,— 
then, beyond Haemus, the Getae, and all the other 
tribes that are settled south of the river Ister? 
in the general direction of the seaboard of the 
Euxine sea; and the Getae and the people of 
that region are not only neighbours of the Scythians 
but are also equipped like them, all of them 
being mounted archers. And he summoned also 
many of the mountain Thracians who are independ- 
ent and wear short swords, who are called Dii, most 
of them inhabiting Rhodope; and some of these 
were won to his service by pay, while others came 
along as volunteers. He called out, further, the 

1 cf. ch. xxix. 4. 2 Philip died meanwhile. 

8 As commander of expected Athenian troops, which 
however failed to come (ch. ci. 1) 

* of. ch. oi. 1. 5 The modern Balkans. 
6 Now Despotodagh. 7 Danube. 



vas Kal Aataious Kal ddXrKa boa eOvn _Hasowead, 
av PXE" Kal eoxaror TIS apxiis ovTOL joa: 
HEX pl Yap Aataiov Ilarovev Kal TOU 2 Tpvpovos 
ToTapod, Os éK Tob 2xouBpov ¢ Gpous br “Aypia- 
vov Kal Aatatov pec, apifeto 7 appx) TQ TpOs 
4 Ilaiovas avTovopous 718. Ta 6é€ Tpos TpeBanr- 
Aous, Kal TOUTOUS avTovopuous, Tptjpes a@pfov 
Kal Trarator: oixodar 5° ovtTos T pos Bopéav TOU 
ZKouPpov ¢ dpous Kab TapyKouat mpos nAtov Svaw 
HEX pe TOU ‘Ocxiou ToTapod. pet & ottos éx TOD 
Gpous ddevrep Kal o Néotos kal o “E8pos: gore O€ 
éphuov TO Opos Kal péya, éxouevov THs “Poddzys. 
XCOVII. “Eyévero 58 4) apy 7 ’Odpucdy pé- 
yeOos él pev Oddaccay xadnxovea aro ‘AB- 
onpov TONEWS & TOV Evfewov TOVTOV expt 
“‘Iorpov TOTAMOD" _abtn mepiThous early 7 Y) 
ta Evytowwrata, Hy aiel KaTa Tpvuvay LoTnTAaL 
TO TvEeDLAa, VHl OTpOYYUAN Tecodpav Huepav Kal 
icwy vuxTt@v: 06@ 6€ Ta EvyTouwtata é& *AB- 
Srpev és "Iatpov avnp evfwvos evdexaratos TENE. 
2 Ta wey T™ pos Odhacoayv TOTAUTN 7V, és ‘AyTreypov 
dé aro Bufavtiov és Aataiovs kal em TOV 
= Tpupova (TavTy yap 61a wAeioTov amo Oa- 
Adoons avo éyiyveto) TEPOV. avdpl evlave TPL@V 
3 Kat déxa avicau. opos Te éx mdons THs Bap- 
Bdpov xat tav “EXAnvidwy torewv Scwvtrep 

1 of, in the MSS. before api(ero, deleted by Arnold. 

1 Paeonian tribes that dwelt in the mountain regions 
bordering on Macedonia, watered by the Upper Strymon 
and the Axius; most of them were afterwards subject to 


BOOK II. xcv1. 3—xcvi. 3 

Agrianians and Laeaeans, and all the other Paeonian 
tribes which were under his sway. These peoples 
were at the outer limits of his empire ; for the bounds 
of his empire extended, on the side towards the 
Paeonians, who are independent, as far as the 
Laeaean Paeonians and the river Strymon,? which 
flows from mount Scombrus through the country of 
the Agrianians and the Laeaeans. On the side to- 
ward the Triballi, who also are independent, the 
boundary is formed by the Treres and Tilataeans ; 
and these dwell to the north of Mount Scombrus and 
extend toward the west as far as the river Oscius.? 
This river has its source in the same mountains as 
the Nestus* and the Hebrus®—a mountain range of 
great extent and uninhabited that is adjacent to 

XCVII. Now the empire of the Odrysians® in 
respect to its size extended along the sea-coast from 
the city of Abdera to the Euxine Sea as far as the 
river Ister. This stretch of coast constitutes a 
voyage for a merchant-vessel, if the shortest course 
is taken and the wind keeps steady astern, of four 
days and as many nights; but the journey by land 
from Abdera to the Ister can be accomplished by an 
active man, taking the shortest route, in eleven 
days. Such was its extent on its seaboard; but 
inland the distance from Byzantium to the Laeaeans 
and the river Strymon—for this was its inland point 
farthest distant from the sea—it is possible for an 
active man to cover in thirteen days. As for the 
tribute which came in from the barbarian territory 
and from all the Hellenic cities over which the 

2 Now Struma. 3 Now Isker. 
4 Now Masta. 5 Now Maritza. 
§ Coinciding in the main with modern Bulgaria. 



4 a 
ApEav ért LevOov, 65 baotepov YraddrKov Bacu- 
a \ 4 
Aevoas TAelotov 67 éroince, TeTpaKociwy Ta- 
/ 4 
AdvTwy apyvpiov pddiota Svvauls, A ypuads 
Kal apyupos neu Kal d@pa ovK éhacow TOUT@Y 
a \ / 
ypucod Te Kal apyvpov mpocepépeto, xwpis Oe 
e ‘ s \ a Pineiro iS , 
dca vpavTa TE Kal Ela KaL ) AXAN KATACKEVN, 
/ A \ \ a 
Kal ov povoyv avT@, GAAA Kal Tols Tapadvuva- 
, > a 
otevoval Te Kal yevvaiots Odpvcay. Kxateotn- 
- / fo] lal 
cavto yap Tovvaytiov THs Llepoav Bacireias 
\ , v \ \ n ” \ 
TOV vouovy dvTa pev Kal Tois adrdots Opaki 
r a / 
AapwBavery padrrov 7H didovar (Kat aicyiov Hy 
ral a b] A a 
aitnOévta pn Sovvar  aitnoavTa pn TvxELV), 
? \ Ce Spa r a oe , 
dumws O€ KaTa TO OvvacAar eT TEOV AUTO €xp7)- 
5 \ 9S a WY: A 8 56 rn 
cavto* ov yap Hv mpakar ovdev py StdovtTa Spa. 
ef ’ \ fe ¢€ , = > / lal 
@oTe ert péya 7 Bacirela nAOEv Ltaxvos. TeV 
yap év tH Evpomn boat petakv tov ‘loviov 
lal / , A 
KOMTrov Kal Tov Ev£eivov movtou peyloTn éyéveto 
/ lol ¥ 
XpnudTov mpocodm Kal TH adrdn evdaimovia, 
’ 7 \ , \ aA / \ , 
loxvr 6€ payns Kal oTpatod TAGE Tord SevTépa 
\ \ Ss a / be OU > lal 
peta THY XKvoav. TavTn O€ advvaTa eEicovaPat 
a > lal 
ovy oT: Ta ev TH Evpworn, adr ovd év tH ’Acia 
4 a \ a > 5Y4 fxd \ F 
€Ovos ev mpos év ovK Ectw 6 TL duvatov YKvOas 
Ouoyvomovotalt Tac aYTLCOTHVAaL. ov pHVY ovd 

1 Nephew and successor of Sitalces ; ¢f. ch. ci. 5, 6 ; IV. ci. 5. 

2 £81,000, $388,800. 

8 Among the Persians the monarch gave rather than re- 
ceived presents: cf. Xen. Cyrop. VIII. ii. 7, diawéver Ett kal vor 
Tois BaciAevow 7 ToAvd«pla, 


BOOK II. xcvit. 3-6 

Odrysians acquired sway in the time of Seuthes 1— 
who, succeeding Sitalces on the throne, brought 
the revenues to their maximum—its value was about 
four hundred talents? in coin, and was paid in gold 
and silver; and gifts equal in value to the tribute, 
not only of gold and silver, but besides these all 
manner of stuffs, both embroidered and plain, and 
other articles for household use, were brought as 
offerings to the king, and not for him only, but also 
for the subordinate princes and nobles of the Odry- 
sians. For these kings had established a custom 
which was just the opposite of that prevailing in the 
kingdom of the Persians,? namely, to take rather 
than to give; indeed it was more disgraceful for a 
man not to give when asked than to ask and be 
refused. This custom was observed among the 
other Thracians also; but the Odrysian kings, as 
they were more powerful, followed it more exten- 
sively; indeed it was not possible to accomplish 
anything without giving gifts. Consequently the 
kingdom attained to a great degree of power. For 
of all the kingdoms in Europe between the Ionian 
Gulf and the Euxine Sea it was the greatest in 
revenue of money and in general prosperity; but 
as regards the strength and size of its army, it was 
distinctly inferior to the Scythian kingdom.* With 
that not only are the nations of Europe unable to 
compete, but even in Asia, nation against nation, 
there is none which can make a stand against the 
Scythians if they all act in concert. However, with 

‘ Contradicting Hdt. v. iii.: Opnlkwv 3& vos péyiordy ears 
peta ye Ivdovs ravtwy avOpadmwv ei de bm’ Evds Upxoito f) ppovéo 
Kata TwuTd, Guaxov 7 by en Kal moAAG KparioTov mavTwy 
COvéwy Kata yvouny Thy euhy. 



és thy addnv evBovrtav Kat Evveow tepl trav 
/ > \ , A € a 
Tapovt@y és Tov Biov adXols omotodvTat. 
XCVIII. Setarkns pév ody yopas tocavtns 
Bacitevwv wapecxevadfeto Tov oatpatov. Kal 
érreto) avT@ ETotua Hv, dpas éropeveto eri rHv 
/ al \ \ na a n 
Maxedoviay mpatov pev Sta THs avtod apyjs, 
y \ , > /, ” ~~ , 
érecta dua Kepxivns épnjwou dpous, 6 éote peo- 
A \ / > 4 7 > 
ptov wTav Kail adver. érropevero be & 
a a fQa ‘ 
avTov TH 0d@ tv mWpoTepoy avTos émrotncato 
\ \ ef id 9K / > , 
Teu@v tHv DAV, Ste ert Ilaiovas éotpatevcer. 
\ Me = Ae, ? ? a , > a \ 
TO 5€ dpos €& ’Odpucav Suovtes ev SeEia pev 
Ss / > > As \ \ \ 
eiyov Ilatovas, €v apuctepa S€ Xwvrodvs kal 
J , 
Matdots. SdreXOovtes 5€ auto adixovto és Ado- 
/ a 
Bnpov thy Ulacovixny. tropevopéva 5€ avT@ arre- 
\ a a > 
ylyveto pev ovdéy TOD OTPATOD EL fH TL VvOTo, 
\ lal 
mpoceyiyveto 5é. ToAXol yap TOV avToVvop“wr 
A 3 
Opaxay arapakryTa eb aptaynv nKodovGour, 
oe \ a a / > »- / 

Kal déxa pupiddov yevécOar Kal TovTov Td pev 
/ \ e , \ / e , 
a > € la) \ lal > \ > 7 
too 8 inmixod TO mWAEicTov avTol ‘Odpicat 
TapetyovTo Kal pet’ avtous T'étar. rod dé refod 
of maYalpoPopor maXluwoTaToL “ev Hoav ot eK Tis 

€ / ? / / ¢ \ ” e 
Podorns avtovouot kataBavtes, 0 6€ adXos Spe- 
Los Evppecxtos TANGE HoBepwtatos nKorover. 
XCIX. HuvnOpoifovto otv év tH AoBypw xai 
mTapecKkevalovto bTws Kata Kopudny ésBarovaw 
és tThv Kato Makedoviar, hs o Llepdixxas hpyev. 


BOOK II. xevu. 6—xcix. 1 

reference to wise counsel and intelligence about the 
things that belong to the enrichment of life the 
Scythians are not to be compared with other nations. 

XCVIII. Such then was the extent of the country 
over which Sitalces ruled at the time when he was 
preparing his army. But when everything was 
ready, he set out for Macedonia, proceeding first 
through his own territory, then through the deso- 
late range of Cercine, which lies between the Sinti 
and Paeonians. And he passed over this mountain 
by the road which he himself had constructed before, 
when he made an expedition against the Paeonians, 
cutting a path through the forest. As his army 
crossed the mountain, leaving the country of the 
Odrysians, they had the Paeonians on the right 
and on the left the Sinti and Maedi; and when 
they came out on the other side they arrived at 
Doberus in Paeonia. On the march his army 
suffered no loss, except from sickness, but rather 
was augmented; for many of the independent 
Thracians joined the expedition unsummoned, in 
the hope of plunder, so that the whole number is 
said to have been not less than a hundred and fifty 
thousand, the greater part being infantry, about one- 
third cavalry. Of the cavalry the Odrysians them- 
selves furnished the largest contingent, and next to 
them the Getae; while of the infantry the sword- 
wearers, independent tribes that came down from 
Mount Rhodope, were the best fighters, the rest ot 
the army that followed, a miscellaneous horde, being 
formidable chiefly on account of its numbers. 

XCIX. So Sitalces’ army was being mustered at 
Doberus and preparing to pass over the mountain 
crest and descend upon lower Macedonia, of which 



2 Tav yap Makedovev eicl cal Avyknotai Kai 
"EXimia@tar Kal Ara EOvn évravwber, a Evumaya 
/ b] J A e 4 / Dis aw 
Hév €oTL TOUTOLS Kal UTIKOa, Bacidelas O° Eye 
3 xaQ avta. Thy 6€ Tapa Odraccayv vov Make- 
> €, , 
doviay “AnréEavdpos o Llepdtcxov twatnp Kat ot 
a \ ° 
mpoyovor avtod Tnuevidar To apyatov ovtes && 
v nw” > / \ b] / 
Apyous mp@tot extyicavto Kat éBacidevoav 
> , / > \ , / e\ 
avactycavtes payn éx pev Ileepias Iltepas, ot 
totepov wo 7d Ildyyatov tépav XTpupovos 
oxnoav Paypnta Kat dddXa yopia (Kal étt Kal 
rn \ , an ee \ A , 
vov Ivepexos xoXzros Kadettas 9 UTO TO Llayyaiw 
mpos Odraccay yh), éx dé THS BotTias KaXoupe- 
/ \ cal ccd / > la 
vns Bottiaious, of viv Guopot Xarkidéwv otKovd- 
fol / x 
4 oi. tTHS O€ Ilatovias mapa tov “A€vov totapov 
/ / A / / 
otevny tia Kabynxovoay avwblev péype IléeAXns 
\ / > / \ / > /, / 
kal Oardoons éxtTHcavTo, Kal tépav A€iou péypt 
\ > a 
Xtpvpovos tHv Murydoviay cadovpévnv ‘Hoavas 
> , / by / \ 4 bd A 
5 éFeNacayTes vé“ovTal. avéoTnaay O€ Kal Ex TIS 
an > / / > / 2 e \ 
vov *Eopdias xadovpévns ‘Eopdovs, oy ot pep 
Toro €bOapnoav, Bpayd b€ Te avTav Trepi 
DicKxav catoxntat, kal €€ Adporias” AXpowras. 
6 é€xpatnoay S€ Kal TOY GdAXAwv EOvav oi Maxedoves 
otto: a Kal vov Ets Exovat, Tov Te “AvOeuovvTa 
kat T'pnotwviay cat Bicadtiav cat Maxedovev 
avT@v TOAAnY. TO O€ EUuTtav Makedovia Kanrel- 
/ a 
ta. kal Llepdixxas ’AXeEavdpov Bacidevs adTtov 
s x4 / b / 


BOOK II. xcix. 2-6 

Perdiceas was ruler. For the Macedonian race 
includes also the Lyncestians, Elimiotes, and other 
tribes of the upper country, which, though in alli- 
ance with the nearer Macedonians and subject to 
them, have kings of their own; but the country by 
the sea which is now called Macedonia, was first 
acquired and made their kingdom by Alexander, the 
father of Perdiccas, and his forefathers, who were 
originally Temenidae from Argos. They defeated 
and expelled from Pieria the Pierians, who after- 
wards took up their abode in Phagres and other 
places at the foot of Mount Pangaeus beyond the 
Strymon (and even to this day the district at the 
foot of Mount Pangaeus toward the sea is called 
the Pierian Valley), and also, from the country 
called Bottia, the Bottiaeans, who now dwell on the 
borders of the Chalcidians; they acquired, further, 
a narrow strip of Paeonia extending along the 
river Axius! from the interior to Pella and the sea; 
and beyond the Axius they possess the district as 
far as the Strymon which is called Mygdonia, 
having driven out the Edonians. Moreover, they 
expelled from the district now called Eordia the 
Eordians, most of whom were destroyed, but a small 
portion is settled in the neighbourhood of Physca; 
and also from Almopia the Almopians. These 
Macedonians also made themselves masters ot 
certain places, which they still hold, belonging to 
the other tribes, namely, of Anthemus, Grestonia, 
Bisaltia, as well as of a large part of Macedonia 
proper. But the whole is now called Macedonia, 
and Perdiccas son of Alexander was king when 
Sitalees made his invasion. 

1 Now Vardar. 


‘ € 

C. Kai of pév Maxeddves oboe éridvtos Trod- 

hod otpaToD advvato. ovTes GuvvecOar &s TE TA 

Kaptepa Kal Ta TeLYyN boa HY ev TH XWPA EvEKO- 

ptoOnoav: Av dé ov TOAAG, GAA DoTepov Apyxeé- 

aos oO Llepdikxov vies Bacireds yevomevos Ta 
a > a , > , \ ¢ \ 

viv ovta év TH xKX@pa @Kodounoe Kai odovsS 
> / ” \ = 6 / i | \ % 

ev0elas éreue Kal TAaAXA SieKdopunce TA’ KATA TOV 

/ / \ iA \ iol v 

= / . 7 e v an 

aKxevn Kpeiccove H Evprravtes of addow BacirAs 
A / ¢€ a 

lal b n / > / la \ > 

@paxay ex THs AoBnpov éo¢Bane TPATOV MeV €8 

tnv Diriwmov TpoTEepov ovcav apyny, Kal elrev 

Eiéopeviy pév kata xpatos, Toptuviay be Kai 

’ / \ yy yy / e , \ 

Ataddvtnv kal ddXa ATTA Ywpia oporoyia dia 

/ a a / 
thy Apuvytov didtav tpocywpovvta, Tov Didit- 
¢ \ 

mou viéos, mapovtos: Edpwov dé érodopxnaav 
/ tay a Sh cD hs Pe 4 \ iS. \ 

ev, éreiv b€ ove EdvvavtTo. émecta Sé Kai és THY 

bY / , ‘ 2 ? 5 

Gdrnv Maxedoviay mpovywper THY ev apioTepa 

Tléxrns Kat Kuppov. éow 8 tovtwy és tH 

Bottiatav Kal Ilepiav od« adixovto, adda THP 

/ \ , ee a 
te Muydoviay cai Tpnotwviay cai ’Av@epodvta 
/ al lol 
éSjouv. ot dé Maxedoves wef pev ovdé dvevoovv- 
To apvvecOar, imrmous S€ mpocpeTaTreuypdpevot 
\ lal a / 
aro Tav avw Evppayeor, Orn SoKxoin, ddiryou pos 
\ al 
moAnrovs €céBaddrov és TO oTpadtTevpwa Tov Opa- 
lal / 
KOU. Kal  pev Wpootrécorev, ovdels wrémevev 
dvSpas imméas te ayabovs Kai TeAwpaxicpévous, 
1 +é, in the MSS. after ra, deleted by Haacke, 


BOOK II c. 1-6 

C. The Macedonians of this region, unable to 
defend themselves against so great an_ invading 
army, betook themselves to the strong places and 
fortresses that were in the country. These were 
not many; but subsequently Archelaus son of 
Perdiccas, when he became king,} built those that 
are now in the country, and cut straight roads, and 
in general organized his country for war by provid- 
ing cavalry, arms and other equipment beyond any- 
thing achieved by all the eight kings who preceded 
him. But the Thracian army, advancing from 
Doberus, invaded first the province which before 
had belonged to Philip, and took Idomene by storm ; 
but Gortynia, Atalanta, and some other places 
capitulated voluntarily out of friendship for Amyntas 
son of Philip, who accompanied Sitalces ; moreover 
they laid siege to Europus, but were unable to take 
it. Next they advanced into the other part of 
Macedonia, which is to the west of Pella and Cyr- 
rhus. Beyond these places, however, into Bottiaea 
and Pieria, they did not penetrate, but ravaged 
Mygdonia, Grestonia, and Anthemus. The Mace- 
donians, on the other hand, did not even think of 
defending themselves with infantry, but calling upon 
their allies in the interior for additional cavalry, 
though few against many, they dashed in among 
the Thracian army wherever they chose. And 
wherever they charged no one could withstand 
them, for they were good horsemen and protected 
by cuirasses ; but since they were constantly being 
hemmed in by superior numbers and found themselves 

1 413-399 p.c. He was as famous for the splendour and 
success of his reign as for the crimes by which he obtained 
the throne. 





, eo > / , 4 
TAATLO TO O-lrw és Kivduvoy Kalictacay’ Hate 
TédX0s HovYlav Hyov, ov voulfovTes ikavol elvar 

CI. ‘O 6& YutddrKxns mpds te Tov Lepdixxay 
Aoyous €mroLetTO MY évexa éeoTpatevce, Kal éreELdy 
ot A@nvaio: od Taphoav tais vavoly atioToUrTES 

A A an 
avutov un H&ew (S@pa S€ Kal tpécRes Erreprpay 
> A 4 \ » 4 66 \ B / 
avT@), é Te Tovs Xadrkidéas cai Bottiatovs 
n >] a 
cas é€dyov THy yhv. KaOnpuévov & avtov epi 
@cccarol cat Mayvntes Kal of addXoL UTHKOOL 
Ococarav kat of péxpt OepuotrurAa@v “EAXAnves 
> / \ A vs \ an e \ , 
époBnOncav pn Kal él ohas 0 OTPATOS KWpPNON, 
ice > / \ \ € 
Kal év TapacKkevn joav. époByOncay Sé Kai ot 

/ / \ / a ef , 

mépav XTpupovos mpos Bopéav Opaxes Goo. tredia 
2 ~ A > / \ nw \ 
elyov, Ilavuior cai “Odopavtor cat Apo: kai 

a >] 

Aepoaio: avtovopor 8 eioi Tavtes. mapéoxe Oé 

, lal ? 

Noyov Kal él tovs trav ‘AOnvaiwy TroXepmious 

"EAAnvas py Ur’ ad’Tav ayouevot Kata TO Evp- 

‘ » ES ood a / e \ / 
payixov Kal él ohas ywpnowow. o 8& THY TE 
\ / 
Xar«ibixnv cat Bottixny cal Maxedoviay dua 
> / »” @ Kab > € 6? > a Oe b] / "i 
érréxau edOerpe, €vrelon avT@ ovdév émpac 
A cal , 
ceto wy évexa écéBare, kal  oTpaTLa oiTOV TE 
A \ A 
OUK ElYev AUT@ Kal UTO YELuwmvos eTAaXaLT@pEL, 
/ la! / 
avareiOetat UTO YevGov Tod Xmapacoxov, aded- 


BOOK II. c. 6-ct. 5 

imperilled by the horde that was many times 
their own number, they finally desisted, thinking 
that they were not strong enough to fight with the 
larger force. 

CI. Sitalees now began to hold parleys with 
Perdiccas about the matters for which he had under- 
taken the expedition; and since the Athenians 
(who did not believe that Sitalees would come, 
though they sent gifts and envoys to him) had not 
arrived with their promised fleet, he despatched 
part of his army into the territory of the Chalcidians 
and Bottiaeans, and shutting them up within their 
walls ravaged their lands. But while he was staying 
in the neighbourhood of these places, the peoples 
which dwell to the south—the Thessalians, the 
Magnesians and other subjects of the Thessalians, 
and the Hellenes as far south as Thermopylae— 
became frightened lest the host should come against 
them also, and so were making preparations. The 
same alarm was felt also by the Thracians who 
inhabit the plain beyond the Strymon to the north, 
that is, the Panaeans, Odomantians, Droans, and 
Dersaeans, independent tribes. He gave occasion 
also to a rumour which spread even to the Hellenes 
hostile to Athens, that the Thracians might be led 
on by the Athenians in accordance with the terms 
of their alliance and come against them too. But 
meanwhile Sitalces kept on ravaging at one and the 
same time Chalcidice, Bottice, and Macedonia; and 
then, since none of the original objects of his in- 
vasion was being accomplished, and his army was 
without food and was suffering from the winter, he 
was persuaded by Seuthes son of Sparadocus, a 



a \ , a e \ 8 , 
didod dvtos Kal péyitotov pe® Eavtov Suvapévor, 
a \ \ 
aor év Taye ameOeiv. tov dé LevOnv xpida 
, n , 
Tlepdixxas trocyduevos abdeApay éavtov dwcew 
> lot lal e 
Kal ypnuata ém avTH Mpootoeitar. Kal oO pep 
mevoOels Kal peivas TpLadKoVTa Tas Tdcas HMEpas, 
I$ \ bd \ > la) > , rn 
Tovtay S€ oxT@ év Xadxidevdowv, avexwopnoe TO 
a ? 
oTpaT® Kata taxos ém oixov: Ilepdixxas Se 
a \ 
ictepoy Ytpatovicny THv éEavtov abergiy didwcr 
\ \ = 
LevOn, Bowep UméacxXeTO. TA pev OVY KATA THY 
LuTadrKov oTpateiav ovTas éyéveTo. 
CII. Oc 8 év Navrdet@ “A@nvaior tod avtod 
Yelwavos, émeo1 TO TOV TleXoTovynciwy vav- 
\ YA ld e , b / 
tixov dteAvOn, Doppimvos tryoupmévou éeoTpatevaay, 
Tapatrevoartes ém’ 'Aotakod Kal amoBavtes 
, a > , 
és THv pecoyerav THs “Axapvavias TeTpaxocioss 
> lal nr a 
pev omAttats “AOnvaiwy tov amd TOV Vvedr, Te- 
, \ ¥ ee / \ 
tpaxocios 6€ Meconviwr, Kai Ex TE {tpatov Kal 
Kopovtav cal adX\ov xwpiov avdpas od Soxotvtas 
/ > 3 4 \ 4 \ 
BeBaious eivas €Endacav, Kai Kuvnta tov @eo- 
AUTov és Kopovta Kkatayayovtes avexopnoay 
/ > \ a > \ > / > me! 
Tadw éml Tas vats. €s yap Oinddas alet Tote 
/ bl / > / > 297 
modeulous ovtas povous "Axapvdvav ovK éddxet 
Suvatov elvar Yet@vos GvTos oTpaTevey oO yap 
; A \ cr > / v \ 
Ayed@os totauos péwv éx Ilivdou épovs dia 
/ / 
Aodotrias kal ’Aypaiwv cal "Audiroyov cal dia 
n 3 a / v \ \ / 
tov Axapvavixod rediov, dvwbev pév Tapa {tpa- 
Tov ToALv, és Odraccav 8 é€tels map Oivddas 
/ a a 


BOOK II. ci. 5-c. 2 

nephew and next to him in power,! to go back home 
at once. Now Seuthes had been secretly won over 
by Perdiccas, who had promised to give him his 
sister in marriage and a dowry with her. So 
Sitalces yielded, and after a stay of only thirty days 
in all, eight of which had been spent among the 
Chalcidians, returned home with his army with all 
speed. And Perdiccas afterwards gave his sister 
Stratonice to Seuthes as he had promised. Such, 
then, is the history of the expedition of Sitalces. 
CII. During the same winter the Athenians in 
Naupactus, after the Peloponnesian fleet had been 
disbanded, made an expedition under the command 
of Phormio. They first skirted the coast in the 
direction of Astacus, and then, disembarking, in- 
vaded the interior of Acarnania with four hundred 
Athenian hoplites from the ships and four hundred 
Messenian. And after they had expelled from 
Stratus, Coronta, and other places such men as were 
regarded as disloyal, and had restored Cynes son of 
Theolytus to Coronta, they returned again to their 
ships. For it seemed impracticable in winter to 
make a campaign against Oeniadae, whose inhabi- 
tants alone of the Acarnanians were always hostile ; 
for the river Achelous, which rises in Mount Pindus 
and flows through the country of the Dolopians, 
Agraeans, and Amphilochians and then through the 
Acarnanian plain, passes by the city of Stratus high 
up the stream, but by Oeniadae empties into the 
sea, where it surrounds the city with marshes, thus 
rendering military operations there impossible in 
1 Sadocus, Sitalces’ own son, who had been received into 
Athenian citizenship (ch. xxix. 5; Ixvii. 2), must have died 

before this time. The nephew Seuthes succeeded to the 
throne in 424 B.0. (Iv. ci. 4). 



3 Ud TOD VdaTtos Ev YElwavL OTpaTEvELY. KElVTAL 
al al ’ 
dé xal Tov vyowy Tov ‘“Eywvddwv ai Toddai 
\ > a an? , n > a 
KatavtTikpv Oivadav tod “Ayedwou Tav éxBorav 
ovdéy améxXoucal, @oTE péyas MY O ToTAapmoS 
ra 4 ¢ , 
Tpocyol alel Kal elol TOV ViTwY al HITrElpwvTaL, 
\ \ \ / > b] a x , 
érmis 6€ kal wdcas ovK év TOAX@ Tit AY ypove 
al lal \ lal 
4 TovUTo TaGeiv: TO Te yap pevud éoTe péeya Kai 
\ \ , 7 a , 3 , 
ToXv Kal Gorepov, at TE VTOL TWUKVAL, Kal adAN- 
a \ 
als THs Tpotywcews TO wn TKEddvvVaAaL) Evp- 
\ a 
Seo pot yiyvovtat, TapadrAak Kal ov KaTa oTOtyoV 
/ 7»? » ? / / a ¢e¢ 
Kelpmeval, OVS EYovaat EevOeias Stdd0us TOD VdaTos 
> \ f 2 testy a. ’ >. \ > / 
5 és To méXayos. éphuor 8 eicl Kal ov peydran. 
A > 
AéyeTar O€ Kal "AXAkpéwre TO “Amdidpew, Ste 67 
rn \ / ipl 
aradcbar a’tov peta TOY hovoy THs pNTpos, Tov 
"AmoAAw TavTHnY THY YY Xphoat oiKelv, vTeEL- 
TovTa ovK elvat AVOW TOV SeyudtTwv mp ay 
A / 
a n > a id > 
6 yf Hv, @S THS ye AAANS aVT@ pewlacpevys. o 8 
a / , A / 
fal / a 
oi tTavTnv Tov Ayedwou, Kal édoKxes avT@ (Kav? 
av xey@o0ar Siaita TH cwpatt ad’ obTeEp KTELVAS 
/ a 
THY pNTépa ovK ONLyYOV Xpovov éTaVaTO. Kal 
\ b] \ \ ’ / , > / 
Katoiktabels és TovUs Tept Oividdas TOTOUs édvva- 
otevaé TE Kal aTTO "Axapvavos Trados EavTOD THs 
YoOpas THY eTwvUpmLaY éyKaTédiTEV. TA pev OdY 
pe | / fal / , 
wept AdXKkpéwva ToLavTa NEeyOuEva TrapeaBopev. 
1 Hude brackets 7d wh ocxedavvveGa, following Stahl. 

BOOK II. ci. 2-6 

winter by reason of the water. Besides, most of the 
Echinades islands lie opposite to Oeniadae at no great 
distance from the mouths of the Achelous, so that 
the river, which is large, keeps making fresh deposits 
of silt, and some of the islands have already become 
part of the mainland, and probably this will happen 
to all of them in no great while. For the stream is 
wide and deep and turbid, and the islands are close 
together and serve to bind to one another the bars 
as they are formed, preventing them from being 
broken up, since the islands lie, not in line, but 
irregularly, and do not allow straight channels for 
the water into the open sea. These islands are 
uninhabited and not large. There is a story that 
when Alcmaeon son of Amphiaraus was a wanderer 
after the murder of his mother,! Apollo directed him 
by oracle to inhabit this land, intimating that he 
would have no release from his fears until he should 
find and settle in a country which at the time he 
killed his mother had not yet been seen by the 
sun, and was not even land then, for all the rest 
of the earth had been polluted by him. And he, 
in his perplexity, at last, as the story goes, ob- 
served this sand-bar formed by the Achelous, and 
he surmised that during the long time he had been 
wandering since he had slain his mother enough 
land would have been silted up to support life in. 
So he settled there in the region of Oeniadae, 
founded a principality, and left to the country its 
name Acarnania, after that of his son Acarnan, 
Such is the tradition which we have received 
concerning Alcmaeon. 

1 Eriphyle. 


CIII. Oc 6é ‘AOnvaior Kal O Poppiov apayres 
ex THS ‘Axapvavias Kal adiKopevor és THY Nav- 
TAKTOV dua pl KaTémAevoay és TAS "AOijvas, 
TOUS TE ehevGepous TOV aixPaharov éK TOV 
VAUAXLOY ayOvTEs, ob avip avT avd pos édv- 
Onoav, Kal Tas vais as elAov. Kal o XElpov 
éTeNevTa ovTOs, Kal Tplitov éTos TO TOAEL@ 
éreAevTa THdE Ov Oov«vdidns Evvéyparbev. 


BOOK II, ci, 1-2 

CIII. The Athenians and Phormio set out from 
Acarnania and arrived at Naupactus, and later, at 
the beginning of spring, sailed back to Athens, 
bringing with them the captured ships and also the 
prisoners of free birth whom they had taken in the 
sea-fights. These were exchanged man for man. 
And this winter ended, concluding the third year of 
this war of which Thucydides wrote the history. 





Latin Authors 

AmmMianus Marcetuinus. Translated by J. C. Rolfe. 3 Vols. 
(2nd Imp. revised.) 

ton (1566). Revised by 8. Gaselee. (7th Imp.) 

Sr. AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS OF. W. Watts (1631). 2 Vols. 
(Vol. Ll. 7th Imp., Vol. Il. 6th Imp.) 

Sr. AUGUSTINE, SELEcT LeTTERS. J. H. Baxter. (2nd Imp.) 

Avusonius. H.G. Evelyn White. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp.) 

Bepe. J. E. King. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp.) 

Rev. H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand. (6th Imp.) 


CarsaR: Civit Wars. A. G. Peskett. (5th Imp.) 

CarnsarR: GALLIC War. H. J. Edwards. (l0th Imp.) 

Cato: Dre Re Rustica; Varro: De Re Rustica. H. B. Ash 
and W. D. Hooper. (3rd Imp.) 

Caruttus. F. W. Cornish; Tirsputtus. J. B. Postgate; PEr- 
vicItium VENERIS. J. W. Mackail. (13th Imp.) 

Cetsus: Dr Mepictina. W. G. Spencer. 3 Vols. (Vol. I. 
3rd Imp. revised, Vols. Il. and III. 2nd Imp.) 

Cicero: Brutus, and Orator. G. L. Hendrickson and H. M. 
Hubbell. (3rd Imp.) 

[Cicero]: AD HerENNIuM. H. Caplan. 

Cicero: Dr Faro; Parapoxa SroicorumM; Der PARTITIONE 
Oratrorta. H. Rackham (With De Oratore, Vol. II.) 
(2nd Imp.) 

Cicrro: Dr Finisus. H. Rackham. (4th Imp. revised.) 

CicERO: Der INVENTIONE, ete. H. M. Hubbell. 

Cicero: Dre Natura DEoruM and AcapEmica. H. Rackham. 
(2nd Imp.) 

Cicero: Dr Orricus. Walter Miller. (7th Imp.) 

Cicero: Dr OraTtorE. 2 Vols. E. W. Sutton and H. Rack- 
ham. (2nd Imp.) 

Cicero: Dr Repustica and Dr Learsus. Clinton W. Keyes. 
(4th Imp.) 

Cicero: De SgnNectutr, De Amicitia, Dr DIVINATIONE. 
W.A. Falconer. (6th Imp.) 

Cicero: In Catimimam, Pro Fiacco, Pro Murena, Pro SuLLa. 
Louis E, Lord. (3rd Imp. revised.) 

Cicero: Lerrers ro Arricus. E. O. Winstedt. 3 Vols. 
(Vol. I. 6th Imp., Vols. Il. and III. 4th Imp.) 


Cicero: Lerrers to His Frrenps. W. Glynn Williams. 3 
Vols. (Vols. I. and II. 3rd Imp., Vol. III. 2nd Imp. revised.) 

Cicero: Pururppics. W.C. A. Ker. (3rd Imp. revised.) 

CicrrRo: Pro Arcuta, Post Repirom, DE Domo, DE Harus- 
PICUM Responsis, Pro Puancio. N. H. Watts. (4th Imp.) 

CickrRo: Pro CaArctna, Pro LeczE Manrtr, Pro CLUENTIO, 
Pro Raprreio. H. Grose Hodge. (3rd Imp.) 

CicERo: Pro Mitone, IN Prsonem, Pro Scauro, Pro Fonteto, 
Pro Raprrio Postumo, Pro Marcretto, Pro Licario, Pro 
ReceEe Derotraro. N. H. Watts. (2nd Imp.) 

CicERO: Pro QuryctTio, Pro Roscio AMERINO, PRO Roscio 
ComMoEDO, ContrRA Ruttum. J. H. Freese. (3rd Imp.) 

Cicero: TuscuLaNn Dispurations. J. E. King. (4th Imp.) 

CicERO: VERRINE Orations. L. H. G. Greenwood. 2 Vols. 
(Vol. 1. 3rd Imp., Vol. Il. 2nd Imp.) 

CraupDIAN. M. Platnauer. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp.) 

CoLUMELLA: DE ReE Rustica, DE ArRsBortiBus. H. B. Ash, 
E. S. Forster and E. Heffner. 3 Vols. (Vol. I. 2nd Imp.) 

Curtius, Q.: History or ALEXANDER. J.C. Rolfe. 2 Vols. 
(2nd Imp.) 

Frorus. E. S. Forster and Cornetius Nepos. J C. Rolfe. 
(2nd Imp.) 

FRONTINUS: STRATAGEMS and AquEepucts. C. E. Bennett and 
M. B. McElwain. (Vol. I. 3rd Imp., Vol. II. 2nd Imp.) 

FrRonto : CORRESPONDENCE. C. R. Haines. 2 Vols. (Vol. IL. 
3rd Imp., Vol. Il. 2nd Imp.) 

Getuius. J.C. Rolfe. 3 Vols. (Vol. I. 3rd Imp., Vols. I. and 
Ill. 2nd Imp.) 

Horace: Opes and Epopss. C. E. Bennett. (14th Imp. 

Horace: Satrres, Episttes, Ars Poetica. H. R. Fairclough. 
(9th Imp. revised.) 

JEROME: SELECTED Letters. F. A. Wright. (2nd Imp.) 

JUVENAL and Prerstus. G. G. Ramsay. (7th Imp.) 

Livy. B. O. Foster, F. G. Moore, Evan T. Sage, and A. C. 
Schlesinger. 14 Vols. Vols. I.-XIII. (Vol. L. 4th Imp.. 
Vols. II., III., V., and IX. 3rd Imp.; Vols. IV., VI.-VIILI. 
X.-XII. 2nd Imp. revised.) 

Lucan. J. D. Duff. (3rd Imp.) 

Lucretius. W.H.D. Rouse. (7th Imp. revised.) 

Martian. W.C. A. Ker. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 5th Imp., Vol. IL. 
4th Imp. revised.) 

Miyor Latiy Porers: from Pusiitivs Syrus to Rurtitivs 
NamatTIANvus, including Gratrius, CatpurNius SiIcutus, 
NEMESIANUS, AVIANUS, and others with “ Aetna” and the 
‘“ Phoenix.” J. Wight Duff and Arnold M. Duff. (3rd Imp.) 

Ovip : THE Art oF LOVE AND OTHER Poems. J. H. Mozley. 
(3rd Imp.) 

Ovip: Fastr. Sir James G. Frazer. (2nd Imp.) 

Ovip: HerorpEes and Amores. Grant Showerman. (5th Imp.) 

Ovip: Meramorpnosses. F. J. Miller. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 10th 
Imp., Vol. IL. 8th Imp.) 


Ovip: Tristra and Ex Ponto. A. L. Wheeler. (3rd Imp.) 

Prersius. Cf. JUVENAL. 

Prerronius. M. Heseltine; SENECA APOCOLOCYNTOSIS. 
W. 4H. D. Rouse. (9th Imp. revised.) 

Puavutus. Paul Nixon. 5 Vols. (Vol. I. 6th Imp., Il. 5th Imp., 
II. 3rd Imp., IV. and V. 2nd Imp.) 

Pury: Lrerrers. Melmoth’s Translation revised by W. M. L. 
Hutchinson. 2 Vols. (6th Imp.) 

Puuyy: Naturat History. H. Rackham and W. H. 8S. Jones. 
10 Vols. Vols. 1.-V.andIX. H. Rackham. Vols. VI. and VII. 
W.H.S. Jones. (Vols. 1.-III. 3rd Imp., Vol. IV. 2nd Imp.) 

Propertivus. H. E. Butler. (6th Imp.) 

PrupEntivus. H.J. Thomson. 2 Vols. 

Quintimian. H. E. Butler. 4 Vols. (3rd Imp.) 

REMAINS OF Otp Latin. E. H. Warmington. 4 Vols. Vol. 1. 
(ENNIUS aND Caxrciuius.) Vol. II. (Livrus, NAEVIUvs, 
Pacuvius, Acctus.) Vol. III. (Lucrnius and Laws or XII 
TaBLEs.) Vol. 1V. (2nd Imp.) (Arcuatic InscriPTIons.) 

Satitust. J.C. Rolfe. (4th Imp. revised.) 

Scriptores Histor1ar AucustTar. D. Magie. 3 Vols. (Vol. 1. 
3rd Imp. revised, Vols. Il. and III. 2nd Imp.) 

SENECA: ApocoLocynTosis. Cf. PETRONIUS. 

SenEcA: Episrutar Moraes. R. M. Gummere. 3 Vols. 
(Vol. I. 4th Imp., Vols. II. and III. 2nd Imp.) 

Seneca: Morat Essays. J. W. Basore. 3 Vols. (Vol. IL. 
3rd Imp., Vols. I. and III. 2nd Imp. revised.) 

SenEcA: TraGcepies. F. J. Miller. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 4th Imp., 
Vol. Il. 3rd Imp. revised.) 

Sipontus: Porms anp Lerrers. W. B. Anderson. 2 Vols. 
(Vol. I. 2nd Imp.) 

Situs Iraticus. J. D. Duff. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 2nd Imp., 
Vol. Il. 3rd Imp.) 

Statius. J. H. Mozley. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp.) 

Suretonius. J.C. Rolfe. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 7th Imp., Vol. IL. 
6th Imp. revised.) 

Tacitus: Driatocus. Sir Wm. Peterson. AgGRIcoLA and 
GERMANIA. Maurice Hutton. (6th Imp.) 

Tacitus: Histories anp ANNALS. C. H. Moore and J. Jack- 
son. 4 Vols. (Vols. I. and Il. 4th Imp., Vols. III. and IV 
3rd Imp.) 

TERENCE. John Sargeaunt. 2 Vols. (7/h Imp.) 

TERTULLIAN : APpoLoGiA and De Sprcracuuis. T. R. Glover. 
Minvucius Ferrx. G. H. Rendall. (2nd Imp.) 

VaLERIus Furaccus. J. H. Mozley. (2nd Imp. revised.) 

Varro: De Lineva Latina. R. G. Kent. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp. 
revised. ) 

VELLEIUS PaTERCULUS and Res GresTaE Divi Aucusti. F. W. 
Shipley. (2nd Imp.) 

Vireit. H.R. Fairclough. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 19th Imp., Vol. II. 
14th Imp. revised.) 

Virruvius: Dr Arcuirectura. F. Granger. 2 Vols. (Vol. 1. 
3rd Imp., Vol. II. 2nd Imp.) 


Greek Authors 

Acuitues Tatius. 8S. Gaselee. (2nd Imp.) 

Illinois Greek Club. (2nd Imp.) 

AESCHINES. C. D. Adams. (2nd Imp.) 

ArscHyLus. H. Weir Smyth. 2 Vols. (6th Imp.) 

and F. H. Fobes. 


ApoLttoporus. Sir James G. Frazer. 2 Vols. (Vol. L. 3rd 
Imp., Vol. Il. 2nd Imp.) 

APOLLONIUS Ruopius. R.C. Seaton. (5th Imp.) 

THe Apostotic FatrHers. Kirsopp Lake. 2 Vols. (Vol. L. 
8th Imp., Vol. IL. 6th Imp.) 

AppIAN: Roman History. Horace White. 4 Vols. (Vol. lL. 
4th Imp., Vols. Il. and IV. 3rd Imp., Vol. III. 2nd Imp.) 


ARISTOPHANES. Benjamin Bickley Rogers. 3 Vols. Verse 
trans. (5th Imp.) 

ARISTOTLE: ART OF RHETORIC. J. H. Freese. (3rd Imp.) 

Vices AND VirtTuEs. H. Rackham. (3rd Imp.) 

ARISTOTLE : GENERATION OF AniImats. A. L. Peck. (2nd Imp. 

ARISTOTLE: Metapnuysics. H.Tredennick. 2Vols. (Vol. I. 4h 
Imp., U1. 3rd Imp.) 

ARISTOTLE: Merrreorotocica. H. D. P. Lee. 

ARISTOTLE: Minor Works. W. S. Hett. On Colours, On 
Things Heard, On Physiognomies, On Plants, On Marvellous 
Things Heard, Mechanical Problems, On Indivisible Lines, 
On Situations and Names of Winds, On Melissus, Xenophanes. 
and Gorgias. (2nd Imp.) 

ARISTOTLE: NICOMACHEAN Etuics. H. Rackham. (6th Imp 

ARISTOTLE: OEcoNoMIcA and Maena Moratia. G C. Arm. 
strong; (with Metaphysics, Vol. I1.). (3rd Imp.) 

ARISTOTLE: ON THE HEAvENS. W. K. C. Guthrie. (3rd Imp 

ARISTOTLE: On Sophistica! Refutations, On Coming to be and 
Passing Away, On the Cosmos. E. S. Forster and D. J. Furley. 

W.S. Hett. (2nd Imp. revised.) 

Analytics. H. P. Cooke and H. Tredennick. (3rd Imp.) 

ARISTOTLE: Parts oF Anrmats. A. L. Peck; MorIon anp 
PROGRESSION OF ANIMALS. E. 8. Forster. (3rd Imp. revised.) 

ARISTOTLE: PHysics. Rev. P. Wicksteed and F. M. Cornford 
2 Vols. (Vol. 1. 2nd Imp., Vol. Il. 3rd Imp.) 

ARISTOTLE: PorTics and Loneinus. W. Hamilton Fyfe; 
DEMETRIUS ON StyLeE. W. Rhys Roberts. (5th Imp. revised.) 

ARISTOTLE: Pouitrics. H. Rackham. (4th Imp. revised.) 

ARISTOTLE: ProsLeMs. W.S. Hett. 2Vols. (2nd Imp. revised. 


Vol. IT.). H. Rackham. 

ARRIAN: History oF ALEXANDER and INpica. Rev. E. [liffe 
Robson. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 3rd Imp., Vol. II. 2nd Imp.) 

ATHENAEUS: DeErpNosopHisTaE. C. B. Gulick. 7 Vols 
(Vols. I., IV.-VIL. 2nd Imp.) 

St. Basu: Letrrers. R. J. Deferrari. 4 Vols. (2nd Imp.) 

CaLLmmacuus, Hymns and Epigrams, and LycopHron. A. W 
Mair; Aratus. G. R. Mair. (2nd Imp.) 

CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA. Rev. G. W. Butterworth. (3rd Imp.) 

CotitutTHus. Cf. OPPIAN. 

DaPHNIs AND CHLOE. Thornley’s Translation revised by 
J. M. Edmonds: and ParrHenius. S. Gaselee. (4th Imp.) 

DEMOSTHENES [: OtynrTutacs, PHitippics and Minor Ora- 
tions. I|-XVII. anp XX _ J.H. Vince. (2nd Imp.) 

C. A. Vince and J. H. Vince. (3rd Imp. revised.) 

TrmocratTes and ARISTOGEITON, [. aNnp II. J. H. Vince. 
(2nd Imp.) 

A. T. Murray. (Vol. 1V. 2nd Imp.) 

and Letters. N. W. and N. J. DeWist. 

Dio Cassius: Roman History. E. Cary. 9 Vols. (Vols. L. 
and II. 3rd Imp., Vols. 111.-IX. 2nd Imp.) 

Dio Curysostom. J. W. Cohoon and H. Lamar Crosby. 5 Vols. 
Vols. I.-IV. 2nd Imp.) 

Dioporvus Sicutus. 12 Vols. Vols. 1.-VI. C. H. Oldfather. 
Vol. VII. C. L. Sherman. Vols. IX. and X. R. M. Geer. 
(Vols. I-IV. 2nd Imp.) 

DioGENEs Laertius. R. D. Hicks. 2 Vols. (Vol. L. 4th Imp.. 
Vol. Il. 3rd Imp.) 

Dionysius oF HaAticarNnassus: Roman ANTIQUITIES. Spel. 
man’s translation revised by E. Cary. 7 Vols. (Vols. I.-V 
2nd Imp.) 

Epictetus. W.A. Oldiather. 2 Vols. (Vol. 1. 3rd Imp., II. 2nd 

Euripipes. A. S. Way. 4 Vols. (Vols. I. and Il. 7th Imp., 
Ill. and IV. 6th Imp.) Verse trans. 

EvsEBIus: EccLesiasticAL History. Kirsopp Lake and 
J. E. L. Oulton. 2 Vols. (Vol. [. 3rd Imp., Vol. II. 4th Imp.) 

GALEN : ON THE Natural Facutties. A.J. Brock. (4th Imp.) 

THE GREEK ANTHOLOGY. W. R. Paton. 5 Vols. (Vols. I. and 
II. 5th Imp., Vol. L11. 4th Imp., Vols. 1V. and V. 3rd Imp.) 

Edmonds. 2 Vols. (Vol. Ll. 3rd Imp., Vol. IL. 2nd Imp.) 

THE GREEK Bucotic Ports (THEOcRITUS, Bion, Mosouvs). 
J. M. Edmonds. (7th Imp. revised.) 

GREEK MaTHEMATICAL Works. Ivor Thomas. 2 Vols. (2nd 



Heropotus. A. D. Godley. 4 Vols. (Vols. L.-III. 4th Imp., 
Vol. IV. 3rd Imp.) 

Hxestop AND THE Homeric Hymns. H. G. Evelyn White. 
(7th Imp. revised and enlarged.) 

Hippocrates and the FracMENTS oF Heracteitus. W. H.S&. 
Jones and E. T. Withington. 4 Vols. (3rd Imp.) 

Homer: Inrap. A. T. Murray. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 7th Imp., 
Vol. Il. 6th Imp.) 

Homer: Opyssey. A. T. Murray. 2 Vols. (8th Imp.) 

Isarus. E. W. Forster. (3rd Imp.) 

IsocratTes. George Norlinand LaRue Van Hook. 3Vols. (2nd 

Sr. Jonn DAMASCENE: BarLAaM AND IoasapH. Rev. G. R. 
Woodward and Harold Mattingly. (3rd Imp. revised.) 

JosEpuus. H. St. J. Thackeray and Ralph Marcus. 9 Vols. 
Vols. I.-VII. (Vol. V. 3rd Imp., Vols. I.-IV., VI. and VII. 
2nd Imp.) 

Jutian. Wilmer Cave Wright. 3 Vols. (Vols. 1. and Il. 3rd 
Imp., Vol. III. 2nd Imp.) 

Luctan. A. M. Harmon. 8 Vols. Vols. I.—-V. (Vols. I. and 
Il. 4th Imp., Vol. III. 3rd Imp., Vols. IV. and V. 2nd Imp.) 

LycorpHron. Cf. CALLIMACHUS. 

Lyra Grarca. J. M. Edmonds. 3 Vols. (Vol. L. 4th Imp.. 
Vol. Il. revised and enlarged, and III. 3rd Imp.) 

Lystas. W.R. M. Lamb. (2nd Imp.) 

Manetuo. W. G. Waddell: Protemy: Trrrasrstos. F. E. 
Robbins. (3rd Imp.) 

Marcus AurEtius. OC. R. Haines. (4th Imp. revised.) 

MENANDER. F.G. Allinson. (3rd Imp. revised.) 

Mrxor Artic Orators (ANTIPHON, ANDOCIDES, LycuRGUS, 
DemMaADES, DivarcHus, HyPEREIDES). K. J. Maidment and 
J. O. Burrt. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 2nd Imp.) 

Nonnos: Dionystaca. W.H. D. Rouse. 3 Vols. (2nd Imp.) 

Oppr1an, ComtuTHus, TRyPHIODORUS. A. W. Mair. (2nd Imp.) 

Papyri. Non-Lrrerary Sextectrions. A. 8. Hunt and C. C. 
Edgar. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 2nd Imp.) Lirerary SELECTIONS. 
Vol. I. (Poetry). D. L. Page. (3rd Imp.) 


Vols. and Companion Vol. arranged by R. E. Wycherley. 
(Vols. I. and III. 3rd Imp., Vols. II., IV. and V. 2nd Imp.) 

Punto. 10 Vols. Vols. I1.-V.; F. H. Colson and Rev. G. H. 
Whitaker. Vols. VI.-IX.; F. H. Colson. (Vols. I.-III. 
V.-IX. 2nd Imp., Vols. I. and IV., 3rd Imp.) 

PuHiIto: two supplementary Vols. (Translation only.) Ralph 

Puimostratus: THE Lire or APPOLLONIUS oF TyaNna. F. C. 
Conybeare. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 4th Imp., Vol. Il. 3rd Imp.) 

A. Fairbanks. 

Wilmer Cave Wright. (2nd Imp.) 

Pinpar. Sir J. E. Sandys. (7th Imp. revised.) 

THEAGES, Minos and Eptnomis. W. R. M. Lamb. (2nd 

Hrepras. H.N. Fowler. (4th Imp.) 

Prato: EutrnypHro, APpoLoGy, Criro, PHAEDO, PHAEDRUS. 
H. N. Fowler. (11th Imp.) 

PLtato: Lacues, Proracoras, MENo, EurHypremus. W. R. M. 
Lamb. (3rd Imp. revised.) 

Puato: Laws. Rev. R.G. Bury. 2 Vols. (3rd Imp.) 

Puiato: Lysis, Sympostum, Goraras. W. R. M. Lamb. (5th 
Imp. revised.) 

Piato: Repusiic. Paul Shorey. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 5th Imp., 
Vol. Il. 4th Imp.) 

Puiato: STaTESMAN, Puitesus. H.N. Fowler; Ion. W.R. M. 
Lamb. (4th Imp.) 

Puato: THEAETETUS and Sopuist. H. N. Fowler. (4th Imp.) 

Pxtato: Trmarus, Critias, CLITOPHO, MENEXENUS, EPISTULAE. 
Rev. R. G. Bury. (37rd Imp.) 

PiurarcH: Moraria. 14 Vols. Vols. 1.-V. F. C. Babbitt; 
Vol. VI. W.C. Helmbold; Vol. X. H. N. Fowler. (Vols. 
I-VI. and X. 2nd Imp.) 

PLtutTarcH: THE PARALLEL Lives. B. Perrin. 11 Vols. 
(Vols. L., I1., VI., VII., and XI. 3rd Imp. Vols. III.-V. and 
VIII.-X. 2nd Imp.) 

Potysius. W.R. Paton. 6 Vols. (2nd Imp.) 

Procopius: History or THE Wars. H. B. Dewing. 7 Vols. 
(Vol. I. 3rd Imp., Vols. II.-VII. 2nd Imp.) 


Quintus SmyrnaEus. A. 8. Way. Verse trans. (3rd Imp.) 

Sextus Emprricus. Rev. R. G. Bury. 4 Vols. (Vol. I. 3rd 
Imp., Vols. II. and III. 2nd Imp.) 

SopHoctes. F. Storr. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 10th Imp. Vol. II. 6th 
Imp.) Verse trans. 

Straso: GEoGRAPHY. Horace L. Jones. 8 Vols. (Vols. L., V., 
and VIII. 3rd Imp., Vols. II., I11., [V., VI., and VII. 2nd Imp.) 

ete. A. D. Knox. (3rd Imp.) 

THEOPHRASTUS: ENQutRY INTO Ptuants. Sir Arthur Hort, 
Bart. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp.) 

TuucypipEs. C. F. Smith. 4 Vols. (Vol. I. 5th Imp., Vols. 
Ii., IT1., and IV. 3rd Imp. revised.) 

TrypHioporus. Cf. OPPrAN. 

XENOPHON: CyYyROPAEDIA. Walter Miller. 2 Vols. (Vol. L. 4th 
Imp., Vol. II. 3rd Imp.) 

C. L. Brownson and O. J. Todd. 3 Vols. (Vols. I. and III. 
3rd Imp., Vol. Il. 4th Imp.) 

XENOPHON : MEMORABILIA and Orconomicus. E. C. Marchant. 
(3rd Imp.) 

XENOPHON: Sorrpra Minora. E. C. Marchant. (3rd Imp.) 



Greek Authors 

ARISTOTLE: History or ANIMALS. A. L. Peck. 

Pitorinus: A. H. Armstrong. 

Latin Authors 


Cicero: Pro Ssestio, In Vatrnium. J. H. Freese and R. Gardner. 

CicERO: Pro Cartio, DE PrRovinctis CONSULARIBUS, PRO 
Batspo. J.H. Freese and R. Gardner. 

PHaEpRvus. Ben E. Perry. 



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